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Abstract 
This research uses discourse analysis to examine Japan's UN security policy 
after the Cold War period using three cases: the Gulf Crisis, the Cambodian peace 
process and the promotion of the human security policy. The key argument is that there 
is a need for a new IR theory-based approach that could explain foreign or security 
policy decision-making process and could also provide the analysis at both the domestic 
and the international level simultaneously. This research therefore adopts Wendt's 
Constructivism, along with the use of 'identity' as the key analytical platform, from 
which the 'recursive Constructivist model' is developed. Unlike popular literature, this 
research suggests that 'identity transformation' and the level of conformity between the 
identities projected internationally (international -role identities) and those embraced 
domestically (domestic-type identities) are the key factors determining Japan's foreign 
and security policy preferences. On the interpretation of Japan's post-Cold War security 
development, this research argues that it could be understood via the UN framework, 
and not only from the traditional perspective of the Japan-US alliance. Apart from the 
fact that it could be understood via the process of 'identity transformation', this research 
provides strong evidence and suggestions that Japan's assertive foreign and security 
pursuits in the post-Cold War era are the result of the nation's changing sets of ideas and 
beliefs on the link between 'national' and 'international' security. 
The original contributions of this research are two-fold. The theoretical 
contribution is a modification of Wendt's original framework of identity transformation 
into the so-called 'recursive process of identity transformation. ' The application of 
'identity' and the 'recursive Constructivist model' to Japan's UN security policy in this 
research is significant because it is the first example among research in the field of 
Japanese studies to use a different analytical framework and tool in examining Japan's 
foreign and security policy. The model's ability to capture the intertwined process of 
social interactions at both the domestic and the international level is also important as it 
contributes to further IR theoretical development and a better understanding on Japan's 
foreign policy decision-making process. Also, the value-added benefit of the 
examination of human security policy is another vital substantive contribution, as this is 
the first exploration of this issue within the context of Japan's UN security policy. 
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Glossary 
Comprehensive Security Promoter: contends that the maintenance of international 
peace and security must be managed through such an 'all-round' approach as 'human 
security, ' which addresses both the 'protecting' and the 'empowering' function of 
promoting international peace. The former aspect stresses the importance of emphasising 
the negative effects on people's survival and dignity during conflicts. The latter focuses 
on long-term or 'continuous and interconnected' investment and assistance to help 
guarantee people's basic needs, which will in turn prevent conflicts from happening in 
the first place. 
Development Peace Promoter: addresses the seamless connection between peace 
operations and development and between short-term humanitarian assistance and long- 
term human development. Under the framework of human security and peace operations, 
development peace promoters prioritise the empowering function, which involves short- 
term humanitarian assistance and long-term development programmes. It takes a 
preventive approach rather than a protecting approach to the maintenance of Peace and 
security. 
Domestic-Type Identity: a set of properties or a system of ideas and beliefs that apply 
to persons sharing the same social meanings, attitudes, values, skills, knowledge, 
experiences, opinions and behavioural traits and so on. This social identity is constituted 
at the domestic level and shared among domestic constituents. 
Humanitarian Peace Intervener: emphasises the need or the responsibility to protect 
people facing serious harm in the event of intra- or inter state wars, insurgency or state 
xvi 
failure. It is an identity that results from the understanding that present threats 
confronting the international community are primarily internal and such violence has a 
direct impact on people rather than on states. Assuming the identity of peace enforcer or 
peace promoter alone does not help protect people from becoming victims of violence 
and so on. Therefore, the humanitarian peace intervener reserves the right to intervene 
whenever people's well-being is at stake and places the 'protecting function' at the core 
of the UN peace operations. 
International-Role Identity: a role that cannot be enacted by the state itself but is acted 
out according to the shared expectation of others prior to or during interactions at the 
system level. This social identity is projected at the international level, corresponding to 
others' demands. Continuous projection of the 'international-role' identity will lead to 
its transformation into a 'collective' identity. 
Multilateral Pacificist: holds the idea that international peace and security could be 
maintained only through 'multilateral' efforts, especially through the UN mechanism, 
rather than a single country's political or military manoeuvres. The idea also requires the 
strengthening of multilateral mechanisms (such as the UN) through a greater degree of 
physical, financial, ideational and political contributions. 
Peace Enforcer: stresses the importance of the use of force or the capability to project 
one in every stage of UN peace operations, especially in peacemaking and peacekeeping 
operations. It is an idea that addresses the lack of enforcing units to respond to any form 
of aggression during the Cold War period. The role of a peacemaker/en forcer is, 
therefore, to respond to both imminent and actual aggression as well as to enforce the 
conflicting, parties to comply with ceasefire agreements. 
xvii 
Peace Promoter: undertakes more complex and multi -dimensional UN peace operations. 
The role of peace promoter moved one step further from that of the peace enforcer 
during the Gulf Crisis by strengthening and stressing the 'multi-dimensional' aspects of 
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. It rejects the idea that UN peace 
operations should be conducted in sequential fashion. Rather, to address the multi- 
faceted and complex problems that arise during and after any conflict, rounded and well- 
synchronised peace operations are needed. 
Political Arbitrator: aims at addressing post-Cold War multi-faceted intra- and inter- 
state conflicts, which mostly require an external arbitrator to help settle differences 
among conflicting parties. The political arbitrator believes that the enhancement of 
international mechanisms to help disentangle conflicts and provide full-scale national 
rehabilitation or revive the collapsed economic and social system is indispensable for 
effective UN peace operations. 
Political Facilitator: is the identity based on the idea that Japan had to do something 
4politically' to help sustain long-term international peace and security. Only adhering to 
the 'unilateral pacifist' identity was apparently insufficient for a member of the 
international community. To help facilitate the progress of the peace process and the UN 
peace operations suggests a greater degree of confidence on Japan's part in taking up 
political functions that fulfil the expectations of both the intemational community and 
the domestic constituents. 
Peace Supporter: undertakes the core functions in every step of UN peace operations, 
frorn peacemaking and peacekeeping to the peacebuilding stage, in almost every area, 
ranging frorn personnel to financial, political and ideational inputs. However, while the y 
xviii 
4peace promoter' may choose to launch full-scale peace operations including the use of 
force, the 'peace supporter' is still cautious about the use of military exercises. That is to 
say, some restrictions are still in place for peace supporters and prevent them from 
taking part in full-fledged UN activities. 
Traditional Peacebuilder/Developer: holds the idea that the maintenance of 
international peace and security should be based on 'joint prosperity' through the 
promotion and the strengthening of the sustainable developing assistance regime and 
activities in less-developed countries. Traditional peacebuilders/developers also believe 
that the lack of prosperity and the inefficiency of the post-conflict peacebuilding 
operations via sustainable assistance programmes and long-term projects are key causes 
of instability in international peace and security. 
Unilateral Pacifist: emphasises love for freedom and devotion to peace by relinquishing 
physical military capability and adhering to the 'no-war' principle. For Japan, it suggests 
that that the country's survival and sustainable international peace could be achieved 
only if Japan limits its military capability to invade others or involve itself in any 
military arrangements, even under the auspices of the UN. It basically addresses Japan's 
one-sided military self-restraint. 
US Follower: this is the identity that Japan had assumed through the post-war period. It 
suggests behaviours that pursue foreign policies following demands and pressure from 
the US. The lack of mutual ideational inputs from Japan's part in the bilateral relations 
between the two countries covered both political and economic aspects of Japan's 
international relations. It also shows Japan's political choice to position itself as a 
6 secondary power' in relation to the US. 
xix 
US Partner: this is the identity expected by the US from others during system 
interactions in the Post-Cold War period in the maintenance of peace and security. It 
indicates the ideational transformation of the US in the post-Cold War period, 
acknowledging that the rationale of unilateral attempts to secure peace and security has 
become invalid and that cooperation from other countries under the label of 'US-led 
multilateral effort' is indispensable in handling international conflicts. 
US Supporter: this is another set of identities expected by the US from others to 
support the US international political agenda. This was obvious during the Cambodian 
peace process, when the US could exert its ideas and political leverage on the guidelines 
of the peace agreement only in the UNSC. On Japan's part, its transformation from the 
status of US-follower to US-supporter also suggests that the country did not have to be 
'demanded' to make political or ideational contributions, but to help fill the political 
void among the conflicting parties where the US and others major powers could not. 
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Chapter I Introduction and Methodology 
1.1 Research Questions and Purposes 
Similar to the majority of research on Japan's foreign policy making and foreign 
relations, this research is also triggered by the complex nature of Japan's decision- 
making process and policy choices, which have sometimes been pursued distinctively 
from the established norms of the 'major powers' and the popular neo-realist 
explanations. Since the post-war period, most scholars have agreed on Japan's 'passive 
and reactive nature' in pursuing foreign and security policy simply to fulfil its 
obligations under the Japan-US alliance. Given the Cold War structure, Japan's 
projection as a close US ally both inside and outside the UN was not at odds with the 
predictions of traditional neo-realism. 
One good example is Japan's increasing contributions in its physical, financial 
and ideational resources to the organisation since the early 1990s. Apparently, Japan's 
assertive policy in the UN after the Gulf Crisis may follow the logic of burden-sharing 
and confirm the neo-realist explanation that Japan would step up to take greater 
responsibility as a normal superpower. However, despite these contributions to the 
UNPKOs and other UN-related development activities, the country's refusal to commit 
to full-scale military activities, its reluctance to form a security strategy independent of 
the US and its unique incorporation of the new UN-Centrism and security insights via 
the promotion of human security policy may indicate a more substantial policy 
complication than that predicted by the mainstream approaches. From this outset, this 
research thus concerns itself with three significant research questions and objectives. 
The first question deals with the substantive issue of Japan's security policy and 
its relationship with the UN. In other words, it raises the question of ii, hether the 
understandil7g 0 Japan's security ori . entation could be assessed under the UN .f- 
framework. To many scholars and policy makers, the two policies are often situated in 
different locales of academic interests and political concerns. Although both security 
policy and UN-Centred Diplomacy have been mentioned as the key cornerstones of 
Japan's post-war policy agenda, the emphasis has been placed on the former, while the 
latter was treated as a mere rhetoric without much policy implication or political 
significance. Even in the post-Cold War period, when Japan started to be more assertive 
in political and security affairs within the framework of the UN, as evident in its 
participation in the UNPKOs and its promotion of human security policy, most are still 
convinced that such assertiveness in the UN policy or the revival of UN-Centrism was 
nothing but temporary hype following its interest in the LJNSC permanent membership 
bid. The key question regarding Japan's security development within the UN context is 
therefore whether this policy assertiveness will be short-lived or whether it indicates that 
the security policy, previously attached only to Japan-US bilateral relations, could be 
developed in tandem with the UN policy. Since the latter is the case, the sources of 
Japan's policy preference - to pursue security policy based on UN-Centrism or to pursue 
the UN policy that addresses the security facet at its core - is the central focus of this 
research, as opposed to Japan's past emphasis on social, economic and development 
areas. 
Second, it raises the question of whether the existing popular theoretical 
firameworks in IR could render adequate insight and understanding of Japan's foreign 
policY preferences, which in this case is Japan's security policy in the UN. It might be 
correct to assert that the existing mainstream IR theories (Realism or Liberalism and its 
neo-versions) and foreign policy analysis have contributed extensively to the 
contemporary understanding of Japan's security and UN policy. However, there are also 
some problems that are not and perhaps cannot be well assessed by these existing 
2 
analytical tools. For example, the Gulf Crisis is the classic case for which most scholars 
exercise their theoretical understandings to explain why it was considered a diplomatic 
failure for Japan during the course of international security cooperation and a situation 
that invited harsh criticism of the country. The existing mainstream theories and foreign 
policy analyses would normally point either to Japan's usual response to external 
pressure or to the domestic and organisational constraints within the country as the key 
factors responsible for Japan's attempts, or the lack thereof, to contribute to the 
maintenance of international peace and security. Although this research does take 
account of the advantages of the explanatory power of the existing IR theories and 
foreign policy analytical models in explaining Japan's foreign relations and foreign 
policy, as thoroughly elaborated in Chapter 2, its purpose is to explore a different way of 
looking at Japan's foreign policy using Wendt's Constructivist framework. 
Third, by employing Wendt's Constructivism, another related theoretical 
question is whether the original version of his Constructivism is appropriate to examine 
foreign policy preferences and the decision-making process. Considered one of the 
mainstream IR theories, the advantage of Constructivism over the contending schools is 
the incorporation of 'non-material' factors such as ideas, beliefs or culture and the social 
interactions among actors or agents into the analytical process without losing touch with 
the positivist ground. However, adopting any mainstream IR theory to examine foreign 
policy outcomes and the political structure of domestic politics might be problematic, as 
these theories are intended to explain the changing normative structure of the 
international system. Although this research aims to apply the constructivist approach to 
explain the source of preferences regarding Japan's security policy within the UN, it is 
believed that the adaptation of Wendt's Constructivist model, x\, hich will be elaborated 
in section 2.4, is inevitable. 
3 
1.2 Case Studies and Theoretical Work 
To address the above three primary research objectives and questions, the 
following section will discuss the case studies chosen to capture the development of 
Japan's UN security policy and how they could be used to test the explanatory power of 
Wendt's Constructivism. This research has its roots in an attempt to locate its 
epistemological position and understand social phenomena via the examination and 
interpretation of the world through the eyes and opinions of key actors or participants. 
Its ontological position also subscribes to the view that social properties or phenomena 
are, to a certain degree, constructed through the interactions of individuals, actors or 
even states. 
Contrary to the positivist ontological position, which explicates that social 
properties or phenomena are clearly separated, the tradition of involving people's 
interactions in the 'making of social phenomena' is the primary target of most 
Constructivist research. This research is similarly designed to treat and view each case 
as a social process, which unfolds its pattern over time: hence the selected cases, which 
cover a decade of policy transformation. Accordingly, the case studies on the Gulf Crisis, 
the Cambodian peace process and the promotion of human security policy were chosen 
to cover a period of more than a decade to represent the overall process of 'identity 
transformation', which is one of the key analytical tools of Wendt's Constructivism. The 
three cases will be examined in turn not only to reveal the overall process of the 
transformation of ideas and beliefs of the Japanese society and domestic actors regarding 
international security and UN peace operations, but also to capture the particular 
6political identities' dominating Japanese society during each period. The examination of 
these dominating political identities and their transformations from the Gulf crisis until 
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the promotion of human security policy will benefit the understanding of Japan's change 
from passive to active security postures within the UN. 
Briefly, the Gulf Crisis is considered as a starting point, as it hypothetically 
called the attention of the Japanese decision-makers and people to the matter of 
international security. The system of ideas and beliefs that informed political identities 
during the period, which is believed to be the reason for the country's reluctance and 
passive response to the multilateral peace attempts, will be compared with the 
subsequent UNPKO in Cambodia. The Cambodian peace process is important, as it was 
the first operation where Japan made significant efforts, helping the four Khmer factions 
to reach a peace agreement. The event also overlapped with the later stage of the Gulf 
Crisis and occurred prior to the promotion of human security policy. Therefore, the case 
is treated in this research as the transition period linking the overall process of Japan's 
identity transformation. The final case, the promotion of the human security approach, is 
chosen for its value-added benefit to the study of Japan's UN security policy, as it has 
never been systematically explored within the context of Japan's UN security policy. 
This case is also treated as the end-result of the process of identity transformation, as it 
presents a sharp contrast to the event in the Gulf Crisis, with the Japanese government 
and the public taking an assertive stance to promote international peace and security via 
this policy. 
To enable these cases to be tackled in a systematic way, Wendt's Constructivism 
is the key theoretical framework adopted in this research. Numbers of researchers often 
use postmodernism, feminism or critical theory to expand the issues of international 
relations from 'high' to 'low' politics and to challenge the existing research methods of 
mainstream Realism and Liberalism. This research, however, does not seek to confront 
the mainstream IR theorists conducting research on 'high' politics or issues regarding 
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foreign policy by simply adopting the opposite epistemological supposition. This 
research shares the conviction with other theorists following Wendt's Constructivist 
approach that a 'moderate' or 'thin' version of the social construction framework is 
needed. This research believes that a framework incorporating ideational and non- 
material factors into the analysis of such 'high' political issues would provide IR 
scholars with additional techniques and insights into foreign policy patterns and choices, 
which are rarely found in the existing literature on Japan's security or UN policy. 
Wendt's Constructivism, in essence, focuses on 'non-material' factors, 
especially the transformation of systems of ideas and beliefs, which, in effect, 
contributes directly to the transformation of system agents' identities and the 
transformation of the system structure simultaneously. Unlike the traditional post- 
modernist constructivism, Wendt's constructivism focuses on the observations of ideas 
and discourse through the study of norms and identities and how these norms or 
identities are constructed and reconstructed by collective ideas and social discourse. 
With respect to the analytical device or tool that will be adopted in this research, among 
several studies conducted by Wendt's constructivists, there are three main themes using 
culture, identity and norms as the analytical focus to understand IR issues. Admittedly, 
norms are deliberately chosen to represent identity and culture, as it is agreed among IR 
scholars that the latter two are difficult concepts to define and the examination of the 
constituent parts of identity and culture through norms is relatively more practical. It is 
therefore a common experience to see that norms and identities are sometimes used 
interchangeably within the same texts - signifying the same thing - in many 
constructivist studies. 
See Berger (1996) and Dobson (2003), for example of Constructivist work on Japan's foreign policy. 
I 
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As opposed to Neo-realism's emphasis on structural determinants, the original 
formulation of Wendt's Constructivism is initially meant to explain the transformation 
of the international system, which is the culmination of the social interactions of actors. 
However, this research will firstly introduce the adapted 'recursive' version of Wendt's 
Constructivism to suit the analytical purpose of assessing foreign policy outcomes and 
preferences, as discussed in section 2.4.3. Another significant difference from other 
constructivist research that focuses on norms or culture is that, in this research, the 
'transformation of identity' will be the focus from which policy changes and preferences 
are indicated. 
Based on Wendt's categorisation of identities, as shown in Figure 2.1, this 
research focuses on observing, in each case, the degree of conformity between the 
'international-role' identities and the 'domestic-type' identities. While the former refers 
to identities that are adopted among the international community at a certain period and 
are expected to be projected internationally by Japan, the latter points to the transformed 
identities happening at Japan's domestic level. The comparison of the degree of 
conformity between the 'international -role' and 'domestic-type' identities in each case 
will not only reveal the overall process of identity transformation from the Gulf Crisis to 
the promotion of human security policy, but will also explain the sources of policy 
activism and passivism during each particular period. By setting up the above theoretical 
ground, the core arguments will be outlined in the following section. 
1.3 Key Arguments 
This research firstly argues that the existing mainstream IR theories and foreign 
policy analytical approaches are not sufficiently wýell developed to explain the 
complexity of Japan's foreign and security policy decision-making process. This 
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research therefore strongly suggests that a middle ground framework, which 
simultaneously captures Japan's interactions with the system structure and the dynamics 
of the domestic decision-making process and emphasises the importance of 'non- 
material' or 'cultural' factors, such as 'identity', should be further developed. As 
outlined above, this research initially raises the question at the theoretical level as to 
whether the existing mainstream IR theories and foreign policy analytical models are 
able to make sense of Japan's complicated process of decision-making and its complex 
nature of foreign and security policy orientation. This research certainly does not deny 
the strengths of the existing IR theories and foreign policy analytical approaches in 
explaining Japan's interactions with the international system and its complex internal 
political structure. However, the overly clear-cut divide between the emphasis on the 
separate level of analysis and the emphasis on 'material factors' associated with the 
mainstream IR theories and foreign policy analytical approaches has led to an 
incomplete understanding of Japan's choices of active or passive policy pursuits. 
Among the contending theories and approaches, this research adopts Wendt's 
Constructivism as the main theoretical framework because it questions the excessive 
emphasis on 'structure' and 'material factors' as the only key determinants that generate 
policy outcomes. Wendt's Constructivism incorporates 'non-material' or 'cultural' 
factors into the mainstream positivist research schemes by emphasising how 'ideas about 
self and others' through the studies of the transformation of norms, identities and 
cultures shape system interactions and (re)create the system structure. It is believed in 
this research that an examination of how these 'non-material' factors determine foreign 
and security policy outcomes will provide more reasonable explanations for Japan's 
choices of active or passive foreign and security policies. However, this research is still 
con\-inced that Wendt's Constructivist framework is not developed to explain the source 
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of foreign policy preferences or adequately clarify the decision-making process. Its 
emphasis only on the transformation of 'international-role' and 'collective' identities 
offers only an insight into how social interactions among states affect the reconstruction 
of the system structure. In this sense, Wendt's Constructivism still focuses only on one 
level of analysis: that is, the system level. 
In order to apply IR theory to the analysis of foreign or security policy choices, it 
is therefore essential that the adapted version of Wendt's Constructivism must be 
introduced. This research suggests that it is indispensable to incorporate the 'domestic- 
type' identity, which is treated as given in the original form of Wendt's Constructivism, 
into the analytical process in addition to the existing focus on the 'international-role' 
identity. As will be further demonstrated in Chapter 4 on the Gulf Crisis case, the 
'international-role' identity projected at the international level does not always conform 
to the 'domestic-type' identity embraced within the domestic level. The lack of 
conformity between the two identities is therefore responsible for Japan's reluctance in 
projecting active foreign or security policy. In order to capture the process of these 
identity transformations, this research substitutes Wendt's original 'linear' process in 
assessing 'international -role' identity at the system level with the 'recursive' version of 
identity transformation. This process will be further elaborated in section 2.4.3 and 
shown in Diagram 2.2. 
In short, the 'recursive model' is designed to allow the dual processes of social 
construction of 'international-role' and 'domestic-type' identities being transformed at 
the international level and domestic level to be captured simultaneously. The 
significance of examining the recursive process of identity transformation at both levels 
is to discover ho\N,, far the conformity between the two identities would result in Japan's 
choice of policy assertiveness or passiveness. As argued in this research, the lower the 
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degree of conformity between the 'intemational-role' and 'domestic-type' identity. the 
more likely it is that policy passivism will be pursued, as evident in the Gulf Crisis. In 
contrast, the higher degree of conformity between the two identities in the Cambodian 
peace process and the promotion of human security policy suggests a greater chance of 
policy activism and success. 
This research does not only attempt to develop a middle ground analytical model 
that incorporates observations at both system and domestic levels and includes the non- 
material factors in the traditional positivist assessment. Another important argument is 
also at the substantive level. This research challenges the standard interpretation of 
Japan's security policy under the Japan-US bilateral relations by suggesting that Japan's 
security policy is also developed within the context of the UN framework. This research 
argues differently that the clear dichotomy between national and international security 
throughout the post-war period was responsible for Japan's lack of policy coherence in 
pursuing security policy choices that serve both national and international interests. 
Because national security had always been given more weight through Japan-US 
security treaties and bilateral relations, international security had been therefore either 
rhetorically located elsewhere, for example, within the UN framework, or simply 
forgotten by the post-war decision-makers. It is also pointed out in this research that the 
process of identity transformation throughout the past decade has narrowed the gap 
between Japan's emphasis on securing national security under Japan-US security 
agreements and its promotion of both national and international security via the UN. 
Following the Gulf Crisis in the early 1990s, it is demonstrated in this research that the 
transformation of ideas and beliefs on international security and the essence of peace 
operations, which has informed Japan's 'domestic-type' identities and affected the 
10 
transformation of its 'i nternational -role' identities throughout these past years, has 
contributed to a more balanced security policy under the UN framework. 
In addition, it is also highlighted in this research that the development of security 
understanding under the UN framework has also contributed to the revival of Japan's 
new UN-Centrism, which integrates the security dimension into its core. Through the 
examination of the three cases studies, this research found that Japan's perpetual identity 
transformation during those periods has contributed significantly to its increasing 
emphasis on physical security as much as humanitarian contributions. Among the three 
cases, the Gulf Crisis and the Cambodian peace process, both set in the identity 
transitional period, reveal a gradual change of Japan's understanding of the linkage 
between national and international security as well as the essence of the new UN- 
Centrism. Human security, which is treated as the end-result of Japan's identity 
transformation, is assertively promoted as a result of the transformed and constructed 
understanding among the Japanese of the inextricable link between national and 
international peace and security and also between physical security and humanitarian 
contributions. In the following section on the methodology that will be used to examine 
the process of identity transformation and to capture the system of ideas and beliefs that 
inform Japan's political identities at both the international and the domestic level will be 
discussed. 
1.4 Method of Interpretation and Analysis: Discourse Analysis 
To impart Japan's foreign policy patterns while exploring the establishment of 
the key actors' system of ideas and beliefs, constructed through the process of social 
interactions both at the system and the domestic level, this research requires a 
methodology that allows the qualitative examination of non-material factors as well as 
an analytical device that performs as a tool from which the system of ideas and beliefs 
could be extracted. Among several methodologies adopted in qualitative research, this 
dissertation has opted for the 'discourse analysis' approach, agreed among scholars to 
provide flexibility as a device to observe and impart the meanings of actions through 
forms of communication. Because of its high degree of flexibility, the label 'discourse 
analysis', therefore, has been applied in several social science disciplines. As Jonathan 
Potter rightly states, sometimes discourse analysis is a convenient name for a practice of 
analysing discourse, which can involve various approaches such as speech act theory, 
narrative analysis, conversation analysis or qualitative content analysis. At other times, it 
is also treated as a term for language in use or theorised as a linguistic object that can be 
counted and described. 2 Accordingly, it is important to clearly define the scope of the 
discourse analysis being employed in this research. 
The discourse analysis adopted in this research incorporates the insight from the 
work of Michel Foucault, whose definition of discourse analysis 'denotes how a 
particular set of linguistic categories relating to an object and the ways of depicting it 
frame the way we comprehend that object' and 'emphasises how a group of statements 
provide a way to represent knowledge about a particular topic or moment. ' 3 General 
proposition aside, discourse analysis based on Foucault's construction of new objects 
(social phenomena or reality) and subjects (those who utter the discourse) also suggests 
a 'twin or intertwined processes' of producing both new objects and subjects through the 
41h tend examination of sets of discourse. Unlike other strands of discourse analysis, whic 
to focus more on the action-oriented nature of language or the function of language as 
people use it to do things, Foucauldian discourse analysis is interested in how the social 
2 Potter and NVetherell (1994: 47) 
Brvnlan (2004: 370) 
4 Potter (1996: 86-87) 
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world (both the objects or social phenomena and the subjects or those using the language) 
is constructed through discourse. 5 In this sense, a discourse is not merely a language or 
only a form of communication, but a device to form a subject identity and to impart and 
explore the meanings that constitute social phenomena and objects. By observing 
working sets of discourse throughout a certain time, it is believed that practices or 
objects of social phenomena and individual human subjects in general, or in this case, 
foreign policy processes and outcomes and the practice of foreign policy actors, can be 
significantly understood. Although there are several variations of discourse analysis 
depending on the research discipline, making it extremely difficult to bring about a 
generalisation of research methodology, they basically share some essential propositions 
or theoretical principles that categorically distinguish discourse analysis from other 
qualitative research. As surnmarised in Table 1.1, this research adopts the general 
assumptions and the analytical steps provided as follows: 
Firstly, the majority of approaches in discourse analysis are concerned with 
ýactions. ' In other words, discourse is simply 'action-oriented' and put together as part 
of a broader context and practices. 6 Accordingly, one could theoretically observe and 
expect to extract concrete acts out of sets of discrete utterances. Because discourse 
equals action, different kinds of discourse, which includes almost all kinds of 
communications - talk or 
teXt7_ thus produce different kinds of actions and practices. 
Through the same logic, attention to various sets of different discourses certainly 
establishes series of change in different actions and practices. Although the original 
FOLIcauldian discourse analysis treats not only talk and text but also almost anything as 
5, A more modern way of applying discourse analysis on Constructivist work could also be seen in 
Milliken (1999) on the study of discourse and international relations. 
6 Potter (2004: 609), Wood and Kroger (2000: 4) 
7, Anything that can be read and interpreted - written or spoken forms of language use - is treated as 
discourse. 
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discourse, for the purpose of research feasibility and systematic analysis, this research 
will focus only on talk and text as the key analytical materials. 
Table I. I: Summary of Research Methodology 
Philosophical Theoretical Analytical Methods Layers of Analysis 
Supposition Assumption (Potter) (Potter and 
(Foucault) (Foucault, Potter) Fairclough) 
A 'twin or intertwined 1. Discourse is 'action- Attention to various 
processes' of oriented'. sets of discourse to 
constructing both new compare and establish 1. Identity (political 
objects (foreign policy pattems of foreign identities - how they 
outcome) and subjects policy transformation are set up in discourse) 
(foreign policy actors) 2. Discourse is Attention to details and 
through the 'situated' and rhetorical organisation 2. Relational (social 
examination of sets of embedded in to capture the system relationship between 
discourse sequences of of ideas and beliefs in discourse participants) 
interaction at macro foreign policy 
level. 3. Ideational (the 
3. Discourse is Attention to the construction of 
constructed' and transformation of systems of knowledge 
constructing' social constructed discourse and beliefs) 
identity, relationship and how it constructs 
and identity. political identity and 
establishes foreign 
policy patterns 
Source: Author's Table 
The second theoretical supposition of discourse analysis contends that discourse 
is 'embedded in sequences of interaction', and as expressed by Potter, 'actions do not 
hang in space' but respond to other actions, which in turn set the environment for new 
and subsequent actions. Discourse is, therefore, 'situated' in terms of rhetoric, where 
analysis is a process that considers how talk and texts are embedded in sequences of 
interaction and specific institutional settings. 8 Unlike other strands, Foucauldian 
discourse analysis seeks to identify the set of interactive environments at the macro-level 
and how the discourse serves to 'position' subjects. 9 Therefore, to understand discourse 
or actions in the context of any given situation, the method of reading into details and 
looking for rhetorical organisation forms the prominent step of research analysis. While 
8 Potter (2004: 6 10) 
Langdridge (2004: '138) 
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in linguistics or in psychological disciplines, the emphasis on the former might rest upon 
the details of pauses, grammatical cohesion and so on, the primary concern in this 
research simply examines the discourse beyond the sentence, that is, within the context 
of given situations. This research pays more attention to rhetorical organisation, 
specifically how various versions of rhetoric could capture the system of ideas and 
beliefs in foreign policy among policy makers. 
Finally, the third theoretical assumption shared among discourse analysts is that 
discourse is 'constructed' out of rhetorical devices, while it 'constructs' and stabilises 
versions of social realities. 10 To incorporate this assumption into Foucault's 
philosophical supposition, the function of discourse used in this research therefore is not 
only for text interpretation but also for revealing the constructed social phenomena 
behind it and identifying the identity of the subjects (policy makers) involved in the 
discourse. Fairclough clearly supports the function of discourse in being 'constructed' 
and in 'constructing' the social identity of the objects, the social relationship between 
the subjects and the overall system of ideas and knowledge. " In other words, it literally 
maps out the social world presented by the sets of discourse. These structures are 
analysed simultaneously in this research by taking Japan's formation and transformation 
of systems of ideas and beliefs as the object of social analysis and the main foreign 
policy transformation of political identity among policy makers as the subject of social 
analysis. In order to be certain about the way in which discourse is being constructed 
and constructing social realities, these three-dimensional analyses will be cross-checked 
through different case studies to ensure its validity in different contexts via the following 
groups of data. 
'0 Potter (2004: 6 10) 
'' Fairclough (1992: 64) 
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1.5 Data Collection 
The primary source of data used in this research is written materials, which 
include public records from government agencies, Japan's political parties, the UN and 
other international organisations. Primary documents, such as academic Papers by 
government officials or primary accounts of events by officials or the people involved, 
are analysed with secondary sources consisting of analyses by other IR scholars or 
historians. The third type of documents and records comprises media and editorial 
accounts from the leading newspapers and series of polls conducted by both newspapers 
and government agencies throughout the past decade. The final source of data includes 
electronic texts, such as academic documents and bulletins posted on the Internet. 
Another crucial source of data is in-depth interviews with a variety of key actors in 
Japanese politics, including politicians, MOFA officials, newspaper writers, academics 
and Japanese officials in the UN. 
1.5.1 Documents and Records 
a) Public Records 
The key public records used in this research can be divided into three parts, 
covering the period from the early 1990s to the early 2000s. The first source of official 
documents is the Japanese government agencies, including the MOFA, the MOD and the 
Cabinet Office. The official documents include: 
a) Diplomatic Blue Books (MOFA) 
b) Defence White Papers (MOD) 
c) Reports, publications and monographs (MOFA, MOD, PKO Headquarters) 
d) Security Treaties and Defence Programme Outlines (MOD) 
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e) Keynote addresses and speeches of foreign ministers, ambassadors and 
permanent missions in the UN (MOFA) 
0 Keynote addresses and speeches of Prime Ministers (MOFA and the Cabinet 
Office) 
The second source of public documents is the collection of UN official records 
relating to the case studies, from both the UNSC and the UN General Assembly. These 
documents include: 
a) UNSC Resolutions 
b) UNGA Resolutions 
c) Presidential Statements 
d) Reports of the UN High Commissioners 
e) Reports of the Secretary General 
The third source of public documents used in this research is the US government; 
these documents mainly include: 
a) Keynote addresses and statements of the Presidents, UN mission, Secretary 
of State and other officials in the Department of State 
b) Presidential Directives 
c) Congress Resolutions 
b) Primary/Secondary Sources 
The primary source of documents analysed in this research that do not belong in 
the domain of public records includes first-hand accounts by the actors concerned. These 
dOCUrnents include: 
a) Basic policies of political parties 
b) Historical accounts of political parties 
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c) Reports from internal committees of political parties 
d) Written documents by key interviewees 
e) Speeches and statements made by key interviewees 
f) Reports or academic works from research institutes 
g) Reports, publications and monographs from Japan's specialised agencies. for 
example, the JICA or the JIIA 
The secondary sources include analytical accounts from various scholars and 
practitioners through books, book chapters and articles. 
c) Media Accounts 
Unlike other countries, Japanese newspapers are considered a reliable source of 
information. According to the World Association of Newspapers, Japan ranked number 
two in 2005 with a total daily circulation of more than 70 million copies per day, of 
which the average combined circulation among the largest four papers accounted for 
almost 40 million copies. 
12 
This research therefore examines series of editorials and media accounts from 
major newspapers in Japan, including the Yomiuri Shimbun, the Asahi Shimbun, the 
Mainichi Shimbun and the Nikkei Shimbun. The analysis of media accounts also includes 
special reports or recommendations on certain issues such as revisions to the 
Constitution or recommendations for PKOs conducted by these newspapers. 
According to the Nihon Shimbun Kvokai, the official daily circulations of the Yomiuri, Asahi, Mainichi 
and Nikkci Shinibun, the largest four newspapers, are around 14,12,6 and 5 million copies, respectively. 
lish. /member/tok%o. hqn and http:, Nvwýý. kvan- -k\ ailable from: http: //, A, 'w,. v. pt-essnet. or. *p/env 
press. or, -, ýirtlcle7321. 
html [Accessed 033/11/2006]. 
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d) Polls and Official Statistics 
Polls and official statistics covering the decade-long period being studied are also 
collected. These polls and official statistics can be divided into three categories. The 
polls are collected from different sources, including: 
a) The ROPER Centre, University of Connecticut: this is a database that stores 
the results of polls on political, economic and social issues. The polling 
institutions vary from newspapers and the NHK research bureau to 
independent polling agencies such as the US Information Service and so on. 
b) The Prime Minister's Office: polls regarding foreign relations provide full 
coverage of the decade after the Cold War 
c) Other official statistics are collected from the UN website 
e) Electronic Texts 
This research also relies on some electronic sources of data, such as electronic 
texts, bulletins and press releases from certain organisations that are not available in 
printed form. The data collected from the Internet are in two separate forms. 
a) Academic bulletins of independent research institutions dedicated to 
acadernic works, such as Global Governance, Frontline and so on. 
b) Some sources of information from independent and educational organisations, 
such as press releases or collections of key speakers giving speeches or 
statements that are available only on the Internet. 
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1.5.2 Interviews: In-depth Interviews 
a) Politicians: in-depth interviews were carried out with members of leading 
political parties - both LDP and the DPJ politicians, including cabinet 
ministers, former and current members of the House of Representatives and 
the House of Councillors and the parties' policy staff. 
MOFA and MOD officials: high-ranking MOFA officials responsible for the 
UN policy, former diplomats to the UN and SDF officials were interviewed. 
c) Officials in international and development organisations: in-depth interviews 
were conducted with former MOFA officials who are now serving in UN 
agencies - the UNHCR, the UNDP or in the UN Secretariat--as well as those 
serving at Japan's development agencies and research institutes such as JICA 
and JIIA. 
d) Newspaper writers: Political and foreign policy staff writers in major 
Japanese newspapers, including the Yomiuri Shimbun, the Asahi Shimbun and 
the Mainichi Shimbun, were interviewed. 
e) Academics: Well-known Japanese academics in the fields of Japan's foreign 
policy, security policy and UN policy from leading universities, such as 
Tokyo University, Hitotsubashi University and Keio University, were 
interviewed. 
1.6 Presentation of Findings: Chapter Outlines 
This research is divided into seven main chapters. The first chapter outlines the 
research questions, key arguments, methodology, data collection and so on. The key 
research questions is two-levelled, asking firstly, on the theoretical ground, whether the 
existing mainstream IR theories are capable of explaining and understanding Japan's 
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preference in pursuing its UN security policy. This research accordingly explores 
whether other contending approaches, especially Constructivism, could provide a better 
insight into the process of policy formation, transformation and preference in 
contemporary Japan's security and UN policy. Secondly, this research also raises a 
substantive question about the direction of Japan's UN security policy and whether this 
security policy could be developed under the context of UN-Centrism. If so, the way in 
which this process has taken place throughout the past decades is another main focus of 
this research. 
Chapter Two provides a systematic literature review, including an examination 
of the existing IR theories commonly adopted by scholars conducting Japanese studies. 
The mainstream IR theories - Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism - are examined 
along with foreign policy analytical models. The shortcomings of the existing literature 
and theoretical framework in understanding Japan's post-Cold War foreign relations and 
foreign security policy are extensively countered. Also mentioned in this chapter is an 
illuminating account of Wendt's Constructivist approach and how it has been previously 
applied to the study of foreign relations by using such factors as norms and culture. 
Although this study does not oppose the theoretical insights of norm- and culture-led 
studies, it opts for the observation of identity transformation and how it affects the 
preferences of foreign policy outcomes. The adapted version of Wendt's original 
constructivist approach, 'recursive constructivist logic, ' is accordingly introduced and 
discussed in depth as an alternative tool to explore the relationship between the 
transformation of political identities and the preferences on policy outcomes. 
The third chapter presents an overview of Japan's security and UN policy. The 
main emphasis of this chapter is to point out and elaborate on the dichotomy between 
Japan's national and international security policy since the post-WWII period and the 
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possible re-orientation of its policy functions in the post-Cold War period. While it has 
been problematic to understand Japan's security policy without the framework of the 
Japan-US security alliance, it seems equally difficult to ponder the clear linkage between 
Japan's security orientation and UN-Centrism. This chapter, on the contrary, proposes 
that Japan's security policy could possibly be understood within the framework of UN- 
Centrism and how the lessening of the security dichotomy within the country throughout 
the past decade has contributed to the development of Japan's security policy under the 
UN framework. 
Chapters Four to Six are the main bodies advancing the evidence regarding how 
Japan's gradual identity transformation, based on the reorientation of the country's 
system of ideas and knowledge, has contributed to more assertive policy preferences in 
the security area under the UN framework. The collective ideas being shared by the 
international community and within the Japanese society on the aspects of international 
peace and security, UN peace operations and Japan-US relations will be simultaneously 
explored and compared in each case to confirm the level of conformity between the 
'international-role' and 'domestic-type' identities. The fourth chapter starts with the 
background of Japan's awakening security consciousness during the Gulf Crisis in early 
1990. The case clearly captures Japan in a state of political and ideational confusion, 
which resulted in political embarrassment and diplomatic and policy failure. Japan's 
adherence to its 'unilateral pacificist' identity clearly clashed with the identity that the 
international community expected the nation to project in dealing with the maintenance 
of peace and security in the post-Cold War period, which was more multilateral in nature. 
Chapter Five explores the case of the Cambodian Peace Process, in which Japan 
gradually transformed its security insights, corresponding to the changing international 
environment, especially on the ideas of hoNv peace and security should be pursued \\ ithin 
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the UN context. One might argue that it was merely a diplomatic endeavour that aimed 
at saving the government's face following the Gulf Crisis. On the contrary, this research 
argues that the obvious transformation of self-understanding about its place and its 
responsibility in securing international security, not the external force of other major 
powers, was the primary reason for such an assertive political and security stance during 
the Cambodian peace process. The process of ideational transformation within the 
country and the process of projecting the right identity into the international community 
were, however, not complete at this stage. Nevertheless, it was a significant stage where 
Japan revised its sets of ideas and understanding about peace and, specifically, how 
Japan could contribute to achieve it. 
The sixth chapter deals with the most dynamic period of Japan's post-Cold War 
UN diplomacy. The promotion of human security policy is literally the end-result of the 
decade-long interactions with the international community in the international security 
area and several years of self-apprehension in various security and UN-related aspects. 
In a way, the human security policy has emerged as a policy that combined Japan's 
concern on security issues with its LN-Centred diplomacy. The policy did not emerge 
out of a vacuum or simply because it was forcefully induced by external powers, as had 
usually been the case during the Cold War period. The policy itself combines the issue 
or policy reluctance that had long been Japan's key disadvantage - security beyond the 
areas surrounding Japan - with the most inspired but inactive UN-Centrism, which could 
not otherwise be actively pursued. This chapter plays an important part, concluding the 
account of the whole process of political identity transformation within Japan and 
explaining the development of ideational re-orientation from the Gulf Crisis until the 
present, xvhen Japan has come to grips Nvith its preferred 'domestic-type' identities and 
its projection of 'international-role' identities. 
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The final chapter provides conclusions to the issues previously raised in the 
research questions. Firstly, it confirms the possibility of opening up another theoretical 
and methodological venue to examine foreign policy outcomes. By not only relying on 
mainstream IR theories that tend to treat the external or system structure as the main 
determinants, or on foreign policy analytical tools, which tend to emphasise domestic 
factors, this research has followed the direction of Wendt's Constructivism in finding a 
middle-ground analytical mechanism which largely focuses on the social and ideational 
interactions of the Japanese state at both the internal and the international level. The 
most important finding, however, contradicts the popular view that only one facet of 
external or internal factors could influence policy outcomes. Rather, capturing the whole 
process of how a certain identity is literally transformed into another through a series of 
social interactions renders a richer understanding of policy preferences. 
1.7 Contributions 
The original contributions made in this research are two-fold - at the theoretical 
and the substantive level. The first significant theoretical contribution is the application 
of Wendt's Constructivism and the use of 'identity' in the examination of Japan's 
security policy in the UN, which has never been conducted before. Another important 
contribution is the modification of Wendt's Constructivism to examine Japan's foreign 
and security policy in the UN. The 'recursive version' adapted for the purpose of 
examining Japan's foreign policy decision-making process is as original as it is 
significant, because it contributes to the further development of an IR theory-based 
approach that could be applied to foreign policy analysis. In other words, it is an attempt 
to establish a middle-ground approach that combines two levels of analysis via the 
examination of 'non-material' factors: in this case, 'identity. ' Among other things, this 
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research also offers a re- interpretation of how *identity' should be treated in the process 
of social constructions and how it could be utilised as a framework for the foreign policy 
decision-making process. Instead of focusing only on 'material interests' among political 
actors, an examination of the changing sets of ideas and beliefs that inform political 
identities offers an illuminating account of how decision-making is determined by the 
process of ideational construction and transformation. 
Also, rather than treating 'domestic-type' identity as pre-given and exogenous to 
social interactions, the examination of this sort of identity offers more insights into how 
certain sets of ideas and beliefs are formed in the first place, which also leads to an 
explanation of the sources of foreign and security policy preferences. The inclusion of 
the 'domestic-type' identity into the analytical process alongside the 'intemational-role' 
identity technically allows the analysis to be conducted at both levels simultaneously. 
The process also leads to an explanation of how social interactions at both system and 
domestic level affect the transformation of identity, which determines the choices of 
foreign and security policy. 
At the substantive level, this research essentially contributes to a new 
interpretation of Japan's contemporary security and foreign policy direction, by focusing 
on security development under the UN framework rather than under the Japan-US 
alliance. The examination of Japan's security policy under the LN reveals how Japan's 
understanding of the inseparable link between 'national' and 'international' security has 
been developed in the post-Cold War period, as a result of social interactions and 
exchanges of ideas and beliefs at both the domestic and the international level. Another 
contribution that is important to the study of Japan's UN policy is the way in which the 
nex\ UN-Centrism can be understood. This research suggests that the revival of UN- 
Centrism consists of a more balanced approach, promoting international peace and 
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security via both physical security contributions and humanitarian development and 
assistance, as discussed in Chapter 6 on Japan's human security policy. 
In addition, via the examination of Japan's promotion of human security through 
the Constructivist approach, which is rarely tackled by other scholars, this research 
provides historical accounts of the development of the policy during the past decade. 
Most importantly, this research does not provide an interpretation or explanation of the 
development of Japan's security policy in the UN from passive to active pursuits 
through the popular notions of power relations or domestic politics. Instead, it furnishes 
the academic community with a significant new interpretation that focuses on a 
systematic assessment of the level of conformity between Japan's projected 
'international-role' identity and the country's transformed 'domestic-type' identity. In 
sum, this research attempts to show that the lower the conformity between the two 
identities, the higher the chance that the security or foreign policy will be passive, as in 
the case of the Gulf Crisis. On the contrary, it is evident that the higher the conformity 
between the 'domestic-type' identity and the 'international -role' identity, the lower the 
chance that the country will pursue a passive or reluctant policy. Both theoretical and 
substantive contributions will be discussed in detail below. 
On the one hand, this research employs Constructivism to examine the empirical 
cases of Japan's UN and security policy, which is an issue typically examined by the 
Realist and Liberal schools. Although some studies have applied Constructivism to 
Japan's foreign policy, they have not been entirely successful in producing a model that 
combines the analysis of the system and the domestic structure. One of the major pitfalls 
is the attempt by these studies to apply Wendt's Constructivism to foreign policy 
analysis as it is, without considering the limitations of the original design, which 
emerged as an alternative to neo-realism in explaining the transformation of the Z-ý 
26 
international structure. The existing studies using norms or identity, when applied to 
foreign policy analysis, therefore address only the 'what' question (what sort of foreign 
policy is transformed and projected at the international level? ), but not the 'how' and 
4why' questions (how and why are norms or identities initially transformed or formed? ). 
This dissertation, on the contrary, highlights this theoretical backdrop for the first time 
and focuses on developing an IR theory that is suitable for the analysis of foreign policy 
behaviours and preferences as well as for addressing 'how, why and what' questions 
simultaneously. By introducing the adapted version or the middle-ground approach of 
the 'recursive Constructivist model', this will be the first time that social interactions 
and the process of identity transformation informing foreign policy preferences, will be 
simultaneously captured and analysed at both the international and domestic levels. 
In essence, the 'recursive' constructivist model is designed to overcome the 
disadvantage of the original model, which is intended to explain the changing normative 
structure of the international system resulting from social interactions and ideational 
transformation among states at the system level. In applying this theoretical approach to 
examine not the changing configuration of the existing normative structure but the 
foreign policy preferences and behaviours of an individual state, Japan's social and 
ideational interactions at both the international level (the 'international -ro I e' identity) 
and the domestic level (the 'domestic-type' identity) are considered equally important. 
Accordingly, there is a clear need for an adaptation of Wendt's 'linear' model, which 
treats the 'type' identity as exogenous to the analysis and focuses only on the process of 
the 'role' and 'collective' identity transformation and how these transformations affect 
the sNstem structure. The 'recursive' model is therefore designed to suit the examination 
of foreign policy outcomes and preferences by observing how social interactions and the 
sN, stem of ideas and beliefs have transformed at the system level as well as among 
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domestic actors. This recursive constructivist model is certainly advantageous when 
applied to cases where the policy preferences are considered abnormal or could not 
possibly be understood perfectly through the changing normative structure or the re- 
prioritising of domestic interests alone. The model is also especially beneficial when 
concerns about the process of policy reorientation or the understanding of policy-making 
are central to the research question. 
The contribution in terms of theoretical significance aside, this research provides 
an alternative to the existing way of looking at Japan's foreign policy-making and its 
consensus-building process. While popular literatures focus mostly on interactions 
among particular groups such as elites or non-governmental actors and how their 
individual or group interests are prioritised, this research emphasises comparing systems 
of ideas and beliefs that have transformed through time across different key actors. The 
observation of identity transformation both at the domestic and the international level 
through a certain time reveals a complex process, indicating that Japan's foreign policy 
is formed according to ideational interactions that repeatedly occur internally among key 
domestic actors (domestic-type identities) and internationally with the international 
community (international-role identities) rather than because of simple external 
pressures or domestic political strictures or constraints. 
Not only does it provide a new way to understand Japan's foreign policy 
decision-making process; this research also seeks to offer an alternative explanation for 
the issue of Japan's UN policy, especially its participation in political and security issues, 
by looking into the development of Japan's security orientation in the post-Cold War 
period within the framework of the UN rather than in the context of Japan-US bilateral 
relations. Whereas there is an abundance of studies on Japan's security policy and 
Japan's UN policy, almost no study explores the development of Japan's post-Cold War 
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security orientation under the framework of the UN or the possible linkages between the 
two policy issues, which are normally believed to represent different poles of the 
political spectrum. Furthermore, while there has been analysis of Japan's foreign and 
UN policy using constructivism (norms and culture), this research is the first that 
observes the issue of Japan's UN and security policy through the examination of identity 
transformation. 
This research also adds value to the study of Japan's security policy and the UN 
policy by examining the human security issue through the Constructivist approach. 
Although there are several studies of Japan's UN policy, their emphasis is generally on 
either Japan's UNPKO participation or on its bid for permanent membership of the 
UNSC and its contributions to economic and social development. A thorough 
examination of the newly emerging human security policy and how it affects the re- 
direction of Japan's UN policy and establishes new security insights within Japan itself 
has never been seriously undertaken. Furthermore, apart from the fact that Japan's 
human security policy is infrequently explored by those interested in Japanese studies, 
Constructivist examination of the issue itself is also a rare occurrence. Due to Japan's 
active promotion of the policy during the past few years through the systematic 
integration of the policy with both its UN agenda and ODA principles, as elaborated in 
Chapter 6, this research is believed to contribute to the knowledge in this particular issue 
area and set the preliminary work for further examination. 
In addition, although the other two cases chosen to be studied in this research, 
the Gulf Crisis and the Cambodian peace process, have been covered by many scholars 
throughout the past decade, these cases have never been positioned in a way that allows 
a systematic assessment of their development and their implications for the overall 
framework of Japan's UN policy and its security understanding. By analysing these two 
29 
cases with the human security policy, this research will certainly contribute to a better 
understanding of the new-UN Centrism, new security insights, and among others, the 
way in which Japan's foreign policy-making process is formed. A detailed background 
to the past literature and the theories and frameworks usually adopted to explain Japan's 
foreign policy issue, as briefly mentioned in this introduction, will be presented in 
Chapter 2, while a substantive background to Japan's UN security policy will be 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 2 IR Theories, Identity and Japan's UN policy 
2.1 Mainstream Theories in International Relations 
One of the most difficult questions in IR and international political scholarship is 
'Which IR theory is the most appropriate lens through which we could examine 
significant international phenomena (or cases) with more accuracy and could 
simultaneously tender more sophisticated explanations to our problemsT Since the 
1980s, the mainstream international relations theories have faced this challenge from 
both inside and outside their theoretical domains. The awareness among IR scholars 
regarding the differences of ex lanatoryl foundation theory (realism, liberalism and p 
constructivism, also known as 'rationalism5) versus constitutivelanti-foundation theory 
(post-modernism, feminism, critical theory, normative theory, also known as 
'reflectivism') and the rejection of the former have become more acute and dominated 
the discussion in recent years. ' 3 
With the above starting question, this research firstly attempts to find a suitable 
theory that posits the most viable set of explanations to the research question raised in 
the previous chapter. This chapter, therefore, sets out to review the past literature by 
outlining the background of the existing IR theories (Realism, Liberalism and 
Constructivism) and their applications to Japan's foreign relations. This chapter further 
explores analytical models of foreign policy analysis (the elitist, pluralist, reactive-state 
and civilian power theses) and their applications to Japan's foreign policy and decision- 
making process in section 2.3, and lastly, it examines the shortcomings of these theories 
and analytical models and how Wendt's Constructivism and the 'recursive version' are 
suited to the understanding of Japan's foreign policy preferences. 
13 Baylis and Smith (2001: ""6--'-'8) 
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Realism 
Realist Taxonomy and Main Assumptions 
It is agreed among scholars that realism is perhaps the most classical and the 
most influential IR theory, which can be traced back to 430-400 BC, the period of the 
Peloponnesian War. At this time, the key thinker was Thucyclicles and the key thinking 
on classical realism was drawn from pure 'human nature', which determines the course 
of a state's relationship through the 'endless struggle for power. ' 14 Like other theories, 
the definition and taxonomy of realist theory itself are still subject to considerable 
contention. The majority of realist scholars, although they agree upon the general 
premises that underlie the core assumptions of realism, are still divided into different 
clusters. These clusters also hold different accounts of theoretical notions, which in turn 
reflect the development of the theory through the course of the IR history. ' 5 
Hans J. Morgenthau, the proclaimed father of classical realism, contends that 
politics is governed by the objective law that has its roots in 'human nature. ' The 
trademark of this traditional realism is the concept of 'interests', defined in terms of 
'power. ' Alternatively, it is the idea that explains how material and interests dominate 
the actions of both men and states and how the idea of interests provides the link 
between 'reason and facts' that helps us to understand international politics. 16 E. H. Carr 
is another scholar who has helped strengthen the focus on power and interests in 
classical realism by questioning the obscure notion of morality in international politics 
" Accounts of Realist theory often begin with a prologue about the Peloponnesian War and the thoughts 
of Thucydides. The original text can be found in Rex Warner, The Peloponnesian Wat-, London, Penguin 
Classics, 1954. 
15 We are indebted to several other thinkers such as Machiavelli (The Prince), Thomas Hobbes 
(l, eviathan), Jean Jacques Rousseau (The State of War), E. H. Carr (The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-1939), 
Hans Moro-enthau (Politics Among Nations), Headly Bull (The Anarchical Society) and Kenneth Waltz 
(Theory of International Politics), for the elaboration of Realist theory, NN hich has been extended over time 
since Thucydides constructed its philosophical backbone. 
16 Morgenthau (1973: 4-15) 
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and the harmony of interests advanced by liberal utopianism. such as the concept of 
economic laissez-faire, internationalism or the idea of 'the greatest good for the greatest 
number. ' What really matters is the unconscious reflections of national policy based on 
each state's individual interpretation of interest at each point. The international 
principles, institutions or the non-existing international harmony are, in fact, disguises of 
vested interests of those at the top of power structure. ' 7 Beyond the key concept of 
'power and interests', Bull also advances the idea of 'anarchical society' or the focus on 
the 'system structure' in his thesis, which contends that the current system of states is 
simply 'anarchical' because there is no higher level of authority over states. Despite the 
anarchy, states do form a society with common rules and institutions, although none is 
considered the dominant element in international politics. ' 8 
A refined articulation of the system structure, however, can be found in Waltz's 
neo-realism, in which he advances the argument that the 'anarchical system', as opposed 
to 'human nature', is the primary reason for which fear, suspicions and insecurities 
among states are fostered. Even if the actors have not possessed any malign intent 
towards each other, conflict can easily emerge from such system anarchy. It might be 
true to assert that the core realist assumptions agreed upon by the contemporary realists 
would seem to stem from the key ideas of classical and structural/neo-real ism. Both 
realist traditions make the central assumptions of the 'causes of war/conditions of peace' 
and the 'focus on the state' utterly clear. 19 Realists, especially neo-realists, speak of 
international politics as 'structural anarchy', consisting of states which, similar to human 
beings, are wicked and sinful as well as full of desire to dominate others. Under this 
condition. the ultimate goals of states that exist in this anarchical environment are to 
17 Carr (1946: 103,146-152 
18 Bull (1995: 25 and 49) 
1 () Holsti (1995: 36-37) 
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promote their 'national interests' and to secure their 'survival, power and relative 
capabilities' via political and military means, labelled under 'self-help. ' The practice 
will eventually result in a 'security dilemma', which, in turn, generates the prerequisite 
condition for the system's structural anarchy and intrinsically imprints international 
politics with the vicious circle of a power struggle. 20 Although they are prone to power 
maximisation and war, as unitary 'rational' actors guided by the logic of national 
interests, states are said to be able to resort to peace through the mechanism of 'alliance 
systems' and 'balance of power'. Nonetheless, both realist traditions leave room for 
neither international institutions nor economic instruments to play significant parts in 
peace construction and maintenance. 
In sum, Waltz's theory of international politics neatly elaborates the above- 
mentioned characteristics of the contemporary international politics and the transition 
from classical realism to neo-realism into three following main points. Firstly, Waltz 
sets himself firmly against what he sees as the classical realist's claim about the causes 
of war, such as human nature and state attributes, known as the first and second images 
respectively. He develops a theory which includes the 'third image' or system structure 
into its analytical process and extends his proposition rendering the causes of war. -) I For 
him, the answer lies at the system level: that is, 'In anarchy, there is no automatic 
harmony and among autonomous states, war is inevitable. ' 22 
Secondly, Waltz further develops the idea of system structure in his work on the 
Theory of International Politics. Crucial to his structural approach is the belief that the 
contemporary system is anarchic and decentralised rather than hierarchical. States in the 
sarne anarchic system x\ould seem to have the same rather than different traits of 
20 Morgenthau (1973: 31-4) 
1 21 Wa Itz ( 19-59: 16-41,80-123, and 159-186), for the elaboration on the first, second and third image, 
respectively. 
11 -- Ibid (1959: 186) 
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behaviour. IR scholars, therefore, are allowed to emphasise the study of system 
transitions and other system phenomena in lieu of the study of each individual state itself. 
Thirdly, relating to the previous point, the heart of Waltz's structural analysis is 
the observation of the 'distribution of capabilities' among the units of the system. In his 
own words: 
,[] the structure of a system changes with changes in the distribution of 
capabilities across the system units. And changes in structure change 
expectations about how the units of the system will behave and about the 
outcomes their interactions will produce. ' 23 
Simply put, the distribution of capability establishes system equilibrium and 
explains the outcomes of states' behaviours and international politics. Once the structure 
of states' relative capabilities in the system is reconfigured, the new equilibrium and 
environment of international politics will be re-established according to the change of 
states' capabilities. The end of the Cold War is the most recent obvious example of the 
reconfiguration of the states' relative capabilities. The collapse of the former Soviet 
Union, once a superpower, transformed the structure of the international system from 
bipolarity to uni-polarity. By the same token, the changed relative capability of Russia 
and the US also resulted in changes in both countries' foreign behaviours. 
2.1.2 Liberalism 
Liberal Variances and Main Assumptions 
Emerging as an alternative to realism, liberalism is said to be at the other end of 
the IR theory spectrum. As Dunne put it: 
23 Waltz ( 1979: 97 and 19") 
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'Rather like political parties, realism is the natural party of government 
and liberalism is the leader of the opposition, whose main function is to hound 
the talking heads of power politics for their remorseless pessimism. ý24 
In terms of theoretical advancement, liberal variants have been extended to 
several interrelated strands, which reflect all facets of a larger dynamic of international 
politics and international change. Some IR scholars categorise post-war liberal writings 
into republican liberalism, commercial liberalism, military liberalism, cognitive 
liberalism, sociological liberalism and institutional liberalism. 25 Others, such as 
Michael Doyle, also divide liberalism in accordance with states' actual behaviours into 
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three strands: liberal pacifism, liberal imperialism and liberal internationalism. The 
majority of liberals, however, agree upon the classification of three main strands of 
liberal internationalism, liberal idealism and liberal institutionalism and their neo- 
versions corresponding to the changing international politics, affected by globalisation. 
Firstly, liberal internationalism and its neo-liberal internationalism contend the 
original ideas of Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham on individual liberty, free trade, 
prosperity and interdependence. Liberal internationalism holds that undemocratic states' 
domestic and international interventions are the major factor that disturbs the 'natural 
order' of the system. Balance of power is also included as one of the most outdated and 
unnatural policies, which interferes with and inherently results in the 'imbalance' of the 
international system. 27 Similar to the ideas of republican and commercial liberalism, 
contact among people throughout the world through commerce and travel will facilitate 
a less destructive form of international system and override the deep structural effects of 
24 Dunne (2001: 163) 
25 Zac her and Matthew (1995: 7) and Lamy (2001: 188-189) 
10 - Doyle (1986: 1159-116-5) 
27 DUllne (2001: 165- 167) 
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anarchy. 28 Ikenberry also suggests in his articulation on 'liberal grand strategy' that 
democratic politics, economic interdependence and international institutions encourage a 
stable, secure and legitimate political order. 29 In other words, democratic states that have 
policies of little or no interference and are more transparent will reduce the possibilities 
of other states' misjudging attention, thereby eliminating the anarchical structure of 
international politics. Along the same line, neo-liberal internationalism develops the 
existing research agenda to cover the debates about the pattern of relationships among 
liberal and democratic states and the democratic states versus authoritarian regimes. For 
neo-liberal internationalism, peaceful coexistence would seem to succeed only among 
liberal states. Therefore, it has become the agenda of powerful liberal states, especially 
the US, to use its foreign policy to promote peace by putting pressure on authoritarian 
regimes and transform the countries into new democratic states, as evident in several 
regions throughout the world: in the Philippines, South and Central America in the 
1980s and most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example. 
The second strand of liberalism is known as liberal idealism or neo-idealism. The 
most influential thinker on this Liberal tradition was Woodrow Wilson, who believed in 
and spent many years of his political life trying to promote the importance of 
constrLICting an 'international order. ' The idea was also understood as fundamental for 
subsequent liberal idealist development, which advocates that international order cannot 
possibly be accomplished without effective international organisations, which bind 
states by rules and norms and facilitate peaceful coexistence via disarmament, 
arbitration, enforcement and national self-determination. 
30 Neo-idealism borrowed much 
from the previous account of 19th century Wilsonian idealism, specifically on the notion 
2' lbid, (2001: 178) and Zacher and Matthew (1995: 124) 
29 Ikenberry (2000: 103-104) 
Wilson (1918) gave his speech on Wilson's Fourteen Points to the US Senate establishing the platform 
for American Idealism. 
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of how to strengthen international organisations via both the top-down and the bottom- 
up approach. As agreed by Dunne, the former focuses on the significance of promoting 
democratisation and the fortification of domestic state structures whereas the latter 
advances the argument on the roles and practices of civil society. 31 
Lastly, among several liberal traditions, the most developed strand and the one 
considered the true realist challenger has been Liberal institutionalism. Since the end of 
World War 11, liberal institutionalism has been developed through three successive 
presentations, namely functionalist integration theory in the 1950s, functionalist regional 
integration theory in the 1960s and finally interdependence theory in the 1970s. 32 In a 
way, the core idea underlying Liberal institutionalism is the rejection of the Realist 
account of 'the state as the unitary and primary actor' and the 'pessimism about the role 
of international institutions. ' Liberal institutionalists in every tradition - the functional, 
neo-functional and interdependence schools - all agree that non-state actors, such as 
technical experts, specialised agencies, political parties, labour and trade unions, TNCs 
and so, should be put in the spotlight alongside states. It has also been suggested that 
international institutions should carry out a number of functions that cannot be 
performed by states, particularly in the more globalised and interdependent world. As 
for neo-liberal institutionalism, although it varies from the conventional strands by 
accepting the realist emphasis on anarchy and the centrality of the state, its research 
focus is still centred on the creation of 'regimes' and the maintenance of system 
cooperation, facilitated by international organisations. The variances of the notion of the 
'possibility of cooperation' and the concept of 'system anarchy' adopted by neo-liberal 
I Dunne (2001: 177) 
32 Grieco, (1995: 15 1) 
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institutional ists, however, diverge considerably from Realism. As suggested by Axelrod 
and Keohane: 
'Achieving cooperation is difficult in world politics. There is no common 
government to enforce rules, and by the standards of domestic society, 
international institutions are weak. Cheating and deception are endemic. Yet, 
cooperation is sometimes attained. 133 
Therefore, 
'Anarchy also needs to be defined clearly. As used here, the term refers to 
a lack of common government in world politics, not to a denial that an 
international society - albeit a fragmented one - exists. ' 
34 
In sum, unlike realism, liberalism fundamentally objects to the view that 'human 
nature is sinful and bad' and that 'cooperation is unattainable', regardless of its liberal 
origins or traditions. As human nature is basically good, aid and cooperation are thus the 
intrinsic nature of the international society. Bad human behaviours, wars between states 
and anarchy are in fact the product of bad institutions and structural arrangements. To 
eliminate such malign structural conditions, the strengthening of international 
institutions and the construction of international society are the key. 35 In recent years, 
with the end of the Cold War and the success of the UN in dealing with international 
conflicts as well as the longevity of international economic and security organisations, 
the influence of neo-liberal institutionalism seems to have received overwhelming 
recognition among IR scholars. 
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, Axelrod and 
Keohane (1985: 226) 
34 lbid (1985: 226) 
Kegleý and Wittkopf (1997: 4) 
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2.1.3 Constructivism: An Overview 
In recent years, it is undeniable that Constructivism has gained a prominent place 
alongside other mainstream IR theories and has become the key framework in 
international politics and foreign policy analyses. Similar to Realism and Liberalism, 
Constructivism is also divided into several variations, although the distinctions between 
the 'thick' and 'thin' versions are most common. 36 Some Constructivists, like Hopf, 
Jepperson and Katzenstein, would rather call the variations 'critical or postmodernist' 
versus 6neo-classical or conventional' as to differentiate the methodology and 
epistemology between the former, whose emphasis is on 'interpretivism', from the latter, 
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whose retention of 'classical pragmatism and positivism' methodology is highlighted . 
In other words, the difference between the 'thin or conventional' and the 'thick 
or critical' versions of Constructivism is that the former Constructivist work is still 
assessed under the positivist assumptions in which 'statism' and 'realism' are the core 
endorsements. 38 Some other scholars, like John Gerard Ruggie, however, locates 
Wendt's Constructivism as the third variant or 'naturalistic constructivism' which 
combines both aspects of mainstream Constructivist theorising but grounded in scientific 
realism. 39 Accordingly, although Wendt's Constructivism and Katzenstein's or Adler's 
Constructivism could be grouped under the 'thinner' Constructivist version, subtle 
differences between the two can still be spotted. 
36 Carisnaes (2002: 339) has grouped Wendt (1999), Adler and Barnett (1998), Checkel (1999 and 200 1 ), 
Ruggie (1998) and Katzenstein (1996), for example, as the 'thinner' Constructivists. The 'thicker' version 
of Constructivists includes Kratochowil (1989), Onuf (1989) or Larsen (1997), for example. 
I 
37 Hopf (1998: 181-187) and Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein (1996: 65-67) 
38 Lapid(1996: 13-14) 
I . IQ Ruggie (1998: 35-336) He also points out that Katzenstein or Adler's ConstructIN ism, which according to 
some scholars belong to the 'thinner' group of Constructivism, has close affinity with pragmatism which a 
set of analytical tools necessarý to make sense of intersubjective meanings is the core methodology. 
40 
Although both Constructivist versions contain methodological dissimilarities, 
they join force in arguing against the other two mainstream IR theories on several 
grounds. Adler is right in pointing out that Constructivism occupies the 'middle ground' 
between rationalist approaches (Realism and Liberalism) and interpretive approaches 
(postmodernism, poststructuralism and critical theory) . 
40 Both 'thick and thin' strands 
basically stress the emphasis of 'idealism, holism and interpretivism' over 'materialism, 
individualism and rationalism' advocated by the other two mainstream IR theories. 
However, the 'thin or conventional' version of Constructivism has fewer tendencies to 
strictly adhere to the interpretative approach and tends to highlight the understanding of 
behaviours and foreign policy through rules or collective meanings. Therefore, the 
commonalities between the two variations when applied to empirical cases are only the 
focus on ideational or social factors over material ones and the emphasis on the social 
structure over individual motivation. Despite the similarities shared between the two 
strands of Constructivist paradigm, this research tends to limit the discussion only within 
the 'thinner' variation, as to engage more in developing a Constructivist-based analytical 
tool which could be applied to foreign policy analys iS. 4 ' The clear discussion only on the 
'thin version' of Constructivism will also allow this research to engage in less detailed 
examination on the 'meta-theory' of the reconstruction of Constructivism, which is not 
42 its main objectives . 
40 Adler (1997: 3 19-32 1) 
" Carisnaes (2002: 339) clearly suggests that the 'thick, critical or postmodernist' version is difficult to 
incorporate within a foreign policy analytical framework. This is also confirmed by Dessler (1999: 124) 
that these traditions have little or no interest in the project of developing causal accounts of international 
relations. 
42 The detailed discussion of philosophical position or the meta-theoretical controversies of the 
reconstruction of Constructi\, ism and the way in which 'reality' is constructed can be found in Guzzini 
(2000) in which the relationship on the le\el of observation (social construction of knowledge and social 
construction of the social world) and the intersubjectl\-e unit of analysis (how intersubjective meanings or 
shared recognition and consensus shape ideas and relations) is emphasised as opposed to the neo-realism's 
narrow definition of realitv. 
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With regard to the use of Constructivism on empirical inquiries. the central 
concerns are the relationship between 'agents or actors' and 'social structure' and the 
extent to which social factors determine the outcome of the normative structure or the 
outcome of foreign policy choices. In general, the ideational factors being employed in 
43 Constructivist work are grouped into two crucial streams - norms and identity . While 
serious debates about the specific applicability of each social factor to particular 
empirical questions are rarely found, one could easily spot the sizable volume of norm- 
led empirical cases over the other types of social factors. Furthermore, although 
Constructivists can liberally pick and choose their preferable version of analytical tool 
and the distinctive emphasis on rules and practices (norm-led) and constitutive 
properties of identity (identity-led) are clearly suggested, according to Carlsnaes, the use 
of these two factors - norms and identity - is usually intertwined. 
44 
According to Finnemore and Sinkkink, the studies using norms seek to examine 
how norms shape interests of states as opposed to the limited role of norms in neo-liberal 
literature which usually subjects norms under power distributions. It essentially points 
out how normative issues and how norms have been the key determination to both the 
changes of system structure and human behaviours. 45 The empirical Constructivist work 
linking norms to domestic change can be found in, for instance, Finnemore's own 
analysis of the role of humanitarian norms in shaping patterns of humanitarian military 
intervention in the past century or in Price and Tannenwald's examination on norms and 
deterrence and the 'norms' explanation on the inhibition on nuclear use. 46 Nevertheless, 
as pointed out by Checkel, the Constructivist studies using norms still exhibit two 
43, Constructivist work using ideology and culture can be found, for example, in Kier (1996) about how the 
French culture explains the choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines or in Berger (1996) 
on the waN in which Japan's culture of anti-militarism affects the choice of passive security policy. 
44 Carisnaes (2000: 3340) 
4S Finnemore and Sinkkink (1998: 889) 
4(, f-innernore (1996: 153-185) and Price and Tannenwald (1996: 114-152) 
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crucial limitations in producing a clear systematic mechanism through which the 
international norms reach and have constitutive effects on domestic arena and in 
providing the account on the constitutive impact in one case but failing to do so in 
47 
others . This research is also convinced that those engaging in the use of identity as the 
analytical tool in Constructivist work also experience the very same theoretical and 
methodological shortfalls, as will be further discussed below. 
Similar to other Constructivists emphasising the importance of ideational factor 
or the distribution of ideas on the construction of (international) reality, Constructivist 
studies using identity focus on how specific identities of states shape their interests and 
policy outcomes, in other words, how ideational factors constitute interest base in the 
first place. Wendt and Ruggie, along with other Constructivists, help elaborate the 
theoretical accounts by arguing that, firstly, international politics or international 
political reality is 'constituted' by the distribution of interests and that the content of 
interests are also constituted in part by ideas and that these ideas are generated in part by 
social interaction S. 
48 
The empirical work focusing on identity and the examination of ideational 
factors on policy choices has been constantly developed and could be divided into two 
distinctive groups. The first category strictly examines how identities could be employed 
to explain the 'origins' of interests or preferable policy choices. Risse-Kappen and 
Herman, for example, have demonstrated how a reconceptualisation of interests 
grounded in new ideational understandings about reality and actors' evolving identities 
has contributed to Soviet's 'new thinking' policy towards the end of the Cold War and 
towards solving the problems of East-West confrontation . 
49 Although a fex\, - 
47 Clieckel (1999: 85) 
48 Wendt (1999) and Ruggie (1998) 
. jL) Herman (1996: 271 -3,16) and Risse-Kappen (1994: 185-214) 
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constructivist research projects have demonstrated the interactive process or the 
constitutive analysis of how identities and interests are defined and redefined, they were 
simply a response to the criticism about the lack of the analysis of social construction 
from the bottom-up or at the unit level . 
50 The other group, which is the central focus of 
this research, is theoretically developed by Wendt. Within this group, identity is 
employed to explain the changing structure of the normative system structure and not 
foreign policy outcomes per se. 51 
As mentioned previously, norms and identities are in fact facing critical 
theoretical pitfalls, despite its explanatory power. On the one hand, the cases using 
norms may fail to produce a clear systematic mechanism through which international 
norms have constitutive effects on domestic arena. Identity-led cases, as pointed out 
above, are criticised as one-sided because they either focus on how the identity at the 
unit level affects interests and policy outcomes or how the transformation of identity at 
the system level contributes to the changing system structure as evident in Wendt's 
Constructivism. Unlike traditional mainstream IR theories in which the issue about the 
'level of analysis' has always been one of the key theoretical focus and development, 
Constructivism is obviously short of a serious debate on the overly clear-cut divide on 
the level of analysis. 
52 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, one of the key objectives of this research is to 
address the above problem and to also develop a clear analytical mechanism through 
which the interactive process of identity transformation at the system level affects the re- 
50 The constructivist self-criticism could be found in Ruggie (1998: 855-886). Apart from Risse and 
Herman, tile Constructivist work which responds to the criticism or attempts to address the problem at the 
constitutiN e level is, for example, Milliken's work on the Social Construction of the Korean War (2001). 
51 Wendt (1999) 
52 See for example, Putnam (1993), about the theoretical development in traditional mainstream IR 
theories which addresses the importance of the two-level analysis or the linkages and the analyses of the 
international bargaining process by key actors at both levels simultaneously. ltý 
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definition of identities and interests at the domestic level. Wendt's Constructivism is 
chosen to be the starting point, even though it is not originally designed for the analysis 
of foreign policy, because the systematic process of identity transformation at the system 
level provides the platform from which further development on the analysis at the 
system level could be linked with the transformation of identity at the domestic level. 
Moreover, Wendt's Constructivism also allows us researchers to conduct the study on 
security in the name of social ly-constructed identities while enables modes of analysis to 
be closely linked with scientific realism. The way in which foreign and security issues 
are examined in this fashion is not new. Buzan and Wacver have developed a framework 
for security studies which takes identity as socially constituted but not more so than 
other social structures. To them, this 'inert constructivism', at some point, allows 
identities and other social constructions to become relatively constant to be examined 
with objectivist mode of analysis. 53 
As for the application of Constructivism on empirical security cases, Wwver tries 
to create a middle ground conceptual framework which captures the reconceptualisation 
of security focus between 'state and society', as evident in his 'hourglass model. ' His 
work on the dual process of examining the 'state security' and 'societal security' is an 
example of how Constructivism has been developed to make sense of a hard case like 
security policy. 54 This research, however, takes on a different direction by emphasising 
the lack of a dual mechanism which could bridge the gap between the analysis of the 
redefinition and the transformation of identity at the system and the unit or domestic 
level. In other words, it explores the way in which a particular model of Constructivism 
- Wendt's Constructivism - which has been originally limited to the study of the 
ý 11 Buzan (1998: 203-207) 
ý4 NN'xver (1995: 65-7 1) 
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changing normative structure can be developed to explain the process of foreign policy 
outcomes and decision-making process. This research, in essence, addresses the concern 
about the development of an analytical pathway through which the transformation of 
identity at the system level reach and have constitutive effects on the identity and 
interests embedded at the unit level. Further details on Wendt's Constructivism will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
a) Wendt's Constructivism 
As mentioned above, Constructivism has been developed as an alternative to the 
above two traditional mainstream IR theories since the late 1980s by several modernist 
and post-modernist theorists such as Emanuel Adler, Jeff Checkel, Yosef Lapid, 
Friedrich Kratochwil and Nicholas OnUf. 
55 However, the elaboration of the most 
developed and most recognisable version of Constructivism, which will be adapted in 
this thesis to be applicable to foreign policy analysis, can be found in Alexander 
Wendt's Social Theory of International Politics, published in the late 1990s. His 'thin 
version' of constructivism has hence been unanimously accepted among IR scholars as 
one of the three contemporary mainstream IR theories, alongside neo-realism and neo- 
liberalism. 56 Wendt's Constructivism emPhasises 'ideas and discourse' through the 
studies of 'norms and identities' and how 'ideas about se4f and others' shape 'system 
interaction'and vice versa, thereby creating an international system that is based on 'the 
s1ructure qf shared social knowledge or distribution of ideas' rather than 'the structure 
of material capabilities or distribution of capabilities. 57 
55 See, for example, Adler (1997) on the middle ground approach of world politics, Checkel on norms, 
institutions and national identity in contemporary Europe (1999), Lapid and Kratochwil (1995) on culture 
and identity in international relations, Kratochwil (1989) on norms and international relations and 
KubAlkov, i ( 1998) on constructivism and international relations. 
56 Smith (2000: 15 1) and Keohane (2000: 1215) 
57 Wendt (1999: 1-2,2-2-213,16-5-167,224-225 and 249-2152) 
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Constructivism directly challenges neo-realist and neo-liberal notions that the 
4structure' and 'behaviour' of agents are the only factors which basically generate 
outcomes and that neither identity nor interests can be changed, but only behaviours. 58 
Because the process of identity and interest transformation is disregarded and states' 
interests simply exist to be discovered, the question regarding 'how' changes occur, thus, 
cannot be accounted for by both rationalist mainstrearns. This fact has become one of the 
major frailties of both neo-realism and neo-liberalism. 
Whereas both rationalist and positivist scholars are unwilling to explore non- 
material factors or the explanatory power of 'idealist' or social construction factors and 
such reflectivist schools as postmodernism, feminism and critical theory also have no 
interest in developing the fundamental account of mainstream IR theory, Wendt's 
Constructivism, along with other versions of Constructivism is aimed at filling the gap 
and developing a middle ground between rationalist and reflectivist theories with a 
'moderate' and 'thin' version of 'social construction' that is still based on positivist 
episterno logy. 59 This attempt invites several attacks on Wendt's Constructivism, ranging 
from its combination of positivist epistemology and post-positivist ontology and the 
dichotomy between 'materialist' and 'idealist' notions to the conviction on 'a priori 
identity' coalescing with the lack of the analysis of the nature of agency or the 'identity 
of identity. ' The following section will offer a detailed examination of Wendt's logic of 
constructivism and the use of norms and identities in empirical case studies, and 
elaborate on 'norms and identities' in Wendt's Constructivism. 
is Wendt (1992: '391-397) 
ig Wendt (1999: 1), Dessler (1999: 123) and Smith (2000: 15 1) 
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b) Identity typology in Wendt's Constructivism 
In examining identities in Wendt's constructivism, it is important to look 
carefully at the distinction among different types, levels and structures in which 
identities are constituted. The point of raising this issue is that although 'identity' is 
practically the main focus of Wendt's constructivist model, Wendt does not emphasise 
all sorts of identities or incorporate them into his analysis. A certain type of identity - 
corporate identity - is left untouched and considered as 'exogenous' to the process of 
identity formation, while others are regarded as 'endogenous. ' The identities (and 
interests) that matter most to Wendt's constructivists are those constructed by 'shared 
ideas' and socially exchanged at the system level. Unlike others, Wendt contends that 
identity is: 
ca property of international actors that generates motivational and 
behavioural dispositions. This means that identity is at base a subjective or unit- 
level quality, rooted in an actor's self-understandings. However, the meaning of 
those understandings will often depend on whether other actors represent an 
actor in the same way, and to that extent identity will also have an inter- 
subjective or system quality. Two kinds of ideas can enter into identity, those 
held by the 'Self and those held by the 'Other. ' 560 
Four types of identity are constituted with different qualities at different 
structural levels, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Corporate and social qualities suggest how 
each of the identities is originally constituted. Corporate quality, including both its 
material and its subjective base, durably and intrinsicallY exists as a 'site' or 'platform' 
60 Wendt (1999: 2-14) 
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for other identities to develop and requires no other elements to confirm its existence. 
Corporate quality is also believed to be 'pre-given, 'auto-genetic' and 'exogenous' to 
the process of any interaction. 61 Unlike the corporate aspect, the social quality 
emphasises that some kinds of identity can be constructed only when a particular subject, 
such as states or human beings, is in relation with others and that the social qualities are 
usually developed, redefined or transformed through social interactions at different 
domestic and system structures. 
Figure 2.1: Wendt's Identity Typologies 
Corporate Social 
Domestic 
Systemic 
Personal Type 
(existence) (properties) 
Role 
Collective 
(Behaviours) 
Source: Author's Figure 
Among the four types of Wendt's typologies, the first one, 'personal' identity, is 
categorised as having the corporate quality, which is essentially self-organised and 
embedded in the domestic level. For example, in the case of people, 'A' has his 
corporate identity represented through his 'body' and his 'memory' as 'A. ' Despite his 
thoughts or activities, he is still 'A', with the biological (or material) quality and the 
consciousness (or subjective quality) of being 'A. ' In the case of states, corporate 
identity is the joint narrative of themselves as actors among their populations, also 
61 lbid (1999: 225) 
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known as domestic group-level recognition. According to Wendt, an actor can have only 
one such identity or existence. 62 
The 'type', 'role' and 'collective' identity are all categorised as having been 
socially constructed. The main difference is that the 'type' identity, referred to as labels 
or properties that are applied to persons who share the same social meanings, attitudes, 
values, skills, knowledge, experiences, opinions and behavioural traits and so on, is the 
social identity that is constituted by internal principles at the domestic level. Considered 
exogenously given to the system interaction, most Constructivists do not pay much 
attention to both 'personal' and 'type' identities, as they are not practically constituted 
through social interaction at the system level. 63 They are simply the identities that the 
state carries with it prior to the system interaction and are bound to be transformed 
during the stage of system interactions. 
'Role' identity, on the other hand, is considered endogenous to the process of 
system interactions, as it exists only in relation to others. It is the role that cannot be 
enacted by the state itself but is acted out according to the sharing expectation of others 
64 
prior to or during interactions at the system level . In a way, another difference between 
'type and role' identities is that the former is the identity commonly shared by domestic 
constituents while the latter is the one adopted in corresponding to others' demands. 
What is noteworthy about this difference is that there are times when these two identities 
might clash with each other, as is the case with Japan's pacifism (domestic-type identity) 
and the role identity Japan has been expected to play by the international community. In 
tandem with the emphasis on role identity, constructivists also put much emphasis on 
ýcollective' identity and take it as the logical conclusion to the process of system 
62 Wendt 1996: 5 1) 
63 Wendt 1999: 226) 
o4 lbid (1999: 2227) 
50 
interaction. Put more elaborately, it is the result of a process in which the 'Self-Other' 
distinction becomes blurred, transcended, and finally becomes a 'collectively' shared 
identity among the community of states. 65 In Wendt's Constructivist analysis, 'role' and 
4collective' identities are socially and systemically constructed: the former represents a 
process or mechanism by which to incorporate the self into others and vice versa, while 
the latter represents the concluding result of the process. Both can be made evident 
through states' behaviours. 
c) Logic and Process o Wendt's Constructivism ýf 
Wendt's constructivism deals simultaneously with the 'identity transformation ' 
of system agents (states), which is the key to states' behavioural dispositions, and the 
(change' of system structure due to the transformation of states' identities. He set out to 
demonstrate the relationship of agents and structure and how each affects the process of 
transformation of the other. He terms his kind of Constructivism 'structural idealism', 
which primarily suggests, on the one hand, that identities can be constructed, 
reconstructed and internalised by 'intersubjective or social' aspects of system structure 
through the 'distribution of knowledge' at structural level. On the other hand, it further 
argues against neo-realism, suggesting that the system structure can also be (re)created 
through the process of actors' identity transformation. As opposed to neo-realism, which 
contends that 'structure (alone) affects states' behaviours', constructivism points out, as 
mentioned above, that it is the actors' identities that play an important role in the 
interacting process and that 'identities motivate what states want (interests) and what 
66 
they do (behaviours) . In this sense, 'anarchy or cooperation' 
is, therefore, 'what states 
make of it. ' In other words, whether the system structure will be in anarchy or in 
65 lbid (1999: 229) 
66 lbid (1999: land 318) 
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cooperation depends upon the conditions with which states identify themselves. 
Constructivists expect states to identify themselves with the 'Other', thereby allowing 
their identities to be fused with others in the system as well as with existing collective 
norms. The system structure, anarchical or not, is therefore reconfigured in this fashion. 
In Wendt's Social Theory of International Politics, he primarily emphasises the 
process of 'identity transformation', on which this study places its focus and which will 
be discussed in further detail. As elaborated in the above section, the constructivist 
process of identity transformation concentrates on 'role and collective' identity and 
considers 'corporate and type' identity as exogenous to the process of identity 
transformation. In brief, the former two are treated as 'socially constructed', while the 
latter two are treated as intrinsically given. As for the process of Wendt's 
Constructivism, shown in Diagram 2.1, Wendt embarks on the supposition that his 
constructivist version is mainly concerned with the transformation of 'role and 
collective' identities, influenced by the social mechanism called 'cultural selection', 
which consists of 'imitation' and 'social learning' processes. According to Wendt, 
states' identities and interests are acquired during the imitation process when a state 
adopts the 'self-understanding' of those attitudes, material assets or behavioural traits 
that have been successful or have been the basis of national accomplishment in the past. 
States then bring with them 'material assets' in the form of geographical entities or 
associated needs (corporate identity) and 'representational assets' or a priori ideas about 
who they are (type identity) to the system interaction. 67 
The second process, 'social learning', plays a vital part at this stage, and is 
regarded by Wendt's Constructivists as the most significant element of the theory. Via 
the process of social learning, once entering the systern interaction, states (A and B) ý\ ill 
67 lbid (1999: '126-3128) 
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choose from among the available representations of the 'Self they would want to be and 
among the interests they would want to pursue (international -role identity) and keep 
sending these signals to the 'Other' in the system. Until they reach the stage where the 
distinction between the 'Self and 'Other' is blurred, states will keep sending signals to 
others while expecting to have their identities altercasted during system interactions. 
More precisely, the 'collective identity' that appears at this stage is the extension of the 
boundaries of the 'Self to include the 'Other' and to merge the two into a 'single' 
identity. 68 The process of social interaction and the end-result of collective identity, in a 
way, are deliberately chosen by constructivists to explain the possibility of structural 
change towards international cooperation. The process literally wraps up Wendt's initial 
argument that 'anarchy' or 'international structure' is 'what states make of it. ' 
Diagram 2.1: Wendt's Constructivist Logic and Process 
Type Role P, Collective 
------------------...... 
International 
(exogenously Cooperation 
given) System interac ion 
Constitutive A P, B Collective 
Type) Identity Identity 
I 
I 
Domestic) 
Cultural A, Selection 
Imitation 
( Systemic) 
Social Leaming 
Source: Author's Diagram 
It) 
68 lbid (1999: 2-19 and 129-3311) 
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d) Norms and Identities in Wendt's Constructivism 
It remains now to consider how Wendt's Constructivism can be applied to 
empirical cases. While Wendt contributes tremendously to the theoretical construction of 
social theory, Peter Katzenstein, Robert Herman, Ted Hopf, Thomas Berger, Paul 
Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, to name a few, help promote the theory by incorporating it 
into research practices. 69 In essence, Constructivists generally point out that, instead of 
putting the emphasis on the distribution of material capabilities in the system structure, 
the focus should be on the distribution of ideas and shared experiences among states, 
which inherently leads to states' identity transformation, and the restructuring of state 
systems should be regarded as central. 
Previous constructivist empirical research can be roughly divided in two 
categories, those adopting 'norms' and those adopting 'identities' as analytical tools. 
Admittedly, 'norms' are deliberately chosen to straightforwardly represent 'identity and 
culture', due to the fact that the latter are difficult concepts to define and the 
examination of the constituent parts of identity and culture through norms is more 
practical . 
70 Generally, norms are also used interchangeably with identities and can be 
seen scattered within the same text - signifying the same thing - in several constructivist 
studies. However, one objection to this assertion might be that identities and norms, 
although closely related, are not precisely the same. Moreover, the assertion that identity 
and norm can be used interchangeably has paid far too little attention to the fact that 
identity-led cases and norm-led cases address different sets of methodical departures, 
ask different kinds of research questions and render different analytical explanations, as 
surnmarised in Figure 2.2 and in Table 2.2. 
69 See Katzenstein (1996) in which many constructivists analyse international structural change and 
foreign policy via norms, identity and culture. See also in Hopf (2002) on identity and foreign policy. 
70 Dobson (2003- 27-29) 
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To begin with, as mentioned earlier, Constructivism focuses upon the 
relationship between agents and structure - states and the international system - and the 
mutual impacts of both towards one another. The effects of structure on actors, and vice 
versa, can be distinguished into three levels of social constructions, which corresPond to 
the identity typologies (Figure 2.1) suggested in Wendt's Social Theory of International 
Politics, namely existence (corporate identity), properties (type identity) and behaviour 
levels (role and collective identity). 71 Wendt, Katzenstein and other constructivists 
conduct empirical research in similar veins. In other words, all ignore the corporate 
identity and the effects of agents and structure at the existential level. For norm-led 
theorists or the majority of the constructivists, who are convinced that 'we are or become 
what we do', the emphasis is placed particularly on the 'level of behaviours' from which 
researchers could infer the transformation of 'role and collective identity' or from the 
observed behaviours. On the contrary, identity-led theorists, who believe that 'we 
behave in accordance with the self-understanding of who we are', would instead focus 
on the 'property level' or the 'type identity, ' as shown in Figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2: Katzenstein's Constructivist Framework (operation a lisation level) 
(Properties) 
Identity-led 
(Behaviours) 
Norm - led 
A 
we do - what we are 
B 
we are/become - what we do 
Source: Author's Diagram 
It) 
As shown in Table 2.2, with respect to other dissimilarities between norm-led 
and identity-led cases, the starting questions or research objectives posed by the two are 
poles apart. Norm-led theorists ask about the impacts of norms on international politics 
1 Katzensteln (1996: 4 1) 
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or how norms generate actions and behaviours in international politics, which implicitly 
affect the nature of agents. Alternatively, the concept of 'norms' is employed to explain 
the continuity and change of system phenomena or interstate normative structures, for 
instance, collective security, alliance formation, democratic peace or anarchy. Among 
others, as mentioned previously, some Constructivists believe that identity is a difficult 
concept to grasp. 
Table 2.2: Distinction between Identity-led and Norm-led Cases 
Identity-led led 
Analytical How do identities become How do norms generate 
Questions sources of actions (or norms)? actions in international 
(Q: where do the behaviours or politics? (Q: what are the 
norms themselves come from? ) impacts of norms on 
international politics? ) 
Explanatory Formation or transformation of Continuity and change of 
Focus states' policies and actions system phenomena or interstate 
normative structures, such as 
collective security, democratic 
peace, anarchy and so on. 
Independent Ideas, beliefs, ideologies, Practices and behaviours 
Variables political culture and so on. 
End Result New 'type' identity (shared Collective identity 
(Dependent conception of identity) structural change 
Variable) policy change 
Source: Author's Table 
To integrate identity observation into empirical analysis is also perceived as a 
huge stumbling block. Norms thus emerge as an alternative, for it is claimed that norms 
can occasionally operate like rules that define and specify the identity of states. 72 Via 
'behaviours and social practices', believed to be the premises of state's 'self-reflection' 
and the most concrete analytical variables, norm-led case studies adopt these two 
72 lbid (1996: -5) 
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variables to describe the social process or the transformation of role identity that 
generates standards of action both within and outside states' parameters. The concluding 
result is unquestionably the explanation of continuities and changes of the international 
structure. Possible collective identity, which might emerge from the social construction 
during the system interactions, is believed to be the result that will eventually transform 
the interriational system altogether. 
Explicitly or not, identity-led cases, which stress the importance of 'type 
identity' at the 'property level' of social construction, take off in a different fashion by 
asking how identities become the sources of states' actions, how the 'static' state of 
norms could be overcome or how the sources of norms themselves could be discovered. 
Although the question is simply put, however, it is essentially posed to answer another 
level beyond the mere 'causal effect' of the agent-structure relationship: the 'constitutive 
sources' of the causes themselves. This kind of question, in a way, does fill the gap of 
contemporary Constructivism, since the norm-led cases do somehow answer the 
questions regarding the impact of norms, but not the sources of norms per se. 73 
Incidentally, identity-led cases can be found in foreign-policy related cases, although 
they are not as abundant as the norm-led ones, which aim at attacking and replacing neo- 
realist explanations of international political structure. 
As regards the use of identity as the analytical focus, some acknowledgement of 
the claims about the controversial definition of identity and the difficulty in using it as a 
tangible variable is certainly necessary; however, to argue that the use of identity is too 
difficult to tackle is perhaps too pessimistic a view. Identity-led theorists, knowing the 
limitations of the concept itself, adopt the use of 'ideas, beliefs, and political culture' 74 
73 Kowert and Legro ( 1996: 45 4) 1 Among others, Judith Goldstein, Robert Keohane and Thomas U. Berger. See Goldstein and Keohane 
(1993) on ideas and foreign policy. 
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and so on, just as norm-led theorists use behaviours and practices to solidify norms. In 
recent years, researchers conducting identity-led cases have developed a way in which 
identity could be utilised as a concrete social variable itself. Herman, for example, 
advanced the argument about how the transformed identity shared by the Russian think- 
tank became the major source of the country's political transformation and the move 
towards the 'New Thinking' policy. 75 The concluding result, as opposed to norm-led 
cases, is the 'shared conception of identity' that has been transformed over time and 
signifies the 'recursive processes' of social construction, which is the principal cause of 
the new 'type-identity' or even the establishment of a new set of norms. There will be a 
detailed discussion of Constructivism and the use of identity in foreign policy analysis in 
section 2.4. 
2.2 IR Theories and Japan's Foreign Relations 
Now, let us look at how the above IR theories are applied to the study of Japan's 
foreign relations and Japan's foreign policy. The literature on Japan's foreign policies 
can be divided into two main categories - mainstream IR theorists adopting IR theories 
to explicate Japan's external relations and political scientists or economists taking on 
foreign policy analysis as the main instrument by which to make sense of foreign policy 
behaviours. The main objective of those belonging to the former category is to 
specifically answer 'what and why' questions or to offer the vivid scenarios for Japan's 
past, contemporary and future station in international politics through an understanding 
of the changing structure and power relations in the international system. This is not to 
say that IR theory is inapt in explaining Japan's foreign policy behaviours. To some 
extent, IR theorists are capable of capturin-c-, how far the changing system structures 
jections and SiMUltaneousk, rendering the notions that affect Japan's behavioural pro i I 
75 Herman (1996: 271 -3 11) 
58 
Japan is as normal as others and could be understood through analysis at the systemic 
level. 
In contrast, based on the belief that unlike the study of the foreign policies of 
other countries, exponents of the latter category argue that Japan's 'unfamiliar ways of 
politics' are somehow best understood through the assessment of domestic factors at the 
internal level. Those political scientists espousing foreign policy analyses and decision- 
making models to explain Japan's foreign policy behaviours from domestic viewpoints 
are more concerned about 'why and how' questions and tend to focus more on the 
changing domestic structure that designates the outcome of both foreign and economic 
policies. In this section, the extent to which each IR theory could draw viable 
explanations of Japan's foreign relations will be discussed. Nevertheless, it is important 
to note that to decisively pinpoint whether Japan's foreign policy is best described by 
one or other particular theory is believed to be a rather futile effort, for each theory and 
analytical tool does contribute to the understanding of the complexity of Japan's foreign 
relations. 
2.2.1 Realism and Japan's Foreign Relations 
The earlier version of realism, which focuses its analysis at the sub-systemic or 
domestic level and treats the state as the primary actor, contends that the core interest of 
states lies in the pursuit of interests defined in terms of power. As the concept of power 
is placed at the centre stage, several attempts have been made to explain Japan's political 
moves, power acquisition and foreign relations since the pre-war era. Pre-war Japan is 
best described by classical realism, as military leaders, ambitiously driven by the surge 
for power and prestige, attempted to build a mighty Japanese empire through the 
formation of the 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' and alignment with the Axis 
during World War 11. In fact, the urge to promote the country's power and place in the 
59 
world, or to become a 'first-rate country' (itta koku), had been rooted in Japan since the 
early I 9th century, when the country faced the challenge of Western imperialism that led 
to the Meiji restoration from 1860 until the early 20th century. The options for the 
country's survival lay only on paths that led to the pursuit of power and leadership in the 
Asia Pacific region as a front-runner with the West. 
To classical realists, Japan in the post-war period has pursued the same ends. To 
these scholars, the concept of the pursuit of power remains the focus of analysis. 
However, the conception of power itself has also been developed through time, from the 
emphasis on material and ideal elements of power into other 'soft' elements, such as 
cultural or social elements. As argued by Huntington and Drifte, it is inevitable for a 
great economic power to transform itself into a military power. Huntington clearly 
argues that Japan has accepted all the realist assumptions about power maximisation but 
simply applied them to economic rather than military competition. Instead of acquiring 
military instruments of power such as missiles, tanks or warships, Japan has 
accumulated instruments of power in the form of market control, trade surpluses, 
technology and ownership of foreign companies and so on. 76 
However, unlike other realists, Drifte is not convinced that such transformation 
would be automatic. Rather, the understanding of how the term 'power' has been 
defined by the Japanese is also important. The notion of power is not directly linked to 
'coercion' or 'military prowess': what remains prevalent in the concept of 'power' of the 
Japanese state is the possibility of 'unintended influence' or 'relational power', and not 
that of the distribution of power as usually circumscribed by structural realism. 
77 Post- 
Cold War mercantile realists also share similar notions with classical realists, as they 
7" Huntington (1993: 72-733) 
77 Drifte (1998: 4-8) 
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both assume that states always seek to maximise power to ensure their security. The 
main difference is that the latter are more concerned with 'economic security' rather 
than 'military security. ' In Japan's case, despite its capability to generate military power. 
Japan tends to use economic power through the ability to generate technology as the 
basis for national sovereignty and security. 78 
Nevertheless, Japan's post-war foreign policy has not been solely driven by the 
concept of power alone. Neo-realism or structuralism also holds its international 
resonance by directing the analysis on the outcome of foreign policies to a broader scope, 
especially to the impact at the systemic level rather than the sub-systemic level. 
Although both realist strands share the same notion of the pursuit of power, for neo- 
realists, power is not an end in itself, as notably put by Morgenthau, but rather a means 
to several ends. 79 Besides, neo-realism largely explains the effect of the degree to which 
the Japanese state and its policies affect the status quo and the distribution of power in 
the system, or to put it another way, how the country's position affects, for example, the 
balance of existing powers in the international system. The core tenet of neo-realism 
therefore holds that rational state actors, like Japan, with its escalating economic 
strength, must also assume roles of leadership, shoulder more responsibilities and pursue 
more assertive agenda-settings, particularly in the security sphere and in the area of 
public goods. This, in turn, is believed to fulfil its national interests. 
Put more clearly, throughout the post-war period, the change of power 
configurations at the systemic level was largely tied with the developments and 
implications of Japan's increasing economic power and the country's decision to assume 
cylobal leadership. Some scholars expected to see Japan claim the position of a new 11 
" Heginbothani and Samuels (1998: 20 1) 
79 Schniiegelow (1990: 553-5-56) 
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hegemony and to create the so-called 'Pax-Nipponica' to challenge or even replace the 
then 'Pax-Americana'. The view has been especially echoed among international 
political economists like James Fallows, Clyde Prestowitz and Chalmers Johnson and 
those in the media, such as Karel van Wolferen, for instance. 80 
On the contrary, others believe that the existing Japan-US bilateral relationship 
remains one of the essential beams of the system structure. From the 1980s, when the 
US was believed to be in decline, until the present, when it has assumed the position of 
the sole superpower, Japan has always been viewed as the main 'supporter' of the 
existing US-led system structure. The Japan-US alliance has led to such speculated 
scenarios as the emergence of 'Japan-US parallelism', which signifies the division of 
labour between the two powers in promoting stability of the international system and 
explains the concordance of the two countries' policies towards third countries, for 
instance. 81 Another strand of literature focusing on the impact of the Japan-US alliance 
on security and regional matters also argues that to sustain the Asian balance of power in 
the Asia Pacific among potential powers like China, Russia and North Korea, Japan is 
expected to strengthen its ties with the US through a Japan-US security treaty rather than 
reviving its military prowess itself 
2.2.2 Liberalism and Japan's Foreign Relations 
With regard to Japan's foreign relations, liberal institutionalism, especially the 
functionalist and neo- functional i st strands, is regarded as having better performance in 
explaining Japan's political and foreign policy uniqueness. Although both classical 
realism and liberal institutionalism emphasise the sub-systemic level. the latter alloý\s 
the inclusion of domestic political structures beyond the state's 'black box' into the 
So See further discussion in Fallows (1995), Johnson (1995), Prestoxvitz (1988) and Van Wolferen (1989). 
81 Schrniegeloxv (1990: 5-53). See also Campbell (1993) on Japan-US bilateral relations. 
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analysis. The latter also has its advantage in incorporating the dynamic processes into 
systemic analysis through such concepts as 'interdependency theory. ' Besides, liberal 
institutionalism also paves the way for researchers to examine the pluralistic influence of 
domestic actors over foreign policy making, such as political parties, bureaucracy, 
societal groups, business conglomerates (zaibatsu), the media and so on. 
The study of Japan's foreign economic policy, although it relies on economic 
theory for the most part, stresses the tight knots between the 'political triad, ' including 
the LDP politicians, business groups and the bureaucracy. This combination is believed 
to account for the success of economic policies since the mid 1970s. 82 Similarly, in the 
political and security spheres, the focus on domestic politics, specifically the role of the 
MOFA and political parties, is also evident and is located at the other end of the 
spectrum, opposite to the Realist structural explanation. Most studies that adopt 
domestic politics as their explanatory factors often suggest that the 'pluralistic nature' 
and internal politics among those actors are the major constraints obstructing Japan from 
pursuing active foreign policy and are essentially the main reasons for the incompletion 
of policy re-orientation during the past decade. 
As stated above, liberal institutionalism is not only concerned with analysis at the 
sub-systemic level. Its recent version of the interdependence school, which has been 
developed since the 1970s, further suggests the significant impact of systemic change on 
Japan's foreign relations. In terms of actors, as pointed out previously, the pluralistic 
nature of the Japanese state is emphasised by most liberals, and it is vital to note that 
such nature does not simply exist. The force of globalisation is believed to be the factor 
that erodes the relevance of the traditional unit of analysis or state, and avails the 
82 Johnson (1982 and 1995) 
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opportunity for other actors, such as sub-national governments or NGOs, to flourish and 
83 
take part in foreign policy making . 
With respect to the impacts of interdependence and globalisation towards foreign 
policy mechanisms, the economic interdependence and the escalating force of 
globalisation penetrating Japan have constrained the choice of states in pursuing their 
foreign policies, such as mercantilist foreign economic policies on trade and investment. 
The globalised and interdependent world has blurred the boundaries of the traditional 
units of sovereign states and, in a way, has transformed the way in which Japan deals 
with international issues. Some issues, such as environmental problems or human rights, 
have also required collaborative efforts from all states. The fundamental question of 
Japan's foreign policy choices is therefore not about what kind of policy Japan should or 
would pursue but how Japan could possibly contribute to the enhancement and 
maintenance of the international public good in order to sustain the well-being of both 
Japanese and other world populations. 84 
2.2.3 Constructivism and Japan's Foreign Relations 
As mentioned previously, Wendt's original constructivism primarily aims at 
giving an account of the changing normative structure of the international system, as an 
alternative to Waltz's neo-realism. Most studies using Wendt's constructivism, therefore, 
also attempt to explain how the social interactions between state actors at the system 
level affect the existing structure of the system. However, the use of constructivism in 
Japan's foreign policy is still considered limited and has not thoroughly developed. At 
one point, constructivism was also criticised as a mere extension of liberalism and 
83 Jain (22000: 20) 
8-1 Olita (2000: 96) 
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sharing common grounds with existing rationalist theory. 
85 However, some distinctions 
are also evident, as follows. 
As regards the process of decision-making, while Liberal decision-making is 
processed within the parameter of the state's apparatus, Constructivism stresses the 
interacting process, which is truly embedded in the social parameter. In terms of 
interaction, Liberalism contends that the interaction or relationship among important 
actors is still confined to the sphere of states. The decision-making process is usually 
exclusive to the state's actors rather than mutual interaction between actors in different 
spheres. To put it more simply, although Liberalism recognises the important inputs and 
indirect impact from non-state actors, whether these actors have gained solid positions in 
the foreign decision-making process is still very much in doubt. On the contrary, 
Constructivism places more emphasis on the process of policy decision-making 
embedded in social and ideational interactions between actors. The heart of the 
Constructivist perspective is therefore to observe how actors, both states and non-states 
alike, interact with one another and how the outcomes of such interaction subsequently 
affect the transfiguration of structure and motivations that actually inform foreign policy 
choices. 
As regards the constructivist explanations for Japan's foreign relations, the focus 
in the Constructivist study of political and security policy is also on how those key 
actors' norms and identities are mutually and socially constructed, which inherently 
affects the transfiguration of the international structure as well as the motivations that 
inform foreign policy. The study of Japan's foreign policy so far falls into the latter 
categories or 'how social factors like norms and culture could inform different foreign 
policy choices. ' The study of the impacts of norms, identity and culture on Japan's 
85 Snilth (2000: 15 1- 152) 
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national security can be seen through the work of such scholars as Thomas Berger, Hugo 
Dobson and Peter Katzenstein, who emphasise the use of cultural understanding and 
norms to help explain political and security issues in Japan. For example, Berger argues 
that the primary reason for Japan's reluctance to become a ma or military power lies not j 
in any structural explanations such as the higher degree of interdependence nor the 
changing distribution of power in the world system. Rather, Japan's humble position as a 
non-military superpower is attributed to the 'culture of anti-militarism. ' 86 Katzenstein 
and Okawara are, however, convinced that Japan's security policy is influenced by the 
structure of the state. Both emphasise the scrutiny of the context of social and legal 
norms, which helps to define standards of appropriate behaviours for specific policy 
choices. 87 Dobson further develops the utility of constructivism and norms in explaining 
the empirical case of Japan's UNPKO participations. He argues that Japan's 
assertiveness in PKO participation, which had been a long-time national taboo, is the 
direct result of the role of norms of behaviours in promoting the forward moves in 
UNPKOs. 88 
Despite these convincing Constructivist arguments regarding how non-material 
factors such as norms and cultures have determined Japan's security restraints 
throughout the post-war period, other scholars still point out the shortcomings of 
Constructivism in explaining the substantial gap between Japan's adopted norms and 
values and its actual policy preferences. Lind, for example, argues against 
Construct iv i sts' claim that if Japan truly adhered to the 'anti-militarist norms', it would 
have distanced itself from the US and built a truly defensive military structure, not an 
offensive one that supports the US military presence. To Lind, Japan's security direction 
86 Ber(. ),, er (1993: 120) 
87 Katzenstein and Okawara (1993: U-86) 
88 Dobson (2003: 4-5) 
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is simply a 'hard-nosed realist' policy. 89This underlying problem regarding the inability 
of Wendt's original Constructivism to bridge the gap between the actual policy 
outcomes and the upheld norms or values is addressed in this research and the adapted 
4recursive' version of Wendt's Constructivism, which is able to demonstrates the 
applicability of identity transformation to explain Japan's policy preferences, will be 
introduced and discussed in section 2.4. 
2.3 Foreign Policy Analysis and Japan's Foreign Policy 
Unlike IR theorists, political scientists are not greatly concerned about the 
structure of the international system and its relation to Japan's foreign relations. The 
latter rather put more emphasis on explicating Japan's foreign policy uniqueness via the 
assessment of its domestic structure and politics at sub-systemic level. 90 Interestingly, 
because the large majority of the existing literature on Japanese politics and international 
relations is filled with studies of Japan's sub-systemic issues, the development of several 
foreign policy analytical models to render better insights into Japan's foreign behaviours 
are abundant and more advanced than those using IR theories. As the main objective of 
most foreign policy analysis is to explore and explain the causal roots that determine 
Japan's foreign behaviours, various models with different combinations of 'actors, 
relationship and issues' will be introduced in this section, including the elitist, the 
pluralist, the reactive-state and the civilian power model. 
2.3.1 Elitist Model 
Scholars who portray Japan's decision-making model as 'elitist' agree with the 
basic propositions that the major groups of prominent elites are often, although not 
Lind (2004: 92 and 119-1-10) 
90 Schnilegelow 0 990: 5 ý4) 
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always, united in terms of purpose, interest and action. Earlier studies generally suggest 
that the tight niche of the 'ruling triad', the 'triple alliance' or the 'tripartite power' 
among bureaucracy, political party (the LDP) and big business is the major factor 
accounting for the unified and goal-oriented type of foreign policy. When this is coupled 
with the nature of the decision-making process itself, which habitually leaves out the 
participation of outsiders, those who are excluded from the inner circle of the tripartite 
powers literally 'have no say' in important policy issues. 91 In other words, the 
relationship among the actors representing the policy makers in the elitist model is 
somewhat intertwined. In general, one would say that there is nonetheless a division of 
labour between them. That is, the bureaucracy plans and drafts the policy strategies, the 
political party (LDP) helps push them through and the big business has them 
implemented. Nevertheless, there is still some dispute about the emerging contending 
schools of thought - the 'bureaucratic-dominant school' and the 'political party- 
dominant school' - in terms of who has assumed a dominant role in the decision-making 
process. 
92 
One of the most strongly fixed images of Japanese policy-making is the image of 
bureaucratic dominance, consensus building and the absence of charismatic leaders. In 
foreign policy issues, the role is visibly left to the MOFA as the main actor to deal with 
all routine decisions. As Minor suggests, for routine decisions that involves non- 
controversial situations with little political consequence, decisions are usually technical 
and more computational, and are best left with experts on bureaucracy and especially 
with the 'middle echelon' in the bureaucracy. 
93 As in the case in foreign policy, the role 
of politicians and foreign ministers has always been hindered by the lack of real 
91 Fukul (1977: '35) 
92 Koh (1989: 
-104) 93 Minor (1985: 1-130) and Hosoya (1974: 359) 
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technical knowledge about international issues. However, although the MOFA is 
believed to be the primary actor among the Japanese bureaucracy involved in foreign 
policy decision-making, other actors such as the MITI, the MOFA or the MOD are also 
sometimes included in the process. 
Ahn also suggests that after Japan's attempt to 'international i se' its country, the 
numbers of new ministries such as the MOT, MOC, MOE or MOJ, which are involved 
in foreign decision-making, has also increased because of the importance of several 
international issues. 94 This elitist model or triple alliance model has characterised 
Japan's foreign policy-making throughout the post-war period, specifically in foreign 
economic policy, in which the alliance among the MITI, the LDP and big businesses has 
been prominent. The economic policy based on the 'developmental state' approach has 
been the trademark of the close cooperation between the governmental and business 
sectors in targeted industries throughout the post-war years. 95 In other issues, especially 
with respect to Japan-US bilateral relations, the elitist model and the 'bureaucratic- 
dominant school' are also often adopted to explain the process in which the Japanese 
state politically deals with Washington. This was specifically the case in the post-war 
period when the MOFA, the MITI and the MOF were the major actors exercising 
influence over policy outcomes of Japan-US bilateral relations. 
2.3.2 Pluralist Model 
Another parallel strand of the literature on foreign policy analysis also 
emphasises the 'pluralist nature' of Japan's foreign policy-making by showing evidence 
of factions and political infighting among LDP politicians and among the bureaucracies 
themselves. Furthermore. later works on Japan's foreign policy-making also began to 
94 
, Ahn (1998: 42) 
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stress the increasing importance of non-political actors, especially interest groups, the 
media and public opinion, and suggest these actors' influences on foreign policy 
decisions, such as the peace movement, sub-national government, political parties, 
labour unions and women's groups in terms of injecting their input into the process of 
decision-making. The central idea of the pluralist approach is thus to suggest the 
openness and accessibility of the decision-making process to extensive participants, both 
governmental and non -governmental actors. 
96 
Another set of domestic actors, who have become undeniably important for the 
analYsis of Japan's domestic politics, are those representing the view of the public. Pharr 
and Krauss pioneered the field of study on 'Media and Politics' in Japan. 97 Unlike others, 
who often generalise that the media are the same thing as public opinion, Pharr and 
Krauss make a clear distinction between the two. The media are sometimes treated as a 
mirror reflecting and transmitting what public opinion believes at a given time. At other 
times, the media, especially major newspapers, also play their part as 'tricksters' by 
setting their own agenda, stimulating, evaluating and impinging on the policy direction 
of the government. 
98 
The broadening landscape of foreign policy today makes it inevitable for the 
government to involve other non-state actors in its decision-making process. The 
interactions and relationships of the actors involved in the decision-making process in 
countries that espouse the features associated with western democracy, such as Japan, 
are said to be much more complex. The relationship of those actors who participate in 
the foreign policy decision-making process is not merely within organisations, political 
parties or particular groups, as before. Rather, the relationships and interactions of these 
96Chency (1990: 25 1) 
97 See Pharr and Krauss (1996) on the Japanese media and their impact on domestic politics. 
98 '17-3 lbid, (1996: 12) 
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actors are more criss-crossed, as evident in several policy areas. For example. the 
interactions between the bureaucracy, the Diet interest groups and the political parties 
were exchanged throughout the course of the Gulf Crisis during the early 1990s. The 
close interactions of the central government, sub-national government and NGOs can 
also be seen scattered throughout this past decade in such issues as human rights, 
education, environmental protection and even world peace. 99 
Furthermore, pluralism in Japan's foreign policy analysis is not only 
characterised by numerous emerging political newcomers but also by the relationship 
and interactions between actors or factions within and among key actors in the political 
arena. Previous studies have often concentrated on the factional politics within Japanese 
ministries and the MOFA and their dominance in agenda setting, for instance. From the 
post-war period until the latter half of the 1990s, it is often said that the MOFA had 
pursued independent foreign policy on behalf of the Japanese people. Studies that regard 
the MOFA as their key analytical focus, thus, are questioned as to their validity as 
representations of Japan's real foreign policy agendas and whether other domestic 
political actors are properly taken into account. 100 
Among key actors who deal with the same foreign issues, factions and political 
infighting are also evident in Japan's pluralist world. To a large extent, the decision 
about a certain issue is usually made within the ministry directly responsible for the 
policy's implementation. These ministries also have the tendency towards 
compartmental isation and strict adherence to autonomous existence, which subsequently 
encourages a strong 'ministry-centred' consciousness or 'inter-ministry consultation, 
99 
Jain (2000: 19) 
100 The work of Drifte (2000) on the quest for a permanent UNSC seat, for example, is often criticised by 
. Japanese scholars for its invalidity 
in placing the NIOFA as the core mechanism in analysing UN policy. 
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coordination and deci si on -making'. 
'01 Despite all this, this tendency increasingly 
misleads us to believe that foreign policy decision-making simply springs up from the 
ministry responsible for such issues. On the contrary, the clear-cut jurisdictional 
boundary is often blurred because of the intertwining nature of foreign policy issues, as 
evident in the bureaucratic politics between the MOFA and the JDA over such matters 
as personnel issues, the MOFA and the MITI over sanction measures or the MOFA and 
the MOF over the size of economic or financial aid and so on. 
2.3.3 Reactive-State Thesis 
The reactive-state thesis is perhaps the approach that draws out the most 
vigorous debates among scholars conducting research on Japanese studies. Throughout 
the past fifty years, Japan has been portrayed as a 'reactive state, ' conveying the 
meaning of a country that lacks international goals and will as well as the capabilities to 
play assertive roles commensurate to its power in world politics. As originally suggested 
by Kent Calder, the characteristics of the reactive state are two-fold. The state fails to 
undertake major independent policy initiatives when it has the power and incentives to 
do so and responds to outside pressures for fundamental domestic change, albeit 
erratically, un systematical Iy and often incompletely. 102 
Largely, the reactive and passive state of Japan's foreign policy is the result of 
the emphasis on the post-war 'Yoshida Doctrine, ' advocatin minimalist, risk-avoidance 9 
diplomacy, the separation of politics from economics and dependence on the US with 
regard to security. The doctrine has played a pivotal part in framing the Japanese state's 
policy behaviours or its concentration only on economic aggrandisement without having 
to commit the country to international burdens. Japan's reactive character could also be 
101 Ahn (1998: 41-60) 
102 Calder (1988: 519) 
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understood through the post-war international system that allowed Japan to be cocooned 
in the Japan-US security umbrella. 103 But most important of all, the factor that has 
played a major part in rooting the reactive character into Japan's political nature is the 
domestic political structure. Both Kent Calder and Akihiko Tanaka agree that the 
domestic setting and constraints, including the fragmented character of the 'doughnut- 
politics', the lack of leadership and the high level of consensus-building offer critical 
clues to the immobility of Japan's political, economic and security spheres. 104 
However, some acknowledgement of the merits of the reactive state is certainly 
necessary. Major studies of Japan's foreign policy that adopt reactive state approaches 
rightly pick up the lack of military and security contributions as examples to support the 
argument for Japan's reactiveness. Japan's lack of enthusiasm in despatching military 
troops to the Gulf war and subsequent PKOs and the lack of initiation in other political 
issues in the UN are often raised as the best examples by proponents of the reactive state 
thesis. Furthermore, compared to other middle-range European economies, Japan's 
foreign economic policies remain even less pro-active and confrontational. 105 
Nevertheless, the limitation of the approach to the understanding of Japan's 
contemporary foreign policy through the traditional depiction of Japan as always being 
subservient to external pressures and confined by domestic politics cannot be overlooked. 
Throughout the past decades, Japan has developed several of its foreign policies 
independent of external pressures and the US, especially its foreign aid, environmental 
and even human rights policy. 
Another group of scholars argue differently that Japan is a 'rising state' rather 
than a reactive one. Pharr and Yasutorno are convinced that Japan should be classified as 
10" 35) lbid (1988: 526), Pharr (1993: 21- 
104 Calder (1988: 52-18-530), Calder (1991: 24) and Tanaka (2000: 5-6) 
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either a 'defensive state' or a 'proactive state', as Japan has undertaken the security 
policy of 'low-cost, low-risk and benefit-maximising, ' which essentially implies a 
character that is active more than reactive. ' 06 Based on the defensive perspective, Japan 
seems to secure its survival through such strategies as securing its national integrity by 
avoiding security and military involvement but pursuing its national agenda through the 
ý new-mul iti lateral ism' via multilateral organisations and so on. ' 07 
2.3.4 Civilian Power Thesis 
The civilian power approach has emerged as an alternative way to view Japan's 
foreign policy only recently. In the light of the changing international system 
environment after the Cold War period, many scholars, including the proponents of the 
civilian power thesis, have also pointed out the transforming essence of international 
politics and international relations, especially the transformation of the relationship 
between 'power and security'. To them, any study of international relations that revolves 
around the concept of 'power struggle' must be re-examined and the concept of 'power' 
itself must also be redefined. The term 'power' must not be used only to refer to the 
'hard' or material istic/structural nature of military prowess, geographical and resource 
endowment or the ability to 'command' others. 
Rather, as suggested by several scholars, the ability to 'persuade' and to use 
'soft' power, which connotes non-military uses of power such as economic, culture or 
diplomatic means to set agendas and complete political or security ends, has become a 
new principal element in today's state of affairs. 108 According to Maull, the shift from a 
realist system structure to a more liberal i nst ituti onal -based one allows the emergence of 
a new archetype of international power or a 'civilian power', as in Japan and Germany. 
106 Pharr( 19933: 23-5-2236) 
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The new kind of power is believed to advocate the necessity of international cooperation 
as a vital means by which to reach international goals; to instrumentalise economic and 
non-military resources in lieu of military means to secure national interests and 
objectives; and lastly, to develop a supranational organisation to deal with international 
issues. 109 
The concept of civilian power actually originated from the same source as did 
other approaches questioning how Japan could possibly enhance its political 
assertiveness commensurate to its economic status. Much of the literature on Japan has 
revolved around either Japan's failure to assume international responsibilities or its leap 
forward to establish a new kind of superpower or to transform itself to a 'normal power. ' 
Both extremes interestingly raise the same question about the validity and relevancy of 
an 4economic superpower'. Although Japan's focus on economic development and the 
country's sense of 'anti-militarism' are evident, Japan's ability to assume the role of a 
prototype civilian power is still very much in doubt. On the one hand, Japan is exposed 
to the strengthening and the utilisation of the vast arrays of international organisations, 
from regional groups like APEC or ASEAN to global ones like the UN, IMF, OECD or 
WTO. 
However, regarding the core relationship of 'economic power and security', the 
necessary quality of a civilian power, who must be able to effectively wield its economic 
resources to counter not only non-military issues such as human rights or foreign aid 
policy, but particular security threats as well, is still lacking in Japan. For example, 
Hughes tested the validity of the civilian power concept by investigating how Japan 
exerts its economic power over North Korea's military aggressiveness. He found that at 
109 Maull (1990-1: 92-93) 
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present, Japan still lacks sufficient policy-making will to mobilise its economic power to 
reach a resolution regarding North Korea's security problem. ' 10 
Other scholars also further point out that the evolving dimensions, such as 
political, domestic or even military aspects, still need further examination alongside 
further development of the civilian power conception itself. Pempel, for instance, raises 
questions about the development and evolution of democracy in Japan. "' The primary 
reason is because in order to substantiate the assumption that Japan is on the verge of 
turning itself into the first civilian power, as originally suggested by Maull, it is also 
important to consider that factors such as political development within Japan, which has 
not exactly followed western liberalism, might present an intricacy in terms of political 
will, institutional support or domestic mechanisms for Japan to transform the country 
into a real civilian power. 
2.4 Constructivism, Identity and Foreign Policy 
2.4.1 Shortcomings of IR Theories and Foreign Policy Analysis 
In the previous sections, the IR theories, foreign policy models and their 
application to the cases of Japan's foreign relations and foreign policy have been 
reviewed. In this section, their shortcomings and the adapted Constructivist model will 
be discussed in detail. The main shortcoming of IR theories and foreign policy analysis 
in the study of Japanese foreign relations and foreign policy perhaps lies in the 
epistemological problem or the overly clear-cut divide between the external and the 
domestic level of analysis. IR theories, regardless of their distinctiveness, are well 
known for their focus on the analytical observation of the system structure and its impact 
on the power relations among international actors. Foreign policy analysis. on the 
110 Hughes (1999: '32 and 187) 
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contrary, focuses on 'sub-system' examination and is the major analytical tool for those 
scholars interested in domestic structure. 
The sharp contrast between scholars adopting IR theories and those using foreign 
policy analyses and their emphasis on separate levels of analysis is simply the 
underlying problem that inevitably causes incomplete understanding of a state's foreign 
behaviour. To put it more clearly, by concentrating only on external factors, IR theories 
de-emphasise the ability and distinctive variety of factors of individual agents that might 
offer sound explanations for the understanding of international relations and states' 
behaviours. Foreign policy analysis falls into a similar trap by focusing excessively on 
domestic agents and ignoring the systemic effects on states' behaviours. As clearly put 
by J. David Singer, the lack of communication between the international relations 
theorists interested in the system structure and the political scientists and economists 
dealing with foreign policies and domestic structure is the key impediment in the study 
of states' policy behaviours. " 2 
On the one hand, the limitations of such IR theories in explaining states' 
behaviours, especially those with a lot of peculiarities like Japan, may be due to the 
incorrect calibration of the concepts of the Realist's 'state as the unitary actor' or 
6structure and distribution of material power' and Liberalism's reliance on the economic 
paradigm. 113 Realism, for example, bases its explanation of Japan's place in the world 
and foreign behaviours only on Japan's material capability and resources. The 
assumption that a certain state would automatically follow the same course of 
international behaviours simply because the system mechanism and structure allow it to 
do so seems irrelevant in Japan's case. To date, Realism still finds it difficult to explain 
Singer (1969: 28-29) 
Sclu-niegelow (1990: 556) 
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why Japan is so reluctant to develop its political and military capability to match its 
amplified economic leverage. In contrast, Liberalism is regarded as performing better in 
explaining the uniqueness of Japan's foreign policy by allowing the inclusion of the 
domestic political structure into the analysis. However, Liberalism is still unable to offer 
an empirically sound explanation of Japan's resistance to the force of globalisation and 
interdependence. For example, despite Japan's full recognition of the advantageous 
devices of international organisations and cooperation, Liberalism still fails to 
understand Japan's inertia to move towards 'full-fledged' contributions other than the 
financial one. 
On the other hand, foreign policy analysis seems to have more advantages in 
attempting to reveal Japan's foreign policy complexity. Several models have been 
introduced throughout these past decades, as stated in the previous section. Although 
each model is capable of disclosing the factors that determine Japan's foreign 
behaviours as evident in the extremely tight niche of Japanese elites, the varieties of 
domestic actors or the psychological factors such as the reactive nature in Japanese 
politics, detailed investigation into domestic determinants is sometimes plainly 
inadequate. For example, the reactive state thesis merely suggests domestic politics as a 
major constraint on Japan's development of more resilient international political 
gestures and argues that the country cannot engage in fundamental change if not forced 
by external pressures. The civilian power thesis is another alternative, offering a new 
possibility to speculate on the future directions of Japan's foreign policy. 
However, one of the major flaws of using these models of foreign policy analysis 
is that they are somehow 'pre-determined' and several cases raised by these models 
simply support the validity of their arguments. By the same token, it is also easy for the 
opponents of these models to pick up particular cases that suggest the contrary. In other 
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words, the advocates of the reactive state thesis always have to confront their opponents 
- the 'active-state' thesis and the proponents of the civilian power thesis are also 
challenged by the advocates of Ozawa's 'normal-power' thesis. Therefore, in terms of 
theoretical development, it seems that the existing models adopted to explain the 
directions and behaviours of Japanese foreign policy are incomplete and merely consist 
of groups of scholars throwing cases and evidence towards one another. 
As for Constructivism, despite its advantage in filling the theoretical gaps of the 
IR theories and foreign policy analysis, some critics still question Wendt's attempt to 
mix positivist or scientific epistemology with post-positivist ontology to create a middle 
way between rationalist and reflectivist theories. ' 14 Wendt's attempt to develop a new 
theoretical framework, which emphasises the concepts of 'idealism and holism', is often 
criticised as an attempt to muddle up 'social and natural scientific epistemology' and is 
somehow inconceivable. The second criticism lies in Wendt's clear dichotomy between 
ýmaterialism' and 'idealism' and the precedence of 'idealism' over 'materialism'. 
According to some, the social world is not constituted of one or another, but of a mixture 
of both material and ideational factors. As pointed out by Keohane, the issue is not one 
of 'material forces versus ideas' but how they are actively linked together. 115 
Among others, as far as this research is concerned, Wendt is also often criticised 
for his complete negligence of the importance of domestic politics upon states' identity 
formation. Put another way, Wendt fails to discuss the 'identity of identity' or how 
actors are initially constituted into 'self and 'other, ' but simply sets this aside as 
exogenously given. 116 By ignoring the so-called 'type- identity', the overall process of 
identity transformation is simply 'one-sided, ' focusing only at the international level. 
1" See Smith (2000) and Keohane (2000) 
115 Keoliane (2000: 127) 
116 Smith (2000: 160) and Zehfuss (20021: 89) 
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Although such criticism is acknowledged in this research, it is believed that the 
advantages of Wendt's Constructivism, mentioned previously, still surpass these 
theoretical controversies. However, it is still admittedly problematic to apply Wendt's 
Constructivism to foreign policy preferences and outcomes. Therefore, the adapted 
version, recursive Constructivism, is needed and will be discussed in the following 
sections, which focus on the relevance of the model to the analysis of foreign policy 
outcomes. 
2.4.2 Why Constructivism?: Identity and Foreign Policy 
The use of 'identity' as a starting point for foreign policy analysis is nothing new. 
However, the application of 'identity' usually centres on the basis of defining domestic 
ideals and politics and represents 'national identity' instead of defining 'interests. ' The 
traditional use of 'identity', although useful to some extent, only addresses one-sided 
concerns about 'self-image' on the domestic front and how these sets of self-images 
converge with or diverge from one another. The mitigation and exacerbation of conflicts 
are certainly the result of the converging or the diverging of these self-images. 117 In 
contrast, Wendt's Constructivism offers a deeper theoretical basis for approaching 
identity, as argued in section 2.1.3. Again, it is important to repeat that Wendt's 
constructivism originally aimed at explaining the transformation of international 
political structure and not how the identity at the domestic level is transformed or the 
extent to which these transformed identities impinge on the direction of foreign policy. 
These questions began to catch constructivists' attention only recently. To 
constructivists interested in the transformation of identity and the impact on policy 
117 See Nau (2000) on identity approach, identity and interests and American self-image. 
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preferences, the key that hooks up the ideational factors such as identity to the substance 
of foreign policy is perhaps the link between identity and interests. 
On the one hand, the heart of the neo-realist argument on foreign policy analysis 
is based on the rational choice theory of states' actors pursuing foreign policies, which 
they perceive as fulfilment of national interests. On the other, for constructivists, 
national interests are closely knitted with identity and both are socially transformed and 
defined. Unlike neo-realism, in the view of constructivism, national interests do not 
simply exist to be discovered by rational actors. Foreign policies may be pursued in 
accordance with national interests, but interests themselves are significantly defined 
through the process of identity transformation. Therefore, whether it is relevant to infer 
foreign policy direction from the transformation of identity, the answer is obviously 
affirmative. As Wendt puts it: 
'Interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it 
wants (desire) until it knows who it is (beliefs). This is to suggest that without 
interests, identities have no motivational force, without identities, interests have 
no directions. Both designate motivations that help explain state's behaviours. ' 118 
'How possible is it to infer identity from ideas and beliefs that are embedded 
among political actorsT is another question often raised by most sociologists and 
reflectivists on the validity of applying sociological concepts in the study of 
international relations and foreign policy analysis. It is important to make clear from the 
start that the constructivist empirical studies, while using sociological concepts such as 
CLI Iture, norms or identities, do not focus on the construction of norms or identities per se. 
and the Amon-_ constructivist scholars, norms and identities are literally 'pre-given' 
118 Wendt ( 1999: 2 'N I) 
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focus is rather placed upon how the norms and identities of states are transformed or 
merged into collective ones. On the one hand, most constructivist cases concentrate on 
the process of identity transformation from 'role identity' to 'collective identity' and 
treat the process as the main reason for the transformation of the system structure. On 
the other hand, constructivists who focus on the transformation of 'type identity' to the 
new collective one and its effect on foreign policy initiatives are concerned with the 
process of transformation at the domestic level. As for the latter, with particular 
reference to foreign policy analysis, 'identity', used for this purpose, signifies a 'social 
cognitive structure' within which some political traits dominate others. ' 19 
In his introduction to the study of cultural factors and national security policy, 
Katzenstein defines the use of identity as the depiction of varying national ideologies of 
4collective distinctiveness and purpose'. Identity, according to constructivists, is a label 
for the construction of statehood enacted domestically and projected internationally. 120 
The existing constructivist empirical studies on foreign policy argue about the 
importance of the observation of a genuine re-conceptualisation of interests, and how 
experiences and shared knowledge grounded in new collective understandings of the 
dynamics of world politics and actors' evolving identities are interpreted by domestic 
political actors. 121 In these analyses, identity formation is not treated as central and 
usually pre-given. Ideas and beliefs, collectively shared among domestic constituencies, 
are often used to infer the overall depiction of the transformation of existing identities. 
In contrast, other studies go even further to trace identity formation itself in order to 
avoid the pitfall of Wendt's constructivism, which relies on the a priori assumption and 
119 Hopf (2002.1) 
120 Katzenstein (1996: 6) 
12 1 Herman ( 1966: 2 73) and Berger ( 1996: 3 18) 
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pre-theorisation of identities. 122 In sum, one could possibly infer 'political' identitý, 
which is believed to be developed over time by observing shared ideas and beliefs 
revolving around political actors. Once the transformed identity is defined, national 
interests follow, and through this process, one could render a better assessment of the 
direction of foreign policy, which reflects both national identity and interests. 
2.4.3 Recursive Constructivist Logic: Understanding Identity Transformation 
As mentioned repeatedly throughout the previous sections, Wendt's 
Constructivism may provide us with an alternative in incorporating 'non-material' 
factors, especially norms and identities and culture, into the analytical system and render 
better insights into how social interactions at the system level affect the transformation 
of the normative structure. However, to apply his model 'as it is' to the analysis of 
foreign decision-making processes or foreign policy preferences might be problematic, 
as discussed in section 2.4.1. This research, therefore, aims at observing simultaneously 
how the 'domestic-type' identity has been transformed and how it has affected the 
direction of Japan's projection of 'international-role' identities, and vice versa. The 
adoption of identity as the analytical tool and the adaptation of Wendt's original model 
into the 'recursive version' are based on the following assumptions. 
Firstly, the first assumption articulates that political identities are social assets, 
which can be pinpointed and are as evident as material factors. In the case of Japan, IR 
scholars have long struggled with some difficulties in making sense of the foreign 
policies pursued by the Japanese state throughout these past decades. The principal 
reason for this is that they fail to notice the importance of identity transformation. which 
is inextricablN, linked with Japanese politics. Neo-realists have tried for a long time to 
122 Hopf (2002": 4-9) 
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specify the best foreign policy courses for Japan -a policy based on material capability: 
that is, one in which Japan would behave in accordance with its transformed power 
position. Unfortunately, Japan has never followed this route, or if it has, it would appear 
to be only temporary and only when it was forced to do so by heavy external pressures. 
Given its historical accounts, Japan's political identities have been developed during the 
course of its relations with the external environments. Japan has developed the 
symptoms of political schizophrenia and xenophobia through the course of the country's 
250-year effort to isolate itself from Western influence during the Meiji era. The 
symptoms were innately implanted in the Japanese society and resulted in the attempt to 
establish the so-called 'Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere', with its leading role 
attached to the regional structure, during the World War 11. 
In retrospect, apart from the Realist account of power hunger and economic 
rationality among Japanese militarists, it would also seem that Japan had for a long time 
attempted to distance itself from the existing western powers and also recognised itself 
as 'different'. Even the pursuance of the policies in the post-war period, which resulted 
in the emergence of a humble economic giant, also contrastingly mirrored Japan's self- 
understanding of its safest place in the world arena, as a pacifist, an economic power and 
a follower of the US. On the contrary, Japan's political identities during the post-Cold 
War period have entered another loop of transformation. Although its identity as an 
economic giant has been secured for some time and the policies that reflect Japan's 
identity as such could be seen through, for example, assistance and multi-development 
programmes, its political identity as a pacifist country creates many problems and t: ) 
controversies for its policy speculation. Appearing as the new alternative, 
Constructivism suggests how IR scholars could shift their focus to study the effect of 
social construction on the country's identity, rather than placing their theoretical 
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commitment on only economic-based, profit-maximising rationalist theories. The social 
factor, often overlooked by mainstream IR, is believed to be the one that determines 
Japan's foreign policy directions. 
Secondly, in order to observe socialfactors such as identity, this research will 
take on the concept of 'social construction' as the major process to be scrutinised. 
Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein outline five main pathways or social construction 
processes as follows: 
123 
a) The process by which 'norms' shape national interests or state policies 
b) The process by which 'norms' shape identity 
c) The process by which 'identity transformation' shapes national interests and 
state policies 
d) The process by which 'identity transformation' shapes the normative 
structure of the inter-state system 
e) The process by which 'state policies' reproduce and reconstruct the 
international structure 
This study slightly modifies the existing Wendt's social theory to suit its own 
objective, which aims at using the concept of identity transformation to explain Japan's 
UN policy sources and directions in the past decade, but not the effect of identity 
transformation on system structure nor the study of the process of identity formation per 
se. This research is restricted to primarily observing process V or 'the process by which 
'identity transformation' shapes national interests and state policies, so as to address the 
qUestion of how identity transformation has affected the direction of Japan's UN 
security policy in the past 15 years. In addition to that, another 'recursive process' will 
also be observed, that is: 
123 Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein (1996: 5 2-65) 
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f) The process by which 'social interaction at the system level' affects the 
transformation of identity at the domestic level (how the international-role 
identity affects the transformation of 'type- identity') 
To elaborate this point, as shown in Diagram 2.2, this research argues that 
although the formation of the 'domestic-type identity' is taken as given, the 
transformation of such identity cannot be taken as exogenous to the research observation. 
Contrary to Wendt's concentration on the linear process of how 'international -role 
identities' 124 have been transformed into the 'collective identity' or the expected end- 
result of the social interaction at the system level (stage I to stage 4, without passing 
stages 2 and 3), this research is convinced that this social process of identity 
transformation is rather 'recursive' (with the inclusion of stages 2 and 3). The 
interactions between or among states do not necessarily or habitually result in 'collective 
identity' at the system level. This implicitly signifies that the transformation of identity 
might not occur at system level, as predicted in the linear structure of social interaction, 
as shown previously in Diagram 2.1. 
Nevertheless, the result of the interactions at the system level (stage 1) is the 
major signal sent to states as to what kind of conditions or expected roles are the 
requirements prerequisite to the joining of the international community (stage 2). Such a 
process, or process T (stage 2), will be sent back to the political actors. However, this is 
not to say that states will transform their identities to suit with demands or conditions set 
by the interactions at the system level, otherwise this would be simply the repetition of 
the process advocated by Neo-realism. The most important point is that states also 
engage themselves in process 'c', ývhich basically deals with identity 'redefinition or 
12 4 The selection of 'domestic-type identities' which states want to make apparent while interactin-2 with 
others. 
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transformation' at the domestic level. Again, the process of identity transformation or 
redefinition, or as Katzenstein puts it, 'self-reflection', does not occur in isolation. 125 It 
is communicated to others as these transformations of identity and the preferred 
'domestic-type' identities will be sent back to the international system again (stage 3). 
Diagram 2.2: Recursive Constructivist Logic 
Typ e Role Collective 
2 
International 
Cooperation 
System interaction 
AB 
Domestic 14 Collective 
Type Identity Identity 
Causal Principal 
ldeajBeliefs 
31 1 
(Domestic) 
Cultural 'T Selection 
3 
Imitation Social LearninQ 
II 
---------------------------------------------- (Systemic) 
Source: Author's Diagram 
Whether the new 'collective (type) identity' at the domestic level would 
correspond to the 'collective (role) identity' defined at the international level very much 
depends upon the issue concerned, and will vary from issue to issue. Thus, in order to 
speculate as to the direction of a country's foreign policy, the observation of the 
conformity of both the transformed domestic-type and the international -role identity 
should be considered equally important, as hypothetically put in this research. To sum 
Lip, as seen in Diagram 2.2 and previously drawn in Diagram 2.1, the linear structure of 
125 Katzenstein ( 1996: 21) 
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Wendt's Constructivism follows route number I straight to stage 4, without passing 
through stages 2 and 3. On the contrary, the 'recursive version' suggests a process that 
begins and ends in numerical order, from stage I to 2 to 3 to 4, respectively. 
Furthermore, by comparing Diagrams 2.1 and 2.2, Wendt's original model clearly 
focuses on the system level, while the 'recursive model' emphasises identity 
transformation at both domestic and system level. 
Thirdly, to solidify 'identity' and to make the study of its impacts on foreign 
policy directions possible, the examination of identity should be drawn from the 
'distribution of ideas, shared beliefs and experiences' among political actors. ' 26 The 
extant literature observing identity formation and transformation depicts different kinds 
of variables to be examined. Hopf, for example, chooses to infer Soviet identity 
formation by observing 'habitual form of action'. He is convinced that among Max 
Weber's four categories of social actions, namely rational, normative, emotional and 
habitual, the unthinking, automatic and unintentional latter is the most reliable source 
from which identity can be inferred. 127 Others depict 'historical experiences and political 
cultures' of key political actors and institutions as the main variables and examine how 
those variables are institutional ised in the society, and hence become an integral part of 
national identities. Thomas Berger contends that the cu Itural- institutional context in 
which defence policy is made in Germany and Japan is the key to the antimilitarism 
stance in both countries. To him, political culture, which simply refers to cultural beliefs 
and values, is the primary factor that shapes a given society's orientation towards 
PolitiCS. 
128 
126 See Herman (1996) on the use of constructivism in Soviet foreign polley analysis and Dobson (2003) 
on the use of norms in Japan's policy towards the UNPKO participation. 
127 Hopf (2002: 10-11) 
12 S Berger (1996: 31231-325) 
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Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane have also indirectly contributed to the use 
of 'ideas and beliefs' in constructivist analysis, though both are strong advocates of the 
rationalist school. Despite this fact, their articulation that the three sets of ideas and 
beliefs - world view, principled and causal ones - provide causal pathways and affect 
policy preferences supports the constructivists' claim that non-material factors can also 
be located at the centre of scientific analytical focus. With respect to the relationship 
between 'ideas and beliefs' and 'identity', Goldstein and Keohane state that they are 
literally entwined with people's conceptions of their identities, and since ideas and 
beliefs cannot easily be compartmental ised from interests, nor can identities. 129 
To put it in more concrete terms, the main articulation in this dissertation 
proposes that the higher the degree of conformity between the 'domestic-type' and 
'international-role' identity, the more likely it is that activism on human security policy 
or the new UN-Centrism will be sustainable. In other words, the foreign policy or 
'international-role' identity projected internationally should coincide with the collective 
knowledge of 'domestic-type' identity among political actors at the domestic level. One 
might argue that there is no surprise in seeing Japan pursue its UN foreign policy based 
on its national interests (if one accepts the notion that identity and interests are closely 
knitted and one can infer national interests from identity), that is, when the 
'international-role identity' is in tune with the 'domestic-type' identity. 
The point is that Japan's interest and identity does not simply exist, awaiting 
discovery by rational actors. The country does not suddenly know what its national 
interest is, but has been through several recursive processes of social construction, both 
at domestic and international level, to acknowledge and adjust itself to the changing 
identit 
. Saying that 
Japan's activism of in human security policy (the direction of yI 
1-11) Goldstein and Keohane (19931: 8 and 27) 
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Japan's foreign policy) depends upon the transformed identity (domestic-type identity) 
is therefore different from saying that Japan pursues its human security policy based on 
the existing national interests. The main reason is that national interests simply exist in 
rationalist viewpoints, whereas identity transformation in constructivist cases - both 
national interests and identity - involves the process of social interactions both at internal 
and international level. The 'type identity' is not merely there to be discovered but also 
evolves and transforms from time to time. Thus, the observation of the transformation of 
'type identity' will be one of the viable references to explain the success or failure of the 
state's foreign policy preferences. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In general, the literature on Japan's foreign relations and foreign policies can be 
divided into two main categories. The first group consists of those adopted mainstream 
IR theorists who adopt Realism, Liberalism and their neo-versions to explicate Japan's 
external relations. The other group are those political scientists or economists who take 
on foreign policy analytical models as the main instrument to make sense of foreign 
policy behaviours. Despite their contributions to the understanding of Japan's foreign 
relations and policy behaviours, the main shortcoming of IR theories and foreign policy 
analysis lies in the epistemological problem or the overly clear-cut divide between the 
external and the domestic level of analysis. IR theories, regardless of their 
distinctiveness, are well known for their focus on the analytical observation of the 
system structure and the impact of material factors on the power relations among 
international actors. Foreign policy analysis, on the contrary, focuses on 'sub-system' 
examination and is the major analytical tool for those scholars interested in domestic 
structure and internal politics. The sharp contrast between scholars adopting IR theories 
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and those using foreign policy analysis and their emphases on separate levels of analysis 
is simply the underlying problem that inevitably causes incomplete understanding of a 
state's foreign behaviour. 
Wendt's Constructivism, however, emerged only recently as an alternative 
approach that serves the purpose of bridging the gap between the positivist and post- 
positivist research schemes by integrating 'non-material' factors such as ideas and 
beliefs into the analytical process. Furthermore, it also offers a new way to understand 
how the normative structure of the international system could be transformed through 
social interactions and exchanges of ideas, beliefs and knowledge among system agents. 
Despite the theory's contribution, this research slightly modifies the existing form of 
Wendt's social theory to suit its objective, which aims at using the concept of identity 
transformation to explain Japan's UN policy sources and directions in the past decade, 
but not the effect of identity transformation on system structure, nor the study of the 
process of identity formation per se. Firstly, this research is restricted to primarily 
observing how 'identity transformation' shapes national interests and state policies, in 
order to address the question of how identity transformation affects the direction of 
Japan's UN security policy. Additionally, another 'recursive process' will also be 
observed - the process by which social interaction at the system level affects the 
transformation of identity at the domestic level or how the international -role identity 
affects the transformation of 'type-identity'. 
Secondly, this research argues that although the formation of the 'type identity' 
is taken as given, the transformation of such identity cannot be taken as exogenous to the 
research observation. Contrary to Wendt's concentration on the linear process of how 
'role identity' (which is indirectly the selection of type identities that states ý\ ish to make 
apparent when interacting with others) has been transformed into the 'collective identity', 
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which is the expected end-result of the social interaction at the system level, this 
research is convinced that this social process of identity transformation is rather 
'recursive'. The interactions between or among states do not necessarily or habitually 
result in 'collective identity' at the system level. This implicitly signifies that the 
transformation of identity might not occur at system level, as predicted in the linear 
structure of social interaction. 
Thirdly, to solidify 'identity' and to make the study of its effects on foreign 
policy directions possible, the examination of identity should be drawn from the 
distribution of ideas, shared beliefs and experiences among political actors. By 
comparing the system of ideas and beliefs embraced by the international community, 
which informs their 'international-role' identities, and those adopted within Japan, 
which also inform the 'domestic-type' identities throughout the past 15 years and the 
conformity between these two identities, it is believed that the sources of Japan's foreign 
policy preferences will be revealed. In Chapters 4-6, the 'recursive model' will be 
applied to the cases of the Gulf Crisis, the Cambodian peace process and the promotion 
of human security policy to examine the degree of conformity between the 
'international-role' identities and the 'domestic-type' identities and the overall process 
of Japan's identity transformation. In the next chapter, however, the background to 
Japan's UN and security policy will be outlined to introduce the basis of Japan's security 
direction in maintaining international peace and security. 
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Chapter 3 Japan's Security Policy in the UN Context 
3.1 Japan's Security Policy: An Overview 
Before looking into the case studies in Chapters 4-6, the background to how- 
Japan's UN security policy has been examined over the years and why Japan's security 
direction could be understood within the framework of the UN will be discussed in this 
chapter. While studies on Japan's security policy under Japan-US bilateral relations are 
abundant, few venture into the examination of Japan's security policy under the UN 
framework. Besides, the popular arguments simply substantiate the existing contention 
that 'the UN did not play a central part in Japan's security policy' and that Japan usually 
'had no motivation to take the initiative to strengthen the influence of the UN in the 
international political and security spheres. " 30 
Unlike Japan-US security arrangements, since its formal admission to the UN in 
1956, there has always been a question about whether there is anything peculiarly 
significant about Japan's 'UN-Centrism' or 'UN-Centred Diplomacy' and whether the 
UN could perform as a security shield for Japan or as the key security mechanism to 
uphold international peace and stability. Scholars often argue that Japan's attitudes 
towards the pronouncement of 'UN-Centrism' have been ambiguous and the concept 
itself has been a mere replica of Japan's minimalist foreign policy pursuits. "' It is 
undeniable that for more than five decades, Japan's UN diplomacy had lurked behind 
the scenes, as a background to Japan's foreign policy setting, and tended to have only a 
limited association with Japan's security policy. In contrast to the majority of studies 
that contribute to the limited understanding of Japan's UN policy, the following sections 
N\; ill discuss the development of Japan s securitv insights under the framework of UN- 
130 Pan (2005: 347) 
I'll LAI (19931: '190) 
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Centrism in parallel with the popular security understanding under the Japan-US security 
alliance. This is to serve as the basic background for the argument to be advanced in 
subsequent chapters on the effect of identity transformation on the emerging activism of 
Japan's UN security policy. 
Since its WWII defeat, Japan has embarked on a security policy that entrusted its 
own national survival to Japan-US Security arrangements and to its security belief in the 
unique conviction that it could build a truly peaceful nation. To achieve such an 
ambitious end as a military-free and a peaceful nation, the adoption of the Peace 
Constitution, the special relationship under the framework of the Japan-US security 
alliance and UN-Centred diplomacy have been the most integral mechanisms steering 
Japan towards such political security inspiration. The first legal and political gesture 
symbolising the post-War 'peaceful' Japan was the adoption of the 1946 Peace 
Constitution, especially as it was stipulated in the Preamble that: 
'[] We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply 
conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationshiPs, and we have 
determined to preserve our security, and existence, trusting in the justice and 
faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world [ ... ]. We recognise that all peoples 
of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want. ' 132 
Ideationally speaking, the Constitution Preamble not only reflected Japan's 
traumatic experience in WWII, which inevitably resulted in the country's aversion to 
war and militarism, it also echoed Japan's ideas and beliefs that the only way 
international peace and national security could be totally secured was perhaps through 
havinor faith in others' political morality and the universality of international law and 
13 _2 See the full text in The Constitution of Japan, 1946 
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through the strict adherence to the pacifist sentiment of neither resorting to war nor to 
other military endeavours to achieve peace. This ideal pacifism has become the 
cornerstone characterising Japan's security and foreign policy and has been one of the 
fundamental ideas that have evolved and been transformed throughout several decades. 
Immediate after the end of WWII, Japan's understanding about building up a ýpeace- 
loving nation' or a country upholding pacifist sentiment was certainly 'inward-looking. ' 
To a certain extent, 'pacifism' was very much understood among Japanese people as 
4anti-militarism, ' a sentiment that was concerned only with restraining itself from 
military ambition so that Japan would never again have to experience the horror of war. 
Such high ideals, stipulated in the Constitution Preamble, were materialised through a 
well fabricated 'no-war clause, ' also known as the famous Article 9, which also laid out 
the framework for Japan's post-war foreign relations. 133 
On the one hand, it clearly mirrored Japan's post-war concern about how 
international peace and security could be achieved. In the mindset of the Japanese 
government and people, 'war' or any 'use of force' could never be a legitimate choice 
towards the maintenance of peace and international security. To substantiate this 
ideational conviction, Japan willingly renounced its sovereign right to wage war against 
others and curbed its 'land, sea, and air forces' to the lowest level possible. The very 
idea of the preservation of peace and the banishment of oppression and intolerance 
derived from atrocious wars was also believed to be shared by other 'peace-loving 
nations. ' On the other hand, the sincere wish to establish eternal international peace 
through the upholding of such pacifism, as set forth in Article 9, was not the only 
133 Article 9 stipulates that: 
'Aspiring sincerek, to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people 
forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling 
international disputes. 
in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as 
other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerenc\ of the state Nvill not be recognised. ' 
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security aspect initially portrayed by the Japanese political founders. While the 
Constitution might clearly limit Japan's military potential to the minimum, it does not 
deny the 'inherent right of self defence that Japan is entitled to maintain as a sovereign 
nation. ' 134 To translate the above ideas and spirit of the Peace Constitution into tangible 
and sensible policy implementation, Japan's politicians during the post-war period 
apparently placed their concern regarding national security on the Japan-US Security 
arrangements while quietly hoping to rely on the newly established UN for the task of 
maintaining international peace and security, as originally stated in Yoshida's three main 
pillars of Japan's post-war foreign policy principles. 
As described in Figure 3.1, the pattern of Japan's security and foreign policy is 
largely comprised of three subsets. At its core, Japan's primary concern since the post- 
War period has always been how to protect and secure its national security in the 
absence of proper and normal military capacity. By renouncing the sovereign right to 
maintain traditional military components, the minimum necessary level of SDF has been 
developed under close bilateral ties with the US and within the framework of Japan-US 
Security arrangements. Moreover, Japan's concern over its national security was also 
linked with the maintenance of peace and stability at the regional and international level. 
On paper, it might seem that Japan put tremendous faith in the UN to uphold 
international peace and security, as stipulated in the Constitution Preamble and even in 
the 1957 Basic Policy for National Defence, in which Japan's pledge to support the 
organisation's promotion of international peace was the topmost priority. 135 Despite its 
I, the 
lack of efficiency of the UN, coupled with the ideological rivalry original intention 
between the East and the West that characterised most of the Cold War period, forced 
134 Website of NI OD, pojicý, Japans defense policy/ I/ I. htm, accessed 
0606 
-1005. 135 Website of MOD, http: //wwv. 0di., _, o. 
ppý, "e/defense policN "Japans defense ppolicy/2/Thtm, accessed 
15,0 '1,, 2004. 
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Japan to reconsider the whole scenario of its security policy. By placing these three sets 
of security concerns under Japan-US security arrangements and close bilateral relations, 
this served both the purposes of physical and military protection as well as acting as an 
efficient deterrent measure for Japan throughout the past decades. This pattern of 
Japan's security policy, with the Japan-US security arrangements and the bilateral 
relations in place and in which all three levels of security concerns - national, regional 
and international - are located as subsets of the Japan-US security alliance, has been 
believed by some scholars to characterise Japan's post-War and contemporary security 
policy . 
136 
Figure 3.1: Japan's Security and Foreign Policy Design 
I Japan-US 
Security Arrangements 
Regional and 
International 
Security 
SDF and 
National 
Security 
Source: Author's Diagram 
Although many scholars acknowledge the theoretical and historical credentials of 
the above-mentioned security pattern, an alternative contention is also suggested. One 
could not simply ignore Japan's ideas and sincere determination to establish itself as a 
'peace-loving nation' and its belief that the ideas of eternal peace would be shared by 
other nations via the UN mechanism, and possibly Japan's adherence to UN-Centrism. 
Tile 1957 Basic Policy for National Defence even first called for the promotion of 
136 Hook c/ al. (2001: 12) and IntervieNN with a Japanese scholar, 25/01, '2006. 
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international cooperation and other efforts for international peace via the support of UN 
activities in order to ensure 'the realisation of world peace. ' The sentiment had 
apparently been separated from the issue of protecting national security or how Japan 
would deal with external aggression, which was tied up with the development of the 
effective but minimal defence capability of the SDF and the Japan-US security 
arrangements. 1 37 As shown in Figure 3.2, a clear dichotomy between Japan's 'national' 
security under the Japan-US alliance and 'international' security under UN-Centrism can 
be observed. However, it is largely true that due to the absence of efficient UN 
mechanisms and the lack of effective functioning of the UN in establishing the 'world 
peace' envisioned by Japan, the emphasis of Japan's security policy during the Cold 
War period was undoubtedly on the issue of national and regional security under the 
Japan-US security alliance rather than on the issue of international security or the 
importance of promoting UN-Centrism. 
Figure 3.2: Japan's Post-War Alternative Security and Foreign Policy Design 
I --' Website of MOD, littp: wwxv. i da.. go. ip 1'e, defense policN,, 'iapans-defense-ppolicý'ý2'1. litm, accessed 
15ý031`004. 
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Source: Author's Diagram 
Functionally speaking, apart from the fact that the Japan-US Security 
arrangements were literally a great substitute for Japan's absence of military forces, the 
significance of Japan-US Security arrangements was that they fundamentally served the 
purpose of 'defending Japan' and ensured the nation's security and integrity. The 
security arrangements, special as they seemed, also served to maintain security in the 
areas surrounding Japan, which doubly confirmed the importance of Japan's national 
security in the grand strategic design of the US in Asia Pacific and vice versa. These 
arrangements have been suggested by some scholars to represent an alternative way for 
Japan to place all its security concerns, national or international, on the security alliance 
between the two countries. 138 Coupled with the dysfunction of the UN during the first 
few decades, it is fair to agree with the contention that Japan's security blueprint was 
drawn on the basis of maintaining national security and the Japan-US Alliance rather 
than on the promotion of international security through its connection with UN-Centred 
Diplomacy, which inherently resulted in a very limited discussion and exploration of the 
development of Japan's security policy under the UN framework. However, by pointing 
out the possible pattern of Japan's security understanding in terms of securing its 
national survival under the US framework and through promoting international security 
via the UN, Japan's security orientation under the Japan-US security alliance during the 
post-war and the post-Cold War period will be analysed in parallel with the security 
understanding developed under the UN framework. 
3.2 Japan's Security Policy in the Post-War Period 
Apparently, in the post-war period, the functions of the Japan-US security 
alliance in maintaining peace and security at the national and regional level were clearly 
138 I'anaka Akihiko, for example. 
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dichotomised from the functions of UN-Centrism in promoting Japan's concerns 
regarding the maintenance of international peace and security. As shown in Figure 3.2 
and discussed in section 3.2.1, Japan's security focus was crucially placed upon the 
Japan-US alliance, with relatively less concern for security promotion under UN- 
Centrism, as will be further discussed in section 3.2.2. Therefore, Japan's national 
security and defence policy has been in constant development under the Japan-US 
security treaty, which leaves the question of whether Japan's international security 
concern was paid as much attention as its national or regional concerns. This scenario 
also generates questions regarding whether Japan's security concerns, especially 
international ones, could ever be developed outside the framework of the Japan-US 
Security Treaty or under Japan's UN framework. In this section, the main characteristics 
and the security functions of the Japan-US alliance and Japan's UN-Centrism during the 
post-war period will be discussed correspondingly. 
3.2.1 Japan-US Post-War Security Arrangements 
a) Main Characteristics 
It was a mutual understanding between the two allies that in order for Japan to 
achieve what it portrayed in the Peace Constitution as the status of a 'peace-loving 
nation' and to adhere to its pacifist principles of not becoming a military power that 
might pose a threat against another, the establishment and maintenance of Japan-US 
security agreements were indispensable. Based on the 1951 Japan-US Security Treaty 
and the revised 1960 Japan-US Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security. the two 
COLIntries agreed on the following three main principles - cooperation with the UN, 
concern over the security of the Far East and cooperative efforts between the allies to 
ensure Japan's national security. Firstly, irrespective of the gridlock of the East-West 
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conflict, both countries were to adhere to the purposes and principles of the UN, as 
stipulated in Articles 1,2 and 7. The intentions to utilise the newly established UN and 
to strengthen other free institutions to further develop peaceful international 
environment were mutually prioritised by the two counterparts. The 'desire to live in 
peace' mentioned in the 1960 Japan-US Security Treaty coincided with Japan's 
inspiration to build its country into a 'peace-loving nation', as mentioned in the 
Constitution Preamble and in Article 9. 
Another fundamental principle specified in the 1960 Japan-US Security Treaty 
was their common concern over regional stability or the international security of the 'Far 
East. ' While Articles Iý2 and 7 did mention the desire to support UN activities as the 
main conduit to maintain international peace and security and to prevent the use of force 
of any nation against the territorial integrity or political independence of others, it was 
not particularly clear how concerted efforts among the 'peace-loving countries', 
especially the two allies, could be pursued in order to achieve such an ideal environment. 
On the contrary, it was perceptible in the language used in Article 5 that the main 
concern about 'international security' during the Cold War period under the context of 
Japan-US security relations was in fact the security of the 'Far East' and the areas 
surrounding Japan. 139This outright stipulation under the context of Japan-US security 
relations unreservedly linked up Japan's national security with regional rather than 
international integrity. Therefore, whether Japan's security policy in the post-war period 
consisted of any element of international concern or whether international security was 
fully integrated into the bilateral security framework between the two countries remains 
a controversial question. 
139 See further details in Article 5, Treat. v of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the US, 
1960 
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The third fundamental principle was the mutual agreement, based on Articles 3 
and 6, stressing both individual and cooperative efforts of 'self-help' and 'mutual aid' to 
develop the capacities to resist armed attacks, including the granting of permission for 
the US to use military facilities in Japan. Since Japan had voluntarily relinquished the 
right of a sovereign state to maintain effective or full-scale military means or to exercise 
such forces overseas, it was inherently important that Japan's national security be 
defended by the US forces under the Japan-US Security Treaty. Although it was clearly 
stated in Article 9 of the Peace Constitution that Japan would forever renounce war and 
the use of force as means to settling (international) conflicts, this clause has been 
interpreted by Japan to mean that a limited level of self-defence capacity could be 
retained. The implication of this interpretation is evident in the gradual increase in 
defence spending of the Japanese government on the SDF as it coincided with the Japan- 
US Security Treaty, which, explicitly or not, encouraged Japan to cooperate with the US 
in facilitating the US forces' efforts to protect both Japan's national security and 
maintain stability in the Far East. 
b) Security Functions of Japan-US Alliance 
According to Satoh and other scholars, although Japan began to step up its 
security efforts with increasingly broad external and domestic support by shouldering 
more responsibility on political and economic fronts, 140 the focal concern of Japan 
towards international security at this stage was still somewhat 'premature' and had been 
developed in the context of the Japanese post-war mindset, which was based on an 
aversion to military exercise and the use of force. The main corresponding security 
policies therefore revolved only around the existing policy of 'non-nuclear principles' of 
140 Chapman (1983: xi) 
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not acquiring, not possessing and not exporting such weapons. Another emphasis was 
put on the country's economic prowess, which had served as the key component of 
Japan's economic-security policy, which comprised of, for example, the use of ODA and 
other economic manoeuvres to convince other states into altering their political and 
security courses. 14 1 Furthermore, during the post-war period, Japan was still the 
beneficiary of the security relationship and the international economic and security order 
provided by the US. The Japan-US security agreements, during this stage, still played a 
critical part as the 'major shield against external attack. ' 142 
In terms of the role of Japan-US security arrangements in determining Japan's 
security posture and direction, the security alliance served two integrated functions 
during this period. Firstly, the 'protection function' of the Japan-US security 
arrangements served as the key protective shield for Japan's national security. Under the 
Japan-US security pact, Japan was allowed to pursue the so-called 'exclusively defence- 
oriented policy', which generally undermined and limited the scope of the use of force to 
only the minimum level required for self-defence. Regarding the level of defence 
capabilities, it has been commonly known and recognised by both the Japanese and 
others that the Peace Constitution only permits Japan to possess self-defence capabilities 
at the minimum necessary level. However, the Japanese government has interpreted this 
to mean that 'the specific limit of the minimum necessary level of armed strength for 
self-defence varies depending on the prevailing international situation', which provided 
a legal base for Japan's increased security cooperation with the US in the Cold War 
period. 
143 
141 " Hughes (1999: 2 
142 Satoh (1982: 
14 1 See tile government's \, ic\\, and interpretation of Article 9 on the MOD Website, tý 
jdaJo/e/defence policNjapans defence policvj/3/. htrn. accessed 10'12/1005. 
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Secondly, the Japan-US security arrangement also served the security interests of 
both countries as a 'deterrent function' for overall regional security design. The security 
arrangements may prioritise the function of protecting Japan's national security - 
Japan's territorial land, sea and airspace - as the highest precedence. In truth, it has 
always been interpreted by the Japanese government to include 'the areas surrounding 
Japan' and the scope for maintaining security and stability has been always extended to 
the regional level, as clearly stated in the Japanese Government's View of Article 9: 
'[ ] the use of minimum necessary force to defend Japan as employed in 
the execution of its self-defence is not necessarily confined to the geographic 
scope of Japanese territory [ ... ]. Nevertheless, the government believes that the 
Constitution does not permit it to despatch armed forces to foreign territorial land, 
sea and airspace for the purpose of using force, because such an overseas 
deployment of troops generally exceeds the limit of minimum necessary level of 
self defence. ' 
144 
The above interpretation by the Japanese government implied two significant 
points regarding Japan's regional security posture. On the one hand, it clearly suggested 
that under the framework of the Japan-US security arrangements, regional security and 
stability have been prioritised as key security elements along with Japan's national 
security. Under certain circumstances in which the regional stability of the area 
surrounding Japan is considered to be at stake, Japan would reserve the right to extend 
the exercise of self-defence beyond national boundaries. This could be seen as an 
inteoral part of the US grand security posture in the Far East to deter communism during 
the Cold War. On the other hand, it w, as evident that the concern about international 
144 lbid, littp: ' \\\ý\\,. ida. jp,, e defence policy japans defence policy/ I /3/. htni, accessed 10/12, '2005 
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security had lagged behind somewhat. According to the strict interpretation of the 
Japanese government, overseas deployment theoretically exceeded the minimum 
necessary level of Japan's self-defence. As for securing international security, although 
the Peace Constitution did not stipulate that Japan was prohibited from participating in 
military activities overseas for the benefit of international peace and security, and the 
integral use of force under the 'collective security' action has never been strictly 
prohibited as actions under 'collective self-defence, ' the ability of the Japanese 
government to exercise such a right to participate in collective security was still limited 
by the spirit of the Peace Constitution and Article 9. 
3.2.2 Japan's Post-War UN-Centrism 
a) Main Characteristics 
Unlike the Japan-US security alliance, it is undeniable that UN-Centrism or UN- 
centred diplomacy is indeed a vague foreign policy concept, as it has been frequently 
talked about but has never been clearly defined by Japanese policy makers. The origin of 
UN-Centrism was found in 1957 in Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi's idea about 
redefining Japan's foreign policy framework and was formulated in addition to the 
existing Yoshida Doctrine as the third pillar of Japan's foreign policy. It initially 
conveyed the idea that Japan would utilise the UN as the major international arena in 
which it could pursue national interests and reduce international tensions. 145 As 
suggsted previously, successive policy makers and diplomats have never clarified the 
essence of the policy and made it clear to the public. 146 In reality, the ideas behind UN- 
145 1 wa naga ( 199 8: 3 ") 
146 The academic community, however. agreed on the core substance of UN-Centrism as follows: Japan is 
to conform to UN obligations and to respond positively to proposals for new UN activities. Japan is to 
strengthen the UN and other international agencies and to seek opportunities for creating initiatives to 
strencythen the LIN and place the organisation as the top priority in Japan's foreign policý. See also Dore 
(1997: 95-96) 
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Centrism had neither been implemented nor functioned in the post-xvar period. Other 
scholars even suggest that UN-Centrism was not meant to be the framework in \ýIýhich 
the UN would be the central focus of Japan's foreign policy; nor was it meant to be the 
structure on which Japanese diplomacy was to be based. Rather, the concept of UN- 
Centrism itself merely implied that Japan's foreign policy should be carried out in line 
with the rules and principles articulated in the UN charter. 1 47 
It might be true that Japan's lack of clear definitions of UN-Centrism and its UN 
policy inertia in the post-war period were the result of the fact that the policy was meant 
to serve as 'a means to other ends. ' Japan's focus on the UN was not directed 
particularly towards upholding or enhancing the organisational functions per se, due to 
both structural and ideational limitations. However, the UN-Centrism contrarily became 
the source of Japan's hidden national agendas, serving, for example, as the source of 
legitimacy, an auxiliary security guarantee and a self-constructed image as a peace- 
loving nation, as discussed below. To some, for the first fifteen years after Japan's 
admission to the UN, Japan's UN policy was parochial and many of the efforts were 
only directed towards the restoration of its international position. 148 
In addition, it could also be pointed out that the early stage of Japan's UN- 
Centrism involved a process in which the solid idea of 'UN-centred' foreign policy was 
initiated. In fact, the 'vagueness' of the concept or the 'passivity' of the actual UN 
policy could possibly be the result of Japan's inability to manifest the idea into more 
tangible practices. The main reason for such deficiency was perhaps that all the energy 
was poured into economic rehabilitation rather than into more complex issues of 
international politics or the promotion of peace thrOLIgh the UN. Pan suggests that 
147 
tleki (19931: 348) 
14, S 
kunaga (1998: '17) 
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although the UN did not completely lose its value in Japan's national security policy in a 
broader sense, the post-war UN policy simply functioned as a forum for security debates 
and a safeguard for its economic interests among the Third World. 149The vagueness and 
passivity of Japan's UN policy, which was the direct result of the incoherence between 
'idea' and 'practise', could be seen in several cases. Besides the self-proclaimed rhetoric 
about its aspiration to be a peace-loving nation - the country's guiding principle to the 
maintenance of peace and security - Japan in the early post-war period was simply a 
bystander waiting to cast supporting votes in the UN General Assembly alongside the 
US, even when it came to peace-threatening issues like nuclear disarmament. ' 50 It was 
not until the post-Cold War period that ideas about international peace and national 
security were manifested in a more coherent policy, as will be discussed in section 3.3.2. 
Inactive as it was, the post-war UN-Centrism still had its own security functions in 
Japan's diplomatic scenes, as described in the following section. 
b) Security Functions of UN-Centrism 
L Source of auxiliary security guarantor 
The aftermath of WWII influenced the restructuring of post-war Japan in several 
ways, from political and economic effects to social structure. However, the most 
groundbreaking structural alteration of the Japanese state was probably the adoption of 
1946 Peace Constitution and the renunciation of war as well as the ban on the use of 
armed force. While on the political and economic fronts, Japan was ensured of a stable 
liberal democratic system and a liberal market provided by the US, it was well aware of 
the security vacuum resulting from the adoption of the Peace Constitution. In this initial 
stage, the UN filled in the gap effortlessly as a guarantor of auxiliary security. In this 
149 Pan (200-5: 342-3143) 
150 Ueki (1998: 3533) 
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early stage, the UN was not a mere international organisation, but a pathway on which 
Japan would place its security reliance and promote some measures for world peace 
through the Allied Powers under the organisation. 15 'However, although the initial 
idealist scenario of the post-war Japan was to place its security future in the hands of the 
UN, this UN-Centrism was actually pursued alongside close bilateral relations with the 
US. The security alliance that has been developed between the two countries since the 
enactments of the San Francisco peace treaty in 1952 and its revision in 1960 proved to 
be firmer and more promising than the one with the UN, as discussed in the previous 
section. 
The relatively more solid security guarantee from the Japan-US security 
agreement raises a fairly difficult question about the relevance of the UN as a security 
guarantor to Japan. Without its own military muscle, the ideal scenario to place its 
national security under the UN umbrella and the emphasis on UN-Centrism was less 
practical and more elusive. It is therefore not surprising that by the early 1960s, UN- 
Centrism had gradually disappeared from the speeches of Japanese political leaders. 
Several scholars largely agree that one possible reason that contributed to the inability of 
the UN to perform as a security guarantor for Japan was that the UN itself had not been 
able to fully function as a world organisation for the maintenance of peace and 
security. 152 Considering the outbreaks of both proxy and internal wars throughout the 
Cold War period - the Vietnam War, the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan or the threat 
from Korean Peninsula - all plainly confirmed the significance of having a more 
substantial security agreement firmly in place, in this case with the US, rather than 
ideally placing the country's survival in the hands of the inadequate UN. Inevitably, the 
151 Wakarnizu (1987: 26) 
15 22 INvanaga (1998: 35-36), Ueki (1993: 347) and Ogata (1987: 961) 1 
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post-war UN-Centrism was simply impractical and the essence of the concept itself was 
soon forgotten by the subsequent Japanese administrations. 
ii. Source of legitimacy 
Contrary to its failure as a security guarantor, the post-war UN-Centrism 
successfully functioned as a source of legitimacy for the Japanese state on several 
political scales. At the regional level, Japan's membership of the UN and the 
pronouncement of UN-Centrism provided an opportunity for Japan to lessen any 
tensions that would otherwise have occurred around the Pacific Rim. 153 For Japan's 
Asian neighbours - China, the USSR, Korea, or even Southeast Asian countries - 
Japan's close ties with the US and its military revival were both suspicious. Japan's 
heading towards full-scale commitment to the UN through its UN-Centrism was, to 
some extent, perceived as a legitimate political gesture that eased their minds on security 
and strategic worries. Despite this gesture, Japan still very much suffered from negative 
responses from some of its neighbouring countries, especially the former USSR and 
China. Although having been recognised as a member of the UN, its legitimacy was still 
tarnished by Articles 53 and 107, often referred to as the 'enemy clause' 154 of the UN 
Charter. 
However, acquiring legitimacy at the regional level was not in fact the concern 
of the Japanese government during the post-war period. At the international level, 
having been positioned as a war defeated nation and occupied by the victor, post-war 
Japan was desperate to re-establish itself to secure its membership of the UN. In this 
151 Ueki (1993: 347-348) 
154 The clause states that if any country is to be attacked by any state which, during WWII, had been an 
enemy of the signatories of the UN Charter, the former could take full countermeasures on its own without 
authorization by the UNSC. Athough the Charter does not state the names of the 'enemy states', it seems 
that the message was sent exclusively to Japan, Germany and Italy. This issue remains controversial and 
Japan's legitimacy could never be completed without the deletion of this clause from the UN Charter. 
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period, the emphasis on UN-Centrism was rather a symbolic gesture echoing Japan's full 
commitment to the norms of the international community towards peace and security. ' 55 
To some extent, admission to the UN might have been Japan's ultimate wish, as it 
signified the end of the defeated status of the country. On the other hand, one could 
always argue that the admission was inevitable, as Japan was encouraged by the US to 
move into the circle of the world community as a US political supporter. The road to 
community recognition was not automatic; nor was it the genuine self-directed policy 
agenda of the Japanese government. The tension between the Eastern and Western blocs 
in the UN was no less than that on the battlefields in other parts of the world. The veto 
on the admission of Japan to the UN until 1956 was no coincidence, given the Russo-US 
rivalry. Coupled with the US loss of its automatic majority in the UN General Assembly, 
the need for a loyal alliance in the world organisation was equally important. 156 Thus, 
the source of legitimacy from the UN membership during the post-war period was, in a 
way, a by-product of the heightening Cold War state of affairs and Japan's conviction in 
placing its national and regional security on the Japan-US security arrangements and 
bilateral ties, which might partly explain why Japan could not clearly form a more 
coherent idea about UN-centred diplomacy in the subsequent post-war years. 
iii. Source of self-constructed image 
As well as serving as a source of legitimacy, the UN has played a significant role 
as a source of Japan's self-constructed image. Through the UN-Centrism, Japan has 
made it clear that its priority as a 'peace-loving nation' was to uphold the principles of 
the UN in order to secure sustainable peace and security. According to Iwanaga, in its 
early Vears, Japan sought to assume a position of 'bridge-builder': to link up, mediate 
1 S5 InterN ie\\- with a former senior Japanese diplomat, 2 F02 , '1006 
lib Dore (1997: 62-65) 
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and intermediate between the Western and Eastern blocs. In an acceptance speech to the 
world body, the then-Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu also emphasised that the 
nation's post-war Constitution was founded on the same basic principles of peace that 
have underlined the UN Charters. ' 57 Apart from the self-portrait as 'bridge-builder' 
between the East and the West, to a certain degree, the UN-Centrism was also ideally set 
as a conduit for Japan to assume the role of a peaceful country and to pursue activities 
commensurate to its idealism, that is, to promote peace and security via an international 
organisation. In a way, these were integral components of the process of identity 
transformation to a peace-loving nation, as opposed to the former military aggressor. 
UN-Centrism was, therefore, a means towards the end that contributed to Japan's major 
i dentity-reconfi gurati on. 
However, as previously mentioned, one of the vital reasons why UN-Centrism 
was even more ambivalent was that the concept was never really transformed into 
coherent policy practises during the first two decades of the post-war period. Clearly put, 
Japan's peace and security had usually been considered under the framework of its 
Peace Constitution, banning the right to collective defence and the use of force overseas, 
and had also been considered in parallel with the Japan-US security strictures. In this 
fashion, Japan had already confined itself within a separated peace and security 
parameter that left virtually no room for the UN's peace and security agenda. As for the 
country's 'bridge-builder' position, it was apparently short-lived and practically 
unattainable during the post-war period. Because Japan had never been on good terms 
with sorne of the Asian countries like China or North Korea and was even in a state of 
c1car hostility with the former USSR due to Japan's subscription to a full-fledged 
alliance with the US, it simply demonstrated a misnomer of Japan's self-image as a 
1 57 lwanaga (1998: 34-35) 
I 
bridge-builder between the Western-Eastern blocs or the Western bloc and other Asian 
countries. As suggested by Mendl, the legacy of the war, fear and suspicion of Japan's 
intentions, and the impact of the Cold War structure combined to keep Japan far from 
fulfilling its original UN-Centrism and its wish to cultivate this new legitimate self- 
portrait in the post-war period. 158 In the following section, the development of Japan's 
security understandings in the post-Cold war period will be discussed. 
3.3 Japan's Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Period 
During the post-war period, it was fairly clear that Japan's security orientation 
was dichotornised between the concerns over national/regional versus international 
security. While the Japan-US security alliance had served the country as the umbrella 
under which Japan's national security was firmly placed, the UN-Centred diplomacy had 
provided an alternative, albeit futile, framework in which Japan's focus on international 
security could be developed during the post-war period. The security dichotomy and 
Japan's emphasis on the Japan-US alliance has been transformed during the post-Cold 
War period and Japan's revival of the new UN-Centrism is believed to have resulted 
from the converging security insights between national and international security. 
At the start of the post-Cold War period, some scholars were convinced that the 
re-emerging activism in UN-centred diplomacy was because of the obvious lack of trust 
between Japan and the US over its economic frictions in the 1980s or the result of the 
Gulf War effects. 159 To some extent, the impact of the economic decline of the US in the 
late 1980s and the negative feedback from the international community towards Japan's 
attempt, or the lack thereof, to help re-establish peace and stability 'in cash but not in 
kind' durim) the Gulf crisis. on Japan's post-Cold war security understanding ývas 
1ý8 N lendl ( 1995: '1 1 -3 -') 159 See, for example, Ueki (1993), Immerman (1994) and Purrington (1992). 
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unmistakable. Therefore, in this section, the characteristics of the post-Cold war Japan- 
US security arrangements, the post-Cold war UN-Centrism and their security functions 
will be discussed and the outline of Japan's security understanding and settings directed 
during the period will be examined. 
3.3.1 Japan-US Post-Cold War Security Arrangements 
a) Main Characteristics 
During the Nakasone Administration in the early 1980s, which was considered 
the period where Japan was at its economic zenith, the Japan-US bilateral relationship 
had reached the point where both traditional political and security rapport were not 
functioning properly. 
160 It is impossible to deny that Japan's economic success in the 
1980s and the decline of the US economic prowess was one of the prominent factors that 
might have contributed to the re-orientation of the Japan-US security posture. Despite 
this, Japan's security orientation still relied heavily on the existing Japan-US security 
arrangements. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was still very much in 
place as the cornerstone for common security objectives during the 1980s. This was 
subsequently confirmed in 1996 by the Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security Alliance 
for the 2 I't Century, which requested the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-US 
Defence Cooperation in 1997. By comparing the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-US Defence 
Cooperation with the previous 1978 Guidelines, although the premise of the security 
cooperation largely remains during normal circumstances and when Japan is under 
armed attack, major nuances that signify the development of the Japan-US security 
relationship could also simultaneously be deducted. 161 
160 Interview with a former Japanese MOFA official and the current UNDP official, 07/03/2006 
161 1978 Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation and the 1997 Review of the Guidelines for US- 
Japan Defence Cooperation. 
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Firstly, regarding cooperation under normal circumstances, both Guidelines 
generally indicate that Japan will certainly maintain its defence capacity at the 
appropriate level in accordance with the 'minimum necessary' restriction in the Peace 
Constitution. However, the key difference between the two Guidelines is the extent to 
which 'the increasing mutual cooperation' between the two countries was underscored in 
the revised 1997 Guidelines. ' 62 This trend had emerged in Japan's security depiction 
since the 1980s, especially when Nakasone clearly pronounced in the basic principles of 
his administration that 'Japan's top priorities included maintaining peace at home and 
abroad. ' As vague as it seemed, without systemic clarification or an implementation 
plan for what he meant by Japan's emphasis on 'peace at home and abroad', one thing 
that was repeatedly expressed by Nakasone was that 'Japan and the US share a common 
destiny that binds them together across the Pacific, hence the need for Japan to share 
responsibilities for peace and security in the region. 163 
At face value, the cooperation between Japan and the US under the 1978 and 
1997 security guidelines may be relatively analogous. Nevertheless, the increasing 
cooperation had become 'mutual' in a true sense of the word and no longer followed the 
route of a 4patron-client' security relationship. The mutual cooperation has also become 
the framework under which Japan's defence posture has been developed beyond the 
narrow-minded framework of self-defence, but with concern for 'a more stable 
international security environment. ' This also suggested that the function of Japan-US 
security arrangements in the post-war period might have been 're-prioritised' by 
focusing more on utilising the security arrangements as a platform to address regional 
102 While the US will maintain its nuclear deterrent capability and its forward deployment forces in the 
region, Japan \vIII enhance mutual cooperation via information sharing, policy consultations, several types 
of security cooperation through arms control and disarmament. 
lo" LDP, Period of President Nakasone's Leadership, 
ht tj? ý,, wj\ JI niin. i p/i imi n/engl i sh/h i stor\ ch ap 11. htrn, accessed 2121 004 
114 
problems and international activities rather than heavily addressing the issue of Japan's 
national security, as it previously had. As clearly mentioned in the 1997 revised 
Guideline: 
'Bilateral cooperation to promote regional and global activities in the 
field of security contributes to the creation of a more stable international security 
environment. 
Recognising the importance and significance of security dialogues and 
defence exchanges in the region, as well as international arms control and 
disarmament, the two Governments will promote such activities and cooperate as 
necessary. 9 
164 
Secondly, Japan's mounting concern regarding regional and international 
security has been more evident than in the post-Cold War period, especially after the 
latter half of the 1990s. It has become widely recognised by Japan that the situations in 
areas surrounding Japan will certainly contribute to the well-being of the nation's peace 
and security. The 1978 Guidelines mentioned only Japan's modest functional assistance 
to facilitate the US forces in case of situations in the Far East: the systematic facilitative 
modalities were never clearly stated. The 1997 Review Guidelines apparently 
demonstrate how Japan would step up to shoulder the security responsibility in the 
region alongside the US. Apart from customary diplomatic efforts and the use of 
bilateral coordination efforts through such activities as relief measures, search and 
rescue, non-combatant evacuation and other economic sanctions, Japan will actively 
provide not only the use of facilities for the US forces but also will provide *rear area 
164 See further details in the completion of the Review of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defence 
Cooperation on the NIOD's website, 
.--j 
pans defense policy 3'6. lltin, accessed 16/09 2004. Mtp. '_\\ \\ \\. *da.,, ojL) e'defense policy/ a 
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support', primarily within the Japanese territory and possibly on the high seas and 
international airspace around Japan. Above all, the SDF will also take part in such 
activities as intelligence gathering, surveillance and minesweeping to protect lives and 
property and to ensure the safety of the US forces. These post-Cold war characteristics 
have certainly contributed to the changing security functions in several ways, as 
discussed below. 
b) Security Functions of Japan-US Security Arrangements 
As for the functionality of Japan-US security arrangements in the post-Cold War 
period, the post-Cold War Japan-US security arrangements were still the principal 
cornerstone upon which Japan's national and physical security firmly depended. From 
the comparison between the 1978 and 1997 Guidelines for US-Japan Defence 
Cooperation, action in response to an armed attack against Japan is the only element that 
did not go through many changes. Basically, the Review of the 1997 Guidelines, which 
became the actual law in 1999, followed through the mechanism articulated in the 1978 
Guidelines, which outlined the necessary steps from diplomatic efforts to such military 
activities and operations as command and coordination, communication, intelligence 
activities, or other logistic support activities. 165 The 1996 National Defence Programme 
Outline (NDPO) also further stressed the importance of the Japan-US security 
arrangements, which would continue to play a key role in the security of Japan and 
peace and stability in the surrounding region. ' 66 However, it had also been evident since 
the Nakasone era that the Japan-US security arrangement was to serve as a platform 
fi-om \vhich Japan could exert its economic and security responsibilities and work with 
los 1978 Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation and the 1997 Review of the Guidelines for US- 
Japan Defence Cooperation. 
6" See the full text of the 1996 National Defence Programme Outline at the MOD's website, 1: 1 littp: //ivNN, NN-. ida. ý,, o. ip/e/defeiise policy/japans defense policy; 4 ndpofl996/index. htm, accessed 
15 0 1) 12100 ý. 
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other advanced democracies in order to 'establish a new peace and restructure the global 
economic order I. 
167 
There were several attempts from many Japanese officials and think-tanks to 
furnish the new conceptual framework in a way that was compatible with the changing 
position of the Japanese economy and dynamic security environment from the 1980s 
onwards through such ideas as 'comprehensive security. ' 168 According to those who 
advocated the comprehensive security concept, Japan's security direction should revolve 
around several layers of security, from political to social, economic and military security. 
With Japan reaching its economic apex in the late 1980s and the criticism of the nation's 
lack of international political responsibility during the Gulf Crisis, the argument as to 
whether Japan should start to substitute the narrow understanding of national security or 
its sole concern with physical survival with the so-called 'economic security policy, ' 
which focuses more on the relationship between economic measures and development to 
ensure both national, regional and international security, was audible. ' 69 
However, in the areas of international security, it was still evident in the early 
post-Cold War period that the arguments for the clear dichotomy between 
national/regional and international security were apparently convincing. While Japan has 
doubled its defence and security efforts to complement the US security strategy in Asia- 
Pacific, the joint cooperation between the two countries for the benefit of international 
security was somewhat limited. It was not only that the core security agreements, the 
1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation or the Review of the 1997 Guidelines for US-Japan 
167 LDP, Period of President Nakasone's Leadership, 
,, 
Iish/history/chapl l. htm, accessed 22/11/2004 http:, \\NvN\. jii11injl) jimin/eng 
16N Several think tanks and non-governmental research institutes, such as the Nomura Research Institute 
and iaovernmental -supported bodies such as the Study Group on Comprehensive Security, had been started 
since the late 1970s and were very active in the 1980s to conceptualise the way in which Japan's security 
policy should be directed. 161) 
Chapman (1983: x\ ii) 
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Defence Cooperation, did not enthusiastically outline serious policy executions that both 
countries could follow to tackle the problem of international security. apart from 
pointing out in principle the im ortance of upholding the UN; the kind of implicit p 
cooperation between the two countries regarding the betterment of the international 
security environment had only been about curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, arms control and disarmament. 170 Although the 1997 Guidelines allowed 
Japan to despatch the SDF beyond its territory, it remained restricted to the 'areas 
surrounding Japan. ' It was not until the promulgation of the Anti-Terrorism Special Law 
in 2001 that the restriction was lifted and the SDF was allowed to support the US 
overseas to counter terrorism. 171 While the international security understanding under 
the Japan-US alliance has been developed to an extent since the 1980s and fully 
embraced in early 2000, corresponding to the heightened intensity of international 
terrorism, a more comprehensive approach, which has combined Japan's security 
insights, addressing both national and international concerns, was advanced under the 
development of the security understanding under the UN framework, as will be further 
discussed in the following section. 
3.3.2 Japan's UN-Centrism in the Post-Cold War Period 
a) Japan's Post-Cold War UN-Centrism 
The UN-Centrism in the post-Cold War period is not entirely catered for by the new- 
found policy concept, but is rather based on the same fundamental philosophies - the 
source of legitimacy, the pathway to peace and security and the source of self- 
constructed image. However, the nature of the post-Cold War UN-Centrism differs 
170 1996 National Defence Policv Outline, 
httLi: /)\\\\, \\. ida. ý-, o. ip/e/defense policy/japans defense policy/4/ndpofl996,2. htm, accessed 1-5 03/2005 
M MORA, Japan (2002a), 'Campaign Against Terrorism', http: \\ýNN'\N'. nlofa. ýzo. *plrejaion/n- 
anierica. Ais teri-oOI09/policy/cainpaic,, n. html, accessed 15 03 2005. 
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greatly from that of the post-war period. Firstly, the sign of more activism in UN- 
Centrism has become evident. Unlike the vague UN-Centrism of the post-war period, 
the policies based on the UN-Centrism in the 1990s were more structured and coherent. 
It was only after the Gulf Crisis that Japan could actually define a tangible set of UN 
policies or a more coherent policy manifestation that hardened the concept of UN- 
Centrism and was actually associated with the embedded philosophy of peace and 
security promotion. In the post-Cold War period, the top-most priority of the UN- 
Centrism and Japan's foreign policy has been to maintain international peace and 
security, thereby ensuring Japan's own peaceful environment. This security 
understanding significantly demonstrates the lower degree of security dichotomy and a 
more balanced approach between national and international security concerns. 
Compared to the early period of activism in UN-Centred diplomacy, especially during 
the Nakasone administration, the UN contributions, both financially and logistically, 
were merely spent on particular issues and to only some sectors of the UN organs. For 
example, during the period from 1960 to the mid 1980s, 75 per cent of the total annual 
contribution went to economic and social activities, more than to any other area. 172 
On the contrary, in the post-Cold War period, the emerging new form of security, 
collaboratively advocated by Japan and other middle powers, or the so-called 'human 
security' within the framework of the UN, has filled the gap of the relative disarray of 
the post-war UN-Centred Diplomacy. Unlike the concept of 'comprehensive security' 
that circulated among academia and policy makers during the 1980s but failed to 
establish any concrete polic-v implementation, the human security policy, which first 
appeared in official rhetoric during the mid-1990s, has helped to balance the political. 
military, social and economic facets of UN-Centrism. 
172 Ogata (1987: 966) 
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As shown in Figure 3.3, the human security policy, which will be discussed in 
further detail in Chapter 6, is the link that holds the new UN-Centrism together and 
possibly the end result of the decade-long identity transformation process. Precisely put, 
the key to the attainment of the 'new UN-Centrism' is the ability of the government to 
manifest the coherent Policy practises and the ability to relate Japan's fundamental 
security ideas and political agenda, including the maintenance of peace and security, to 
the world at large via UN-based organs, members and activities. The security 
understanding being developed in the UN framework and the security functions of the 
new UN-Centrism are articulated in section (b). 
Figure 3.3: Japan's Security Policy in the UN 
Concept 
UN-Centrism 
............... 
Manifestation (Policy Construct) 
Human Security 
.................... -------------------- 
Ideational /Social Political /Economic mplementation 
long-term development) (short-term assistance\ 
Source: Author's Diagram 
b) Security Functions of the Post-Cold War UN-Centrism 
i. Enhance international status 
The primary ffinction of the UN-Centrism in the 1990s in Japan's security policy 
is to enhance Japan's international status and to put an end to the asymmetry between its 
economic and security projections. Unlike the post-war period, when Japan's UN- 
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Centrism and the UN itself served only as a 'rubber stamp' confirming Japan's 
legitimacy in the international community, the 1990 UN-Centrism has been pursued 
with the aim of redefining its role in the new global context, to set political and security 
agendas and to exert ideational influence independent of the US within the framework of 
multilateralism through the UN. 173 As pointed out by Drifte, Japan's attempt to increase 
its responsibility and to increase its influence in agenda-setting in the UN during the 
1990s is partly to fulfil the nation's long-awaited hope to achieve prestige and 
recognition. 174 The move towards a more active UN-Centrism has been developed in a 
series of pragmatic stages. To strengthen its international role, assertive multilateralism 
has been integrated into the master plan of UN policy since the mid 1980s. Through this 
assertiveness, it is believed that Japan should be able to deal with an extensive range of 
regional and global problems, especially via the UN. 175 In general, as shown in Figure 
3.3, Japan's ideational exertion within the UN includes the serious reform in social, 
political, economic and security structures. 
At first, the attempt to reform administrative functions and financial structure 
was meant only to strengthen and improve the performance of the entire organisation. 
Later in the 1990s, it was clearer that Japan has deliberately hooked up the issues of 
financial reform and administrative reform, including the reform of the UNSC, with the 
country's attempt to gain a permanent UNSC seat. Japan has been strongly convinced 
that financial reform should include the issue of fair representation in the permanent UN 
Security Council in accordance with the proportion of financial contribution. 176 In terms 
17 1 Tamarnoto (1997: 3) 
174 
Drifte (1998: 137) 
175 
lwanaga (1996: 26) 
1 176 Japan has constantly increased its share in the institution's financial burden, despite its decrease in 
GDP Per-Capita during 1996-1998. The latest assessment showed that Japan shouldered almost 20 
percent of the UN regular budget in 2002, approximately a 10 percent increase from 1991. See annual 
publication of the United Nations Handbook , Ministry of Foreign Affairs (New Zealand). 
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of security and the development facets of the UN policy, Japan has used its quest for UN 
reform as a platform to further its policy agendas, which include such matters as 
disarmament, environmental protection, fights against other economic and social 
instability and so on. In the latter half of the 1990s, Japan also proposed its 'new, 
development strategy', which was comprised of the following three components. Firstly, 
the combination of both a 'comprehensive approach' and a 'country-specific approach' 
that addressed the strengths of ODA, trade, investment and other modalities in bailing 
out those in need was emphasised. Secondly, cooperation among developed countries, 
10s, NGOs and other parties in providing support and partnership to overcome short- 
term physical threats in developing countries was encouraged. Thirdly, a focus not on 
the amount of capital injection but the achievement of long-term quantity development 
was stresse . 
177 
These attempts accounted for later development for a more refined and coherent 
'human security' policy, which will be discussed in Chapter 6. However, it is important 
to point out that the important characteristic of Japan's endeavour to level up its 
international status during the early stage of the post-Cold War period via UN-Centrism 
was to promote its combination of security facets within the new UN-Centrism. The 
clear-cut divide between peace and security and development issues was palpable and 
the latter had long been a representation of Japan's post-war UN-Centred Diplomacy. It 
was not until the latter half of the 1990s that the development of the idea of 'human 
security' reached its peak and the idea started to indicate the direction of genuine UN- 
Centred Diplomacy, which addresses both security and development aspects in the same 
agenda. 
177 MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook 1998, http:, "/\\'\\ýNNý. niofa., -, o. ip policy/other/bluebook/1998/1-a. htmi, 
accessed 220,03 -1004. 
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ii. Promote peace and security agenda 
Apart from the general UN reform, to Japan, another top UN priority has been to 
promote peace and security via the 'pacifist doctrine. ' The UN itself was certainly 
viewed as an arena where Japan could promote its own peace agendas and create a 
global environment that enhanced Japan's national interests and stability. Thus, after 
WWII, Japan had consistently adhered to the concept of 'one-country pacifism', often 
known as 'isolationist pacifism. ' 178 The term is often used to refer to Japan's unique 
conception of peace and the conduct of military operation, mostly advocated by the 
majority of people, political leftists and the communist party. 'Isolationist pacifism' 
contends that the importance of Japan's survival was to strictly adhere to the 'no-war' 
clause of the Peace Constitution and there was no need for Japan to become involved 
militarily with any sort of collective security arrangements, even under LJNPKOs. In 
other words, it was the conviction of the post-war Japan that it could simply contribute 
to the maintenance of international peace and security only through 'anti-militarist 
foreign policy', even if this meant that Japan had to pursue it unilaterally. 
The end of the Cold War saw changing ideas among Japanese constituents - 
political parties, academics and public opinion - regarding Japan's unilateral pacifism. 
The most important transformation of Japan's UN-Centrism was the domestic 
recognition that unilateral pacifism could not prevent the outbreaks of either inter-state 
or intra-state conflicts; nor could it maintain peace and stability of the international 
system, as firmly believed in the post-war period. The post-Cold War UN-Centrism still 
undoubtedly regards the idea of the maintenance of peace and security as the uppermost 
priority. However, Japan has incorporated elements of 'multilateral pacIficism' that have 
been manifested through the activities under 'human security' in its new UN-Centrism 
178 Hellmann (1988: 41-44). The term is originally coined by Takashi Inoguchi in the late 1980s. 
123 
in the post-Cold War period. This use of 'multilateral pacificism' indicates that Japan 
has begun to realise the inadequacy of unilateral pacifism and to acknowledge that the 
misconception about the maintenance of peace and security through such unilateral 
effort accounted for the incomplete nature of the post-war UN-Centred diplomacy. 
Secondly, multilateral pacificism, in the context of Japan's UN-Centrism, literally means 
that Japan would expand its efforts to promote peace and security not only in terms of 
geographical extent or in the areas surrounding Japan for the benefit of its own national 
survival, but also in terms of scopes and activities that would lead to long-term 
sustainable peace and security, including conflict prevention, arms control, UNPKOs, 
development, environmental and drug issues, human rights, refugee assistance, culture 
and education, and so on. 
179 
In short, the most important feature of the new UN-Centrism is perhaps Japan's 
ability to incorporate both development and security facets into the same coherent policy 
implementation, via 'human security' - the forte of the new UN-Centrism. Since the 
post-war period, Japan has long been renowned for its efforts to secure international 
peace and security through developmental and humanitarian efforts. However, those 
efforts merely address one aspect of peace and security affairs, which is the 
developmental aspect of conflict resolutions. Human security, on the contrary, addresses 
both the 'downside-risk' which concerns the menaces and deprivations that may occur to 
human survival, dignity and freedom, and 'human development', which deals with 
optimistic qualities or the expansion of people's choices. ' 80 The inclusion of the former 
element into the overall framework of the maintenance of peace and security signifies 
179 MOFA, Japan (2004a: 6-9) 
180 Commission on Human SecuritN (2003: 10) 
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several changes in Japan's position regarding peace and security and how it could exert 
its influence and ideas via the UN, all of which will be further discussed in Chapter 6. 
His Quieting both domestic and international opposition 
As Japan began to pursue a more assertive stance in both political and security 
policy in the 1990s, domestic and external responses to such moves were significantly 
divergent. On the domestic side, the debate revolved around the choice of assertive 
civilian power or normal power. The advocates of the former, which represents Japan's 
mainstream, argue for Japan's active role in the multilateral context without the use of 
military power. The latter, however, opts for a normal state, which could assume an 
active role in international affairs and a role in world leadership. The rationale behind 
this idea is that Japan's global military and political power might be symmetrically in 
line with its economic power. ' 81 
The new UN-Centrism has been a major catalyst, which, to some extent, helped 
compromise the differences between the two main streams. Under the umbrella of the 
UN, Japan could play a more assertive political role and assume the role of an agenda 
setter. The attempt to secure a permanent seat in the UN Security Council was agreed by 
the majority of Japanese people during the first half of the 1990s, when Japan started its 
campaign for UN Reform and its quest for a UNSC seat. On the issue of military use, 
although Japan still strictly adheres to Article 9 and the prohibition of any activity that 
involves military exercise, from 1995 onwards, Japan has attempted to revise its 1992 
UNPKO Law and to lift the *five principles', which hitherto prohibited the participation 
of SDF troops in anv Nvar-zone, and finally to allow the greater participation of the 
18 1 Taniamoto ( 1997: 96-110) 
12 5 
Japanese SDF personnel to work shoulder to shoulder with other UNPKO staff. 182 Via 
the new UN-Centrism, the proponents of civilian power are not too offended by the 
increasing military activities of the SDF. Simultaneously, those who advocate normal 
power are also appeased for Japan's previous lack of active participation in military 
activities in the UN. Both are believed to be satisfied with the increasing political and 
leading role in the multilateral context via the UN. 
On the external front, it is widely known that Japan has been very careful in 
exerting its political influence and initiating any military and security moves due to 
negative responses from major neighbouring countries, such as China and North Korea. 
As suggested by Mendl, Japan's phenomenal economic success and its wartime 
experience are the major factors that restrain Japan and other mainland countries from 
deeper involvement in politics and security. 1 83 Besides, although Japan's close security 
tie with the US would guarantee its security from hypothetical threats, in a way, the 
close bilateral relations between the two countries have long been another factor that has 
created distrust among the mainland countries. However, in an era when Japan is on the 
qUest for international symbolic recognition and prestige, political assertiveness and 
international responsibilities that might sometimes include the despatch of military 
manpower are a prerequisite. In order to attain the aforementioned international political 
goal without aggravating or causing too many anxieties among its Asian neighbours, the 
UN as the embodiment of the peaceful ideal seems to be the most feasible option for 
Japan, in which it could play an active political role and exert its influence. 
The assessment of the development of Japan's security orientation under the 
Japan-US security alliance and the UN framework demonstrates that under both 
182 IPCH, UN Peacekeeping Operations, http:, "ww\v. pko. go. jp PKO E/pko/lildex2 e. html, accessed 
Ill -100ý 
183 Nlendl (1995: 125) 
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frameworks, Japan's security understanding at national and international level has 
become less dichotomised and less imbalanced in the post-Cold War period. On the one 
hand, it has been obvious that the development of security orientation under the Japan- 
US framework has been expanded in scope beyond Japan's national survival and 
regional stability, and includes the notion of responsibility towards the maintenance of 
international peace. On the other hand, it has been clear that Japan's security policy 
could also be understood via the UN framework, which is one of the key arguments in 
this research. The examination of the security understanding under the latter reveals 
even more about Japan's transformed ideas about the importance of international 
security to the maintenance of national security: that is, Japan's national survival is 
inextricably linked with well-maintained international peace and security. By promoting 
international peace and security, Japan's national security is also guaranteed. Before 
going into an examination of the transformation of such ideas about security policy 
under the UN framework in Chapters 4-6, the final section of this chapter will introduce 
the key actors involved in Japan's UN security policy decision-making process. 
3.4 Key Actors in Japan's UN Security Policy Decision-Making Process 
a) Government Officials: MOFA 
The key actors in Japan's UN policy and international security issues are perhaps 
from Japan's government agencies - the MOFA and the JDA. In the case of Japan's UN 
security policy, to some scholars, government decisions tend to be more dependent on 
the development of internal debates among bureaucrats, the so-called 'middle echelon' 
within the MOFA, rather than originating from the initiatives of the Foreign Ministers or 
the Prime Minister themselves. 18' The main reason for the lack of leadership and visions 
184 Hosova (1974: ', 57) and Nlinor (1985: 1229) 
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among the political elites partly stems from the short-term office tenure of those 
occupying te seats. This inherently prevents them from obtaining expertise in foreign 
issues and inevitably forces them to rely mostly on the suggestions of the MOFA 
bureaucrats, who are more familiar with the foreign policy problems. Ahn further 
supports this argument by pointing out that apart from setting up, formulating, 
implementing and reviewing feedback on policy agendas, the MOFA also plays an 
important role behind the scenes (kuromaku) in directing the change in foreign policy 
orientation. 
185 
Despite the above criticism of the MOFA's lack of clear definition of 'UN- 
Centrism' 186 and the clear asymmetry between security and development aspects of 
contributions, it is agreed that the MOFA is the most important actor in Japan's UN 
policy-making process. It is probably the most consistent actor within Japan's political 
structure, which has been advocating an assertive role in the international political arena. 
Since the 1970s, MOFA has attempted to forge new foreign policies that envision Japan 
as an assertive player, especially in UN affairs, to expand its contribution to the 
international community. Particularly, since the outbreak of the Gulf War, when the UN 
itself began to resume its importance, the MOFA and the UN policy have also 
undergone a great number of developments. In the 1990s, prior to the political 
realignment in 1994, the MOFA's stance was similar to that of the LDP, which adhered 
strictly to the Japan-US alliance. At the same time, the MOFA also found itself being the 
key actor in initiating a policy agenda that reflected the organisation's conviction that 
Japan 'must do something more'. During and following the Gulf Crisis, the MOFA's 
active pursuance of UN policy, especially on the PKO participation and the quest for a 
185 \hn (1998: 45) and Zhao (1993: p. xi 
Iso Ueki (1993: 348-49) and Ogata (1987: 957) 
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permanent UNSC seat, was perceived as a repetition of views expressed by the US. 
Therefore, the MOFA often found itself clashing with other bureaucratic agencies as 
well as with opposition parties, who were obviously against the active UN policy under 
the US directives. 187 
It was not until after the second coalition government between the LDP-SDPJ 
and Sakigake in the latter half of the 1990s that the MOFA could successfully 
compromise with both political parties and public opinion on the issue of the importance 
of UN-Centrism. After 1995, the MOFA laid out a more coherent and persuasive outline 
for the new revival of Japan's UN-Centrism, the participation in UNPKOs, the bid for a 
permanent UNSC seat and the promotion of human security. Simultaneously, the MOFA 
was also compromised by the former opposition party, the SDPJ, in emphasising Japan's 
principle of pacifism and less reliance on the US. According to Kono Yohei, Foreign 
Minister in 1995, the foreign decision-making process in this era would certainly be 
based on Japan's own 'national identity' rather than on attempts to please the Western 
alliance as a member of the West. 188 This also means that, in order to make the right 
decisions on foreign policy issues, Japan needs to establish firm values and principles in 
assessing its own identity and national interest. 
b) Political Parties 
During the post-war period, the rivalry between the LDP and the then opposition 
parties - the SDPJ, the JCP, and the DSP - were quite apparent on the Japanese political 
scene. Under the 1955 system, the 'camp-conflict' between the LDP and the opposition 
parties could not be avoided. To be more precise, it had been a strong tradition among 
opposition parties to vote against the LDP on foreign policy issues that were at the 
187 
, 4sahi Shimbun, 20 April 1992. 
188 NIOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook 1996, policN-, otliet-, blue-book, /1996/1-a. html#2, 
accessed 2WO'Iý 2004 
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centre of public attention, such as the issue of the Japan-US alliance. policies towards 
Japan's neighbours and so on. During the Gulf Crisis and its aftermath, the major 
hindrance that accounted for the failure of Japan's UN policies, especially in the case of 
UNPKO and the bid for a permanent UNSC seat, was the result of both intra- and inter- 
party ideational discord, which will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
As clearly put by Hosoya, for a country that most values 'consensus-building', 
the failure to reach consensus among civilian and military leaders often prevents the 
government from making vital decisions, keeping it in a state of indecision. 189 Nor could 
consensus be reached within the LDP government itself The main reason for the 
disagreement was that the party was constituted of different factions, which viewed the 
situation regarding the UN and security matters differently. Although the LDP has been 
considered pro-UN, differences in perspectives between those calling themselves 
'moderates' and 'hard-liners' within the party have been apparent. 190 For example, the 
LDP members who belonged to the LDP-moderate camp included such important names 
as Miyazawa Kiichi and Kono Yohei, who were cautious about the government's full 
response to the UN demands and quite satisfied with the 'gradual change' in the 
country's foreign posture. On the contrary, LDP-hard-liners like Ozawa Ichiro, Takeo 
Nishioka and Taku Yamazaki were convinced that Japan must fully participate in 
various security activities and hoped to revise the law in order to fulfil all UN collective 
security obligations. 
The differences among LDP members were not as much of a hindrance as the 
complete differences between LDP and the opposition parties. Their dissimilarities 
ranged frorn the fundamental philosophy upheld by each party, opinions about the 
189 
HosoVa (1974: '165) 
190 
Heinrich, Shibata and SoeYa (1999: 78) 
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constitutionality of Japan's contribution abroad and types of humanitarian assistances to 
trivia such as the operations of the SDF under UN command and control. The LDP has 
long been in favour of gradual rearmament and close ties with the US, which can be 
traced back to the end of World War 11. Pacifism, to the majority of LDP members, was 
intimately tied to the idea of burden-sharing under the US security umbrella and to the 
UN in case of international crises. It is therefore inevitable that the LDP government 
would act in response to the US and UN demands. The left wing worshipped the essence 
of the Peace Constitution and Article 9, and were inclined to promote 'one-country 
pacifism' (ikkoku-heiwashugi). This, to their belief, did not require Japan to play an 
active part in any multilateral effort to maintain world peace and prosperity. Accordingly, 
the left-wing parties claimed that any move towards any involvement in UN-related 
force would mean that Japan would gradually resume its military functions, as implicitly 
expressed in the agenda of LDP since the end of the World War 11. The failure of 
Japan's activism in the UN policy, therefore, was simply due to the inability of the LDP 
and other opposition parties to reconcile their ideational differences. 
Nevertheless, the pattern of intra-party and inter-party discords somewhat 
disappeared in 1994 and a new political pattern, a coalition government between the 
former rivals (the LDP and SDPJ) and the emergence of a new party, the DPJ, replaced 
the previous one. The 'coalition government' generated two important impacts in 
Japanese politics. It basically altered the way political parties deal with each other, or the 
so-called 'ruling party effect" 91 and it changed the view of the former opposition parties 
entirely on some important policy agendas, especially in foreign and security policy. The 
1955 system, which consisted of one dominant political party versus the rest of the 
191 The term lar,,, elN- refers to the changing stance of the SDPJ on the issue regarding Japan's participation 
in UNPKO and the rationality of Japan's assuming a more responsible role In the UNSC. The changing 
stance was mainIN the result of the participation of the SDPJ in the first and second coalition governments 
in 1993 and 1994. Source: Yormuri Shimbun, 30 September 1993 
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Japanese political parties, created the manner in which the dominant government 
pursued both domestic and foreign policies as it saw fit while the opposition parties 
devoted themselves to challenging and opposing everything proposed by the government. 
To a certain extent, the successful political realignment in August 1993 and especially in 
June 1994 between the LDP and SDPJ in fact provided an opportunity for the long-time 
opposition party to assume the role of policy decision-maker and expose itself to the 
problems, rather than only relying on the same old strategy as an opponent of the LDP. 
Together with the emergence of a new wave of politicians under the new opposition 
party - the DPJ - this meant that more constructive discussions on international security 
and UN matters started to materialise in Japanese politics in the latter half of the 1990s. 
c) Media: Newspaper Writers and Polls 
Another set of domestic factors that are undeniably important for the analysis of 
Japan's UN security policy are those representing the views of the Japanese public. The 
recent literature on Japan's policy-making has started to take into account the 
importance of non -governmental actors, especially those planting themselves in the 
societal sphere, including media and public opinion. In a way, the media might be 
treated as a mirror reflecting and transmitting what public opinion believes at a given 
tirne. Simultaneously, the media, especially the major newspapers and television, also 
play their parts by setting up their agenda and stimulating, evaluating and impinging on 
the policy framework of the government. As suggested by Pharr, the media also play 
different roles, ranging from a spectator, a watchdog or a servant to a trickster alongside 
the other governmental actors. In case of Japan, unlike other western democracies, the 
media - specifically new7spapers - enjoy great credibility among the Japanese people. 
' 92 
192 Pharr and Krauss (1996: -5-8) 
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It is also interesting to see the close connection between newspapers and television, 
because the so-called ýbig five' Japanese television networks -Nippon Television, TBS. 
Fuji Television, Asahi Television and TV Tokyo - are respectively owned by Yomiuri, 
Mainichi, Sankei, Asahi and Nikkei, the 'big five' national dailies. 
As for public opinion, assessment of the polls made by several research 
institutions has made a significant contribution to a better understanding of the changes 
and continuities of the views and impacts of Japanese society towards the decision 
makers on foreign policy issues. It might be difficult to answer the question of whether 
there is a direct effect of public opinion on the decision-making process, unless one 
conducts a study evaluating how a certain government policy affects its electoral 
structure and outcomes. However, it cannot be denied that public opinion and polls have 
been effectively used by opposition parties to hinder the decisions of the executive 
branch. The first half of the 1990s, after the Gulf Crisis and the issue over the UNPKO 
bill, was perhaps the finest example of the impact of Japanese public opinion on the 
outcome of Japan's foreign policy. During and immediate after the Gulf Crisis, public 
opinion played as important a role as any other domestic actor. Some academics even 
suggest that the main reason for the failure of the Kaifu government in securing the 
passage of the first PKO bill in 1990 was the negative responses from public opinion, 
ý\, hich were repeatedly presented through the media. 193 Therefore, it is believed that the 
study of how the system of ideas and beliefs among the public regarding Japan's UN 
security issues has been transformed over time, as will be discussed in the following 3 
chapters, can also offer better insights into the reasons behinds policy preferences. 
PUrrington ( 199'22: 16 1-18 1 
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3.5 Conclusion 
In general, studies of Japan's security and its UN policy are normally located in 
separate arenas of academic interest. The majority of Japan's security study has also 
been anchored on the analysis of Japan-US bilateral relations and security arrangements. 
This is the case simply because during the post-WWII period, Japan's primary objective 
was to build up a peaceful nation based on the fundamental belief that the only way for 
Japan to ensure its national security was through Japan's and other countries' adherence 
to the pacifist sentiment of not resorting to war to settle conflicts. In a way, Japan's early 
understanding about a 'peace-loving nation' was somehow 'inward-looking, as it 
addressed only Japan's one-sided military self-restraint and put the rest of its faith in 
other members of the international community to maintain international peace, 
especially via the UN mechanism. 
However, such idealistic sacrifice through the renunciation of war did not seem 
to be very realistic, given the Cold War situation of East-West ideological rivalry. In 
reality, throughout the post-war period, Japan had never succeeded in pursuing the ideal 
national or international security policy, relying on the UN, because of the obvious 
ineffectiveness of the organisation itself and Japan's concern mostly for national security, 
which was also limited to a narrowly defined geographical area. It is therefore not 
surprising that the original idealistic aspiration to link the issues of national and 
international security under the UN umbrella was neglected as soon as it originated. 
Instead, most of the issues revolving around Japan's national security were emphasised 
more strongly, and Nvere practically tied to the Japan-US security alliance, as the axiom 
of Japan's post-war foreign and security policy. 
Without an effective UN, Japan's national security has been solely anchored to 
Japan-US security arrangements, and this unique bilateral relationship is believed by the 
13' 4 
majority of scholars to be the key mechanism that has dictated the overall direction of 
Japan's security policy at national, regional and international levels throughout recent 
decades. However, whether the Japan-US security arrangement has actually been the 
cornerstone upon which all of Japan's security dimensions were developed is still open 
to criticism. It is undoubtedly true that Japan-US security arrangements have not only 
protected Japan against external aggressions, but also have performed as strategic 
deterrent measures in the areas surrounding Japan and in the Asia-Pacific region, as 
clearly stipulated in the 1960 Japan-US Security Treaty and in other basic security and 
defence guidelines. 
Nonetheless, issues of how to secure international security and the ways to 
pursue stabilised peace via these existing security arrangements have never been clearly 
outlined under Japan-US security arrangements. Therefore, it might be true to assume 
that the dichotornised ideas and understanding of Japan's security policy between the 
emphasis on national/regional security under the Japan-US security arrangements and 
the concern over issues of international security under UN-Centrism have played a 
pertinent role in steering Japan towards the imbalance of its post-war security policy: 
that is, the prioritising of national and immediate regional security with the US rather 
than highlighting its emphasis on international security. UN-Centrism, therefore, was 
left as only policy rhetoric and was diverted to deal with economic and social 
development issues rather than security concerns. 
UN-Centrism in the post-Cold War era, on the contrary, has emerged as a new 
framework in which Japan could possibly develop its security policy based on its 
ori(jnal desire to promote international peace and security. Prior to the Gulf crisis, the 
UN served only as an arena NN, here Japan could identify itself as a strong ally of the 
N\estern democratic countries and as a major contributor to development and financial 
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donor, none of which was even close to what Japan had hoped to achieve through the 
UN. On the contrary, after the Gulf war, Japan started to adjust its UN policy emphasis 
by exploring how the symmetry between its economic, political and security 
contributions could be correspondingly projected within the framework of the LN. The 
most pertinent feature of the new UN-Centrism emerging since the Gulf crisis was not 
Japan's increasing activism in the promotion of international peace and security via a 
doubling of its financial contribution alone, but the ability of the country to improvise 
the approach to which security and development could be fully integrated. 
The emergence of the 'human security' approach also originated from the 
transformed understanding about national and international peace among the Japanese 
people and the government, in which the two spheres of security are no longer clearly 
dichotomised, but are closely intertwined. The increasing emphasis on international 
security in the post-Cold War period, however, does not signify Japan's autonomous 
stance or a parting of ways with the existing security arrangements with the US. It 
merely suggests that the emphasis has become more equalised, rather than being 
weighted in favour of the Japan-US alliance over UN-Centrism. Accordingly, the 
development of Japan's security policy under the UN framework therefore deserves a 
careful examination. In the following three chapters, which focus on the Gulf Crisis, the 
Cambodian peace process and the promotion of human security, the development of 
Japan's UN security policy will be observed simultaneously with the examination of the 
process of identity transformation, which is believed to be the key factor responsible for 
security development within the UN framework. In other words, each case will reveal 
each phase of the overall process of Japan's identity transformation in the post-Cold war 
period. which directly contributed to Japan's activism in the UN security policy. 
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Chapter 4 The Gulf Crisis and Peacekeeping Operations (1990-1992) 
4.1 Background to the Gulf Crisis, 1990-1992 
To give some background on the Gulf Crisis, in August 1990, governments and 
media around the world were startled by the unlawful invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi 
government. It was the first military invasion in the post-war era, after the German 
annexation of Poland in 1939, and it confirmed that the possibility of physical threats to 
states' sovereignty still exists even after the Cold War. The reaction from the 
international community to Iraq's illicit advance was overwhelmingly disapproving. The 
majority of nations agreed with the UN measures to retaliate against the Iraqi 
government for its violation of international law and its disruption of world peace. The 
UNSC adopted its resolution 660 (1990), condemning the military invasion, demanding 
that Iraq immediately and unconditionally withdraw its forces from Kuwait and calling 
upon both countries to begin intensive negotiations. Subsequently, a dozen UN 
resolutions regarding necessary measures were adoPted consecutively, including arms 
embargos, diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions. 194 
Although the UN and the international community attempted to manage the crisis 
in a peaceful fashion, the rapid launch of military forces to expel the Iraqi troops from 
Kuwait was inevitable. Resolution 678 (1990) was adopted on 29 November 1990, 
issuing an ultimatum on Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 1991, but was 
again deliberately ignored by the Iraqi government. ' 95 Without any positive response 
from Iraq, the UN member states settled on the use of force to repel Iraq and liberate 
Kuwait. Kuwrait's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and legitimate 
194 United Nations, United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNICOM), 
litt [i:, ' tin. org/Dcpts'dpko/m i ssi ons/un i korn /back ground. htm 1, accessed 11/01/2005. UNSC 
resolutions adopted during these past months were resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990)7 662 (1990), 664 
(1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), 667 (1990), 669 (1990), 670 (1990), 674 (1990), 677 (1990) and 678 
(1990), respectiNrCIN'. 
19i United Nations, UNSC Resolution 678, -19 November 1990 
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government were successfully restored in April 1991 when all the Iraqi armed forces 
vacated the country's territory. With haste, the UNSC adopted resolution 687 (1991) to 
outline the detailed conditions for a formal ceasefire and to expedite the establishment of 
a machinery to ensure the smooth operations of the parties involved. 196 
The Gulf Crisis demonstrates not only an attempt by the international community 
to address the post-Cold War international peace and security issue, which had usually 
been tackled unilaterally by major powers during the Cold War period, but also a great 
impact on several countries' foreign policy directions. In this chapter, the Gulf Crisis 
will be treated as the start of the process of identity transformation in the post-Cold War 
Japan. The set of ideas and beliefs regarding the nature of international threats, UN 
peace operations and Japan-US bilateral relations embedded in the international 
community and within Japan will be examined in parallel. The 'international-role' 
identities and the 'domestic-type' identities usually informed by these sets of ideas will 
then be outlined and compared. Through the observation of the degree of conformity 
between the two sets of identities, policy failure or success during this period will be 
explained. 
4.2 International Response: Collective Ideas on Peace and Security during 
the Gulf Crisis 
4.2.1 Collective Ideas on the Nature of International Peace and Security 
The Gulf Crisis is considered a vital turning point, which has contributed to the 
transformation of international politics in many respects. To some scholars, physical 
threats in the post-Cold War world were substantially diminished and the end of the 
Cold War has led to the 'end of history' or the end of the East-West ideological rivalry. 
196 United Nations, UNSC Resolution 687,3 April 1991 
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Fukuyama, for example, argued that the triumph of liberal democracy over the 
communist regime would end the long-term political and ideological battles, which had 
served as the fundamental reason for most conflicts in the Cold War period. 197 It might 
be true to assert that most of what had characterised the threats and conflicts in the Cold 
War period might have ceased to exist. The confined 'proxy' wars, which affected only 
those in the warring zones, and the source of threats that were more or less from the 
identifiable major powers, no longer held places in the equation of post-Cold War 
international politics. However, the dissimilarity between the Cold War and the post- 
Cold War conflicts was the difference in the 'source of threats' and 'scale of impacts' 
resulting from those conflicts. 
Contrary to Fukuyama's belief in lasting peace, the Gulf Crisis demonstrated that 
the traditional threat to national security and integrity, in the most primitive form of 
territorial invasion, did not totally disappear, although it was significantly diminished. It 
also drew the attention of the international community to the source of threats in the 
post-Cold War era, which was also substantially 'vertical', in that state or national 
governments themselves are actually the cause of physical threats to their own people, as 
evident in the threat posed by the Iraqi government to the Kurdish minority following 
the Gulf Crisis or the ethnic cleansing of Bosnians and Croatians in Bosnia Herzegovina 
by the Serbian government in the early 1990s. Since 1992, of all 41 peace operations, 
intra-state conflict accounted for 92 percent of the overall missions. ' 98 These 
predominant trends of 'intra-state' conflicts emerging from the disappearance of 
197 Fukuyarna (1992: xi) 
10S Of 41 operations established since 1992, only three conflicts between Iraq-Kuwait (UNICOM), 
Croatia-Serbia-Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNPROFOR) and Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), were I 
considered inter-state conflicts. Source: United Nations, Timeline of the United Nations Peacekeeping 
1948-2005, http: //wN,,, xv. tiii. ora, /Depts/dpko/dpko'tinieline/pa. Res, "ninetya. html and 
hqpjLA\ \ý Ný. Lin. org, /Depts dL)ko/dpko/tirne1ine pages/twoo. htm], accessed 05/09'2004. 
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ideological rivalry required the international community to locate another means of 
managing post-Cold War conflicts and peace operations-' 99 
Another characteristic that contributed to the format of post-Cold War threats 
was the 'horizontal' scale of impact of the conflicts. In the post-Cold War world, those 
affected by physical threats are not limited only to people residing in the conflict zones. 
Nowadays, the impact of massive population displacement and refugees, as well as 
environmental degradation such as oil pollution in neighbouring countries, has 
significantly increased and become multifaceted. Hence, when the nature of threats and 
the format of conflicts were somewhat different from the Cold War inter-state conflicts 
and 'proxy wars, ' the ideas that the international community embraced regarding the 
handling of security situations and maintaining international peace differed accordingly 
from the earlier period. One such idea was that the management of security and the 
maintenance of international peace should be based on the idea of joint or multilateral 
efforts, including the use of multilateral armed force. Unlike the American or the Soviet 
showcases in Vietnam and Afghanistan in the 1970s-1980s, in which both major powers 
took on unilateral military assertiveness to secure and maintain their self-defined peace, 
the Gulf Crisis gave rise to the first 'legitimate and effective' multilateral force that was 
multilaterally summoned in lieu of unilateral military intervention. Although such 
multilateral force was criticised to some extent as a US-led military force, it was 
undeniable that the force was endorsed both legally and in spirit by the consensus of the 
international community and the UN resolutions. 
Another relatively important idea was that the international community finally 
viewed the UN as a capable messenger for peace. The reason behind this idea was that 
for the first time, the UN mechanism was effectively utilised both in terms of conflict 
199 Cabal lero-Anthony (2005: 1-2) 
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avoidance (diplomatic efforts) and conflict management (military functions). In a sense. 
this also indicated the transformation of the UN itself, from its former stance, which had 
been based largely on preventive diplomatic functions and on a clear distinction between 
conflict management and conflict avoidance, to the integration of both. To clarify, the 
diversification between the UNSC, where the conflict management approach was the 
key focus, and other UN organs, where the conflict avoidance approach was adopted, 
was believed to be responsible for the ineffectiveness of the UN during the first 50 years 
of its operations . 
200 The incorporation of the two approaches to how to deal with 
conflicts in the post-Cold War period certainly contributed to the changing ideas on the 
way in which peace operations should be effectively handled, as discussed in the 
following section. 
4.2.2 Collective Ideas on UN Peace Operations 
Compared to the Cold War period, when the UN peace operations were inactive 
for such reasons as the inhibited East-West rivalries within the UNSC during the late 
1960s- I 970s and the limited cooperative efforts from major powers, especially from the 
US in the 1980s or the administrative inertia within the UN itself, the post-Cold War 
period has been considered as the 'Expansion Period' of the UN peace activities, as 
more than 40 operations have been conducted since the end of the Gulf Crisi S. 20 1 As 
Nvell as quantifying the UN peace operations, the Gulf Crisis also acted as the main 
qualitative catalyst that transformed the consensus ideas and beliefs of the international 
community regarding peace operations and conflict management. As mentioned earlier, 
peace operations in the Gulf Crisis were distinctive because it was the first time since the 
1950 Korean War that the UN had been successful in incorporating the idea of conflict 
200 Fetherston ( 1994: 8) 
201 lbid (1994: 25) 
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management into its peace operation activities. Taking the organisation's past 
endeavours into account, the UN had continuously adopted the ideas of 'conflict 
avoidance, ' which includes the methods of 'preventive diplomacy or peacemaking, ' 
'peacekeeping' and 'post-conflict peacebuilding, ' as the organisation's central, albeit 
passive, approaches to ensure lasting peace and security. The transformation of 
collective ideas about 'more assertive' peace operations emerging during and following 
the Gulf War period was believed to have major implications for the post-Cold War UN 
peace operations in a number of ways. 
Firstly, 'preventive diplomacy and peacemaking' had been the core idea in UN 
conflict prevention and a primary political mechanism since its establishment. The 
ultimate aim of this mechanism was to prevent any potential tensions or disputes from 
escalating into full-scale armed conflicts. The early preventive measures included, for 
example, good offices and mediations undertaken by UN Special Envoys or 
representatives of the UN Secretary General prior to the eruption of possible disputes. 
Later prevention, on the contrary, focused on preventing existing disputes from 
intensifying into armed conflicts. The measures employed included fact-finding 
missions, early warning, recommendation of a specific dispute settlement procedure and 
attempts to make peace via diplomatic conciliations and negotiations with the conflicting 
parties. 202 Since the Gulf experience, the idea that other measures complementing 
preventive diplomacy should be included alongside the existing diplomatic efforts has 
been circulating among the international community. The current ideational departure of 
preventive measures consists of 'preventive deployment' and 'preventive disarmament, ' 
E\ ans (1998: 63-64 and 79) 
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which suggests the transformation from 'preventive diplomatic measures' to 'preventive 
military actions. ' 
203 
The ideas and beliefs that have evolved around the concepts and implementations 
of peacekeeping operations have also been greatly transformed. Traditional 
peacekeeping operations were conducted with the objective of containing the conflicts to 
the least precarious magnitude and tackling the root causes peacefully. The main 
activities of these operations, conducted by light-armed or unarmed military officers and 
civilian personnel from member countries, initially covered only such activities as 
monitoring, observing and assisting the peace process, which often includes power- 
transition arrangements, electoral support, law and order strengthening and economic 
and social development. 
204 
Despite this, the development of ideas surrounding UN peacekeeping, as was the 
case during the Gulf Crisis, saw an increasing emphasis on 'peace enforcement' in 
addition to the existing un-armed peacekeeping operations. The thin line that had 
previously been drawn between peacekeepers and the multilateral forces has also 
become increasingly blurred, due to the changing nature of peace operations. As 
mentioned previously, the lesson from the Gulf Crisis precipitated a shift of ideas on 
how peace operations should be effectively managed. Due to the increasing complexity 
of contemporary conflicts, whose impacts are widely horizontal and experienced by a 
large number of populations across borders, the emphasis on the past 'conflict- 
avoidance' peacekeeping function would mean a doubling of war casualties. It is 
203 The Report of the Secretary General (1995) highlights the fielding of peacekeepers to forestall and 
deter the escalation of probable conflicts as well as to provide 'a thin blue line' to help contain conflicts 
through confidence and trust building among conflicting parties, as seen in the missions in the Former 
Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (UNPREDEP) and in the Central African Republic (NIINURCA). The 
latter, however, focuses on reducing the number of small arrns in conflict-prone areas, such as those in El 
Salvador (ONUSAL) or Mozambique (ONUMOZ). 
204 United Nations, Meeting New Challenges, http: //www. Lin. orgiDepts/dpkc), 'dpko /r faq/q I. htm, accessed 
09 09 2004. 
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therefore inevitable that the international community must embrace the idea that 
effective peace activities may need a suitable synthesis between un-armed diplomatic 
efforts and the use of force to secure peace. 
The idea regarding 'post-conflict peacebuilding' was perhaps the only one that 
did not experience an abrupt transformation as a result of the Gulf Crisis in the early 
1990s. Peacebuilding was usually referred to as all external efforts accumulated by 
member countries to assist and ensure the former conflicting parties in smooth 
transitions from war to peace . 
205 Supposedly, effective peace-building operations were 
those that included myriads of integrated actions from all military, diplomatic, political, 
economic, social and humanitarian fronts, in order to guarantee a strong and lasting 
structural peace. 206 The peacebuilding in the first half of the 1990s following the Gulf 
crisis shared similar characteristics with the traditional post-war peacebuilding: that is, it 
emphasised the developmental aspect of peacebuilding activities. The ideas regarding 
peacebuilding measures were reflected through the focus on such activities as 
agricultural, educational or cultural and infrastructure projects. Views regarding the 
extent to which negative effects resulted from the conflicts, especially ideas regarding 
human security and how to respond to it in post-conflict peacebuilding, were not 
specifically embraced during the early post-Cold War period. It was not until the latter 
half of the 1990s and the promotion of human security policy that the ideas underlying 
peacebullding operations were transformed. 
205 United Nations, Peacemaking and Peace-building, 
http: /, "\\ \\, \\. uii. oi-. (,,, /Depts/dpa/pre\, dip fr peacemakim, )'. htm, accessed 9/9/2004 
206 More details in the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the 
Occasion of the 506' Anniversary of the United Nations (1995). As suggested by the previous UN 
Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, peacebuilding can be divided into two stages. The first stage of 
peacebuilding can commence upon the end of conflicts or the start of peaceful settlement, in which the 
political, economic and social as well as the root causes of conflicts are thoroughly negotiated and settled. 
The main actors undertaking the task are essentially the on-site peacekeepers. The second stage of 
peacebuilding involves more resources and actors, and covers a Nvide variety of acti\ ities that lead to the 
creation of institutionallsed peace. 
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4.2.3 Ideas and Beliefs of the US on the Gulf Crisis 
As Japan's foreign policy in general and its UN security policy in particular have 
been predominantly influenced by the Japan-US relationship, an examination of the US 
ideas and beliefs behind political and diplomatic measures as well as UN peace 
operations during the Gulf Crisis is thus vital to the analysis of Japan's choice of its 
projected 'international-role' identity during the crisis. The US, like most members of 
the international community, reacted to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait with utmost 
contempt. The Bush administration, joined by the majority of the UN members, had 
launched successive diplomatic and political measures and economic sanctions aimed at 
persuading Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. A series of high-profile diplomatic offers and 
attempts to create political incentives that were acceptable to Saddam Hussein, 
conducted by both US Secretary of State, James Baker and the then-USSR president, 
Mikhail Gorbachev, were pursued without satisfactory results. 207 The war against Iraq 
resulted from the failure of other peaceful efforts, and was said to be largely based on 
the ideas that the Iraqi invasion was a threat to US access to the Persian Gulf oil and 
areas that are vital to US national security. According to the National Security Directive 
45 regarding the US policy in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the commitment 
to secure stability in the area also included the will to defend its interests by using 
military force if necessary, apart from freeing the Kuwaitis and restoring Kuwait's 
208 legitimate government . 
Nevertheless, the ideas surrounding the issues of US military retaliation against 
Iraq held by the US government as well as other UN members were not based solely on 
the need to secure access to oil in the Gulf. Based on an idea that has taken root in the 
Io7 
Warner ( 1990: 3 4-315) 
208 National Security Directives 45,20 August 1990. 
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American society since the late 19th century, the American -embraced 'manifest destiny' 
has evolved through time and added up to the justification of 'just war. ' As pointed out, 
for example, by McGrath, the Spanish-American War of 1898 during Theodore 
Roosevelt's administration laid out rules about US military engagements, stating that a 
mere national interest alone would never justify conquest and that foreign policy would 
have to be 'moral' and 'virtuous. ' 209 Since then, American military engagements around 
the world have partly served the country's own national interests and partly advanced its 
moral ideas through foreign military conduct, as evident in the promotion of democracy 
and liberty as part of its 'liberal grand strategy' in Vietnam and throughout Central 
America and the Caribbean. 2 10 The war against Iraq was no different: the commitment to 
establish the 'new world order' was repeatedly pronounced both by George Bush 
himself and by other high-ranking civilian and military officials, and labelled as the US 
moral ideal to help free Kuwait, to protect innocent lives and to restore a legitimate 
political regime. As straightforwardly put by George Bush: 
'[ ] With unity and determination, and yes, patience, I am confident that 
these objectives are within reach. When we succeed, we will have returned a 
country to its people. We will have shown that aggression will not be tolerated. 
We will have invigorated a United Nations that contributes as its founders 
dreamed. We will have established principles for acceptable international 
conduct and the means to enforce them. In short, we will have taken a major step 
towards a community of nations bound by a common commitment to peace and 
restraint [ ]. ' 2'' 
101) McGrath (1990: 38) 
2101kenberry(2000: 1033-106) 
2 '' Bush (1990: 29) 
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However, unlike previous military efforts conducted unilaterally under the name 
of 'freedom', 'liberty' or 'democracy', the US government itself has added to its foreign 
policy and foreign military manoeuvres another important characteristic by embracing 
the idea of utilising the UN as a settlement mechanism and the use of collective 
multilateral force endorsed by the majority of nations. The American leadership 
portrayed during the Gulf War, although it remained positive and constructive, did 
insinuate the changing pattern of foreign conduct that would engage the international 
community and its commitment towards the establishment of peace and security. The 
way in which these above sets of ideas and beliefs were shared during the Gulf Crisis 
and translated into 'international-role' identities, collectively embedded by the 
international community, will be discussed in the following section. 
4.3 International-Role Identity Projection and the Expectations on Japan 
4.3.1 On International Peace and Security: 
'Multilateral Pacificist ' 
Given the abrupt end of the Cold War, the international community found itself 
facing both the traditional threat of a state waging war against others for primal political 
and economic reasons and the increasing intra-state conflicts previously masked by the 
major powers' ideological adversaries. The Gulf Crisis perhaps would not have gained 
so much attention if it had not provided the international community with the 
opportunity to reconsider how international peace and security should be maintained. 
Aside from the fact that the Gulf Crisis was the first international conflict in which clear 
Cold War ideological divergence or vested interests among the major countries was not 
the principal motive. it was the first crisis in which the whole international communitv 
\\as a stakeholder, facing the disorder of the international systern and the breach of 
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international law. Such ideas led the international community to assume the identity of a 
cmultilateral pacificist, ' whose main task was to restore and maintain international peace 
and security through multilateral rather than unilateral efforts and even through the UN 
mechanism rather than a single country's political or military manoeuvres. 
By assuming this identity as a multilateral pacificist, the international community 
collectively recognised the importance of strengthening the efficiency of the UN, which 
would surely involve much more vigorous and persistent efforts than those contributed 
to the UN in the past. In the Cold War period, the UNSC adopted only 15 resolutions, 
whereas this figure trebled to 53 resolutions in 1992. The number of countries 
contributing military and police personnel also significantly increased, from 26 in 1988 
to 56 countries in 1992. Above all, the annual budget on UNPKOs was 6 times higher in 
1992, comparing to the amount donated by the member countries in 1988, rising from 
US$ 230.40 to 1,689.6 million dollars. 212 These statistics not only show that the 
international community was extremely keen on utilising the UN as the main mechanism 
to restore and maintain peace and security, but also reflect a better understanding among 
the international community that peace could not be achieved through the sole effort of 
any individual country. 
Another important development on the ideational position of the 'multilateral 
pacificist' embraced by the international community was the systematic layout of how to 
achieve peace both in the short and the long term. While 'An Agenda for Peace', 
sLibi-nitted in 1992, fundamentally dealt with the Cold War peace operation problems 
encountered by the UNSC, the new process initiated in the 1994 publication, 'An 
Agenda for Development, ' prompted the international community on the importance of 
212 UN (1995) on the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the I Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the UN. 
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ýcomprehensive procedures' that incorporate economic and social development into the 
maintenance of Peace and security, as will be further discussed in section 4.3.2 and in 
Chapter 5, respectively. There was a clear intention on the part of the international 
community to collectively fulfil the identity of the 'multilateral pacificist', as evident 
through both the quantitative and the qualitative volume of activities. It was rather 
apparent in the early 1990s that neither the remaining inter-state conflicts nor the 
increasing intra-state conflicts could be properly solved through any one nation's effort. 
Instead, the shared ideas and collective efforts through the UN were to be further 
developed and pursued in order to establish long and lasting peace. 
4.3.2 On UN Peace Operations: 
'Peace Enforcer' 
In the Cold War period, apart from the fact that UN peace operations were very 
limited in quantity and less accomplished in quality, the only area of UN operations that 
was constantly emphasised by the UN and the international community was 'preventive 
diplomacy. ' Statistically speaking, the UN might receive insignificant amount of support 
and was considered inefficient in other areas of peace operations, specifically in 
peacekeeping. However, in the area of preventive diplomacy, there was no substantial 
difference in the numbers of disputes and conflicts in which the UN was actively 
involved. While there were II missions involving preventive diplomacy in the Cold War 
era, there were also 13 missions in the early post-Cold War period. The main reason for 
the UN's focus on preventive diplomacy over other costly peace operation activities 
during the Cold War might have been the lack of faith and beliefs among the 
international community that the UN could perform as the primary international security 
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mechanism: hence their small contributions in terms of personnel, finance and ideas. As 
pointed out by one UNDP official: 
'[ ] In the Cold War period, the UN could be a possible means in 
maintaining peace and security, in theory. But elsewhere in the world, nobody 
thought it was real. The UN at that time was still representing East-West 
conflicts. Nothing moved when the former Soviet Union and the US 
confrontation happened. That was the reality. ' 213 
Nevertheless, such ideas and beliefs started to be transformed after the success 
of the multinational force in restoring international peace and order in the Gulf Crisis. 
The embracing of the UN's identity as the 'peace enforcer' was essentially a direct result 
of the Gulf experience and the transformation of ideas regarding the handling of peace 
and security by remedying the weakness of the Cold War peace operations. As 
mentioned earlier, it was agreed that the necessity of creating a more effective UN 
mechanism to deal with the post-Cold War international security, which was 
increasingly complicated, was a prerequisite to the post-Cold War maintenance of peace 
and security, especially the patterns and contradictions of deepening economic 
cooperation, increasing political nationalism and the emerging intra-state and root cause 
confl iCtS. 
214 The 'Agenda for Peace' submitted by the former UN Secretary General, 
Boutros Boutros Ghali in 1992, responded to the ideas suggested by the international 
community on how to handle post-Cold War international peace and security by 
emphasising the lack of enforcing units to respond to any form of aggression and the 
meaningless agreements on ceasefires violated by conflicting parties during the Cold 
,I" icial and a current high-ranking U, 'DP official, 07/03/2006 Interv I ew with a former NIOFA off ýýN 214 t IN (1992: 2) on An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. I 
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War period. The failure of the UN in the Cold War period, compared to its success in the 
Gulf Crisis, triggered the international community to reconsider the future activities of 
enforcing actions, which was believed to be the 'key' to the success of the UN peace 
operations during the Gulf Crisis. 
According to the Agenda for Peace, the international community was clearly 
convinced that the three stages of peace operations were to be integrally related. 
'Preventive diplomacy', for example, was action aimed at preventing disputes from 
arising between parties or preventing existing disputes from escalating into full-scale 
conflicts through confidence building, fact finding, early warning, preventive 
deployment and the creation of demilitarised zones. 'Peacemaking' was basically action 
to bring hostile parties to agreement through such means as the world court, sanctions, 
and most important of all, enforcement actions. Peacekeeping was the deployment of a 
UN presence in the conflicting areas, which normally involved military, police and 
civilian activities. 
However, among the three stages of peace operations, the experience from the 
Gulf Crisis particularly stressed the importance of the use of force to respond to both 
imminent and actual aggression as well as to force the conflicting parties to comply with 
cease-fires agreements. 'Peacekeeping' was thus another area that the international 
community emphasised strengthening. The new departures of peacekeeping operations, 
which could provide flexibility in security demands, were discussed at length, especially 
the readiness of the international community to contribute military, police and civilian 
personnel. '115 In addition, the fourth stage of UN peace operations or the 'post-conflict 
peacebuilding' was also mentioned, but rather as follow-up projects that enhanced 
econornic and social development to achieve a durable foundation. However, it is 
215 lbid, (1992: 4-1 
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important to note that during the early 1990s, each of the UN operations was mutually 
strengthened to respond to each individual step of peace restoration and maintenance. 
Although it was clearly stated by the former Secretary General that all of the UN peace 
operations must in theory be comprehensive and integrated, it was not until later in the 
decade that clear links between operations materialised, as will be further discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
4.3.3 On Japan-US Relations: 
'US Partner' 
During the Cold War period, the wars against communism were waged mostly 
'unilaterally' by the US government, and were numerous throughout several parts of the 
world, from the Vietnam War in Asia to several wars in Latin American countries, not to 
mention those 'proxy wars' supported behind the scenes by both the US and the former 
Soviet Union's governments. These ideological differences and military conflicts were 
the main political events characterising international politics during the Cold War period. 
The US's ideas on the rationale of unilateral attempts in military operations during the 
Cold War period were also transformed in some ways during the Gulf Crisis. As 
mentioned above, the most important ideational transformation among the international 
community, the US included, was that multilateral efforts, especially through the UN 
mechanism, became preferable to other methods in securing peace and security. To the 
US, the invasion of Kuwait and the start of the Gulf Crisis did not occur in ways with 
which the US had been familiar throughout the Cold War period. The nature of the war, 
N\hich was a security threat waged by one against another, was not ideological but 
i nterest- based. The war was the first time in 40 years after the WWII when there was 
unprecedented territorial invasion and the shameless declaration of a 'comprehensive 
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and eternal merger' 216 of one country against the will of another. The US surely learned 
from the experience in Vietnam that such a large-scale war in the Gulf would certainly 
require not only military but also political support and reserves from the international 
community. As reiterated by Colin Powell: 
we can't go to war without them, a war of this size. One of the 
things that was done back in the mid-seventies, after Vietnam, was that the 
structure of the armed forces may have had more than the military motivation but 
a political motivation and made sure that the whole nations would get involved 
IIý 217 
or as further commented by James Baker, the then Secretary of State, on the US 
emphasis on depending on the UN mechanism and on cultivating 'partners' to win the 
Iraq war: 
,[]I felt good about the fact that we were able to bring the international 
community on board for what was right. We had really been able to cobble 
together a rather unprecedented international coalition. I had the feeling that the 
United Nations was working that day in the way in which the founders had 
intended. 
[] It was after all the President's decision to go multi-laterally. That 
was not an easy decision. There were voices suggesting that we should do this 
under article 5 1. We knew we could do it under article 5 1. We had no problem 
with that. We knew legally we had the authority to do it under article 5 1. But we 
also recognised the importance of doing this in a xvay that it was not seen to be 
216 UN, UNSC Resolution 662,9 August 1990 
217 Frontline, An interview Nvith Colin Powell, 
http: 'Av\v\\'. pbs. org \\ gbh 'pa.,,, eS/fi-ontliiie/. iZulf/orallpoWell/3. htini, accessed 15, ý03/2004. 
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America and the West against the Arab world and that it was not seen to be a 
cowboy operation. So the President [Bush] thought it was an important vote as 
far as he was concerned because it proved the wisdom of this approach. It proved 
that the United States was leading the international community and doing 
something that was right and that was unprecedented. 218 
The most vital ideational transformation was not only that the US needed the 
international community, let alone Japan, as its 'partner' in the Gulf War: the US also 
made it clear for the first time in post-WWII history that 'multilateral pacificism' - the 
ideas that echoed collaborative efforts of the international community to restore peace 
and maintain international security - was important. This sentiment was shown through 
the US attempt to pursue military actions through the UN mechanism, which has set 
standards for the maintenance of international peace and security in the post-Cold War 
period. The vote of the UNSC members in the UN Resolution 678 for the use of 'all 
necessary means, ' including the use of force through multi-military means, was 
considered one of the key historical votes in the history of the UN and underscored how 
the maintenance of peace and security in the post-Cold War could proceed .2 
19 The 
transformation of ideas and beliefs, which constituted a new set of 'international -ro I e' 
identities among the international community, did not occur only at the international 
level. At the domestic level, Japan experienced the same process of ideational and 
identity transformation as a result of the Gulf Crisis, as discussed below. 
218 Frontline, An interview with James Baker, 
., ulf'oral,, 
"baker/l. html, accessed 15/03,2004. www. pbs. org, \N, ý-, tili'pa, -, es'froiitline/'e 219 t IN, UNSC Resolution 678,29 November 1990 
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4.4 Domestic-Type Identity Formation: Japan's Political Identity during 
the Gulf Crisis 
Japan's response to the Gulf Crisis was one of many classic cases that have been 
thoroughly examined by several scholars throughout these past years. It was widely 
agreed among the international community to be 'too little, too late' and too forced to be 
credited. During the Gulf Crisis, Japan showed its reluctance and hesitation from the 
start by allotting an embarrassing package of US$ 13 billion, some of which was 'in- 
kind', under pressure from the US and the international community. 220 As pointed out 
by a Japanese scholar, none of the billion-dollar contributions announced on several 
occasions had been arrived at as an independent move based on the ideals and 
philosophy of the Japanese government. They were offered grudgingly as an 
appeasement to the US demands. 221 Internationally, Japan's crisis response was not only 
lacking in terms of physical input, but also in terms of such intangible efforts as 
ideational input. It was even worse in the domestic arena, when the Kaifu government's 
efforts to push through the 1990 Peacekeeping Bill were fruitless, leading to the abortion 
of the bill and criticism from the international community. 222 
Previous studies of the Gulf Crisis are certainly varied, depending upon 
individual scholarly interest, ranging from domestic political determinants and the 
changing international system to Japan-US bilateral relations. The most common 
approach adopted by scholars to explain Japan's Gulf response is probably the one 
focusing on domestic political factors or the interactions among the so-called 'ruling 
220 Economist (1991 a: 29-39) 
221 Ito (1991: 275) 
12, 
-- The 1992' UN Peace Cooperation Law (Kokin-en Hehva Kj-5iýOkzi-M - UNPKO Law), although 
eventualk enacted, was also slated as 'untimely' - approximately I year after the conclusion of the Gulf 
War. 
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triad. ý 223 Some scholars, however, set their objectives to overcome the narrow viewpoint 
of the existing interpretation circulating in domestic politics and adopt the perspective of 
'ideational factors% namely culture and norms, to explicate the possible reasons behind 
Japan's response to the Gulf Crisis. 224 This research takes on the same stance as the 
latter group but turns its focus to another set of ideational factors - ideas and beliefs that 
operate and inform Japan's 'domestic-type' and 'international -role' identities. In the 
following section, the ideas and beliefs that informed Japan's identities during the crisis 
will be discussed to explain why Japan's response to the Gulf Crisis was 'too little and 
too late. ' In the following section, Japan's ideational responses and the adoption of 
'domestic-type' identities during the Gulf Crisis will be thoroughly examined. 
4.4.1 Ideas Surrounding International Peace and Security: 
'Unilateral Pacifist ' 
As pointed out by Hunsberger and Tarnarnoto, Japan has had the habit of looking 
to outsiders when shaping its national goals - from looking to China during the Meiji 
restoration in 1868 to the western civilisation in the post-WWII era. 225 However, as 
regards peace and security issues, Japan's 'domestic-type' identity as the 'unilateral 
pacifist' seemed to have been influenced by its own cultural attributes and historical 
experiences. The ideas behind the formation and the adoption of the 'unilateral pacifist' 
identity were firmly based on the historical experience of war calamity and defeat during 
WWII and on the spirit behind the 1946 Peace constitution. Throughout the post-war 
period, Japan had developed its own unique political identity, which focused on the idea 
that Japan was a devoted 'peace-loving' country. By placing all its security concerns 
'23 See C. Purrington (1992) and A. George (1993), for example. 
'24 See T. Berger (1996) and H. Dobson (2003). for example. 
ger ( 1997: xxxi) and Tarnarnoto (1997: 3-4) 225 Hunsber, 
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under the framework of the Japan-US alliance, Japan could effortlessly relinquish 
physical military capability and cling to the ideas of 'love for freedom and devotion to 
peace' (Jiyu wo ai shi, heiwa ni tessuru), as expressed in the 25 th Meeting of the UN 
226 General Assembly by the government of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato . It was thus a 
consensus among political, economic and social segments in Japanese society that, given 
the Cold War environment and domestic sentiments, it was most appropriate for Japan to 
assume the identity of the 'one-country pacifist'(ikkoku-heiwa shugisha) or 'unilateral 
pacifist'. 
Fundamentally, the core ideas of this 'domestic-type' identity were that Japan's 
survival, as well as sustainable international peace, could be attained only if Japan 
strictly adhered to the 'no-war' clause of the peace constitution and only if it did not get 
involved in any sort of military arrangement, even in the form of collective security 
under the auspices of the UN. 227 In other words, there was a conviction that Japan could 
contribute to the maintenance of international peace by not becoming a military power, 
limiting its potential to invade others and pursuing a policy that discouraged military 
build-ups in other countries. 
To some extent, the post-war 'domestic-type' identity as the 'unilateral pacifist' 
was essentially 'passive', as it addressed only Japan's one-sided military self-restraint. 
Not only did it fail to suggest how to help promote peace in general: the formation of the 
ýunilateral pacifist' identity in Japan also theoretically and practically clashed with 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which requires UN members to adhere to the concept of 
collective seCUrity in order to 'maintain', 'restore' and 'enforce' peace. As convincingly 
noted by a commentator from the Economist, Japan during the Gulf Crisis was the one 
226 LDP, Period of President Sato's Leadership, http: //xN,, \N, \ý,. iimin. ip"iimin'en, -, Ilsh 
history chapter5. htmi, 
accessed 212111/2004. 227 Hellmann (1988: 41-44) 
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country that did not really come to grips with what was happening in the world, what it 
was to do about it, or how its behaviour would fit with other people's. 228 The essence of 
being the 'unilateral pacifist' country, for Japan during the Gulf War, certainly did not 
include the idea or the urge to do something for others, except to curb itself so as not to 
harm others. Ito has summed up the ideas of this passive peace endeavour very clearly: 
,[] the post-war unitary pacifist identity suggested not only Japan's 
intention 'not to experience the horror of war again', but also the thoughts to 
others that Japan wanted to 'banish such horror from every corner of the world'. 
However, this type of pacifist identity was 'unitary' because its altruistic side is 
totally divorced from any idea or belief of willingly sacrificing oneself for 
others. ' 
229 
However, the adoption of the 'domestic-type' identity as the 'unilateral pacifist' 
seemed to lose its validity during the post-Cold war period. Although in the first few 
years during and after the Gulf crisis, Japan had tried to project its 'international-role' 
identity in a manner that was collectively adopted by the international community 
through the despatch of the SDF to overseas operations, it was still considered 'untimely 
and inadequate' internationally and 'unjustifiable' domestically, as it completely clashed 
with its 'domestic-type' identity as the 'unilateral pacifist. ' In fact, the earlier ideational 
adjustments and the tangible legal and political implementations emerged in a variety of 
N\,, ays. The Kaifu government took initiatives and worked out a specific plan in October 
1990 to create a legal framexvork to send its SDF to participate in the UNPKO efforts. 
The draft legislation instantly became the focus of intense debates both inside and 
228 Economist (1991 b: 'I 1 -31 229 Ito (1991: 288) 
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outside the Diet - among politicians, bureaucrats and the public alike. However, not 
only did the first attempt to pass the bill fail completely, it even rekindled the old debate 
regarding the constitutionality of the existence of the SDF itself and the violation of the 
famous Article 9. Nevertheless, the Kaifu government, again in September 1991, made 
another attempt to introduce a new draft legislation of the UNPKO Law that would 
permit the despatch of the SDF overseas. The UNPKO Law was eventually enacted in 
June 1992 under the Miyazawa administration, a year after the Gulf crisis. Although the 
SDF activities were largely limited by the above 'freezes', it enabled Japan, for the first 
time in the post-war period, to engage more fully in 'manpower contribution', and not 
only contribution in cash or in kind, to which it had committed for decades. 230 
Moreover, based on the 1992 UNPKO Law, the International Peacekeeping 
Headquarters (Kokusai Heiwa Honbu - IPH) was established within the Cabinet Office 
to administer and implement international peace cooperation plans and activities. The 
enactment of the UNPKO Law and the establishment of the new agency responsible for 
the administration and implementation of international peace cooperation was a further 
step for Japan and the SDF towards participation in the UNPKOs - this time with legal 
and systematic support. On the one hand, the enactment was regarded as an event of 
symbolic importance, since it would be the SDF's first overseas mission since its 
establishment in 1954. However, in these early years after the enactment of the UNPKO 
LaN\,,, the types of activities that the SDF was permitted to participate in were strictly 
confined by the narrow interpretation of Article 9.23 1 The seemingly unsuccessful, 
2 30 The nexN draft legislation was carefully crafted to ease the constitutional and ideational tension among 
politicians and the public by tackling the most controversial issues, such as the use of force among SDF, 
the despatch of the SIDIF overseas under 'civilian control, ' the inclusion of such activities as cease-fire 
aRreernent, medical care, police supervision and election monitoring as well as the right of the Japanese 
oro\ ernment to withdraw the SDF as it saw appropriate. 
Japan's UNPKO contributions consisted of the despatch of personnel and SDF to un-armed units, the 
international humanitarian relief operations and the election monitoring. 
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reluctant and faltering UN policy during the Gulf Crisis could thus be attributed to the 
clash between Japan's projection of the 'international-role' identity induced by the 
collective ideas circulating the international community and the 'domestic-type' identity 
ingrained in the Japanese political and societal level. In short, whereas Japan's 
international role identity was supposed to be a 'full-fledged pacifist' as collectively 
expected by the international community, Japan's 'domestic-type' identity or its actual 
4political self still clung to the notion of 'unilateral pacifist. ' 
4.4.2 Ideas Surrounding UN Peace Operations: 
'Traditional PeacebuilderlDeveloper' 
Having been one of the most successful economies in the post-war period, 
economic development had occupied most of Japan's foreign relations. Prior to the Gulf 
Crisis, although Japan's unusual identities as the 'economic giant' and 'military dwarf 
were fairly at odds with each other in the eyes of outsiders, they were precisely what the 
nation's post-war political founders had in mind. Not only had Japan taken advantage of 
the harmonious economic environment provided by the US and the liberal economic 
system, but it had also positively integrated its financial machinery into its own peace 
maintenance and strategy. 
As well as the adoption of the 'unilateral pacifist' identity, Japan also viewed 
itself as a 'traditional peacebuilder/developer' that could employ its financial surpluses 
as an effective foreign policy tool both within and beyond the UN parameters. Although 
the promotion of close relations Nvith free and democratic countries had been mentioned 
by Japan's senior officials since the early 1960s after the announcement of Prime 
Minister Sato's three main policy principles, exactly hoxv Japan would cooperate with 
those countries was not set out in concrete terms. The principle did not fully materialise 
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until Japan reached its peak in transforming its identity into that of a 'traditional peace- 
builder/developer, ' who provided financial aids not for charity but with a notable 
purpose and rationale in the late 197 OS. 
232 
Having identified itself as the 'traditional peacebuilder/developer, ' the foreign 
policy that led towards closer cooperation with democratic countries also became linked 
with those that promoted 'joint prosperity' around the world. In other words, when it 
comes to Japan's post-war insight about the maintenance of international peace, the 
fundamental element underlying sustainable peace was believed to be 'prosperity' rather 
than 'security. ' It was clearer to Japan how international peace could be achieved 
through the promotion and the strengthening of prosperity, compared to its poor insight 
into the maintenance of world peace through security measures. Leading to the start of 
the Cold War period, Japan's identity as the 'traditional peacebuilder/developer' was 
considerably strengthened through the idea that threats towards international peace were 
mainly the result of the lack of prosperity in most developing countries, which 
accounted for 30 percent of the total world econoMy. 
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Accordingly, Japan made considerable efforts to establish a sustainable 
developing assistance regime and increasing additional funds available to developing 
countries, mainly through its ODA contributions and non-ODA financial cooperation in 
the form of loans, for instance, by the Export-Import Bank of Japan . 
234 It was during 
this period that Japan utilised its economic strength to the fullest via multilateral aid both 
at bilateral level and through multilateral organisations like the World Bank and the 
232 Fukushima (2000: 166) 
2", The problerns were grouped into three main categories: poverty, primary commodity shortages and 
accumulated external debt problems. 
NIOFA (1994a) Diplomatic Bluebook 1994, 
litto: ', \N\\\N-. Illofil. ",, O. ip", polic\ other/bluebook/ 1994, 
'c I 
. 
1-itnil, accessed 21/03/2004 
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International Development Association, as well as UN agencies such as the UNHCR, 
UNDP, WFP and UNEP. 
On account of this, it is possible to point out that Japan's ideas about peace and 
security, as well as the format of peace operations, were generally consistent throughout 
the post-war period and even during the Gulf Crisis. While the international community 
had turned its focus to address physical security threats and how to effectively handle 
peace operations by redefining the essence of preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding, Japan still held the idea that the promotion of joint prosperity around the 
world would finally lead to sustainable peace. Preventive diplomacy in the form of 
financial aid both through bilateral and multilateral ODA and non-ODA aids was seen as 
the key component of Japan's peace strategy in the early 1990s. As shown in the ODA 
White Paper, Japan's net ODA disbursement increased remarkably, from a few million 
dollars in the late 1970s to almost $US 15,000 million in the mid-1990s. 235 Although 
one could argue that Japan's adopted 'domestic-type' identity as the 'traditional 
peacebuilder/developer' was compatible with the international community's idea on the 
later stage of peace operations, especially in the peacebuilding process, it was not until 
the late 1990s that Japan's financial aid was systematically incorporated into the grand 
peacebuilding strategy, as will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
4.4.3 Ideas Surrounding Japan-US Relations: 
'US-Follower' 
As suggested by several scholars, throughout the post-war period, successive 
Japanese prime ministers had repeated similar accounts ernphasising the importance of 
2 -, 5 MOFA, Japan (1994b and 21002b) ODA Annual Report 1994, 
li t tLi: I N\ \\ \\. iii o fa. go. i p/pol i cy 'oda/S LI m ni ary/ 1994/ 1. htni 141 and ODA Wh ite Paper 2 002, 
Illtiý. "\\, \\, \\-. mofa. ý, yo. iplpolicý, j"oda/\vhite/2002/suniiiiar\. IitniI accessed 05/04/2005 
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Japan-US bilateral relations and the shared ideals of freedom, democracy and a liberal 
economic system, and confirmed that bilateral ties and shared ideals were the major 
factors underlying Japan's post-war peace and prosperity. 236 The Japan-US relationship 
has, to a certain degree, contributed to the formation of the Japanese identity in several 
crucial ways. Since the primary goal of both countries was to construct a new pacifist 
Japan, which strictly followed the economic and military guidelines laid out by the 
Japan-US Security Treaties, Japan had been positioned in the economic and security 
embrace of the US, which secluded it from foreign conflicts and entanglements. 
As a result, Japan could build up its post-war identity as the 'unilateral pacifist' 
and was content to add 'US-follower' to its post-war set of identities. Japan's foreign 
conducts during the post-war period were essentially pursued under the format of this 
'leader-fol lower' relationship. Seeing itself as the humble follower, Japan spent most of 
its post-war years pursuing foreign policies in a way that corresponded to those of the 
US, ranging from the policy towards the communist countries, the diplomatic 
revitalisation with some socialist countries like China in the early 1970s and the 
establishment of friendship and political connections with Southeast Asian countries in 
the late 1970s to the strengthening of close cooperation with the Third World as directed 
by the Reagan administration during the 1980s. 
In contrast to the political sphere, throughout the course of its economic boom in 
the 1970s and 1980s, Japan began to develop another political identity independently of 
the political and security guidelines of the US and closer to the UN and multilateral 
organisations, as a successful 'traditional peacebuilder/developer' with ideas and 
conceptions of peace that were based on the solid form of national development and 
prosperity, as previously discussed. However, Japan's identity as 'traditional 
-36 Buckleý (1992: 159) 
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peacebuilder/developer' was criticised as one of the many obligations carried on 
correspondingly to its identity as a good 'US-follower', and was simply the result of 
direct demands from the US on Japan to shoulder more international burdens. For 
example, it was argued that Japan's ODA and other financial aids were based on the 
policy to 'recycle surpluses' that Japan had with the US as well as other industrial 
countries, and these acts were not performed as a result of Japan's own understanding of 
the maintenance of peace and security. 
237 
The 'leader-fol lower' syndrome, which had occupied the major part of Japanese 
political identities, ideas and conceptions about foreign relations, was examined again 
during the Gulf Crisis. Having fixed its identity as a loyal 'US follower' and client, 
Japan behaved accordingly against domestic opposition by despatching troops overseas 
as part of its alliance obligations rather than as an active response to international 
commitment. A huge financial contribution was again allotted because of pressure from 
the US rather than representing Japan's own initiative. Although it was made clear by 
the Bush administration that the US would rather see Japan behave as a US comrade and 
partner in constructing the 'New World Order, ' it was obvious that Japan was still 
comfortable being cocooned in the previous framework of the Japan-US security 
arrangement. As mentioned by the Deputy Foreign Minister Takakazu Kuriyama in 
December 1990, Japan was still content to assume the status of 'a minor power. ' 238 
Although the lessons and humiliation from the Gulf War, received from both the US and 
the international community, did lead Japan to consider whether it wanted to continue 
assuming the identity of TS-folloxver, ' it was not until after the Gulf Crisis that the 
Levin (199-3: 206) and Fukushima (2000: 16-2) 
IS Judis (1991: 2 1) 
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transformation of Japan's identity concerning Japan-US relations and security position 
was thoroughly assessed by decision-makers and the public. 
In addition to Japan's lack of ideational insights in terms of assuming an 
acceptable 'domestic-type' identity conforming to the expected 'role-identity' 
collectively shared by the international community, its inability to develop a more 
compatible identity as a key major power undertaking both political and financial 
responsibilities to meet demands from the international community also had a 
tremendous effect on Japan-US relations. Japan's response in the Gulf Crisis confirmed 
that the country was not yet ready to assume the same responsibility in parallel with its 
closest ally. Japan's financial contribution alone was obviously not enough to gain US 
acceptance. Furthermore, its previously defined identity as the 'leader- follower' was 
certainly no longer an option for the healthy relationship between the two countries. 
Japan's adoption of the identity of a 'secondary power' therefore needed a readjustment 
of both ideas and insights into how the nation would deal with the issue of international 
peace and security, especially with regard to peace operations under the auspices of the 
UN. The ideational settings within Japan that informed the above 'domestic-type' 
identities will be clarified in the following section via the key actors' systems of ideas 
and beliefs, including those of the bureaucrats, political parties and media/public opinion. 
4.5 Ideas and Beliefs that informed Domestic-Type Identities 
4.5.1 Bureaucratic Worldviews 
The MOFA has been the main advocate for Japan to play a more assertive role in 
the maintenance of international peace since the end of WWII. However, without a clear 
danger in terms of global military crisis, the MOFA had simply injected general ideas 
about how Japan, as the 'unilateral pacifist, ' should behave with respect to the securing 
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of world peace. One such idea involved securing world peace through arms control, 
disarmament and non-proliferation. Since the country's ratification of the Non- 
proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1976, successive cabinets have never failed to address 
Japan's three non-nuclear principles, used to describe the policy of not possessing, not 
producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapon into Japan . 
239The 
stance against the use of armed force could be counted as the fundamental element that 
constituted Japan's post-war 'unilateral pacifist' identity. For this apparent reason, the 
policy was pursued without external inducements. Japan had promoted this policy 
although it would mean that it might have to pursue the policy unilaterally, and even in 
times when the tension of the Cold War required countries to accumulate both 
conventional arms and nuclear weapons to protect themselves against the unfriendly 
security environment. 
Contrary to this scenario, the Gulf Crisis introduced conditions in which the 
identity of the 'unilateral pacifist' was challenged. The MOFA actually recognised the 
ideas being exchanged among the international community in constructing a new 
framework for peace, and it was also aware of the necessity for Japan to lead active and 
creative diplomacy and to participate in the formation of collective ideas about Peace 
and security. It was convinced that the ideas that constituted Japan's 'unilateral 
pacifism' should go beyond the simple notion of not becoming a military power and not 
invading other countries, moving towards active contributions that would effectively 
ensure peace on a larger scope and on a wider scale . 
240 As stated by the then Foreign 
Minister Michio Watanabe: 
239 NIOFA, Statement by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato at the Budget Committee in the House of 
Representative (First statement in history on the Three Non-Nuclear Principles), II December 1967 
littp: / \\\v\\. niofa. -o JL'pohcý un disarmaiiient/nnp/antlOLliice. htnil, accessed 12/12/2003. ,,. i 240 NIOFA (1994a) Diplomatic Bluebook 1994, 
littp: /, \N \\ \k,. niofa. ý,, o. ip/policv/other/'blijebook/I 994/c l. htmI, accessed 21/03/2004. 
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Japan could no longer enjoy peace within its borders while ignoring 
its international responsibilities towards peace [ ... ]. 
241 
As repeatedly mentioned, it is worth noting that the Gulf Crisis did bring about 
questions regarding the validity of Japan's existing domestic 'self or the 'domestic- 
type' identity. The MOFA and the public alike knew that it was inevitable that Japan 
must adapt its own ideas and understanding about its appropriate 'self and 'identity' 
regarding security matters in order to project a more sensible 'international -role' identity 
at the international level. However, during the Gulf War, Japan was still unclear about 
the new direction in which it had to move forward. During this period, the significant 
bureaucratic players - the MOFA and the JDA - both basically agreed 'in general' that 
242 
the framework for peace and security would certainly include only the followin g: 
a) A close security relationship with the US 
b) Attempts to ensure the movement of arms control and non-proliferation 
c) Close cooperation with developing countries 
d) Close cooperation with the UN and the promotion of the three main UN 
pillars - cooperation for peace, the strengthening of international cultural 
exchange and official development assistance (ODA). 
Three items from the above framework, from (a) to (c), were simply repetitions 
of the existing ideas of foreign policy principles constituting Japan's 'unilateral pacifist' 
identity, as previously mentioned. The latter, recently incorporated under Takeshita's 
24 1 Yoniiiii-i Shinibun, 24/11/1991 
242 N IOFA (I 994a) Diplomatic Bluebook 1994, 
hup: / \\ \v\\. niofi. oo. jp polic\ other, bluebook/l 994/ cl. html, accessed 21/03/2004 and Japan Defence 
. Icnc\, 
White Paper 1990 http: //ida-cleariniz. ida. Ro. *p/hakusho data/ I 990. "w 1990 03. hti-nl, accessed Ag 
21,03 '1004. 
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administration after the 'vision for international cooperation' (kokusai kyoryoku koso) 
held no clear indication of Japan's posture towards international peace and security, 
except on the developmental aspect. Notwithstanding the ambiguity of concrete ideas 
epitomising Japan's Gulf War 'unilateral pacifist' identity, the MOFA's ideas and 
beliefs on financial aid attempts and self-assigned status as 'traditional 
peacebuilder/developer' had never been clearer. The MOFA shared the same ideas as 
did other segments of the society that in coping with the increasing numbers of regional 
conflicts that were rooted mainly in economic difficulties and social discord, the most 
appropriate way was to address the causes themselves, including poverty, shortage of 
commodities, debts and so on. Since the late 1970s, Japan had repeatedly advocated the 
importance of equal development and prosperity as the best way to handle internal 
conflicts. 
244 
With different ideas underlying how peace should be maintained and peace 
operations should be handled, in the 1990s, the MOFA and Japan took the usual track to 
secure a more prosperous and humane world. Whereas Japan was inept in responding to 
the demands of the international community in terms of both physical and military- 
related contributions during the Gulf Crisis, it was not slow in seeking ways to 
encourage efforts towards political and economic reform in the LDCs. Immediately after 
the Gulf Crisis, Japan took initiatives in stimulating the interest of international 
community in the problems faced by Africa, for instance. The UN was still the main 
forum where Japan usually expressed its enthusiasm in addressing the problems of the 
24 - 11 LDP, Period of President Takeshita's Leadership, 
http: //wýN, Nv. iiiiiiii. ip/jimin/ýEnglish/history/chapl2. litmi, accessed 22/11/2004. 
244 During Fukuda's cabinet, for example, the 'Fukuda Doctrine' considered the main idea underpinning 
the transformation of Japan into a 'traditional peacebuilder/developer, ' expressing the conviction that 
'relations between Japan and Southeast Asia must be based on spiritual bonds of friendship and 
cooperation that contributed to the region's development and prosperity'. Source: LDP, Period of 
President Fukuda's Leadership, littp: //wNN,,, v. iinlin. ip/iii-nin, /Entzlisli/histoi--ý,, /chai38. html, accessed 
22"11/2004. 
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LDCs. The initiative to set up comprehensive and policy guidelines for African was 
started during the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in 
1993 and continuously enforced by the Japanese government. 245 
Alongside Japan's concrete attempt to build solid ground for sustainable peace in 
Africa, Japan's ODA in the early 1990s was also distributed to Southeast Asia and other 
countries in transition in the form of technical cooperation, grant-aid and aid through 
international organisations. In fact, Japan's assumed identity as 'traditional 
peacebuilder/developer' did find its place in a long line of Gulf War contributions. It 
could also be said that Japan's ideas about peace operations focused mainly on the latter 
part of the whole peace process, namely peacebuilding operations. As announced by the 
MOFA in the early 1990s, Japan's international peace efforts during the new post-Cold 
War era would consist of 'contributions to international humanitarian relief and the 
operations of UNPKO. 246 While concrete activities Pertaining to the UNPKO were still 
seriously questioned, Japan's moves toward substantive contributions to international 
humanitarian missions were conspicuous, especially after the Gulf Crisis. According to 
the MOFA, solving those crucial economic problems would secure both the medium- 
and long-term political stability of the region concerned and would finally bring about 
247 international peace . 
Along with the ideas and beliefs about military self-restraint and prosperity- 
based international peace that underpinned the 'unilateral pacifist' and the 'traditional 
peacebuilder/developer' identities, ideas about the Japan-US alliance also accounted for 
much of Japan's direction towards UN peace operations. For the MOFA, the 
24ý NIOFA. TICAD I Outline: Tokyo International Conference on African Development, 
hilp:, NN \\ N\. mofa.! zo. ip/reýzion africa/ticad/outline. litnil, accessed 09 09"-1004. 
Rose (21000: 1-'-2) 
N1OFA (1994a), Diplomatic Bluebook 1994, 
jitjnlý. I, accessed 21 '03/- littil: '\\N\Ný-. niofýi. go. ip/policy/otheri, 'bluebook/1994"c"I '1 '1004. 
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significance of the Japan-US alliance has always been at the top of Japan's foreign 
policy agenda. In terms of ensuring national security, it was unlikely that the Gulf Crisis 
would influence any major change in Japan's ideas and identity as a 'US-follower. ' The 
Gulf War merely confirmed that despite the end of the Cold War, international disputes 
and intra-state conflicts still existed. According to the MOFA, under these circumstances, 
the US strategic guarantee based on the Japan-US Security alliance remained vital to 
Japan's adherence to its peace and security ideas as the 'unilateral pacifist' and its belief 
in performing its function as an 'international lender/developer. ' 248 
Some scholars have also suggested that another important reason why Japan was 
content to stay in the background of the international political arena at the end of the 
Cold War was not because it lacked the ability to influence the shaping of the post-Cold 
War world. On the contrary, it was simply that Japan was unwilling to exert its influence 
independently of its benefactor. 249Naturally, the most sensible option for Japan was to 
continue to preserve its identity as the 'US-follower' during the crisis. In contrast to the 
situation in the latter half of the 1990s, the possibility that the existing Japan-US alliance 
would mean the extension of a 'partnership for peace' beyond the areas surrounding 
Japan was neither in the mindset of Japanese decision-makers nor of the MOFA in the 
early post-Cold War period. In explicating Japan's inertia during the Gulf Crisis, it was 
thus not difficult to draw conclusions from this minimalist interpretation of the Japan- 
US alliance resulting in Japan's adopted identity as a 'US follower. ' 
4.5.2 Party Politics 
Although the Kaifu government and the MOFA both initially announced their 
intentions to continue the country's foreign policy vision of 'international cooperation' 
148 NIOFA (I 994a), Diplomatic Bluebook 1994, 
lIttP: N\N\. N\'. Illofl. ', 'O. 
-iL)"Policy/othei-, 
'bluebook/1994/cl.. htni1#1 21 3, accessed 21/03/2004. 
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laid out by the Takeshita government and embarked on the first legal attempt to play an 
active role in the Gulf Crisis by proposing the first International Peace Cooperation 
legislation to despatch the SDF to undertake non-combat tasks in the Gulf in autumn 
1990, and even announced publicly that 'Japan was becoming politically active in 
response to expectations from outside Japan and that each Japanese must think about 
what he or she can do to contribute to peace and prosperity in the region and all over the 
world 2501 the positive and enthusiastic response to the Crisis and such forward-looking 
attitudes lasted only a few months. Since then, Japan's response to the Gulf Crisis had 
become totally passive and was then criticised by the international community as 'too 
little and too late. ' 
The reason behind such criticism was partly a result of the ideational tug-of-war 
among political parties about the essence of the country's 'domestic-type' identity as a 
4unilateral pacifist. ' On the one hand, the principal reason behind Japan's inconsistent 
response was the fact that under the 1955 political system, the bitter rivalry between the 
ruling party and the opposition parties was beyond any political principles. The Gulf 
Crisis became an issue when the Diet was at the centre of conflict between the LDP and 
the opposition parties over such domestic issues as consumption tax or government 
reform. It was simply one of several events in which the ruling and opposition parties 
exercised their ideational differences. On the other hand, although it could be considered 
a part of the political game, the stagnation of the first and second PKO legislations 
proposed by the government was also because it was the most sensitive issue or a long- 
standing political taboo in Japanese politics and foreign relations. Among those political 
parties themselves, the Gulf Crisis divided politicians into several factions based on their 
'50 
, Jkwanohara (1991: 44) 
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ideas regarding Japan's identity as a 'unilateral pacifist, ' the need to revise the Peace 
Constitution and technical questions regarding the despatch of the SDF. 
a) Intra-party Discord 
As for the LDP, the intra-party discord was principally the result of different 
views towards the degree of SDF contribution to the Gulf Crisis and the issue 
concerning the reinterpretation of the Peace Constitution. Although the party has been 
considered pro-military and pro-US, there was an evident distinction between 
'moderates' such as Kiichi Miyazawa or Yohei Kono and 'hard-liners' such as Ichiro 
Ozawa, Takeo Nishioka, Taku Yarnazaki and Mutsuki Kato. Those belonging to the 
moderate group were very cautious about sending the SDF abroad and were fairly 
satisfied with the restriction imposed by the 1992 UNPKO Law. Under the Miyazawa 
government, the LDP thus found it easier to compromise with the opposition parties in 
order to push through the PKO Law, although it meant that the LDP had to sacrifice its 
position on the original draft regarding the technical functions of the SDF and the 
civilian control function of the National Diet. 251 On the constitutional issue, those 
moderates practically supported Japan's 'international contribution', especially via the 
UN, but argued against amending the Constitution. For them, interfering with Article 9 
would simply end Japan's uniqueness as the 'unilateral pacifist' and would open the 
deadlock to becoming a military power. 
The hard-liners, on the contrary, proposed that Japan perform a more active part 
in international crises by injecting both financial and human inputs and transforming the 
countrv Is identity to a step beyond the 'unilateral pacifist' status. 252 To them, the way in 
\\-hIch Japan could collectively contribute to secure international peace was through 
2ý1 Daiýv Yomiuri, 04, O'I'l 992 
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UNPKOs and the fulfilment of UN collective security obligations. Headed by Ichiro 
Ozawa, this faction advocated the reinterpretation of the existing Peace Constitution to 
allow the conversion from what he called 'passive pacifism' into a more active form. 
According to the then LDP Secretary General, the spirit indicated in the preamble of the 
Constitution is 'one of striving for sustainable peace and an honourable place in the 
world via cooperation with the international community. ' 253 The LDP has therefore 
consistently advanced several possible options for a new interpretation of the Peace 
Constitution in order to fulfil UN obligations, especially with regard to 'collective 
security. ' Knowing that a full revision of the Constitution was not likely to be supported 
by others sectors of the Japanese society, in the aftermath of the Gulf Crisis, the LDP 
attempted to suggest only a new interpretation of Article 9, despite the lack of 
favourable responses from other parts of the society. 254 
b) Inter-party Discord 
If the ideational differences within the LDP were easily spotted during the Gulf 
Crisis, the inter-party discord during the Gulf Crisis between the LDP and the opposition 
parties was even more pervasive. The progressive Japan Socialist Party (JSP, renamed 
the Social Democratic Party of Japan or SDPJ in 1996) and the Japan Communist Party 
(JCP) both opposed the despatch of the SDF abroad even for humanitarian purposes for 
no reasons other than seeing it as a first step towards remilitarisation. Among the 
opposition parties, the strong sentiment of the 'unilateral pacifist' country automatically 
planted the idea of an anti-militarist stance on their political activities. 
Precisely put, for the JCP, the Korneito, the DSP and the JSP, ' , pacifist' was 
simply equal to 'anti-militarist' and the role of the military in modern advanced 
253 Oza\\ a( 1999: 109-11 ") 
254 YontiltriShimbun, 10/1-21992 
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countries was beyond their comprehension . 
255 T narrn ed -neutral i ty' was the marketable 
idea supporting Japan's 'unilateral pacifist' stance among these opposition parties and 
was used as a campaign against the government's Gulf War initiatives. The issue of the 
constitutional revision to allow SDF to effectively perform their duties overseas was also 
vehemently opposed by the fundamental believers who were in favour of the 'no-war 
constitution. ' As suggest by Dore, along with the bias toward Japan-US bilateral 
relations, the left-wing political parties had long asserted that the constitutional revision 
had only originated because of the pressure exerted by the US and the initial Japanese 
plan to participate in UNPKO had little to do with the spirit of maintenance of 
international peace. 
256 
As shown in Table 4.1 ý the Komeito and the DSP, nevertheless, were rather more 
centrist in this matter, although they were still divided on the issue of SDF participation 
in UNPKOs. The Komeito were mostly pacifists and therefore suspicious of plans to 
send the SDF abroad. The DSP, however, shared a similar view of the SDF despatch 
257 
with the LDP moderates . Despite this, these two centrists acknowledged the 
importance of Japan's international contribution and supported the government's attempt 
to pass the second PKO bill, though with some restrictions regarding civilian control and 
the functions taken by the SDF. Despite these ideational differences, the opposition 
parties held a similar idea that the move towards active participation in the LTNPKO and 
the despatch of the SDF abroad was essentially 'unconstitutional. ' 
Apparently, the outright differences in ideas and beliefs between the LDP, the 
JCP and the JSP gave no opportunity for any political cooperation. Given the 
opportunistic nature of the JSP under the leadership of Takako Doi, which aimed at 
255 Sato (2000: 24-25) 
256 Dore (1997: 38-49) 
257 Heinrich (1999: 37-318) 
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aggravating domestic resistance to the government's Gulf War initiatives without 
considering any constructive or strategic discussions on the situation Japan was facing, 
cooperation between these political rivals was even more difficult. Having learned from 
the first attempt to pass the UNPKO bill in 1990, the top LDP leaders and Ichiro OzaNva, 
who had assumed a new position as the chairman of the newly created intra-party special 
committee on international commission, agreed that the LDP must move beyond its past 
disagreement with some of the opposition parties - the Komeito and the DSP - in order 
to push forward the PKO Bill in August 1991. A series of negotiations were conducted 
and political concessions were reached before the final draft of the PKO Bill, which 
empowered the government to despatch personnel to participate in logistical aspects of 
UN peace operations, finally materialised. 258 
Table 4.1: Ideational Differences among Political Parties during the Gulf Crisis 259 
LDP Korneito/DSP JSP/jCP 
(Conservatives) (Centrists) (Leftists) 
Peace Conception Unilateral pacifist Unilateral pacifist Anti-militarist 
International -I ender International -lender Anti-Japan-US 
Japan-US alliance Unarmed neutrality alliance 
Unarmed neutrality 
Constitutional Reinterpretation of Against Against 
Revision Article 9 
Technical functions Active Moderate Against 
of SDF in UNPKOs 
Despatch of SDF Active (with some Civilian control Against 
reservations) 
Source: Author's Table 
258The three most important issues being negotiated and compromised between the LDP, the Komeito and 
the DSP were as follows: 
a) The SDF was allowed to carry automatic weapons for self-defence and to use 
armoured vehicles, provided that the five principles were strictly observed; 
b) The participation of the SDF in UNPKO was to be made subject to Diet approval; 
C) The PKO bill was subject to review after three years. 
Source: Yomiuri Shimbun, 6 December 1991 
259 The table is adapted from the author's table appearing in the Master's Degree Dissertation on 1990 4f 
ft 0) F1 * (7) M LW IT-k , 
V: PKO (Japan's UN Policy in 1990: the 
case on PKO participation and the bid for the UNSC permanent membership) submitted to Hitotsubashi 
Uni\ ersitN in 2003, p. 40 
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Unlike the conflicting ideas and beliefs embedded among politicians and 
political parties behind the 'unilateral pacifist' identity, there was a consensus among 
those involved in decision-making and in the Japanese political process that both the 
'domestic-type' identities - as a 'unilateral pacifist' and as a 'traditional 
peacebuilder/developer' - must be developed in tandem. Since Japan was determined to 
use its economic power rather than its military capability as its main contribution to 
international peace, its foreign aid was the integral component of overall diplomacy and 
UN policy during the post-war period and during the Gulf cri SiS. 
260 Nevertheless, this is 
not to say that the Kaifu government did not face any resistance from the opposition 
parties. The earlier discords among political parties regarding Japan's financial 
contribution towards the multilateral force during the Gulf Crisis derived from the fact 
that the opposition parties were against the idea of unattached aid to the multilateral 
forces. The Korneito and the DSP, especially, had questioned the use of Japan's 
financial aid in armed activities, which, in a way, would be prohibited by the Peace 
261 Constitution. Apart from this minor clash between the government and the opposition 
parties relating to the unattached contribution, Japan's identity as the 'traditional 
peacebuilder/developer' was not an issue domestically during the Gulf Crisis. 
In terms of international contribution during the Gulf Crisis, the criticism that 
Japan contributed 'too little, too late' even in the area of financial contribution was not 
much of a problem in terms of a clash between the 'international-role' identity as the 
I peace enforcer' adopted by the international community and the embraced 'domestic- 
type' identity as the 'traditional peacebuilder/developer. ' Compared to other areas of 
ideas and beliefs. the two identities were very much in tune as it addressed successive 
260 Yasutomo (1995: 3) 
, ol Purrinaton (1992: 167) 
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stages of peace operations. However, the problem that caused the reluctance and delay in 
Japan's financial contribution perhaps resulted from the fact that Japan had portrayed 
itself as the 'traditional peacebuilder/developer, ' whose primary responsibilities were to 
engage and respond to conflicts at a much later stage of peace operations (such as the 
peacebuilding stage). Japan, therefore, was not prepared to respond promptly to the 
demands of the international community at other stages of peace operations, namely 
peacemaking/enforcing and peacekeeping efforts. 
Despite Japan's generous financial contribution during the Gulf Crisis, the 
subsequent criticism could be considered the major catalyst that led Japan to consider 
the importance of a more coordinated and laudable contribution to the maintenance of 
peace and security. For a decade, since the Nakasone administration in the 1980s, the 
benefits and value of Japan's 'domestic-type' identity as the 'traditional 
peacebuilder/developer' had never been questioned by the international community. The 
most frightening thing for the Japanese government and the Japanese people alike was 
perhaps the revelation that such 'domestic-type' identity, which Japan had developed 
and had worked through with the intention to contribute to the international public good, 
was seen as incompatible with the new world order and even perceived as a 'diplomatic 
failure' by the whole community. During the Gulf Crisis, it was still unfeasible for Japan 
to find a more compatible alternative to simultaneously address both security and 
prosperity and the development dimension in the same UN peace strategies. However, 
the crisis did give Japan a 'wake-up call' to reassess the possibility of transforming its 
'domestic-type' identity into a form that was more compatible with the 'international- 
role' identity collectively adopted by the international community. 
Unlike the first two 'domestic-type' identities - 'the Unilateral pacifist' and the 
'traditional peacebuilder/developer' - for which the fundamental ideas supporting their 
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formation were collectively adopted by the majority of Japanese, the 'domestic-type' 
identity as a 'US-follower' was more controversial, especially among political parties. 
As previously mentioned, the secure environment under the Japan-US alliance would 
allow Japan to form and develop its 'unilateral pacifist' identity without having to worry 
about military questions. Simultaneously, under the framework of the Japan-US security 
alliance, Japan and the LDP government were also able to resume Japan's military 
capability and to adjust itself to the changing Cold War environment during the late 
1970s and 1980s in response to US global military strategies without breaching the 
military prohibition stipulated in Article 9. As a 'US-follower, ' under the Ohira, Suzuki 
and Nakasone administrations, Japan had complied with US requests by pursuing such 
measures as engaging in a firmer foreign policy against rogue states such as Iran as well 
as communist countries or agreeing to send the MSDF to participate in the Pacific Rim 
Exercise (RIMPAC) and increasing defence expenditure to 1% of GDP during the 
Nakasone administration. Such cooperation was thus believed by the LDP hard-liner 
faction to open the way for further military activities between the US and Japan. 262 
The opposition parties, on the contrary, believed that Japan's survival and the 
development of the 'unilateral pacifist' and the 'traditional peacebuilder/developer' 
identities should not be preconditioned by the framework of the hostile Cold War 
environment and especially not by the strong Japan-US Alliance. It was the opposition 
parties' conviction that Japan was supposed to promote peace not only among the 
western countries but also the eastern and the socialist camp, thus integrating the idea of 
'overall peace position' into its core element of assuming the 'unilateral pacifist' identity. 
Apart frorn the ideational difference on how Japan should act in accordance with its 
262 LDP, Period of President Ohira's Leadership, littp: /,, "Ný7NN, xý, -. iimin. ip/iiiiiin/English/histo[y/chap9. hti-ni, 
Period of President Suzuki's Leadership, http: HwNv\N -ii mi n. 
* p, j i mi n/Engl i sh/hi story /chap 10. html, and 
Period of President Nakasone's Leadership, http: /,, NN-Ný, x\,. iimin. ip/iiniin`/EnRlish/historyý'cliaol I. htnil, 
accessed 2211 `2004 
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'unilateral pacifist' identity through disarming the country's military capability and 
maintaining a neutral international stance, the opposition parties also viewed the Japan- 
US alliance as a distortion of the ideals of Article 9 and the Peace Constitution. 
Accordingly, to their understanding, Japan's diplomatic and economic course, 
biased towards the Western bloc and its rearmament question, was simply imposed by 
the Japan-US alliance . 
263 This line of argument had lingered throughout the post-war 
period, up until the 1990s and the Gulf Crisis. The JSP held a firm stance in opposing 
active support of the US-led multinational forces for the same reason that it had accused 
the LDP government for decades that the development of a Japan-US security treaty 
would simply lead to a breach of the Peace Constitution. As the source of Japan's 
rearmament, high military expenditure or substantive law, which allows the conduct of 
physical non-military exercise of SDF overseas, the US was still the main target of 
political attacks from opposition parties and Japan's identity as a 'US-follower' was still 
against the benign idea behind the 'unilateral pacifist' and the 'peacebuilder/developer' 
identities. 
4.5.3 Public and Editorial opinions 
National Newspapers 
The early 1990s was a period when the Japanese public had settled with the idea 
about their 'self and their 'role' in the world as the 'unilateral pacifist' whose major role 
was to contribute to international peace in financial and economic terms while 
simultaneously following the lead of its closest ally -the US. The Gulf Crisis was one of 
the turning points in modern political history that triggered the Japanese public to 
reassess the compatibility of the nation's own 'self and its 'projected role' in the 
26" ": Iý 7) Yatua. auchi 0 99ý 
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international arena. During the Crisis, the main Japanese newspaper editorials clearly 
reflected the dichotomy of ideas and beliefs held by the Japanese public, which could be 
generally divided into two groups - those who supported the government's initiatives 
and shared similar ideas with the rest of the international community and those who 
opposed any radical or active physical and financial mobilisation to the Gulf area. 
Table 4.2: Key Differences among Major NewspaperS264 
Yomiuri Asahi Mainichi 
Japan's Pacificist 
identity based on the 
UN 
" Active 
participation in 
UN missions, Fast pace Slow pace Entirely against 
especially in 
UNPKOs 
" UN as the main 
mechanism of 
Japan's foreign UN-based Existing unilateral Isolationist 
relations pacifist 
Japan's participations 
in UNPKO (technical 
questions) 
SDF despatch Full-fledged Cautious Suspicious 
Safety and 
procedural Support n/a Entirely against 
practices of 
SDF 
" Constitutional Comprehensive Cautious Entirely against 
revision (or at least the Art. 9) (preservation of Art. 
9) 
" Concern for 
foreign n/a Much Much 
countries 
Source: Author's Table 
'04 The table is adapted from the author's table appearing in the Master's Degree Dissertation on 1990 ýý 
fto) H *0)[M L-WkM PKO (Japan's UN Policy in 1990: the 
case on PKO participation and the bid for the UNSC Permanent Membership), submitted to Hitotsubashi 
UmversItN in 2003, p. 48 
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As surnmarised in Table 4.2, The Yomiuri Shimbun has been considered 
conservative and was the main advocate for Japan's transformation towards an assertive 
and responsible country. On the issue regarding the Gulf Crisis, the Yomiuri Shimbun 
consistently urged the government to reassess the ideas behind the country's 'domestic- 
type' identity as a 'unilateral pacifist' and what the responsibilities of such identity 
would entail. The newspaper has made clear in series after series of editorials that a 
discussion on the transformation of the country's identity from the 'unilateral pacifist', 
whose concern about peace could not go beyond its own territory to an 'absolute 
pacifist', which eschewed the necessary measures of 'full-fledged contribution', 
including the use of armed force to secure international peace, was an urgent matter 
waiting to be seriously and collectively addressed by the government, political parties 
and the public. 
265 
According to the newspaper, international peace and the process of achieving it 
could not be more sustainable if Japan merely believed that the most important duty for 
the 'unilateral pacifist' was to limit its SDF force only for the benefit of defending Japan, 
to ignore international tensions as long as Japan remained peaceful or to disregard the 
evolving UNPKOs and its new function as peace-enforcer. For the Yomiuri Shimbun, 
Japan's enthusiasm for peace-building operations was not good enough. 266 In addition, 
the Yomiuri Shimbun also took advantage of the Gulf War tension to point out the fixed, 
outdated ideas embraced by the opposition parties, specifically the JSR who it 
considered to be responsible for the humiliation of Japan during the Gulf Crisis. It 
highlighted the lack of vision of the opposition parties and its inability to embrace and to 
205 Yomiuri Shilyibun, 27/07/1991 
266 Yomiuri Shimbun, 0 7/ 09ý" 1991 
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cope with the changing international ideational structure regarding the importance of 
4collective efforts' to secure international peace and security. 267 
Compared to other newspapers, the Yomiuri Shimbun held the most consistent 
vision on the process of identity transformation from a 'unilateral pacifist' to a 
4multilateral pacificist' country. The newspaper also utilised the Gulf Crisis to the fullest 
by pushing forward the discussion of Constitutional revision and the direction of Japan's 
future foreign and UN policy. It also pointed out the importance of Japan's assuming an 
identity that was more commensurate, not as one of the largest economic powers but as 
one of the most respected members of the UN, as clearly put in one of the series of 
editorials: 
'[ ] the UN is becoming more and more important as an organisation 
enforcing collective security; therefore, it is necessary to make the Japanese 
Constitution compatible with the UN Charter. All constitutions reflect the 
international and domestic political circumstances when they were drafted. 
Therefore, review is necessary after the passage of a number of years. Japan's 
Constitution was drafted under the allied occupation after WWII, when Japan 
had no international role to play. 
Realistically, it might be impossible to revise the Constitution at this time. 
However, it is time for the ruling and opposition parties to engage in debate 
about the merits and shortages of Japan's Peace Constitution. Japan's 
Constitution has many merits, such as its protection of democracy, freedom and 
human rights and its advocacy for peace. But although Japan has caused no 
20 For example, the Yomiuri Shinibun editorials blamed the JSP's rather narrow viewpoints and the 
manoeuvres of Takako Dol's and other opposition parties' infamous 'ox-walk' and 'a silent filibuster' for 
the pre-i-nature abortion of the first PKO bill and the standstill of the second PKO deliberations. Source: 
Yonihn-iShimbun, -14 
November 1991 
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conflicts in the world, it has also contributed so little to the solutions for those 
emerging conflicts [ ... ] -, 
268 
The second largest newspaper - the Asahi Shimbun - was rather cautious on the 
issue of the Gulf Crisis as well as the country's transformation towards a new identity 
that would be developed based on the commitment towards the UN. Regarding the 
SDF's participation in UNPKOs, the Asahi Shimbun'S editorials often presented its 
concerns, which were somewhat different from those presented in the Yomiuri Shimbun. 
Numerous series of infightings between the MOFA and the JDA were extensively 
transmitted with a view to counter the government's overly vigorous endeavour to 
follow the command of the international community. The Asahi Shimbun also often cited 
evidence to show that other bureaucracies, apart from the MOFA, were not very much in 
favour of active participation in UNPKOs. 269 
The Asahi Shimbun also shared the same stance as most of the opposition parties: 
that the transformation of Japan's identity from a 'unilateral pacifist' to a new identity 
with the attached element of military functions would certainly aggravate suspicions 
among neighbouring countries. The newspaper pointed out in its editorials that the 
government and the MOFA's attempts to pass the PKO bill would draw too much 
attention from neighbouring countries and could possibly damage the existing amicable 
diplomatic relations. As the memory of occupation by the Japanese armed force still 
lingered in Asia, there was thus an overwhelming concern as to whether Japan's move 
towards the reassessment of its 'unilateral pacifist' identity would be the first step to 
military rearmament. 
270 
268 Yomiuri ShiMbun 10,12/1992 
269 
4sAi Shimbim 2411 ', '1991 
270 
4sahi Shimbun, 14/04/1992 and 12 0611992 
183 
The Mainichi Shimbun, a rather leftist newspaper whose major task was to 
unreservedly support the opposition parties and question government initiatives, also 
shared the same stance as the Asahi Shimbun on the matter of the Gulf Crisis and the 
reorientation of Japanese 'unilateral pacifist' identity. However, whereas the Asahi 
Shimbun was merely cautious about the pace of Japan's identity transformation, the 
Mainichi Shimbun expressed its suspicions about the government's moves, as did the 
opposition parties. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the Mainichi Shimbun crossed 
swords with the Yomiuri Shimbun by positioning itself against Japan's participation in 
UNPKOs and the revision of the Constitution. Together with several other NGOs, such 
as the 'Peace-Net Members, ' the 'Non-Violent Action Net' and the 'Women's 
Democracy Club, ' the Minichi Shimbun expressed regular political support for the 
opposition parties. The Peace-Net and the Non-Violent Action Net, for example, in 
cooperation with the newspaper, campaigned extensively against the PKO bill and the 
despatch of the SDF overseas and held peaceful protests in front of the Diet to express 
their ideas and beliefs that they were anxious about the security and safety of SDF 
members involved in overseas peace operations. 271 
Public Opinion 
During the Gulf Crisis, ideas and beliefs circulating among the public played an 
important part in deciding the eventual outcome of the government initiatives, both on 
the despatch of the SDF to the Gulf and the passing of the UNPKO Law. It was fairly 
clear that the public mood towards the issues of PKO participation, the revision of the 
Constitution and the ideas about Japan's existing identity as a 'unilateral pacifist' were 
on a great swing. Having embraced the ideas that Japan was a 'devoted peace-loving 
271 
,I fainichi Shinibim, 14,07/1992 
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nation' and that the country had followed a respectable path in promoting peace mainly 
by limiting its military exercises and by contributing financially towards economic and 
social development in several Third World countries, the lesson from the Gulf crisis was 
the turning point that triggered the Japanese public to rethink its own political identity 
and practices. However, during the Crisis, Japanese public opinion showed much 
resistance to the notion of identity transformation and the assertive idea regarding 
Japan's participation in UNPKOs and the maintenance of peace based on the UN. 
In general, the Japanese public agreed on principle that Japan should take part in 
UNPKOs: a poll conducted by NHK in 1991 showed that about 61 percent of a sample 
of 1 254 people believed as such. In the same poll, only 10 percent were entirely against 
participation in UNPKOs and 29 percent did not give any specific response. 272 However, 
whether the Japanese public agreed on how the SDF should participate in the UNPKOs 
was another matter. Three different polling agents - the Asahi Shimbun, NHK and the 
Shin Joho Centre - conducted surveys on the degree of support for the participation of 
the SDF in UNPKOs on different sampling groups, as shown in Chart 4.1. The results 
showed that the Japanese public was clearly divided into two groups of roughly equal 
sizes, consisting of those who supported the SDF participation and those who did not. 
Among 2,370 interviewees, 50 percent answered positively in the Asahi Shimbun poll, 
indicating that they supported the despatch of the SDF in UNPKOs. Approximately 40 
percent disagreed with the idea and 10 percent did not respond to the question. The same 
trend occurred with the NHK poll conducted with 1,224 interviewees in the same year. 
This poll also showed that the difference between those who supported the despatch of 
the SDF and those who did not was only 3 percent, at 44 and 41 percent respectively. 
The poll conducted by the Shin Joho Centre, however, varied slightly and contrasted 
'72 NHK, 1991, Japan Public Opinion Location Library (JPOLL) 
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with the two previous polls by showing that the people who supported the SDF activities 
was less than those who opposed it, at 42 and 47 percent respective ly. 
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Chart 4.1: Public Support on SDF's Participation 
in UNPKO, 1991 
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These polls by different polling teams suggested that there existed a divergence 
of ideas and beliefs arnong the Japanese public regarding the role Japan should project 
internationally. It also reflected that those who wanted to see the transformation of a new 
'domestic-type' identity were as numerous as those who were satisfied with Japan's 
existing identity as a 'unilateral pacifist' with limited involvement in international affairs. 
To some extent, during the Gulf crisis, the lack of consensus among the Japanese public 
about the nation's own 'domestic-type' identity - whether the country should stick with 
the idea of the 'unilateral pacifist' or move forward to a new internationally accepted 
identity - was perhaps one of the main reasons why Japan's contribution to the Gulf 
Crisis was 'too little and too late. ' 
However, it is important to note that during the Gulf Crisis, the Japanese public 
still had firm ideas and beliefs as to hoxv international peace should be promoted and 
handled. Although the international community collectively adopted the idea that the 
73 Asýihi Shimbim, NHK, Shin Joho, 1991, Japan Public Opinion Location Library (JPOLL) 
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thin line between peacekeeping and peace-enforcing had become blurred and even that 
ultimately, peacekeeping operations would inevitably involve the use of force, the 
Japanese public did not move an inch on their idea about how to handle the peace 
process. Despite their different positions on the philosophical and political issue of 
national identity or technical issues regarding the despatch of the SDF, those who 
subscribed to the Yomiuri and the Asahi Shimbun did agree that the SDF should not be 
involved in peace enforcement efforts while participating in UNPKOs. According to the 
polls conducted by these newspapers, as shown in Table 4.3, those supporting the SDF's 
participation in peace-enforcement missions or operations that would involve the use of 
armed force accounted for only 36 and 33 percent in the surveys conducted by the 
Yomiuri and Asahi Shimbun, respectively. The remainder of the interviewees, which 
accounted for 50 and 58 percent from the respective newspapers, either disagreed with 
the ideas or did not give their responses. 
For the Japanese public, the most preferable functions to be carried out by the 
SDF force in UN peace operations in 1992 were non-military duties such as medical 
assistance and election monitoring, which accounted for 46 percent of all 2,178 
responses in the poll conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun. About a quarter of the 
interviewees, however, were convinced that the SDF could contribute more to the 
UNPKOs by undertaking any functions assigned by the UN while the other participants, 
who altogether comprised 22 percent, agreed that such un-armed duties as monitoring 
conduct under a cease-fire and within the UN neutral zone were acceptable. The 
remaining 8 percent did not express their opinions on the matter. 
274 This also confirmed 
that the Japanese public were still against the general ideas collectively adopted by the 
international Community regarding hoxv the UN should perform their duties in securing 
'74 y omiuri Shimbun, 1992, Japan Public Opinion Location Library (JPOLL) 
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international peace and security. In the following section, the conclusion of the early 
process of Japan's identity transformation and the clash between the 'international-role' 
and 'domestic-type' identities during the Gulf Crisis will be summarised. 
Table 4.3: SDF Involvement in UN Peace-Enforcement Missions 275 
Yomiuri Shimbun Asahi Shimbun 
Percent 
Agree 36 33 
Disagree 50 58 
No response 14 9 
Total 100 100 
Source: Author's Table 
4.6 Conclusion: the Clash of the Domestic-Type and International-Role 
Identity 
Apparently, Japan's 'too little, too late' response to the Gulf Crisis suggested that 
the clash between the ideas that constituted the 'domestic-type' identities among the 
Japanese and those collectively shared by the international community, which influenced 
the projection of Japan's 'international-role' identity, accounted for much of the 
reluctance, hesitation and failure in the country's UN policy during the Gulf Crisis. 
Throughout the Gulf War interactions during the early 1990s, Japan was urged to project 
its 'international -role' identities in accordance with the ideas collectively adopted by the 
international community, whereas Japan's 'domestic-type' identities were fixed by 
Japanese experiences and beliefs from the post-war period. In the area of peace and 
seCUrity, the international community characterised the new possible threats as more 
275 Yonihii-i Shimbun, 1991, Japan Public Opinion Location Library (JPOLL) and Asahi Shimblin, 1991, 
Japan Public Opinion Location Library (JPOLL) 
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vertical and horizontal, which signified that international threats were relatively 'intra'. 
4caused from above' and that they had more impacts across borders than was typ, cal in 
the conflicts that had occurred before the Gulf War. Such primitive international threats 
or military invasions required collective and multilateral efforts from the international 
community to rightly address the problems, hence the adoption of the 'multilateral 
pacificist' identity. Japan's conviction that peace could be maintained merely by setting 
itself as an example of self-restraint and unilateral pacifism or by limiting its military 
urges had guided the country along the opposite avenue, which did not reflect the reality 
of the post-Cold War milieu. 
Another clashing set of ideas between the international community and Japan 
surrounding UN peace operations was also unmistakable. In the post-war period, the 
ways to handle international conflicts and to maintain peace were initially based on three 
main principles - preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. However, the 
Gulf Crisis led the international community to realise that the transformation of UN 
peace operations to focus on preventive deployment, the merging of peace enforcement 
into peacekeeping operations and the embrace of the identity of 'peace enforcer' were 
inevitable. In contrast, Japan still clung to the idea that the final stage of peace 
operations - peacebuilding - was perhaps the most effective method of securing and 
maintaining international peace. While adopting the identity of the 'traditional 
peacebuilder/developer' and spending most of its financial resources and efforts in 
promoting social development in LDCs, Japan was entirely ignorant of the fact that the 
combination of the three principles of peace deployment, peacekeeping/peace 
enforcement and peacebuilding was a prerequisite to the effective maintenance of peace 
and security. Japan's focus on 'prosperity' more than 'security' as fundamental to the 
maintenance of international peace, although this was in line with its 'domestic-tvpe' I 
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identity as the 'unilateral pacifist, ' lacked insight into the transformation of peace 
operations in the post-Cold War world. 
The third set of ideas adopted by the Japanese during the Gulf Crisis was perhaps 
a product of the post-WWII Japan's identity regarding Japan-US bilateral relations. The 
security alliance provided a favourable environment in which Japan could fully develop 
its major political identity as the 'unilateral pacifist' without crucial interruptions. Under 
the comprehensive military protection from the US, Japan could portray itself as a 
peace-loving nation that had restrained itself from building up active military capability. 
However, the question of whether the US was content for Japan to remain a 'US- 
follower' with no apparent international political responsibilities was another matter 
entirely. It was fairly evident in the economic sphere that the US had made the situation 
clear with Japan about its identity as the second major economic superpower and the 
responsibility that such a position entailed. In the economic realm, Japan had 
transformed its identity somewhat to meet demands from the US and the international 
community by sharing larger economic burdens and by continuing to assume the identity 
of 'traditional peacebuilder/developer. ' In the political sphere, the US was in dire need 
of more assertive action from Japan as its partner and a sharing of ideas that were 
collectively embedded in the international community on the importance of securing 
international peace and security through multilateral efforts under the UN mechanism, 
including the use of force. For the US, Japan's contribution in financial terms but not in 
physical or ideational inputs was not what the country expected. 
Behind these three clashing sets of identities embraced by the international 
community and Japan during the Gulf Crisis, the ideas and beliefs of political actors 
N\hose vieNvs affected the outcome of Japan's UN policy - bureaucracies, political 
parties and public opinion - were evolving in a way that was less in tune wýlth the ideas 
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and beliefs adopted by the international community. As for Japan's bureaucracy, 
although the MOFA was the main force advocating Japan's assertive international stance, 
it was still at a loss in terms of the directions that Japan would take maintain 'peace and 
security. ' As previously mentioned, the MOFA and the government had spent much of 
their efforts in promoting 'peace' based on 'prosperity', as evidenced by Japan's series 
of development aid programmes. With the exception of the promotion of arms reduction 
and non-proliferation efforts, the MOFA and the government had a solid idea about 
security only in terms of how to ensure Japan's own national security through the Japan- 
US security alliance. The ideas served Japan's identities as the 'unilateral pacifist, ' the 
'traditional peacebuilder/developer' and the 'US-follower' well. 
Political games between the ruling LDP and the opposition parties were another 
factor that hindered Japan's sharing of ideas embedded in the international community 
during the Gulf Crisis. While the majority of LDP members were pro-military, pro-US 
and convinced that Japan should have made a greater human contribution towards the 
maintenance of international peace, the opposition parties were at the opposite end of the 
spectrum. The JSP, JCP, Korneito and DSP were all subscribed to the ideas that the 
essence of being a 'unitary pacifist' and a country whose peace strategy was based on 
strengthening prosperity was to strictly adhere to the 'no-war clause': the prohibition of 
the use of force stipulated in the Peace Constitution. The divergence of fundamental 
ideas about peace and how peace should be handled between the two political groups 
was responsible for Japan's response being 'too late' to pass the PKO bill and 'too little' 
to share the peace sentiment embraced by the international community, which would 
allow, the SDF to effectively participate in UN missions overseas. 
Ideas and beliefs reflected through public opinion also played an important part 
in impinging on Japan's response to the Gulf Crisis. As public opinion was the ý ltý 
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fundamental reflection of the Japanese society that informed the government, 
bureaucracy and political parties as to how the ideational position of the people was 
evolving, the examination of the trend of ideas and beliefs was considered important in 
that sense. The media, especially newspaper editorials, played a major role in reflecting 
the ideas and beliefs that were evolving in Japanese society. During the Gulf Crisis, the 
Yomiuri Shimbun was the most conservative newspaper and advocated active moves 
towards human contribution and the transformation from the 'unilateral pacifist' to a 
more comprehensive identity, which would allow Japan to exercise military capability in 
order to maintain international peace. The Asahi Shimbun, on the contrary, was still 
cautious about the identity transformation and the revision of Japan's Peace Constitution. 
As the main supporter of the opposition parties, the Mainichi Shimbun totally opposed 
any moves that indicated the transformation of the 'unilateral pacifist' identity and the 
possibility of Japan's military involvement. These newspapers toyed with the ideas 
surrounding these issues throughout the crisis and paved the way to further discussion on 
the transformation of Japan's identity in subsequent years. 
Although there was a clear-cut divide among the media and newspapers on the 
ideas and beliefs about peace and Japan's existing identities, Japanese society and public 
opinion were equally divided into two balanced clusters between those supporting active 
participation in the UN peace operations and those opposing these attempts. The answer 
to the question of why Japan was too late and too hesitant in extending its contribution 
or passing the PKO Law was largely the fact that the difference between the proponents 
and opponents was too close to call, hence resulting in the tug-of-war of ideational 
debates from the government and bureaucracy to ordinary Japanese people. Compared to 
the Gulf Crisis, the next chapter on the Cambodian peace process wIII reveal the 
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subsequent stage of Japan's identity transformation and the higher degree of conformity 
between the 'international -role' and 'domestic-type' identities. 
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Chapter 5 The Cambodian Peace Process (1990-1994) 
5.1 Background to the Cambodian Conflict and the Paris Peace Process 
The true cause of the Cambodian conflict in the post-WWII period could be 
attributed to a series of interventions from both regional powers - Vietnam and China - 
and external powers like the US and the former USSR. 276 Because the civil war in 
Cambodia was the result of an ideological tug-of-war between the East and the West, it 
was hardly surprising that the Cambodian conflict also reached a stalemate when 
external powers, especially the major ones, turned their attention towards normalising 
diplomatic relations amongst themselves in the late 1980s. Exhausted by its economic 
difficulties, the former USSR began to rearrange its political priorities by withdrawing 
its troops from Afghanistan and its military support through Vietnam. This political 
move inherently triggered Vietnam to withdraw its military occupation in Cambodia and, 
as Kohno put it, to make the Cambodian conflict an 'internal one. ' 2" The same scenario 
occurred in China as Beijing faced criticism from the international community after the 
1989 Tiananmen incident. China started to reconsider the political repercussions of its 
continuing support of the Khmer Rouge, after its vehement genocide campaign against 
innocent Cambodians. The US and ASEAN's active interests in reconciliation were 
mutually reinforcing when the USSR, Vietnam and China began to abandon their 
276 As precisely summarised by several authors, Vietnam began its campaign in the 1960s by backing the 
fledging Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) to wage a civil uproar against King Sihanouk's I 
government, although the outcome was unsuccessful. King Sihanouk's political legitimacy was challenged 
again during the 1970s in a bloodless coup carried out by General Lon Nol -a US-backed right wing of 
his own government. The Lon Nol government, however, was not a long-lived one, as it was overthrown 
by the Khmer Rouge, a communist guerrilla group from China. After a half decade of Pol Pot's vicious 
regime and genocide scheme, the Cambodian people were freed in 1978, only to be governed by the so- 
called '\"ietnamese puppet government', also known as the 'Phnom Penh Regime. ' The regime, led 
respectively by Heng Samrin and Hun Sen, had been logistically supported by the former USSR and 
administered by Vietnam from the late I 970s until the start of the Paris peace process. 
277 Kohno (1999: 9) 
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doctrine of 'irreversibility' and look for a solution to end the long-standing conflicts in 
Cambodia. 278 
The process of extricating the four rival factions from political gridlock and 
restoring peace to Cambodia was far from easy. Although the influence of the surrogate 
external backers was removed from the equation, even if the major powers had poured 
their resources and energy into easing the enmity among the factions, the fundamental 
cause of internal dissention did not automatically evaporate, especially the question of 
power allocation and political legitimacy. Pike also argues that the central factor in the 
peace process had always been 'governance and the institutional isation of political 
power' and the question of how the power was to be divided and under what 
arrangements it was to be maintained . 
279 The peace process itself did not tackle these 
intractable problems directly but rather was a product of the assumption that peace 
would consequentially be restored as a result of the establishment of a democratic 
government and general elections. Based on this supposition, the Cambodian peace 
process was carried out at two different phases and on two parallel diplomatic tracks - 
before and after the signing of Peace Agreements and at the formal and informal 
diplomatic levels, as surnmarised in Table 5.1. 
Following the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in October 1991, the UN 
was essentially the principal actor involved in the peacekeeping and peace-building 
rehabilitation process. The Agreements invited the immediate establishment of 
UNAMIC with members of the mission to be initially despatched to Cambodia to pursue 
the tasks of maintaining ceasefire, continuing close contact with the SNC and training 
ck,, ilians to avoid mine traps . 
280 The mission was soon absorbed into the subsequent 
27S 
St. John (1995: 67ý) and Brown (1992: 89) 
279 Pike (1989: 847) 
280 UN, UNSC Resolution 717,16 October 1991. 
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transitional authority, the UNTAC, in March 1992. During the transitional period and 
prior to the general election, UNTAC's mandates were divided into four phases. 
Table 5.1: Chronology of Cambodian Peace Process 
Diplomatic Endeavours 
Date Details Formal Informal 
May 1993 * General elections held without Khmer Rouge UNTAC 
ation 
November 1992 * Trade embargo on Khmer Rouge P-5 
June 1992 * Talks with Khmer Rouge: Phase 11 Japan/ 
disarmament violated Thailand 
* International Reconstruction Meeting held Japan 
February 1992 * UNTAC established P-5 
October 1991 * UNAMIC established P-5 
* Paris Agreements signed France- 
Indonesia 
September 1990- * Guideline for political settlement finalised P-5 
July 1991 
August 1991 * Ceasefire and cessation of foreign military ASEAN 
assistance agreed by SNC 
July 1991 * Sihanouk elected as SNC president China 
June 1991 *3 factions' talks on the draft political ASEAN 
settlement 
December 1990 * Draft guideline for political settlement France- 
accept d by SNC Indonesia 
September 1990 Establishment of SNC Thailand 
Comprehensive political settlement 
framework accepted by all parties ASEAN 
August 1990 * Plans for SNC establishment agreed by 3 China 
parties 
June 1990 * Tokyo conference: joint communiqu6 signed Japan 
by 3 parties, excluding Khmer Rouge 
May 1990 * Thailand-Hun Sen Talk: ceasefire initiated Thailand 
February 1990 * Joint communiqu6 between Sihanouk and 
Hun Sen signed Thailand 
January 1990 * P-5 Talks: general principles of the political 
settlement agreed P-5 
February 1989 * I" Paris Conference France- 
* JIM 11: various solution discussed among the Indonesia 
4 factions, including Vietnam ASEAN 
July 1988 * JIM 1: meeting of 4 factions ASEAN 
Source: Author's Table 
Firstly, immediately after its establishment, UNTAC was to implement the Paris 
Agreements and to be constantly in consultation with the interim SNC. The primary task 
was to ensure that the sovereignty of Cambodia would be intact and the implementation 
of further mandates was proceeding satisfactorily. \vith full cooperation by all factions. 
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As adopted in UN Resolution 728 on January 1992, the second phase of the UNTAC 
mission, which lasted from May to November 1992, involved the establishment of a 
mine-awareness programme among Cambodian people, the promotion of national 
reconciliation and the protection of human rights, the maintenance of a ceasefire among 
the four factions and the disengagement of forces, which included gathering information 
regarding the total strength of forces, their deployments, armaments and locations and 
ceasefire violations. 281 UNTAC was expected to enforce all parties concerned to 'refrain 
from all hostilities and from any deployment, movement or action which would extend 
the territory they controlled or which might lead to renewed fighting. ' 282 
The third phase was to establish a legal system, procedures and necessary 
administrative measures prerequisite to the 'free and fair' election scheduled in May 
1993. UNTAC was also to design and imPlement a system of registering voters, a 
system of balloting, and the arrangements to facilitate the presence of foreign observers 
as well as to enable the repatriation of 150,000 refugees and displaced persons in 
cooperation with the UNHCR to participate in national election. 283 Lastly, the fourth 
phase involved the post-election task of delivering appropriate international assistance 
towards rehabilitation and peace-building in the areas of food, security, health, housing, 
training, education, reconstruction and development in Cambodia via financial and 
physical contributions from the international community. 284 
Having laid out the background to the Cambodian conflict and the involvement 
of the international community in the Paris peace process, sections 5.2 and 5.3 will 
281 UN, UNSC Resolution 7228,8 January 1992. 
282 UN, UNTAC-background, httV: HwwA,. un. oi-, iZ/Depts "dpko dpko/co mission/untacback,,, i- I -liti-nl, 
accessed 02/09/2005 
283 UN, UNSC Resolution 783,13 October 1992 
UN. UNSC Resolution 880,4 November 1993 
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assess the collective ideas being shared among the international community and the 
'international-role' identities that were informed by such systems of ideas. 
5.2 International Response: Collective Ideas on Peace and Security during 
the Cambodian Peace Process 
5.2.1 Collective Ideas on the Nature of International Peace and Security 
During the first half of the 1990s, the international community had formed 
collective ideas on the nature of post-Cold War peace and security through several 
international crises. Unlike the Gulf Crisis, which involved one rogue state attempting to 
invade another state and trying to challenge the existing international order, the nature of 
the Cambodian conflict was relatively multifaceted, both in terms of its root causes and 
the scale of impact. In other words, the international community faced a conflict that 
was largely characterised by the intervention of several external powers trying to secure 
their own spheres of influence and the typical realist's struggle for power among the 
four Cambodian factions, which resulted in 13 years of incessant civil wars and social 
unrest. There were, however, certain dissimilarities regarding the origins of conflict 
between the Gulf crisis and the Cambodian conflict. Compared to the Gulf crisis, the 
Cambodian conflict was essentially characterised by the remnants of the Cold War and 
the source of threat was more 'vertical' or caused by its own government. However, 
both cases were also clear representations of conflicts in which the scale of impact was 
immensely 'horizontal, ' with the flooding of war casualties into neighbouring countries 
and the collapse of the whole social system. 
In terms of the source of threats and the format of the conflict, the source of 
threat in Cambodia xN,, as more 'vertical' than the case of the Gulf Crisis, and could be 
compared to the situations in Bosnia and Rwanda, where the respective governments 
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posed coercive threats to the Croatian/Bosnian minority and where Rwandans were war 
casualties of the fighting between their government and the separatist group. Aside from 
Pol Pot's regime in 1975-1978, during which millions of Cambodians were literally slain 
and the major threat against Cambodian people was the government's ruthlessness, it 
could be pointed out that the majority of Cambodia's difficulties were largely the result 
of the governments' failures - from Sihanouk's to Hun Sen's - to provide a fairly stable 
and sustainable environment or even to protect their people against the violence caused 
by the insinuation and intervention of external powers. As observed by Brown and 
Zasloff, civil dissention and each breakdown of Cambodian governments or shift of 
leadership naturally produced further widespread economic deprivation, anarchy, 
violation of human rights, destruction of infrastructure, violence and so on. 285 
Furthermore, although the format of political unrest in Cambodia could be characterised 
as an 'intra-state' conflict, unlike those mentioned previously, it is undeniable that the 
major condition that had dictated the course of the Cambodian conflict was the inability 
of successive Cambodian governments to avoid outside perpetrations. In other words, 
the antagonistic sentiments among the four factions were directly influenced by external 
powers. 
The Cambodia case was significant not only because it was perhaps the last war 
in which both regional and major powers had exerted their political, ideological and 
military leverage over one another by proxy. It was also significant because the ideas 
regarding the scale of impact and the negative effects of the conflict began to be 
solidified among the international community. That is to say, the scale of impact of post- 
Cold War conflict Nvas likely to be 'multi-dimensional' and would require a firm 
commitment by the international community to help sort out the problems. For example, 
Brown and Zasloff (1998: 
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the scale of impact of the Cambodian conflict was described as more horizontal because 
it covered a wide variety of negative effects resulting from a longer-standing conflict 
than the Gulf War, including food and health security, human rights, lack of educational 
programmes and training and inadequate basic infrastructure and so on. Not only were 
millions of Cambodians abused and killed by their own government; hundreds of 
thousands of Cambodians also had to take refuge in neighbouring countries. The 
remaining Cambodians were traurnatised by the traces of Khmer Rouge atrocities, the 
internal turmoil caused by action against the Vietnamese-backed Phnom Penh regime as 
well as economic scarcity and social dysfunction. 
5.2.2 Collective Ideas on UN Peace Operations 
The Cambodian peace process took place during a period in which the ideas and 
beliefs in the UN as a messenger for peace were at their height. Due to the fact that the 
two UN operations were carried out at the same time and were of approximately the 
same magnitude, it is important to take sufficient account of the distinctive development 
of the UN peace operations in the Gulf Crisis and in the Cambodian peace process 
simultaneously. As we saw in the previous chapter, after 40 years during which it could 
only perform as a 'paper tiger, ' the idea of transforming the UN into an efficient peace- 
enforcing agent was prevalent among the international community during the Gulf Crisis. 
The idea was finally realised when the UN peacekeepers - constituted of multinational 
forces - achieved their mandate by expelling Iraqi troops from Kuwait. This also 
suggested the transformation of the ideas regarding the role of peacekeeping operations 
in the post-Cold War period. The peacekeepers are expected to embark on further 
complex operations, preferably as 'peace enforcers, ' rather than simply maintaining law 
and order or containing existing violence. _*n C, 
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It might be correct to assert that the UN peace operation in Iraq suggested a new 
phase of incorporating peace enforcement function into traditional peacekeeping tasks. 
Still, the mandates of the peace operations in the Gulf crisis under LNIKOM were 
limited to political and military functions - the capacity to take physical action to 
prevent small-scale violations of the demilitarised zone or to counter any violations of 
the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait. 286 The role of 'peace enforcer' was not fully 
adopted until the involvement of UN operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH- 
1995) where the UN peacekeepers were to undertake their military tasks in close 
cooperation with a NATO-led multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) and its 
successor, the multinational Stabilisation Force (SFOR), and in Somalia, where the 
peacekeepers were authorised to use 'all necessary means' to establish a secure 
environment under the UNITAF -a multinational force led by the US. 
However, due to the different nature of the conflict mentioned previously, UN 
peace operations in the UNTAC required the international community to procure 
distinctive sets of goals and mandates that would help implement the process of ending 
the long-standing internal conflict, instigate the course of establishing a new democratic 
government and execute the plan of rebuilding a war-torn country. Bentram was right in 
pointing out that the post-Cold War generation of peace efforts revolved around the two 
distinctive ideas of 'moving towards greater UN military involvement' with the aim to 
enforce peace in conflicting area and 'moving towards a prominent role for the UN as an 
agent of democratic transitions. ' 287 While the former was witnessed during the Gulf 
Crisis, the idea of transforming the UN into an agent of democratic transition was 
evident in the Cambodian peace process. The peace process in Cambodia, therefore, 
216 UN, UNIKONI: Background, http: //-, N'N\, 'N\ý. un. or,,,, /Deptsi"dpko/missions! unikom/backgroLind. hti-nl, 
accessed 9 9`2004 
287 Bentrarn (1995: 388) 
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anchored the ideas among the international community of how sustainable peace could 
be reached via full-scale peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, which will be 
further discussed in section 5.3. 
5.2.3 Ideas and beliefs of the US on the Cambodian Peace Process 
Unlike other major powers involving in the Cambodian conflict, the US 
influence over the outcome was fairly limited during the internal unrest in Cambodia 
during the 1970s-1980s. While China was the major source of the Khmer Rouge's 
military assistance and political patronage and the former USSR openly supported 
Vietnam's military manoeuvres to overthrow the Khmer Rouge's regime, the US merely 
controlled its sphere of influence by providing only 'non-lethal support' to the non- 
communist resistance of King Sihanouk and the Son Sann faction via the diplomatic 
venues of ASEAN and its close ally, Thailand. Kohno points out that this was the case 
simply because the US had not yet fully healed from the aftermath of the Vietnam War 
in the 1970s. '188 Above all, the US also suffered from a certain policy dilemma, between 
the urge to defy the Vietnamese-supported Phnom Penh regime and the fear of the 
Khmer Rouge's brutal political manipulation. The US Congress expressed its concern 
regarding this dilemma in its 101" Congress as follows: 
'Whereas the withdrawal of Vietnamese combat forces from Cambodia, 
although strongly supported by the United States and the entire international 
community, nevertheless increases the prospects for increased fighting among 
the four Cambodian factions and raises the spectre of full-scale civil war and the 
return to poNver by the Khmer Rouge'. 
289 
288 Kohno, (1999: 9) 
289 LIS Congress (I 990a), Concurrent Resolution 10 1" Congress, H. CON. R-ES. 254,6 February 1990 
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As a result of this dilemma, the US adopted a 'low profile' in taking a direct part 
in the Cambodian internal conflict throughout the final decade of the Cold War. 290 
However, when the Paris peace process started in 1989, the US ideas to pursue active 
involvements in the handling of peace restoration in Cambodia became more tangible. 
The belief that this was so is evident in the US attempts to normalise diplomatic 
relations with Vietnam, to end US support for the occupancy of a UN seat by the Khmer 
Rouge and to announce the 'Baker Initiative', which emphasised the key role of the 
permanent members of the UNSC in drafting guidelines for political settlements, for 
instance. 291 
Nevertheless, the most significant gesture made by the US in muscling in on the 
peace process was perhaps to work together with other UNSC permanent members in 
arbitrating the conflict. By leaving other diplomatic efforts and trivial matters to other 
countries, the US focused on exerting its ideational position through its dominant role in 
the UNSC, as seen in its manipulation of the drafting of the guidelines for the political 
settlements, which excluded outside participation except for UNSC permanent members. 
In the light of collective experience of post-Cold War crisis management, the US and the 
international community shared similar ideas about managing the Cambodian peace 
process: that the long-standing conflict could be brought to an end and that the process 
of nation-building could be achieved only through positive interventions from the 
international community and specifically through the UN mechanism. Having outlined 
the sets of ideas embraced by the international community as well as the US on 
international threats and UN peace operations during the Cambodian peace process, the 
folloNvinglF section will demonstrate how these sets of ideas were translated into the 
290 Sutter ( 1991: 47) 
2"'US Congress (1990c), Concurrent Resolution 101" Congress, S. RES. 321,4 August 1990 and Van de 
Kroef ( 199 1: 100) 
203 
'international-role' identities collectively embraced by the international community and 
how Japan was expected to shared similar sets of identities with the rest of the 
community. 
5.3 International Role-Identity Projection and the Expectations on Japan 
5.3.1 On International Peace and Security: 
'Political Arbitrator' 
In the Gulf Crisis, the ideas surrounding the international community were that 
threats to international peace and security sometimes originated from traditional 
aggressors aiming at shaking the wel I-establ i shed international order. The understanding 
of such situations had led the international community to assume the so-called 
4multilateral pacificist' identity, which basically signified the idea that international 
peace and security could be achieved through the will and efforts of 'every nation' in 
battling with the threats to resume and recreate international peace and order. In the Gulf 
Crisis, the banishing of Iraqi forces from Kuwait's territory was the focus of the 
multilateral military action and the success of Operation Desert Storm indicated the 
success of the multilateral efforts. The international community also carried on with the 
identity of 'multilateral pacificist' and performed functions that helped to restore peace 
and security through the UN mechanism following the Crisis, as seen in the increasing 
numbers of multilateral operations under the UN, which rose from 5 missions in the 
1980s to 35 operations in the 1990s. 
292 
Despite this, the situation in Cambodia was rather similar to other intra-state 
conflicts and civil wzirs around the globe, as the start of the peace process in the early 
"), UN, Operation Tirnellne, http: //NNýNk, NN,,. un. oi-, Q/Depts/dpko/dpko/timeline'pa2es tinieline. htnil, accessed 
1009-1004. 
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1990s did not necessarily signify the culmination of long-standing problems in those 
countries. In other words, unlike the Gulf Crisis, the end of the political dissention 
among the four factions did not automatically translate into the start of peace, as was the 
case with Kuwait. As Doyle precisely put it: 
'[] peace is not a single or simple good, such as an absence of war or 
violent conflict, but instead a complex and variable process. Especially if one 
looks for a long term peace, real peace requires more than an absence of violence 
[ iý293 
Besides, the initial conflict was not solved merely through the collaboration of 
multilateral efforts from every nation. Rather, addressing post-Cold War intra-state 
conflicts differed from inter-state conflict because it required an 'external arbitrator' to 
help settle the differences and involved further implementations to re-stabilise the 
collapsed economic and social system. Essentially, the ideas surrounding the 
international community were perceptibly the enhancement of international mechanisms 
to help disentangle intra-state conflicts and help provide full-scale national rehabilitation 
schemes. The ideas literally informed the adoption of the 'international-role' identity as 
the 'political arbitrator' both through the collaborative efforts of several countries to 
solve the political divergence in the early stage and through the establishment of a 
mechanism to sort out the after-effects of the conflict. During the Cambodian peace 
process, the international community appeared to register the idea of a wider scale of 
political complex derived from the aftermath of long-standing external manipulations 
and internal political struggles. 
'03 Do% le ( 1998: 31) 
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The 'international-role' identity projected by the majority of nations was then 
transformed from that of 'multilateral pacificist' into that of 'political arbitrator' who 
could act upon the problem more actively, earnestly and systematically. In addition, as 
the conflict was addressed at approximately the same time as the Gulf crisis, the ideas 
surrounding the international community regarding the ability of the UN as a messenger 
for peace were still in place. Most important of all, the idea that 'the UN role in the 
resolution of the Cambodian problem will be enhanced' was clearly echoed by the 
permanent members of the UNSC and acknowledged by the international commun 
ity. 294 
Still, there was an acute distinction separating the two cases in terms of the ideas 
surrounding UN peace operations, which will be further examined in the following 
section. 
5.3.2 On UN Peace Operations: 
'Peace Promoter' 
The Gulf War and the Cambodian case were fundamentally different because the 
latter was categorically a civil war or an intra-state conflict. Such internal conflicts 
compelled the UN and the international community to cope with wider aspects of peace 
transition and restoration, including post-conflict political, social and economic 
reconstruction. 295 While the UN was expected to fulfil its adopted identity as the 'peace 
enforcer' in the Gulf Crisis, the idea portraying the international community as the 
I peace promoter' or the UN as the 'agent of democratic transition' which undertook 
294 UN, United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), a summary conclusion for a resolution 
of the Cambodian problem, Lin. oi-,,,, /Depts/dl)ko,! dpko//co missiori/utiamicbackgr. htmi, accessed 
14 06, '2005. 
295 The UNTAC mission was considered to be one of the largest post Cold War UN peace operations in 
terms of personnel and financial injections, that is, around 22,000 peacekeepers and a budget of USS 1.6 
billion. Source: UN. UNTAC: Facts and Figures, 
httLr'/\\'wN\. un. or,,, Depts'dpko dpko/co iiiission/untacfacts. html, accessed 99 2004 
206 
more complex and multi-dimensional UN peace operations was further developed 
during the Cambodian peace process. With regards to UN peace operations, the 
'international-role' identity as the 'peace promoter' moved one step further from the 
previously adopted 'peace enforcer' in the Gulf Crisis. 
In short, by assuming the identity of 'peace promoter', the international 
community thus found itself handling the peacemaking, peace keeping and 
peacebuilding operation simultaneously. The first element of peace operations - the 
peacemaking effort - was closely and efficiently pursued by several parties during the 
Cambodian peace process. The activities were not only pursued by those major powers 
who had previously been involved with the conflict, but also by those who obviously 
had no stakes or vested interests in the conflict, such as Japan, Thailand and Australia. 296 
As mentioned in the previous section and in Table 5.1, good offices and diplomatic 
activities were conducted in dual tracks, both at formal and informal levels, which 
helped break any deadlocks that arose. After a series of 'late diplomatic prevention' 
exercises, which focused on preventing existing conflicts among the four factions from 
intensifying into further rounds of military attacks via good offices and intense 
diplornatic and negotiating activities, the collective ideas among the international 
community in strengthening 'multi-dimensional aspects' of UN peace operations were 
put into practise. 
It is vital to point out that as in the case of the Gulf Crisis, where a thin line 
between peace enforcing and peacekeeping efforts could be witnessed, one could yet 
again observe a thin line between peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations in the 
Cambodian peace process. While peacekeeping involves such activities as monitoring 
and observing the peace process as well as helping the conflicting parties to implement 
Nikkei Shimbun, 2'1 02 1991 
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the signed agreement, peacebuilding deals with external efforts to assist countries and 
regions in their transition from war to peace and to facilitate the implementation of 
peace agreements. 297 It is evident that in terms of general functions and activities. the 
essence of the two operations was identical, except that they were usually undertaken in 
sequential order - from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. It is true that there are at least 10 
separate peacebuilding operations established to facilitate only post-conflict national 
rebuilding, such as those in Somalia (UNPOS-1995), Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS-1999) 
and the Central African Republic (BONUCA-2000), and recently in Timor Ueste 
(UNOTIL-2005). 
However, after the Cambodian conflict, peace operations were further developed 
based on the idea that conflicts could not possibly be solved in sequential fashion but 
should rather be tackled in a parallel manner. Specifically put, while securing and 
maintaining a peaceful environment for both conflicting parties remains the direct 
mandate of peacekeeping operations, the efforts to build up national institutions, to 
promote human rights, to provide sustainable sources of livelihood to demobilised 
combatants and return refugees and displaced persons, as well as to reactivate economic 
functions and restore the social fabric are to be undertaken concurrently. Figure 5.1 also 
demonstrates that out of 35 UN peace operations from 1992-present, about half of the 
operations incorporated both peacekeeping and peacebuilding into the same mandates. 
298 
297 Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN 'What is peacekeeping? ', 
littp: //www. un. orý,, /Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/ql. iitm, accessed 14/06/2004 and Department of Political Affairs, 
,,. 
htm, UN, 'Peacemaking and peace-building', http: //www. uji. or(,, /Depts/dpa/prev dip/peacemaking 
accessed 14/06ý`-1004 and Bentram (1995, p. 389) 
298 Annex 1, Paris Peace Agreements, Paris, 23) October 1991. As for the case of the Cambodian peace 
process, according to the Annex I of the Paris Agreements, UNTAC was to station 22,000 peacekeepers in 
270 locations around the country and carried out crucial multi-disciplinary roles and most comprehensive 
of such UN history in organising general elections and protecting human rights in addition to civil 
administration and military functions. In brief. these multi -dimensional peacekeeping activities included 
ck il administration, military functions, election and human rights protection. 
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Figure 5.1: Post-Cold War Peace Operations 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 present 
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UNOMIL 
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UNAMIR 
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UNCRO 
UNPREDEP 
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UNMOP 
UNSMIH 
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UNTMIFI 
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Peace Enforcim), + Peacekeepino UNCPSG 
ED II MINURCA UNOMSIL 
Peacekeeping + Peace-bUdding UNMIK 
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Peace-building 
Source: Authors Diagram t) 
5.3.3 On Japan-US relations: 
'US Supporter' 
Unlike the Gulf Crisis, where the US was the main player in determining the 
operational OLItCOrne, it was rather a latecomer to active involvement with the process of 
arbitrating the conflict among the four factions. However, through the venue of the 
UNSC, the US started to play a major role in determining the guidelines of the political 
settlements of the Paris Agreements, as mentioned earlier. Essentially, the core ideas 
inserted into the guidelines by the US included firstly the right to self-determination for 
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Cambodian people, which ensured that all Cambodian would enjoy the same rights, 
freedom and opportunities to participate in the election process and to choose their own 
government. This signified that they must not be influenced in any way by those in 
positions of power, especially the Phnom Penh regime administration. 
Secondly, the enhancement of the UN's role in conflict resolution was also 
emphasised. It was written clearly, as stipulated in the 101't US Congress concurrent 
resolutions regarding the UN role in the Cambodian conflict, as well as in the guidelines, 
that 'an effective UN presence would be required during the transition period in order to 
assure internal security' and that a special UN representative would be needed to 
supervise the process of transition . 
299 The UN roles also included the supervision of the 
withdrawal of foreign forces, ceasefire and the cessation of foreign military assistance to 
secure a neutral political environment, as mentioned above. The increasing and 
definitive role of the UN in the Cambodian peace process was questioned by the 
Cambodian factions, especially the Khmer Rouge and the Phnom Penh regime, which 
questioned the overpowering role of the UNTAC over the interim SNC. 
As the US's closest ally in the region, Japan assumed a significant role in 
supporting the stance of the US and the P-5, albeit with some reservations. Several 
diplomatic efforts were made by Japan as well as Thailand to smooth out the differences 
in terms of how to handle the conditions set by the guidelines for the political settlement, 
such as the issue of arms reduction and the demobilisation ratio as well as the 
justification of the UNTAC's tight control of all factions, including the Phnom Penh 
government itself. Both the Khmer Rouge and the Phnom Penh regime were adamant on 
2()--) UN, United nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), 
ht(Li: /; "\\ý\\, \\,. Liii. or(,, /Deptsýldpko/dpkoý/co mISSiOII/Linamicbackgr. html, accessed 14/06/2004 and US 
Congress (I 990b) Concurrent Resolution 10 1" Congress, S. CON. R-ES. 10 1,7 March 1990. 
http: //tlioiiias. loc. ý,, o\, /cgi-bin/guei-N,, C? cl0l:. /temp/-clOlti9Nyt, accessed 17/01/2005 
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these issues, as they left both parties with political disadvantages . 
300 This was to no avail, 
however: the efforts of those neutral countries did not materialise and there were some 
clear instances indicating US resistance towards any alteration to the original draft of the 
political settlement. 
Despite these negative responses from some factions, the third tangible idea 
concurred by the US and the international community alike was the promotion of peace 
and security based on the strengthening of western democracy. The permanent members 
of the UNSC were convinced that: 
,[] free and fair elections were essential to produce a just and durable 
settlement to the Cambodian conflict, thereby contributing to regional and 
international peace and security [ ... ]. 
5301 
The establishment of the democratic government and society was highlighted 
through the first full operation in holding free and fair elections under the direct 
administration of the UN. As pointed out previously by Bentram, there was increasing 
hope that the UN would perform both in the role of 'peace enforcer' and as an 'agent of 
democratic transition': the idea embedded in the mandates laid out for the UNTAC in 
Cambodia clearly reflected the latter hope. Coupled with the Gulf War euphoria, which 
resulted from the effectiveness of the UN's role as peace enforcer, the ways in which 
political establishment and peace restoration in Cambodia should be best achieved were 
followed accordingly. As for Japan, whether the social interactions or the exchange of 
ideas and beliefs with the international community and within Japan itself during the 
Gulf Crisis and in the Cambodian peace process contributed to the transformation of 
300 Brown (1993: 86) 
UN, UNSC Resolution 745,1-8 February 1992. 
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Japan's system of ideas and beliefs regarding international security and its 'domestic- 
type' identities remains to be seen. An examination of such transformation, or the lack 
thereof, will be carried out in sections 5.4 and 5.5. 
5.4 Domestic-Type Identity Formation: Japan's Political Identity during 
the Cambodian Peace Process 
5.4.1 Ideas Surrounding International Peace and Security: 
'Political Facilitator' 
At the start of the post-Cold War period, an Asian scholar criticised Japan's 
pattern of involvement in Southeast Asia as follows: 
'... there has been very little change in Japan's approach. The focus of 
Japanese policy remains overwhelmingly economic. Japan has also been obliged 
to play a modest political role in the region as a result of international pressure, 
especially from the US and ASEAN... 5302 
It cannot be denied that in the initial phase of the Cambodian peace process, 
Japan was not one of the major players who significantly contributed to the process of 
ending the 13-year conflict. However, Japan's political, economic and ideational 
contributions in the Cambodian peace process were far more enthusiastic than the past 
four decades Put together. Its involvement in the Cambodian peace process can be 
roughly split into three phases of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, during 
N\hich it contributed full political and diplomatic efforts as well as financial, physical 
and ideational inputs. Japan's late-coming status xvas perhaps the result of its passive 
1 -102 Khanichoo (1991: 19) 
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economic interests in Indochina and its political immaturity in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
Similar to the US, Japan's concrete position on the Cambodian matter in the early stages 
was purely to follow the lead of ASEAN. 303 Nevertheless, when the possibility of 
achieving a peaceful resolution began to materialise in 1989 and during the early 1990s, 
Japan started to engage itself earnestly in the process of 'late preventive diplomacy' and 
'peacemaking' endeavours. According to Takeshi Ikeda, a leading Japanese diplornat 
who directly undertook a keen role in pursuing Japanese initiatives on behalf of the 
Japanese government, Japan's diplomatic efforts in utilising its political and diplomatic 
skills were evident at every stage of the peace negotiation process. 304 A former MOFA 
diplomat who was one of the Japanese delegates in the Cambodian peace process also 
confirmed Japan's transformation of ideas regarding the way regional and international 
peace could be facilitated during its involvement in the peace process. He put it as 
follows: 
'Japan has worked to solve international problems militarily, but in the 
framework of the UN. Japan has been asked by many countries to contribute, not 
to combat, but to facilitate conditions in difficult areas in the world. This is the 
reason why the Japanese government decided to adopt a special Law, the PKO 
Law, which was extremely difficult to pass in the Diet, because the opposition 
parties were against it: even now, some parties do not agree to it. But actually 
now I think most of the parties, I think including the opposition parties, are 
inclined to say 'okay' if it's good for world peace. So, this is the first case, Japan 
., 0--, Kesavan (1985: 112 1) 
-104 lk-eda (1996: 1 
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has contributed with our military forces in solving ... 
in recovering peace in 
Southeast Asia. ' 305 
Although Japan did not portray itself as a 'political arbitrator' as the other major 
powers had done, due to its political immaturity and late-coming status, it out-performed 
other nations in transforming its political identity from that of sole 'unilateral pacifist' to 
6political facilitator' to undertake several political functions, as a result of extensive 
cultivation on a personal level with both non-communist factions (the Sihanouk and Son 
Sann factions) and the Vietnamese-backed Phnom Penh regime. In a sense, Japan had 
filled the void caused by the major powers' inability to hold impartial talks with 
constructive diplomatic manoeuvres to lead these two antagonists to the negotiating 
table. The Tokyo Conference in June 1990, the follow-up event to the unsuccessful Paris 
peace talks in 1989 and the Jakarta Informal Meeting in February 1990, was the first 
instance in which Japan started to inject its political efforts to facilitate the peace 
process. 306 The success of the 1990 Tokyo Conference in finding compromises between 
both military and political differences among the four factions implanted the idea of 
positive participation in Japan and simultaneously fulfilled the expectation of the 
international community regarding Japan's contribution to the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
307 
The second diplomatic and peacemaking effort could be witnessed through 
Japan's attempt to smooth out the differences of interests between the Khmer Rouge and 
the Phnom Penh regime over the guidelines on disarmament and clemobilisation and to 
305 Interviewed xvith a former MOFA official, 09/02/2006. 
306 In essence, the Tokyo Conference invited the key factions to negotiate on the possibility of effective 
ceasefire and to form an organ for national reconciliation, later known as 'Cambodia's Supreme National 
Council' (SNC). Although there was some controversy among the participating factions regarding the 
composition of the new national organ, Sihanouk, Son Sarin, the Khmer Rouge and the Phnom Penh 
i-egffne did agree in principle to the establishment of this authoritative body with a 2-2-2-6 formula. 
10- Ikeda (1996: 66) 
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break the deadlock to the peace process caused by the heated contempt of both parties in 
early 199 1. Japan held independent initiatives and informal negotiations to persuade 
both the Khmer Rouge and the Phnom Penh regime to accept the draft guidelines for 
political settlement drafted by the UNSC permanent members in the areas of 
disarmament and demobilisation, the strengthening of the UN mechanism and the 
confirmed cooperation of the four factions with the UNTAC. 308 Although these 
initiatives were considered a trivial issue, which had no particular effect on the drafting 
of the political agreements, Japan's diplomatic effort on this matter was indispensable 
for the finalisation of the draft political settlement, which led to the signing of the Peace 
Agreement in October 1991.309 
Another diplomatic endeavour and example of late preventive diplomacy 
conducted by Japan was again evident during the summer and autumn of 1992, after the 
signing of the Paris Agreement. In cooperation with Thailand, Japan was the only 
country that earnestly attempted to negotiate with the Khmer Rouge and to persuade the 
faction to abide by the rules of ceasefire stiPulated in Phase 11 of the Paris Agreements, 
which would lead to a neutral environment and free and fair upcoming elections in 1993. 
Ikeda again reiterated Japan's effort to persuade the Khmer Rouge to disarm and to find 
a point of compromise with the faction regarding transparent administrative control of 
the UN over the former Phnom Penh regime's administrative bodies. Japan and Thailand 
thus put together a proposal whereby an 'administrative advisory committee under the 
control of UNTAC' would be established, although it was not accepted by the Khmer 
308 St. John (1995: 676) and Takeda (1998: 556) 
1 . 109 . -ks seen in 
Section C of Annex 1, the role of UNTAC in improving the transparency of the disarmament 
and demobilisation process was clearly emphasised. In Article V of Annex 11 of the Paris Agreement, all 
parties Nvere requested to implement the process of demobilisation of at least 70 percent of their militarv 
forces, instead of the original total disarmament. Source: Annex I and 11 of the Paris Peace Agreement, 23 
October 1991 
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10 Because the UNTAC operation was based on the good will of the four 
factions and the unyielding diplomatic efforts of the UN members to facilitate the 
process of restoring peace in Cambodia 311 the failure of the Khmer Rouge to meet the 
obligations under the Paris Agreement therefore needed to be addressed by independent 
and neutral countries such as Japan and Thailand. Although these diplomatic attempts 
did not materialise, the gestures were recognised by the international community as an 
integral element of the process of peace implementation. 
5.4.2 Ideas Surrounding UN Peace Operations: 
'Peace Supporter' 
While the international community had launched full-scale peace operations 
commensurate to its I international -role' identity as a 'peace promoter', Japan was rather 
cautious in pursuing full-fledged UN peace operations due to its restricted legal and 
domestic conditions. Unlike the 'domestic-type' identity adopted during the Gulf Crisis 
as the 'traditional peacebuilder/developer', the adoption of the new 'domestic-type' 
identity as a 'peace supporter' had exposed Japan to the core functions in almost every 
step of peace operations, from peacemaking to peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Besides, 
myriads of active contributions, ranging from personnel to financial and ideational 
inputs, were also made via various channels. 
Firstly, in addition to those Japanese diplomats involved in the late-preventive 
diplomacy and peacemaking operations mentioned above, which brought about the 
successful signing of the Paris Peace Agreements, the epochal contribution of the SDF's 
participation in the UNTAC mission was no less important. Contrary to the awkward 
01 keda ( 1996: 124) 
311 Berdal and Liefer (1996: 36) 
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Gulf War, when Japan was condemned by the international community for its lack of 
personnel participation, the PKO Law enacted in June 1992 allowed Japan to despatch 
the SDF to engage more actively in peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, including 
election monitoring and civilian policing. 312 According to the IPCH, Japan's 
contribution of 1,300 personnel in the UNTAC was divided into four key areas, namely 
ceasefire monitoring, election monitoring, civilian policing and logistic assistance. 313 it 
was the first time in its post-WWII history that Japan had sent its ground troops beyond 
its national border and was perceived by one a scholar as a 'litmus test' for Japan's 
future foreign policy posture and activism in global affairs. 314 Although the bill limited 
SDF missions to only unarmed peacekeeping activities and humanitarian assistance due 
to its severe restricted legal framework, it was considered a leap forward for Japan's 
contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security. 
The third element involved in the Cambodian peace process was the 
peacebuilding operation, in which Japan's financial contribution was unquestionably an 
integral part of the process of Cambodian national reconstruction and reconciliation. In 
contrast to Japan's reluctance in the Gulf Crisis, the nation's dedication to the 
peacebuilding process in Cambodia did not furnish the international community with the 
image of a cash dispenser or a nation that would provide economic assistance without 
any principle attached. Rather, it was self-evident to the international community that 
Japan would want to portray itself as a prime mover in helping Cambodia to reconstruct 
its nation and achieve sustainable peace. 
In detail, Japan's determination to lead a proactive role in Cambodian 
peacebuilding was first seen in its move to despatch a study mission to Phnom Penh in 
3 12 Daiýv Yonfiwl, 22 
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early 1992 to sort out a project list for official development assistance, which included 
agriculture, energy supply and basic infrastructure. 315 However, the most notable effort 
was Japan's initiative in pushing forward the idea of implementing the peacebuilding 
process via a concrete institutional ised framework. The attempt to provide methodical 
economic assistance in Cambodia materialised in the Ministerial Conference on the 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia, held in Tokyo in June 1992. The 
Conference mainly discussed the framework for international cooperation to promote 
short-term reconstruction and rehabilitation in developmental areas such as food security, 
health, housing, training, education, the transport network, basic infrastructure and 
public utilities. 
As a result of this Conference, $880 million in aid was pledged by the 
international community, of which approximately a quarter was promised by the 
Japanese government. 316 Furthermore, Japan also proposed to establish an international 
mechanism for medium- and long-term assistance for Cambodian reconstruction beyond 
the mandate of the Paris Agreements. 317 By setting up the 'International Committee on 
the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC)', a consultative body connecting the 
international community with the Cambodian government under the chairmanship of 
Japan, the development of the country's rehabilitation process could be systematically 
315 St. John (1995: 676) 
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monitored and the body would become the central organ for the provision of further 
economic aid to Cambodia. 
5.4.3 Ideas Surrounding Japan-US Relations: 
'US Supporter' 
In the Cambodian peace process, Japan succeeded in transforming one of its 
'domestic-type' identities from 'US follower', as in the Gulf Crisis, to 'US supporter. ' 
The significant element that could differentiate Japan's status from that of 'follower' to a 
decent 'supporter' was that the country did not have to be ordered to make political or 
ideational contributions, as had been the case during the Gulf crisis. Japan mostly 
supported the US and the international community on the guidelines of the Paris Peace 
Agreements, including the right of national self-determination, the enhancement of the 
UN's role and the strengthening of peace based on western democracy. Japan took 
voluntary action in facilitating the process by conducting several acts of shuttle 
diplomacy to fill the void in which the international community, specifically the US, 
could not perform. As stated by a Japanese diplomat: 
,[] If Japan is to become more deeply involved in the process of 
conflict resolution, unless the Japanese showed positive interest by taking action, 
neither the Cambodian nor other concerned countries would consult us on their 
own initiative. Through taking deliberate action, we were able to create a 
relationship of cooperation and support with the major countries concerned 
[I, 318 
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In concrete terms, although the US declared its support for the three coalition 
factions (Sihanouk, Son Sann and the Khmer Rouge factions) from the outset, it was 
unable to communicate directly with the Khmer Rouge, due to its vicious conduct 
against human rights. Furthermore, Japan had also cultivated a trusting relationship with 
all factions, not only the non-communist ones. The Khmer Rouge and the Phnom-Penh 
regime were also equally on good terms with Japan, which alerted the international 
community and the US to the positions of these two problematic factions with respect to 
the implementation of the peace process. Although some of Japan's initiatives, 
especially the informal dialogues and the unofficial proposal presented to the four 
factions in order to find a compromise among them, went rather against the original 
ideas of the US and the permanent members of the UNSC, Japan made it clear that its 
stance was to limit these informal negotiations and diplomatic efforts to an area within 
the framework of draft agreements that was acceptable to the US and the international 
community. The efforts were obviously appreciated by the permanent members of the 
UNSC and the international community. 
319 
On the one hand, the set of 'domestic-type' identities adopted during the Gulf 
Crisis were transformed largely because Japan had exposed itself to social interactions at 
the system level for long enough to realise what kind of 'international-role' identities 
were projected and preferred by the rest of the international community. Such signals 
were sent back to Japanese society and contributed to the process of domestic identity 
transformation, resulting in the re-orientation of the ideational system on the 
maintenance of peace and security, as shown in this section. Although the 'domestic- 
type' identities Nvere not yet precisely in tune with the 'international -role' identities, 
Japan showed some signs of policy activity in the international security arena under the 
lbid (1996: 117) and UN, UNSC Resolution 792,30 November 1992 
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UN framework. The ideational exchanges among key actors at the domestic level were 
partly responsible for the transformation of 'domestic-type' identities. as will be 
discussed in the following section. 
5.5 Ideas and Beliefs that informed Domestic-Type Identities 
5.5.1 Bureaucratic Worldviews 
During the Gulf Crisis, Japan's long-standing identities as the 'unilateral 
pacifist, ' the 'traditional peacebuilder/developer' and the 'US follower' were major 
hindrances to the MOFA's ability to project active diplomacy that corresponded to the 
expectations of the international community. The idea that peace could be maintained 
simply by Japan containing itself with no involvement in military affairs and purely by 
means of setting itself as an example of a peace-loving nation and concentrating only on 
international economic assistance was deeply embedded in the country and contributed 
to the post-WWII passive identities. While the MOFA recognised the need for ideational 
change, the Japanese domestic constituents were always a step behind on the expanding 
notion of international responsibility. However, the Gulf War and the Cambodian peace 
process, which were the two cases that occurred almost simultaneously, triggered the 
process of identity transformation from those mentioned above into forms that allowed 
Japan to take an active part in the promotion of international peace, as a UN 'peace 
supporter, ' a 'political facilitator' and a 'US supporter. ' The MOFA took note of the 
opportunity by pointing out that several ideational changes must be taken into account 
by Japanese society, as described below. 
Firstly, as regards international peace and security, the MOFA perceived that the 
post-war 'pacifism' should be altered to consist of contributions that xvould ensure the 
peace and prosperity of the 'entire' international community and go beyond the simple 
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pacifism of not becoming a military power and of restraining itself from invading other 
countries. As underlined in the 1995 Diplomatic Blue Book, Japan was expected to play 
major role in building a new framework of international cooperation. In this respect, 
Japan should engage in combined efforts with other nations with common values to 
foster global cooperation and regional cooperation. To ensure the maintenance of 
international peace and security, Japan intended to cooperate with the international 
community, ASEAN and the US as 'mature partners, jointly thinking and jointly acting' 
for peace and security, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. 320 
As a matter of fact, the idea of transforming the country into the prime mover in 
the maintenance of international peace and security had been embraced by the MOFA 
even before the end of the Cold War. In 1988, the so-called 'Takeshita Principles' 
clearly emphasised the idea of 'cooperation for peace' - an approach enhancing Japan's 
contributions to the maintenance and reinforcement of peace by positive participation in 
diplomatic efforts, the despatch of necessary personnel and the provision of financial 
assistance. 321 Unfortunately, it was not until the Cambodian peace process that these 
principles were actively adopted by the MOFA and supported by the Japanese public. 
This also included Japan's political initiatives, which were deemed indispensable for the 
implementation of the maintenance of peace and security. The Cambodian peace process 
allowed Japan, especially the MOFA, to help facilitate the peace process by engaging 
Cambodian factions in the process of diplomatic dialogues, which led to the conclusion 
of the Paris Agreement. On several occasions during Japan's close encounters with 
Indonesia, Taro Nakayama, the then Foreign Minister, also made repeated remarks on 
the importance of Japan's playing a greater role in world affairs in proportion to its 
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growing economic might. 322 According to Ikeda Tadashi, a leading diplomat involved in 
the Cambodian peace process: 
'I sincerely believe that these diplomatic efforts as an 'honest and sincere 
political mediator/broker' represent an epochal phase in Japanese diplomacy in 
the post WWII era. ' 
323 
Secondly, with respect to the UN peace operations, the MOFA eagerly pointed 
out to the public that international conflicts, especially regional ones, were not only 
restricted to affairs between nations: there was also increasing danger of conflicts within 
nations, rooted in ethnic, religious and historical reasons. Under such situations, the 
international community was deploying various methods and efforts to maintain peace 
and build up security through such means as conflict prevention, political reconciliation, 
peace operations, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction and developmental 
assistance. The most significant idea stressed by the MOFA in 1993 during the process 
of implementing peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations in Cambodia was that 
'there is a growing recognition in recent years of the importance of linking 
peacekeeping/peacebuilding with humanitarian assistance and the reconstruction of 
, 324 development and aid . 
Such emphasis signified the idea that it would not be enough for Japan to 
contribute its resources merely in terms of humanitarian assistance and development aid, 
which usually did not involve manpower in political and military functions. Rather, it 
\\, as time for Japan to share both 'sweat and pain' and to allow Japanese personnel to 
face the same risks as others. However, unlike the ideas embedded among the 
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international community and their collective identity as the 'peace promoter' whose 
functions in peace operations sometimes involved the enforcement and military 
measures, Japan would only assume a more proactive role corresponding to the newly 
adopted 'peace supporter' identity, which contended the vital elements of preventive 
diplomacy, non-military peacekeeping and proactive peace-building based on human 
rights, humanitarian and developmental aspects. 
Thirdly, regarding Japan-US bilateral relations, the ideational position within the 
MOFA was relative stable, as the relationship remained as the cornerstone of Japan's 
foreign policy and national security in the post-Cold War era. It was clearly stated in the 
1996 Diplomatic Blue Book that close cooperation and coordination between the two 
countries across the broad spectrum would serve as the foundation for advancing 
frameworks for regional and global cooperation. 325 However, it is important to note that 
although the key ideas regarding Japan-US relations were broadly unchanged, Japan's 
pursuance of the maintenance of international peace and security and its participations in 
peace operations were considerably divergent from, if not clashing with, those of the US. 
Some events revealed Japan's different ideas and efforts to try distinct approach 
and initiatives in dealing with the Cambodian peace process. Some of the ideas and 
proposals, especially how Japan dealt with the Khmer Rouge faction, Japan's acceptance 
of Vietnam's role in Phnom Penh regime faction and the unofficial proposal 
representing Japan's compromise approach to the details of the draft political settlements, 
were not totally welcomed by the US. It was clear during the Cambodian peace process 
that the MOFA's intention to pursue such autonomous tracks that did not contradict the 
US contributed to the transformation of Japan-US relations, xvith Japan's status changing 
325 NIOFA (1996b), Diplomatic Blue Book 1996, http: /, '\N-%ý-xN-, nioheo, jtpohcv/otheri"bluebook/1997/1- 
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from that of 'follower' to 'US supporter. ' Hisashi Okazaki, former ambassador to 
Thailand, suggested the following, which could possibly sum up the ideational position 
of Japan's involvement in the Cambodian peace process: 
'I do not say that Japan settled the Cambodian problem or that Japan's 
scenario for a peaceful Cambodia has in fact materialised. But I think that peace 
in Cambodia could not have been restored so smoothly without Japan's efforts to 
negotiate with the parties concerned to reconcile clashing interests. The countries 
involved in the Cambodian peace effort initially opposed Japan's taking on its 
first post-war political move in Asia. But Japan gradually came to occupy the 
leading position in the peace-making process. ' 326 
5.5.2 Party Politics 
Unlike the Gulf Crisis, in which political parties played the most significant part 
in the process of ideational reorientation, the main actors dealing with the Cambodian 
issue were basically the government and the MOFA. The political stance of the LDP 
government was not much different from that of the MOFA: that is, to exert its political 
and diplomatic expertise as the 'political facilitator' and to treat the Cambodian case as a 
major foreign policy test. 327 The major controversy among political parties during the 
Cambodian peace process seemed to revolve around Japan's participation in peace 
operations rather than the political ramifications of Japan's diplomatic pursuits in 
facilitating the peace process. As mentioned in the previous chapter, prior to the 
enactment of the PKO Law in 1992, the main debates among the political parties and 
within the LDP government centred around the domestic issue of the legality and 
326 Daili, Yonfillri, I/l/1994 
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technicality of SDF missions abroad. Regrettably, the situation in the Gulf Crisis did not 
extend much opportunity for Japan to exert its political and diplomatic efforts to 
influence the outcome of the conflict. 
Despite the on-going debates about the failure in the Gulf Crisis, the LDP prime 
ministers who took office during the Cambodian peace process, such as Toshiki Kaifu 
and Kiichi Miyazawa, continued to assist the MOFA in several official diplomatic 
avenues, while the MOFA took a major part in the informal diplomatic track and 
regional diplomacy. Following the historical move in passing the PKO Law in June 
1992, the LDP government under the Miyazawa administration put even more effort into 
confirming its ideational position in working with the international community as a 
ýpeace supporter. ' The Prime Minister made public remarks on several different 
occasions regarding Japan's relentless political efforts and contributions throughout 
various phases of Cambodian peace operations. Miyazawa expressed Japan's 
determination in extending logistical support by sending the SDF to assist the UNTAC 
in civilian functions, improving the social infrastructure and creating an environment 
that was conducive to the repatriation of refugees and by positioning the SDF to secure 
the safety of election monitors. 
328 
However, the debate concerning the despatch of SDF abroad was rekindled once 
again in April 1993 when a Japanese election monitoring volunteer under the UNTAC, 
Atsuhito Nakata, was accidentally killed by the Khmer Rouge. The opposition parties, 
led by the SDPJ's Sadao Yarnahana, signalled their concern for the safety of Japanese 
personnel in Cambodia and asked the government to pull out the SDF troops, as key 
legal preconditions for Japanese participation in PKO - the conditions of ceasefire - 
were no longer being met. Even among the LDP itself, the ideational positions of the 
V 1993 Dail), Yomiuri, 2-1 17/ 
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party members were also divided. Junichiro Koizumi. the then Minister of Posts and 
Telecommunications, added his voice to the chorus of criticism from the opposition 
parties, telling the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono at a cabinet meeting in May 
1993 that: 
'[] You (Yohei Kono) said that the Japanese must sweat for peace, but 
must we bleed for peaceT 
329 
Far from being deterred by such remarks, both the LDP government and the 
MOFA insisted on maintaining the course that Japan had pursued in UN peace 
operations. Kabun Muto, the Foreign Minister under the Miyazawa administration, 
retorted that: 
'Japan will not waver in its determination to continue its role in UNPKO 
in Cambodia despite the slaying of a Japanese UN worker there. Therefore, the 
government intends to continue despatching Japanese personnel to the country to 
take part in election monitoring and other PKO as previously planned [ ... ]. In 
taking part in UNPKOs, one has to stick to a kind of idealism. Every country is 
making efforts to realise a peaceful Cambodia. Japan too has to join those efforts 
within the framework of what the country (Japan) can offer. ' 330 
With the exception of the above discord between the LDP government and the 
opposition parties, during the course of Cambodian peace process from 1990-1994, the 
opposition parties did not present themselves as a major resistance towards Japan's 
transformation of its 'domestic-type' identities. This was the case because the main 
329 
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opposition party itself, the SDPJ, also underwent a significant ideational change as a 
result of its total loss in the national election in 1992 and its gaining of the position as 
the ruling government for the first time in its political history in 1994, which in effect 
exposed the party directly to interaction with the international community. While the 
loss in 1992 pointed to the weakness in the ideational approach of un-armed neutrality 
and 'unilateral pacifism' that had been held by the SDPJ throughout the post-WWII era, 
Tomiichi Murayama's election to the post of Prime Minister put the SDPJ in a position 
where the party's political ideas were developed based on actual interactions with the 
international community. 
According to Prime Minister Murayama, although the party had long maintained 
that the nation's military forces violated the Peace Constitution, he was convinced that it 
was time for the SDPJ to change its basic policies in line with the end of the Cold War. 
He made several official statements emphasising that 'the SDF's existence is within the 
permissible framework of the Constitution and that the SDF exists legally by 
maintaining the doctrine of seeking a world without arms. ' 33 1 The leadership proposal, 
entitled 'Choices towards the 21" Century', called on the party members to support not 
only the despatch of SDF troops on UN missions for humanitarian causes, as in the case 
of Rwanda, but also SDF participation in UN operations following their missions in 
Cambodia, such as in Macedonia. This also included further consideration of the 
establishment of a UNPKO training centre in Japan and a new organisation, independent 
of the SDF, as part of the grand scheme of supporting future UN peace operations. 332 
The change of ideational position, especially within the former opposition parties like 
the SDPJ, contribUted tremendously to the process of identity transformation in Japan, as 
Daili, Yonliuri, 4`9' 1994 
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it brought about a more coherent foreign policy preference in the years to come. The 
transformation of ideas during the Cambodian peace process not only occurred among 
politicians: similar changes were also evident among the media and public opinion, as 
will be demonstrated below. 
5.5.3 Public and Editorial opinions 
National Newspapers 
As repeated in the previous chapter, the Yomiuri Shimbun was the main advocate 
for Japan's proactive 'international-role' identity projection. It reflected the ideational 
position of the Japanese people who subscribed to the newspapers in supporting Japan's 
diplomatic manoeuvres and the country's active involvement in UN peace operations. 
The Yomiuri Shimbun was convinced that Japan's identity as the 'political facilitator', 
undertaking diplomatic efforts and sponsoring a series of peace conference since 1990, 
such as the Tokyo Peace Conference and the Conference for the Rehabilitation Process, 
contributed tremendously to the promotion of the Cambodian peace process, both at the 
stage of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. 
In contrast to its frustration during the Gulf War, the Yomiuri Shimbun expressed 
its appreciation for the Miyazawa government's move in extending a constructive 
proposal to establish a strategy for long-term regional development, such as the 'Forum 
for Comprehensive Development in Indochina. ' Furthermore, to assume the identity of 
an efficient 'political facilitator, ' the Yomiuri Shimbun contended that Japan also had to 
establish a so-called 'comprehensive approach', including diplomatic efforts, 
participation in UNPKOs and humanitarian assistance, as well as reconstruction and 
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development assistance, 333 which were in fact the three comprehensive stages of 
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. It was therefore not 
surprising that the Yomiuri Shimbun's ideas for the promotion of peace and security 
were directed towards such efforts, which would further lead to a new order based on a 
334 
new model with the UN at the centre . 
As for Japan's identity as a 'peace supporter, ' the Yomiuri Shimbun differed from 
other national newspapers in the sense that it was concerned not only with Japan's 
ability to project an 'international-role' identity commensurate to the expectation of the 
international community, but also with how Japan would transform itself domestically to 
assume greater responsibility without having to wait for the 'gaiatsu. ' Several verbal 
indications appeared repeatedly in Yomiuri Shimbun editorials, such as the term 'a 
trustworthy state, ' which was often used to refer to a combination of Japan's ideational 
position of not only becoming a military giant but also a strong UN-diplomacy advocate 
or a country that was willing to fulfil its international commitment through participation 
in UN peace operations. Although Japan despatched the SDF to participate in the 
UNTAC, the force did not engage in the tasks assigned to the peacekeeping force due to 
its restriction under the PKO Law. However, it also invited much criticism of the fact 
that the SDF did not fully bear the same responsibilities as other nations' forces. The 
newspaper voiced its opinion that the Japanese also learned from the experience in 
Cambodia that once a country took part in UNPKOs, a 'half-hearted approach' of not 
'risking a single life or not exposing itself to a single dangerous situation' was not 
acceptable by anyone's standards. 33 
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As regards Japan-US relations, it was apparent that the Yomiuri Shimbun was not 
satisfied with the 'US-follower' identity adopted throughout the Cold War period up 
until the Gulf Crisis. According to one of its editorials, this made it difficult for Japan to 
adjust and make positive efforts towards maintaining peace and security. 336 Along with 
its identity as a 'US-Follower, ' Japan's confined identity as a 'unilateral pacifist' was 
not benevolently recognised by the international community. One reason for this line of 
thinking was perhaps that while assuming the identity of the 'follower, ' the framework 
of policy thinking could not possibly go beyond what the US expected from Japan or 
what should or should not be done under the framework of Japan-US bilateral relations. 
The question of what Japan could or should do for the international community was at 
the farthest corner of Japanese policy makers' minds. In the case of Cambodian peace 
process, the level of relationship between the two allies seemed somehow levelled. As a 
4 supporter, ' Japan's scope to exert its own political and diplomatic initiatives was 
increasing accordingly. 
The Asahi Shimbun and the Mainichi Shimbun together showed some signs of 
ideational change with regards to Japan's taking on the identity of 'political facilitator' 
and 'peace supporter. ' These newspapers basically contained the idea that in fulfilling 
the role entailed by such identity, Japan must participate positively in settling regional 
conflicts, and it was necessary to assume a political function, to a certain extent, and not 
only an economic one. However, it was quite clear that in participating in the UN peace 
operations, especially the UNPKO in Cambodia, Japan should subscribe to 'Japanese- 
style PKO', which concentrated on 'non-military, civil domains and cooperation in rear 
support. ' 
337 In peacebuilding, the Mainichi Shimbun had quite a vision of sustainable 
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development, suggesting that Japan should develop a 'comprehensive reconstruction 
programme' in cooperation with the UN and related countries. The programme should 
certainly go beyond the ongoing repair of roads and bridges by the SDF, and also 
encompass health, education, infrastructure, refugee settlement and agriculture. 338 The 
Mainichi's stance was in line with the SDPJ Prime Minister Murayama's idea, 
specifically in terms of clarifying the nation's future ideals to transform Japan into a 
4caring country' by promoting 'a world without arms' via the support of UN 
operations. 339 Although never properly defined, the ideas demonstrated the intention of 
the former opposition party to constructively engage Japan as a proactive 'peace 
supporter. ' In this light, the Mainichi Shimbun and the Yomiuri Shimbun shared the same 
ideational position regarding the importance of the establishment of a long-term 
rehabilitation process and developmental approach. The main difference between these 
two leading newspapers was how the SDF should perform under the UN peacekeeping 
forces. 
Unlike the Mainichi Shimbun, the Asahi Shimbun also perceived the issue of 
Japan's identity change in terms of technical operations rather than political or 
philosophical ones. The newspaper was convinced that the country was not yet ready to 
contribute as much as expected by the international community. As it was clear that 
Japan's basic concept in international cooperation in the post-Cold War era consisted of 
the despatch of the SDF for the UNPKOs and relief assistance in case of overseas 
disaster, the latter was relatively less diplomatic, as it involved only non-military 
missions. For the Asahi Shimbun, Japan's active assistance in UNPKOs was still 
problematic. Even if Japan wanted to, it still lacked the organisation, equipment and 
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personnel to undertake such international functions as needed in the UNPKOs. 
Therefore,, it was important that the government first established a 'rapid deployment' 
organisation devoted to relief operations, medical aid, refugee transport, the distribution 
of emergency supplies and so on, or a peace operation organisation apart from the 
SIDE 340 In one of the Asahi Shimbun's 1992 editorials, the following message was sent 
across: 
'In order for Japan to help in LNPKO, we must clarify that this country 
will concentrate on the non-military and civilian aspects through the 
establishment of an organisation devoted to this purpose distinct from the SDF. 
SDF troops may participate with a leave of absence, but only for missions that do 
not go beyond truce monitoring... ' 
341 
In its editorials, the Nikkei Shimbun suggested the transformation of ideas arising 
among the Japanese people as a result of direct interaction with the international 
community since the Gulf crisis in the following ways. Firstly, the newspaper voiced the 
importance of defining Japan's 'political role' both at the regional and the global level. 
For the newspaper, it was important that Japan sent a message to the international 
community regarding its 'ideological pluralism, ' which envisioned Japan as a country 
that dedicated itself strenuously to eliminating military conflict while respecting human 
rights and the principle of pacifism, instead of 'jumping on the Western nations' military 
bandxvagon. ' 342 
In other words, Japan should stick to its philosophy of not resorting to military 
might in resolving military conflicts. In the Cambodian peace process, the process of 
3 340 Asahi Shimbun, 8/5/ 1991 and 4/8/1991 
341 Editorial, Asahi Shimbun, 12/5/1992 
Nikkei Shimbun, 22/"/ 1993 
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sending the signals happening during the first half of the 1990s, indicating that a clear 
and distinct political identity based on the country's ideational position of 'ideological 
pluralism' was of the utmost importance. Furthermore, with regard to Japan Is 
participation in UN peace efforts, the transformation of ideas of the UN as 'something in 
the making' rather than 'something established' was evident. 343 To the Nikkei Shimbun, 
throughout the post-WWII period, Japan's UN-centred diplomacy had long been mere 
rhetoric, simply because the Japanese people were familiar with the idea that the UN 
was a fully established organisation with the full ability to resolve disputes accordingly. 
Through this line of belief, the failure of Japan's post-war UN diplomacy was therefore 
a result of the incompatibility of Japan's expectations of the UN and the reality of the 
organisation, which finally led to the emphasis on a Japan-US security alliance and the 
dichotomy of national and international security, as discussed in Chapter 3. However, 
the transformation of such ideas and beliefs was evident during the course of the 
Cambodian peace process. Japan had become more positive in considering how to 
participate in the 'remaking of the UN'. 344 Hence, Japan was more confident in 
transforming its 'domestic-type' identity, which largely corresponded to the 
'international -role' identity. 
Public Opinion 
Although the Gulf Crisis and the Cambodian peace process were two 
international events that happened at approximately the same time, the Japanese public 
responded to these events differently. In the Gulf Crisis, the Japanese public was clearly 
against both physical participation in the multilateral force and financial contribution. 
On the contrary, the public response to the Cambodian peace process was relatively 
343, ikkei'Shiinbun II/l/1993 
344 Yikkci Shimbun 15,2/1993 
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more positive and more receptive to the sense of involvement in the 'remaking of the 
UN' and in supporting the process of the maintenance of international peace. The 
increasing support for Japan's proactive diplomacy in maintaining international peace 
and in supporting UN operations was also echoed by other social actors. In the academic 
community, Susumu Nishibe, a social critic and former professor of social economics at 
Tokyo University, voiced the opinion that if being a pacifist country denied Japan the 
right to bear arms under any circumstances, such identity was merely a 'cloak for moral 
laxity'. 345 Apart from the pledge of Japanese individuals and firms to make 'symbolic 
donations' to speed up the rehabilitation process 346 ,a sense of public support in the 
business sector could also be witnessed, even when the government faced severe 
criticism from the opposition parties following of the death of a Japanese volunteer 
working for the UNTAC. For example, Yukio Okamoto, the president of the Okamoto 
International Consulting Firm, criticised society in general over the death of Atsuhito 
Nakata: 
'[] the older generation in Japan, including me, was so fainthearted that 
we made it impossible for our country to officially despatch SDF members, 
civilian engineers and physicians overseas to contribute to international peace, 
and the growing criticism of Japan's hesitation in sending personnel had instilled 
in the young volunteers such heroic resolve. ' 347 
345 A fainichi Shimbun, 8/7/1992 
According to the Yomiuri Shinibun, Japanese firms such as Mitsubishi Motors, Takeda Pharmaceuticals, 
Kikkornan, Murata and Cannon, Bungei Shunju and Tokuma made donations both in kind and in cash. 
Besides, other business sectors such as Kinsho Mataichi and Joho Kikaku also contributed to help 
reinvigorate the domestic environment by expediting several shipments of donated goods at their own 
expense and by assisting in the operation of a printing press which would launch Cambodia's first free and 
non- governmental newspaper, respectively. Source: Dail'i, Yonihiri, 13! 6,11992 
347 Daily Yonfizal, 4/5/199 
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Public opinion also demonstrated an inclination towards the transformation of 
ideas constituting the new political identities as 'political facilitator' and 'peace and US- 
supporter. ' As shown in Table 5.2, the polls conducted in 1992 by Japan's leading 
newspapers, the Asahi Shimbun and the Yomiuri Shimbun, indicated that the majority of 
Japanese people agreed with the despatch of SDF troops to participate in UN peace 
operations in Cambodia. Out of 2,178 interviews conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun, 
eighty-eight (88) percent supported the move while 6 percent opposed the despatch. The 
remaining 6 percent did not respond to the question. In the poll conducted by the Asahi 
Shimbun, although signs of support were shown, only 52 percent out of 2,346 
interviewees backed the despatch of the SDF to Cambodia. The remaining opinions were 
divided between opposing the participation and no response, at 36 and 12 percent, 
respectively. 
Table 5.2: Public Opinion on Japan's SDF Despatch to Cambodia 348 
Yomiuri Shimbun Asahi Shimbun 
Percent 
Support 88 52 
Oppose 6 36 
No response 6 12 
Total 100 100 
Source: Author's Table 
The discrepancy between the numbers of supporters between these two major 
newspapers fundamentally lay in the fact that their subscribers had different expectations 
for Japan with regard to both the process of self-transformation of 'domestic-type' 
identities and how Japan should project itself at the international level. Those who 
348 
Yomiuri Shimbun, 1992- Japan Public Opinion Location Librar (JPOLL) and Asahi Shimbun, 1992, 
Japan Public Opinion Location Library (JPOLL) 
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subscribed to the Yomiuri Shimbun normally approached the issues more actively, with 
the expectation that Japan would transform itself into a prime mover in maintaining 
international peace and security, while the Asahi Shibun's subscribers were relatively 
more cautious. 
Irrespective of the differences outlined above, it is undeniable that there was a 
collective transformation of public ideas on Japan's political identity as a political 
facilitator and a peace supporter during the first half of the 1990s following the failure in 
the Gulf Crisis and the success of the Cambodian Peace Process. According to Chart 5.1, 
the percentage of positive responses from the Japanese public on whether or not Japan 
should contribute to peace and stability under the framework of and in close cooperation 
with the UN saw a constant increase. In 1991, the poll conducted by the Yomiuri 
Shimbun indicated that only 62 percent of 2,206 interviewees agreed to the close 
cooperation with the UN, while 20 percent were not in favour of adhering to the 
framework of the UN in maintaining peace and security. The remaining 17 percent did 
not respond to the question. 
349 
A stark difference appeared when the same poll was conducted by NHK, which 
found that 81 percent of the 2,522 respondents were in favour of close cooperation with 
the UN and only 10 and 9 percent respectively indicated that they did not agree with 
Japan's adherence to the UN framework and did not have any opinion about the issue. 350 
The transformation of ideas regarding this issue was confirmed again in 1994 when the 
Asahi Shimbun, whose subscribers had once taken quite a cautious approach in accepting 
the change of ideational positions on Japan's move towards active peace support, 
conducted the same poll and revealed that 91 percent of 1,192 interviewees thought that 
349 Yomiuri Shimbun, 1990, Japan Public Opinion Location LIbrarN (JPOLL) 
350 NHK, 1992, Japan Public Opinion Location Library (JPOLL) 
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Japan should cooperate with the UN. In the same poll, only 6 percent expressed negative 
opinions regarding Japan's adherence to the UN framework and 3 percent did not 
respond to the question. 
351 
Chart 5.1: Japan's Contribution to Peace and Security Under 
the UN Framework, 1990-1994 
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5.6 Conclusion: Identities in Transition 
The clash between Japan's 'domestic-type' identities and the 'international -role' 
identity collectively embraced by the international community and expected to be 
pro. jected by Japan internationally during the Cambodian peace process was not as 
apparent as was the case during the Gulf crisis. The degree of conformity between the 
identities adopted domestically and projected internationally was fairly high, if not 
perfectly or completely matched. It was obvious that the soaring degree of conformity 
between the two identities resulted in a lower degree of policy passiveness during the 
peace process. Compared to Japan's reluctance and passiveness in engaging in positive 
contributions to the GLIlf Crisis, its diplomatic endeavours and massive personnel, 
351 Asahi Shimblin, NHK, Shin Joho, 1994, Japan Public Opinion Location Library (J POLL) 
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should cooperate should not adhere don't know /others 
w ith the LIN to the UN 
f ramew ork 
financial and ideational contributions to the success of the Cambodian peace process 
were omnipresent. 
In the area of post-Cold War international threats, both Japan and the 
international community acknowledged the changing nature of post-Cold War conflicts 
from simply inter-state conflicts into something more fundamental and concerned Nvith 
internal complexities within states. This does not suggest that intra-state conflicts or civil 
wars were new phenomena in international politics. However, one could not deny the 
way in which intra-state conflicts emerged and drew the attention of the international 
community as soon as the Cold War ended. The increasing numbers of intra-state and 
civil wars required the international community to assume the identity of 'political 
arbitrator' to help sort out internal problems, which otherwise could not have been 
disentangled. The Cambodian peace process was essentially a pilot case that provided 
the opportunity for the international community to fully engage itself in a new hybrid 
form of conflict resolution, which focuses as much on positive intervention to sort out 
the underlying problems as on the integration of peace operations via international 
organisations like the UN. 
While Japan recognised the changing nature of international conflicts, during the 
Cambodian peace process, it still did not develop its political attitudes, ideas and beliefs 
to allow itself to fully engage in the process of conflict resolution as the 'political 
arbitrator. ' Due to the long-standing involvements of several major powers who secured 
their places, by default, in arbitrating the conflict, Japan was not in such a significant 
position at the start of the process. Furthermore, Japan's lack of political experience in 
world affairs also raised suspicions among the four factions and some of the major 
countries like China. It is also important to take into account that the Cambodian peace 
process happened at approximately the same time as the Gulf Crisis, during which 
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Japan's political manoeuvres were assessed as policy and diplomatic failures. Japan's 
diplomatic and political moves in the Cambodian conflict, therefore, were undertaken in 
a relatively cautious manner. 
However, Japan had adopted the identity of 'political facilitator' ý\Ithout 
difficulty, as the country was quite enthusiastic about proving its worth in international 
affairs. The ideas constituting this identity were largely developed as a result of 
domestic recognition that Japan had to do something politically in order to help sustain 
long-term international peace and security. Merely adhering to the 'one-country pacifist' 
identity, as it had done throughout the post-WWII period, was apparently inadequate as 
a member of the international community. Thus, Japan undertook several diplomatic 
tasks in cooperation with other neutral countries and some were even initiated by Tokyo 
to facilitate the arbitrating stage and the process that led to the signing of the peace 
agreements, as mentioned earlier. 
As regards ideas about UN peace operations, in the early years of the post-Cold 
War period, the international community perceived the UN as a 'messenger for peace' 
and combined peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding into the same parallel 
functions. If the thin lines between peacemaking, peace enforcing and peacekeeping 
were literally blurred during the Gulf Crisis, the Cambodian peace process was one of 
the finest examples of an event when peacekeeping and peacebuilding were inextricably 
linked. Taking the trend of post-Cold War international conflicts into account, intra-state 
conflicts seemed to rank the highest. The need to address not only the issue of ceasefire 
or status quo among the warring parties but also the root causes of the conflicts, which 
require a multi-faceted approach of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, \vas apparent. Such 
ideas and beliefs reinforced the necessity for the international community to assume the 
identity of -peace promoter. ' In assuming this identity. the international community 
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undertook a multi-dimensional approach to restoring a peaceful environment to 
Cambodia and establishing sustainable development as part of the nation-building I 
process. These functions consisted of not only the traditional peacekeeping activities of 
containing ceasefires or extending logistical supports to locals; also included in the 
process of peacekeeping and peace-building were the supervision of free and fair 
elections and short- and medium-term developmental programmes. 
Also adopted by Japan during the Cambodian crisis was the 'peace supporter' 
identity. In contrast to Japan' s ideational position as the 'traditional 
peacebuilder/developer' during the Gulf Crisis, the nation spent extra efforts to engage 
itself comprehensively in every level of UN peace operations during the Cambodian 
peace process. Japan dedicated enormous resources, ranging from personnel to money 
and ideas, to the peace process. During the stage of late-preventive diplomacy, Japan 
had portrayed itself as a keen supporter to facilitate the political and diplomatic efforts 
of the international community in bringing the four adversaries to the negotiating table 
and ultimately to a compromise agreement. In terms of personnel, Japan also made an 
epochal contribution of the SDF to participate in non-military areas such as ceasefire 
monitoring, election monitoring, civilian policing and logistical assisting. Ideational and 
financial inputs were also effectively injected during the peacebuilding stage through 
both short- and medium-term development programmes. Despite its massive 
contribution to the UN operations in the Cambodian peace process, Japan clearly still 
had some reservations about the military function of the peacekeeping operation due to 
the restricted domestic conditions. For this reason, although Japan's ideational position 
had inclined towards active cooperation with the UN and the international community, 
the collective idea of adopting the -peace promoter' identitv, ý\, -ithin which full-fledged 
v embraced by Japan. military contribution was expected, was not \vholeheartedl, 
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Regarding the US's ideas, beliefs and expectations regarding Japanýs 
'international-role' identity projection during the Cambodian peace process, it could be 
asserted that the US ideas and beliefs regarding the nature of international threats and 
the UN peace operations were collectively in line with those of the international 
community. Historically speaking, the US was not directly involved with the Cambodian 
conflict, other than using Cambodia as a military base to fight with Vietnam during the 
1970s and passing non-military support to the non-communist factions of Sihanouk and 
Son Sann. In terms of assuming an identity as political arbitrator, the US played a major 
part via the P-5 only during the process of drafting the political settlements by enforcing 
its ideas on the right for self-determination, the promotion of western clemocracY and the 
strengthening of the UN as a medium for peace. Other trivial diplomatic matters were 
literally left to be tended by other middle powers and other neutral nations. As expected, 
like other countries, Japan was expected to fill in the gap as a 'US-supporter' by taking 
responsibility for smoothing disagreements among the four factions. 
Largely, during the Cambodian peace process, Japan generally fulfilled the 
expectations of the US and the international community by making political and 
ideational inputs of its own accord, which contributed to the signing of the Paris Peace 
Agreements. However, although Japan was generally willing to transform its identity 
from that of 'US-follower' during the Gulf Crisis and slip into the identity of 'US- 
supporter' in the Cambodian peace process, it did not totally stick to the US lead, as it 
normally did. There were signs that Japan attempted to pursue diplomatic efforts and 
contribute ideational inputs that diverged from the US path. Many of Japan's own 
initiatives, which sometimes differed from, or even clashed with, those of the US and the 
international community, took place through informal talks w-ith the four Khmer factions. 
Some of Japan's initiatives. such as the unofficial proposal to rnodiýv the original draft 
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political agreement of the P-5 on the issue of arms reduction, demobilisation or the role 
of UNTAC, were initially under suspicion from both the US and the international 
community. Nevertheless, some of Japan's attempts were taken into account and did 
finally materialise. 
The transformation of Japan's 'domestic-type' identities, from the 'unilateral 
pacifist' into the 'political facilitator', from the flat, one-dimensional 'traditional 
peacebuilder/developer' into the multi -dimensional 'peace supporter' and from the 'US- 
follower' into the 'US-supporter' was a product of the changing ideational positions that 
stemmed from direct interactions with the international community during the Gulf 
Crisis and the Cambodian peace process, as well as changing ideas and beliefs within the 
domestic constituents. Precisely put, ideas and beliefs embraced by the bureaucracy, 
political parties and the Japanese public were transformed as a result of the process of 
self-understanding and self-perception about 'what is going on in the world' as the 
country interacted with others at the international level. Similar to the Gulf Crisis, during 
the Cambodian peace process, the MOFA was still the main advocate of the view that 
Japan should project an 'international-role' identity corresponding to what was expected 
by the international community, and specifically to discard the WWII 'unilateral 
pacifist' identity. Having been in direct interaction with the international community, the 
MOFA's ideas were much more advanced compared to other domestic constituents in 
portraying Japan as an active country. 
The Cambodian peace process allowed the MOFA to transfer its ideas and 
beliefs to Japanese society by engaging Japan in every stage of the peace process, 
ranging from late-preventive diplomacy to peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. 
Firstly, as regards international peace and security, the MOFA filled Japanese society 
\vith the reality that the maintenance of peace and security, which was the cornerstone of 
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the Japanese constitution, could be realised only if Japan could comprehensively 
participate and cooperate with the international community in all personnel, financial 
and ideational respects. In other words, Japan had to become one of the prime movers in 
maintaining international peace and security. Secondly, the MOFA also transmitted its 
idea on the importance of peace operations as the fundamental mechanism for 
maintaining peace and security. Although Japan had specialised and preferred to take 
part in peacebuilding operations, active participation in other areas of peace operations, 
specifically in peacekeeping efforts, were as significant as the development side of peace 
operations. Thirdly, regarding Japan-US relations, although the MOFA's ideational 
position was relative stable and the bilateral relationship was still the cornerstone of 
Japan's international relations, the MOFA had made it clear to the Japanese public that 
Japan's autonomous diplomatic and political stance was commensurate to its 
transformation from a 'US-follower' to a more active 'US-supporter' identity. 
The ideas and beliefs of political parties in Japan during the Cambodian peace 
process were very much linked with the Gulf Crisis. The debates among political parties, 
although to a much lesser extent, still revolved around the issue of the legality and 
technicality of the SDF mission abroad. However, their ideational positions seemed to 
be more positive regarding the despatch of the SDF to Cambodia after the enactment of 
the 1992 IPC Law and Japan's assumption of the identities of political facilitator and 
peace supporter and fully backing the process of maintaining peace and security without 
military involvement, seemed to sit well even with the opposition parties. This was the 
case because the main opposition party, the SDPJ, also underwent a significant 
ideational change as a result of its defeat in the 1992 national election and its subsequent b 
election as the ruling party in 1994. The former opposition party's direct interactions 
\\ ith the international COMMUnity also affected the ideational position of the party, 
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especially with regard to how Japan should transform its identity from 'unilateral 
pacifist' into something more acceptable to both the international community and to the 
domestic constituents. 
Public opinion in Japan, reflected through major newspapers and polls, also 
showed signs of positive confidence in the country's adoption of the political facilitator 
and the peace supporter identities. The opinions echoed by the Yomiuri Shimbun did not 
differ greatly from those associated with the Gulf Crisis, including the ideas that active 
political, diplomatic, military and humanitarian or so-called 'comprehensive' 
contributions must be promoted, which were widespread among the newspaper's 
subscribers. During the Cambodian peace process, an additional idea expressed through 
the editorial section was the concern that the 'half-hearted approach' of not risking any 
lives and maintaining strict allegiance to the US would impede Japan from developing 
its own mature political identity. 
The Asahi and the Mainichi Shimbun, on the contrary, demonstrated some 
noticeable signs of ideational change. Unlike the views they had echoed during the Gulf 
Crisis, they both contended that in fulfilling the responsibility of maintaining peace and 
security, Japan must participate positively in settling regional conflicts and assume a 
proactive political function, to a certain extent, and not only in the economic sphere. In 
addition, the newspapers also specifically supported the idea that Japan should invest in 
building up sustainable peace and development in cooperation with the UN at both the 
regional and the global level. The Nikkei Shimbun voiced an opinion along the same 
lines as the Yonfiuri Shimbun, especially regarding appropriate international -ro Ie 
projection and the country's regional and global functions as well as Japan's effort to 
strengthen the UN and to fulfil its UN-centred diplomacy. The newspaper also shared 
similar ideas to those of the Alainichi Shimbun that the balance between assuming the 
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responsibility expected by the international community and respecting the countrý"s 
principal philosophy of pacifism must be strictly observed. 
In terms of public opinion and polls, the Japanese public demonstrated an 
inclination towards the transformation of ideas constituting the proactive political 
identities. The public's relatively warm reception of the despatch of SDF abroad 
contradicted its previous adamant response against the same move during the Gulf Crisis. 
The level of public support for full cooperation with the UN had also significantly 
increased, from 60 percent to almost 90 percent from 1990 to 1994. Coupled with these 
positive trends, other sectors within the Japanese public also expressed their support for 
the government's intention to make positive and active contributions via the UN in the 
Cambodian peace process. On their own accord, both the business and individual sectors 
had pledged what could be called 'symbolic donations' to expedite the rehabilitation 
process and the success of Japanese political activity during the peace process. 
Although this chapter has demonstrated less divergence between the two sets of 
'international-role' and 'domestic-type' identities, which determined the active choice of 
policy preferences and relatively successful foreign policy projection, it was not until the 
promotion of the human security policy in the latter half of the 1990s that Japan's 
process of identity transformation could be considered complete. In the following 
chapter, the sets of ideas that inform the 'international-role' and 'domestic-type' 
identities will be compared and the level of conformity between these two identities will 
be assessed. 
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Chapter 6 The Promotion of the Human Security Policy (1995-present) 
6.1 Background to Japan's Human Security Policy 
6.1.1 Human Security Policy and its Significance: An Overview 
This chapter treats Japan's promotion of the human security policy as the final 
stage of the process of identity transformation. Before examining the sets of ideas 
embedded by the international community and embraced internally in the Japanese 
society as well as the sets of 'international-role' and 'domestic-type' identities, the 
background to the policy will be discussed in this section. Some scholars in the area of 
development studies argue that the origin of what is known today as 'human security' 
can be traced back to the late 1960s-1970s when the definition of security was 
broadened to include non-military aspects and the promotion of human development in 
less-developed countries. 
352 
In fact, the term has also been coined and substantially developed by IR scholars, 
politicians, policy makers and practitioners throughout the past decade. As often cited by 
most IR scholars and government officials, the human security approach was initially 
introduced by the UNDP in its 1994 Human Development Report. It is clearly stated in 
the Report that 'human security' should not be equated with 'human development. ' 353 
Although it was not clear precisely how human security should be approached, the 
Report distributes ideas outlining the integrative concept of human security to include 
the two fundamental elements of today's popular phrases - 'freedom from fear' and 
'freedom from want', which address respectively the importance of safety from chronic 
threats such as hunger, disease and repression and the significance of the protection of 
Busunitwi-Sani (2002-: '157-258) 
UNDP (1994: 23-24) 
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people from sudden and damaging disruptions in the pattern of their daily lives and 
development activities. 
354 
Although the concept is often criticised as 'lacking, expansive, and vague' or as 
ultimately trying to encompass everything from physical security to psychological well- 
being 355 , subsequent developments on the concept of human security have been pursued 
along the UNDP line and have been expanded to cover various aspects of the 
maintenance of peace and security. Throughout the years, scholars from different 
theoretical and professional backgrounds have helped define the substantive core of 
human security; for example, Caroline Thomas suggests that: 
'Human security describes a condition of existence in which basic 
material needs are met, and in which human dignity, including meaningful 
participation in the life of the community, can be realised [ ]. 
While material sufficiency lies at the core of human security, in addition 
the concept encompasses non-material dimensions to form a qualitative whole. In 
other words, material sufficiency is a necessary, but not sufficient condition of 
human security that entails more than physical survival [ ]. 
The 'qualitative aspect' refers to material sufficiency. The 'qualitative 
aspect' of human security is about the achievement of human dignity which 
incorporates personal autonomy, control over one's life and unhindered 
participation in the life of the community. ' 356 
As vague and expansive as it is, the robust use of the term, particularly among 
policy makers, government officials and practitioners undertaking different missions in 
354 lbid, (1994: 24) 
Paris (2001: 88) 
56 Thomas (2001: 161-162 
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both IGOs and NGOs, has contributed to a number of theoretical and policy implications 
on the understanding of state and international security and how to respond in case of the 
lack thereof. Firstly, it is still controversial whether the newly launched human security 
approach could replace the existing notion of traditional security, which is primarily 
concerned with undivided territorial integrity or the protection of people from external 
physical threats. 
Despite the traditional view, it has been suggested that the security consideration 
from a global perspective or 'common security', rather than from the angle of an 
individual nation's territorial integrity, should be reflected. The most common move, as 
suggested by King and Murray, is to replace traditional state security with a combination 
of economic development and existing military security. 357 However, the human security 
concept is not a mere economic extension of state security; nor it is developed around 
the concept of poverty or economic deprivation alone. Rather, it ultimately challenges 
the notion of 'state-centred' security with a 'people-centred' security system, in which 
chronic threats are prioritised and considered to be just as vital as threats against national 
territory. In this sense, the human security concept precisely questions the state's sense 
of duty to 'protect' people from 'internal or chronic threats' and to 'enhance', to use 
Caroline Thomas's categorisation above, the 'qualitative aspect' of security through the 
assurance of people's dignity, autonomy and creativity within their communities. 
Secondly, prior to the emergence of the human security approach, the notions of 
'security' and 'development' were literally placed in different locales of political interest. 
On the one hand, those working in international organisations might argue about the 
negative effects of protracted internal and international conflicts within the context of 
the absence of human rights protection, the inability to access food and health care, the 
357 King and Murray (2001-2: 585-586) and The Commission on Global Governance (1995: 79) 
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lack of a basic guarantee of equal income distribution or 'the lack of security, ' which 
require effective short-term humanitarian assistance and higher budget allocation for the 
organisations concerned. 358 On the other hand, those dealing with the area of 
development tend to focus more on the strengthening of political, social and economic 
stability through 'long-term' structural schemes without acknowledging the sudden and 
disrupting effects on the absence of security derived from either the collapse of the states 
themselves or from protracted intra-state and inter-state conflicts. The human security 
concept, therefore, has helped to bridge the gap between the traditional domains of 
development assistance, which only addresses the positive side of the 'long-term' 
structural change, and insecurities in the form of sudden disruptions, by emphasising 
both the negative effects of the lack of 'security' and the positive effects of 
'development' assistance. 
Thirdly, the human security concept has not only contributed to the reassessment 
of traditional state security and national integrity; it has also questioned how 
international security and UN activities are being handled. From its appearance in the 
1994 UNDP Human Development Report, it has been perpetually developed through the 
establishment of a substantive Human Security Fund in 1998, in the 2000 Millennium 
Summit and in the UN Secretary General's 2001 Millennium Development Goals, 
respectively. Throughout the past decade, the human security concept has been gradually 
integrated into the core skeleton of the UN activities, specifically in the area of UN 
peace operations. In parallel with the changing nature of conflicts themselves. which are 
more intra-state and generate even more transnational and grass-roots problems, peace 
operations since the end of the Cold War have also become more complex and 
Multifaceted in order to effectively respond to the echoing international tensions. Crucial 
358 Interview with a UNHCR personnel, 09,02,2006 
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to this development is the fact that there is a necessity, even for the UN, to find a holistic 
framework to bridge the gap between each distinctive type of peace operation - peace 
making, peacekeeping and peacebuilding - as well as to simultaneously address the 
grass-roots problems disrupting people's well-being in the 'absence of political, 
economic, social and community security' through both short-term humanitarian 
assistance and long-term humanitarian development. In sections 6.2 and 6.3, the sets of 
ideas and beliefs embedded by the international community and the 'international-role' 
identities resulting from the ideational interactions of ideas at the international level will 
be examined. 
6.2 International Response: Collective Ideas on Peace and Security during 
the Promotion of Human Security Policy 
6.2.1 Collective Ideas on the Nature of International Peace and Security 
In the latter half of the 1990s, a shift towards a new 'people-centred' security 
consensus materialised among the UN member states. From the Gulf Crisis to the 
Cambodian peace process and other peace operations in between, the accomplishment in 
the employment of multi-dimensional strategies has completely transformed the 
international community's understanding about post-Cold War international threats and 
their effects on people's safety and survival. For one thing, the international community 
were in accord on the notion that although the threat of inter-state war has not 
completely vanished, as witnessed in some regional disputes in the Middle East, South 
Asia or North East Asia, the most acute and prevalent threats nowadays are no longer 
aggressive wars waged by one against another. As repeatedly pointed out in earlier Z7,17, 
chapters, 'vertical' or 'top-down' political threats caused by malicious governments 
against their citizens and 'bottom-up' social, economic and community disruptions have 
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led to foreseeable structural and grass-root vulnerability within these countries. 
Furthermore, the ramifications of 'horizontal' impacts resulting from both protracted 
intra- and inter-state conflicts, in terms of refugee problems, displaced persons or 
environmental degradation, are considerable. Apart from the fact that the complicated 
and multi-faceted threats arising from each individual internal conflict are interrelated, 
the possibility that such interwoven political, economic, social and community threats 
and disruptions would be contagious is exponentially imminent. 
Such rendering and concerns have been echoing among high-ranking UN 
officials and experts, as evident in the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change: 
'The UN was created in 1945 above all else 'to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war' - to ensure that the horrors of the World 
War were never repeated. Sixty years later, we know all too well that the biggest 
security threats we face now go far beyond States waging aggressive war. They 
extend to poverty, infections disease and environmental degradation; war and 
violence within States; the spread and possible use of nuclear, radiological, 
chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organised crime. 
The threats are from non-State actors as well as States and to human security as 
well as State security. , 
359 
Precisely, the transformation of the post-Cold War ideas regarding international 
peace and security is the result of the increasingly complicated threats and shifting focus 
from 'state' to 'people' and 'community' as the primary target of threats. This 
transformation has undoubtedly impinged on the choices undertaken to deal with these 
UN (2004: 9) 
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interwoven threats and to enhance people's well-being by the international community, 
especially the UN, as the main player to maintain international peace and security. As 
we saw earlier, from its outset in the 1994 UNDP Report, the human security framework 
has been gradually developed by several national governments and academics as well as 
IGOs officials and perpetually ingrained into the philosophy, principles and functional 
organs of the UN. On several occasions, human security has been approved by high- 
ranking UN officials - more often than not, by the Secretary General himself - as a 
framework that is considered sufficiently broad to encompass the multiplicity of today's 
threats. The concept was specifically mentioned in the 2000 Millennium Report by Kofi 
Annan: 
no shift in the way we think or act can be more critical than this: we 
must put people at the centre of everything we do. Nor is that all, for even though 
the UN is the organisation of States, the Charter was written in the name of 'we 
the peoples. ' It reaffirms the dignity and worth of the human person, respect for 
human rights and the equal rights of men and women, and a commitment to 
social progress as measured by a better standard of life in freedom from want and 
fear alike. ' 
360 
In short, it was the first time after WWII that the basic principle of the UN had 
informally integrated the 'security' and 'economic and social' issues into the same 
philosophical and operational framework. Practically speaking, the idea of 'people- 
centred' security was welcomed and echoed by several countries, especially Canada and 
Japan, Nvhere the Human Security Network and the Commission on Human Security 
\\ere established respectively in 1999 and 2001. The independent Commission and 
360 LjN (2000b: 6-7) 
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Network, as well as other middle powers and some developing countries, such as 
Norway, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Greece or Thailand and so on, have embarked on 
the task of promoting the concepts and ideas to the international public and have also 
launched peace activities relating to human security through several international 
symposia and grass-root projects. Although the Japanese and the Canadian governments 
have placed different emphases and have provided different interpretations of how a 
'better standard of life in freedom from want and freedom from fear' can be achieved 
through UN peace activities, the collective ideas shared by both countries and other 
members of the international community are to establish a new security framework in 
the post-Cold War period that defines different types of international threats, different 
players to provide security, different means to secure peace and different targets directly 
affected by such potential threats. 
6.2.2 Collective Ideas on UN Peace Operations 
As suggested earlier, the success of the peacekeeping and enforcement efforts in 
UN peace operations, particularly during the Gulf Crisis and the Cambodian peace 
process, had led the international community to believe that the UN has become the 
core mechanism to deal with international threats, both intra- and inter-state. However, 
the unsuccessful turns of events in Somalia (UNOSOM 11,1993-1995), Rwanda 
(UNOMUR, 1993-1994) or Haiti (LNMIH, 1993-1997), which were prematurely 
terminated and were not fully implemented due to the unyielding militant groups, 361 
triggered the international community to question the practicalities of UN peace 
361 The mandate of these missions was to take enforcement actions under the US-led multinational force to 
defuse the tensions between confrontational stakeholders and to provide a secure environment, expedite 
disarmament and humanitarian assistance: UN, UNOSOM 11 
NIandates. http: //\kl\\, \\ý. tin. or, R/Depts/dpko, /dpko/co MISSIOII/Linosoi-n2inandate. littiil, UNOMUR Mandates, 
http: //wNN, xN,. titi. orýz Depts/dpko dpko/co mission, unomurmandate. html, and UINAIIH Mandates, 
Depts,! dpko dpko/co mission/ unmilimandate. liti-ril, accessed 1-5" 03/21006. 
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operations, especially on the legality of enforcement actions vis-a-vis states' 
sovereignty, the significance of the renewed collective security system and the effective 
combination of Peace making, peacekeeping and peace building and so on. 
Furthermore, the limitations of peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations, 
coupled with the shortfall of the 'on-demand' peace operations, which lack the capacity 
to respond to the actual numbers of conflicts, are another concern of the international 
community. As the record shows, the UN peace operations, specifically peacekeeping 
operations, could address only one-third of the conflict situations of the 1990s. 362 On 
this basis, the international community has shifted its focus to 'conflict prevention', 
attempting to prevent potential conflicts before they erupt, as evident in many 
subsequent General Assembly resolutions stressing the importance of replacing the 
cculture of reaction' with one of prevention through the pacific settlement of disputes. 363 
These demonstrated that the ideas collectively shared by the majority of the UN 
member states regarding conflict prevention were relatively broad. In a sense, peace 
operations have not been limited only to typical 'state -to -state' good offices or the usual 
preventive diplomacy as the core activities in conflict prevention. These UN peace 
operations have also been shifted to address the grass-roots difficulties, with the 
emphasis on the 'people-centred' approach, such as poverty, employment opportunities, 
education, health, resource depletion, arms reductions and broad-based economic 
growth. 
364 
Aside from the transformation of ideas and beliefs regarding peace enforcement 
and preventive diplomacy, it remains now to consider another mutual concern among 
the international community - the issue of post-conflict situations. This concern is not 
362 UN, General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/53/87,27 January 1999. 
36', UN, General Assembly Resolution, A, 'RES/W326,6 September 2001 and . -VRES57,337,18 July 
200' 
. 364 UN (2000b: 41-45) 
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particularly the same as those discussed earlier in terms of how to effectively inject 
development projects and funds into post-conflict reconstruction programmes or how to 
handle so-called 'complex humanitarian emergencies, ' and respond to situations where 
there is a dramatically increased cost of human lives, flows of displaced persons and 
refugees, or the suffering of human dignity and well-being. 365 The principal concern is 
how these two phases of humanitarian assistance and development could be effectively 
brought together via the use of UN peace operations. The conviction that the issues and 
practices of humanitarian assistance and humanitarian development have become deeply 
intertwined is a significant ideational transformation within the international community. 
It is also collectively argued by the community of nations that post-conflict 
peacebuilding is not supposed to be implemented after the end of peacekeeping 
missions; rather, a new type of peace operation, which emphasises the need for a 
coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to peace making, peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding, is indispensable. As agreed by member states during the 6 Oth session of 
the General Assembly gathering: 
in order to achieve maximum impact in post-conflict countries, we 
need to bring together the distinct capabilities of the different parts of the UN 
system in a coherent way. Yet, these are not the only tasks required in a complex 
peace operation--human rights, elections, capacity-building and humanitarian 
and development activities are all critical components of the sustainable 
recovery process. Against this backdrop we need to forge strategic partnerships 
within the UN system that build on complementarities while reducing overlaps 
between the different actors. This is particularly the case for cross-cutting tasks 
365 UN, General Assembly Resolution, ARES, 53/87,27 January 1999 
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such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, rule of law, security- 
sector reform, public administration and support for political processes. , 366 
6.2.3 Ideas and Beliefs of the US on Human Security 
Given its powerful position and its financial commitment to the UN, there is 
reason to believe that the US government and the US Mission to the UN should have 
been the main player advocating such a vital ideational transformation of human 
security within the UN. However, since the time when high-ranking UN officials and 
the international community have deliberated on human security as an integrated peace 
and security practice, interestingly, the US government and the US Mission in the UN 
have never made use of the word in their official statements or remarks. This is not to 
suggest that the US is totally against the idea of human security. To avoid any 
misconception about the US's ideational position towards the new concept of 'people- 
centred' security, it is vital to note that the US policy in the LYN and in other 
international organisations has always been working towards advancing four main 
policy agendas - peace, security, democracy and human rights. 
367 As 'democracy and 
human rights' has always been the US commercial slogan for its UN policy since the 
establishment of the organisation, such official remarks stressing the spirit of building a 
world organisation that would strengthen peace and security and lay the foundation for a 
democratic globe has been frequently rehearsed. 368 
The US has also made it clear that it is not ignorant of the profound changing 
complexity in the maintenance of peace and security and the UN peace operations in the 
366 UN, General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/60/640 (29 December 2005) 
367 Bureau of International Organization Affairs, US State Department, Who We Are, Our Mission, 
'1006. http: Hw w Nv. state. g ov/p,, "i o/c14685. htm, accessed 1-5/03/. 
368 Bureau of International Organization Affairs, US State Department (2001), 'Why the US Joined the 
UN' - Address of the Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs to the Swiss Parliament, 3 
. -kpril 2001, http: 
/ \\ \\-\\,. state. gov/p/i o/rl s rin 2001 2016. htm, accessed 1 ý, '03 "2006. 
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post-Cold War period. To be fair, those issues portrayed as core areas of the human 
security concept - political (protection of basic human rights), economic (basic income 
distribution), social (food, health, environmental) and community (cultural, dignity and 
creativity) security - have been essentially promoted under the Economic, Social and 
Development Affairs of the US Mission to the UN. From Table 6.1, the data gathered 
from the US State Department show that in comparison to Japan and other middle 
powers, the US has been relatively more active than others in promoting what is known 
today as human security. 
Whether the US totally integrates the fundamental idea and philosophy of 
human security to its UN policy, which emphasises the combination of both 'security' 
and 'economic and social development', remains a curious question. Precisely put, a 
clear link between the ideas regarding 'international threats' and 'People-centred' 
security has not yet been established within the framework of the US's UN policy 
agenda. For instance, when the US mentioned 'the looming threats to international 
peace and security', it often meant 'state security' rather than 'people-centred' security. 
Immediately after the end of the Cold War, in the area of political and security affairs, 
peace operations included, the US has made it apparent that threats to international law 
and order and the democratic regime are the priority of the government, as evident in its 
constant participations in the PKOs and its taking up the leadership of multinational 
forces to maintain democratic order. One could effortlessly pick up a clear dichotomy 
between the two spheres of US policy towards the UN, especially when looking at the 
situation in Somalia, Rwanda or Eastern Congo, where humanitarian issues and 
programs were not adequately considered, whereas critical political and military 
decision Nvere taken seriously. w 
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Table 6.1: A Comparison of Foreign Policy relating to the UN 
(US, Japan, Middle Powers) 369 
Policy 
related Political and Economic, Social and 
0 the 
V 
to the Security Affairs Development Affairs International Law 
I, N, UN 
Countries Countries 
Africa; Americas; Asia; Children; Corrupt Business War Crimes; International 
Europe; Middle East; Practices; Crime Prevention Criminal Court, Terrorism; 
Chemical and Biological and Control; Democratisation; Law of the Sea; Human Cloning; 
Weapons; Decolonisation; Development; Treaties; General 
Disarmament; IAEA; Outer Disabled Persons; 
Space; Peacekeeping; Sanctions; Drug Abuse Control; 
Terrorism, UN Reform Economic Conditions; Education-, 
Energy; Environment; 
Financing for Development; 
Food-Agriculture; Foreign Trade; 
US Health; 
Human Rights; 
Humanitarian Affairs; 
Landmines; NGOs and 
Civil Society, Older 
Persons; Popul ation/Mi grat ion; 
Racial Discrimination; Refugees; 
Relief, Religious Intolerance; 
Sanctions; 
Social Development; 
Status Of Women; Sustainable 
Development; Trafficking in 
Persons 
Arms Control and Agriculture, Fisheries and Piracy; Transnational 
Disan-nament; Atomic Forest; Climate Change; Organised Crime; Terrorism; 
Energy, Conflict Disaster Prevention and Reliel Treaties 
Prevention; Maritime Emigration; Environment; 
Japan Affairs; PKO and Health and Medical Care; 
International Peace G7/G8; Human Rights; 
Cooperation; Security; Human Security; Narcotics; 
Terrorism, Transnational ODA; Population and AIDS, 
Organised Crime Refugees; Science and 
Technology; Social 
Development; Women's Issue 
Non-Proliferation, Arms Humanitarian Affairs, International Criminal 
Control and Disarmament; Human Rights, Human Court; International Crime 
Middle PKOs, Human Security, Security; Gender Equality and and Terrorism; Compensation 
Powers Children and Armed Conflicts Women's Rights; Landmines; for injustice in the national 
Responsibility to Protect; International development socialist era; Space; 
Peace and Reconciliation cooperation; Democratisation humanitarian law 
Efforts; Peace policy Aids and Election 
I Observation 
Source: Author's Table 
3 369 US Department of State, US States Mission to the United Nations, http: //wx"v. un. i nt'u sa-/po I sec. htm, 
http: /'\\ý\\, \\ý. Liii. iiit"Lisa/law. htm, http: //usLinne\vyork. usmissioii. 2ov/econ. htm, The Ministry of Foreign 
, -kffairs, Japan littp: 
//\N, NN, \N,. iiiofi. go. ip/polic\, ý"itidex. htm, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canada, 
httli: : NN, w \\. d fait -rnaec i. gc. ca/ forei ýzn policy/global issues-en. as , accessed 15 0-3/2006, The Ministr% of 
Foreign Affairs, Norway, littp: / \N\\\\,. dep. iio, /'ud/ý,, Iobal/searchlbn. htnil? sok=i&sokeord=[iLit-nan+secLit, it,,,, 
accessed 3 /10/2006 and The Foreign Office, Germany, http: '. `\\-wxv. ausxaerti ges- 
anit. de diplo eil,, -kLissenpolitik/'Uebersicht. html, accessed 33; 10/2006. 
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However, in the area of peace operations, it is true to some extent that the US 
also shares the same ideas and beliefs with the international community on the urgency 
of complex and multidimensional UN peace operations. It has been often rehearsed bv 
US officials that there is a significant correlation between complex emergencies, peace 
operations and other goals such as human rights, democratisation or the protection of 
sustainable development. 370 One might argue that the US commitment to fight against 
terrorism has still been the topmost priority and it is sometimes seen, especially after the 
9/11 terrorist attack, as a quest that is singled out from other UN-related policies. 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the US focus on terrorism also has its benefits, as it 
addresses one of the core ideas of human security - that of 'freedom from fear. ' Besides, 
the US's original commitment to promote international peace and maintain international 
stability based on a 'free-market economy' and 'good democratic governance' and the 
'rule of law' also underlines another important element of human security - 'freedom 
from want. ' 
371 
6.3 Intern ational-Role Identity Projection and Expectations on Japan 
6.3.1 On International Peace and Security 
'Comprehensive Security Promoter' 
The collective ideas of the international community in assuming an 
'international-role' identity as the 'multilateral pacificist' during the Gulf Crisis truly 
reflected the emergence of the new approach to peace and security and how both can be 
restored and maintained through multilateral enforcing efforts. It triggered, first and 
foremost, the idea that the restoration and the maintenance of peace and security could 
370 US Department of State (2000: 8) 
3" US Department of State (2004a), Statement by Ambassador Patrick Kennedy, US Representative for 
United Nations Management and Reform, on the Report of the High-Level Panel on Reform, in an 
informal meetino, of the General Assembiv. 31 Januar,, I 2005 
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not be managed 'unilaterally' or 'single-handedly' but that a 'multilateral mechanism' 
through the UN was to become the core conflict settlement mechanism. The success in 
assuming the identity of the 'political arbitrator' during the Cambodian peace process 
was another leap forward by the international community in attempting to find the way 
to reconcile a far more complex situation characterising the post-Cold War intra- and 
inter-state conflicts. Assuming the 'international -role' identity as the *political 
arbitrator' required the international community to reconsider the ideas of the 
'systematic' and 'all-round' mechanism, from late-preventive diplomacy and peace 
operations to post-conflict peacebuilding. The successive transformation of these 
identities from 'multilateral pacificist' to 'political arbitrator' and finally to so-called 
ccomprehensive security promoter' has been attributed to the changing understandings 
among the international community of the development of international peace and 
security situations and the way in which both should be managed through the human 
security approach. 
As shown in Diagram 6.1, coupled with the purpose of guaranteeing the basic 
freedom and safety of these security concerns, the human security approach provides a 
way in which problems regarding casualties of war, the victimisation of citizens or the 
issue of displaced persons, from both intra- and inter-state conflicts, could be handled 
by the members of the international community and not by national governments 
themselves. These so-called 'protecting functions' of human security, which emphasise 
the alleviation of acute suffering during the conflicts and the guarantee of people's 
safety and survival in the vast arrays of the above-mentioned needs, require the 
international community to collaboratively contribute their efforts via humanitarian 
intervention and Nvel I -establ i shed humanitarian assistance. Under these 'protecting 
functions, ' the idea of using military operations in the form of 'humanitarian 
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intervention' under 'collective security' are extensively discussed and supported by 
most UN members. 
Diagram 6.1: Scope of Human Security Approach and it Functions 
'Protecting 'Empowering 
Functions' Functions' 
help establish 
Urgent/Basic -------------------- / Humanitarian 
Needs Development 
(Freedom Comprehensive 
from fear) Security 
directly: address directly: address 
Humanitarian Long-term 
Intervention/ Needs 
Assistance/ 
Collective (Freedom 
Security 
--------------------- - 
from want) 
help establish 
Source: Author's Diagram 
The Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change clearly 
states on this sensitive issue that if peaceful prevention fails, the Commission is of the 
opinion that effective security may require the backing of military force. This idea was 
in fact pioneered by the Canadian government and the Human Security Network, who 
advocate effective responses to situations that compel human needs with appropriate 
measures, including coercive manoeuvres like sanctions, international prosecution or 
even military intervention. 372 Despite this, it is important to distinguish betw-een several 
372 ICISS (2001: xi) 
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different situations, from self-defence to situations in which a state is posing a threat to 
others and situations in which the threat is primarily internal, in order for the 
organisations concerned and member states to address the problem correctly and not to 
cause any offence to state sovereignty and the fundamental national philosophy to 
which the individual nation adheres. 373 Although the majority of nations agree to the 
essence of this humanitarian intervention under the banner of 'responsibility to protect', 
as earnestly promoted by the Canadian government and the Human Security Network, 
the question of the use of force is nonetheless a matter of heated debate, especially in 
374 
situations where threats are internal . 
Furthermore, by assuming the 'international -ro I e' identity as the 'comprehensive 
security promoter, ' the international community also embraces another important 
ideational component of the 'empowering function' of the human security approach, 
which introduces a long-term focus on development and is strongly advocated by the 
Japanese government and the Commission on Human Security. This function addresses 
the importance of optimistic qualities of human development or the expansion of 
people's choices and equal access to public goods in order for them to live in a secure, 
stabilised community with sustainable development. The areas into which member 
states should invest their resources and assistance under the human security approach 
are no different from the areas suggested as the basic requirements for human welfare - 
economic, health, personal, environmental, community, cultural and political security. 
However, it is the first time under the human security approach that the issues 
are being tackled in 'a continuous and interconnected succession' and that development 
under the human security approach is not treated as an end in itself, as it was previously 
73 UN (2004: 6 1) 
374 Commission on Human Security (2003: 2 1) 
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perceived. Rather, it is seen as a means to an end to achieve its final purpose of 
providing people with the basic needs of safety, survival, livelihood and dignity. 
375 it is, 
in a way, a fundamental ground for preventing the violent conflicts that are often caused 
by problems rooted in the absence of systematic and sustainable development. Besides, 
another added value of the human security approach is that, for the first time, it 
addresses the problem concerning the gap between humanitarian assistance and 
humanitarian development. Without a connecting approach, which accommodates 
continuous progress of humanitarian practises, there had always been a huge void, 
especially when the period of humanitarian assistance was terminated but the process of 
humanitarian development had not yet started. During this time, people in areas of 
conflict were left confused and hopeless, and it could even push the peace process back 
to its earlier stage of serious turmoil. This continuous and 'non-linear' approach to 
human protection and empowerment is also being applied not only in humanitarian 
assistance and development but also in other areas of operations to secure peace and 
maintain international stability, as will be discussed in the following section. 
6.3.2 On UN Peace Operations: 
'Humanitarian Peace Intervener' 
UN peace operations during the Gulf Crisis, the Cambodian peace process and 
SUbsequent missions have reaffirmed several vital aspects of the post-Cold War UN 
peace operations. In the latter half of the 1990s, the increasing numbers of internal 
conflicts and the support for ideas regarding *people-centred' security among the 
members of the international community paved way towards another development of the 
UN peacekeeping operations. As the threats confronting the international communit\ 
375 Newman (2001: 245) 
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nowadays are not generally issues of self-defence or situations in which a state is posing 
a threat against others, but rather situations in which the threat is primarily internal, the 
focus on the UN peace operation thus has to be adapted to address the problem of 
internal structural collapses and the victimisation of people. The idea has led the 
international community to largely agree to assume an 'international-role' identity as the 
'humanitarian peace intervener. ' The Canadian Government, through the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), has made the central idea 
very clear: that in the event of ethnic cleansing and significant numbers of victims, or 
'when a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, 
repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert 
it, ' the principle of non- intervention yields to the international 'responsibility to 
protect. ' 376 The novel idea of the 'responsibility to protect' then implies the need to 
modify several aspects of UN peace operations in many ways. 
By assuming the 'international-role' identity as the 'humanitarian peace 
intervener, ' it is the first time in its history that official consensus on the method of 
response in the event of a failed state or when there is a massive-scale of loss of lives 
has been established. The collective idea regarding humanitarian intervention, 
especially in intra-state conflicts, not only has implications for state sovereignty or the 
practices of collective security but also for the changing formation and combination of 
peace operations. From the Gulf Crisis onwards, the transformation of UN peace 
operations and activities have been incessant, from integrating enforcement measures 
and the enhancement of the multi-dimensional nature of UN peace operations to the 
synchronisation of the previously clear-cut mandates of the three main UN peace 
operations. Apart from the integral role in balancing and maintaining the traditional 
"" ICISS (2001: xi) 
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rights of sovereign states and the rights of the international community to protect people 
from victimisation within those states, the collective ideas embraced among the 
international community also help to advance the systematic combination of conflict 
prevention and the pretext of military intervention (peace making), peace settlements, 
including quasi-enforcement measures, and humanitarian actions (peacekeeping and 
peace enforcing) and development assistance (post-conflict peacebuilding) into the 
same integrated and overlapping process. 
In the area of prevention, the preventive measures cover both the immediate 
actions of consultations, good offices, military and political deployment and 
humanitarian relief within the timeframe of the conflicts and what is called 'structural 
prevention, ' which emphasises the long-term support of the establishment of human 
security systems. According to Cockell, 'structural prevention' consists of preventive 
peacebuilding, preventive disarmament and preventive development, which basically 
includes governance, human rights and economic and society stability, to name a few. 377 
This structural prevention is, in a way, an integral part of the post-conflict peacebuilding 
process, or to put it another way, the peacebuilding components implemented as 
preventive measures during the peacemaking process. Simultaneously, peacemaking via 
the pretext of military measures and the quasi -enforcement measures of the 
peacekeeping stage have also become significantly intertwined. The mandate to use 
military intervention to defend humanitarian standards as conceptualised in the human 
seCLirity approach during the peacemaking process and the mandate for intervention to 
help UN agencies, NGOs and those involved with humanitarian assistance and 
377 Cockell (2001: 27) 
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dernocratisation during peacekeeping operations by UN peacekeepers are increasingly 
indistinguishable. 378 
This highlights the important fact that the peacekeeping operations have been 
developed from the first generation of traditional peacekeeping, to use Yasushi Akashi's 
terminology, which focused only on cease-fire monitoring and non-military activities, to 
the second generation, which incorporated humanitarian components and the 
establishment of the rule of law and democracy into multifunctional peacekeeping 
activities. It is generally argued that the recent development of the third generation of 
UN peacekeeping, which integrated the enforcing actions into its usual mandates, as 
also been perpetually developed, with equal successes and failures. Although the fourth 
generation of peacekeeping has not yet been officially pronounced by international 
figures or policy makers, the succeeding development of peace operations through the 
overlapping combination of peacemaking or peacekeeping mandates and post-conflict 
peacebuilding measures is underway. At present, whether and when the mandates of the 
peacekeepers should be terminated and the mandates of the peacebuilders should 
commence is still controversial. 
The current multifaceted tasks of UN peace operations, based on the concept of 
human security, raise questions as to whether continuous humanitarian assistance and 
peacekeeping operations are needed to fill the void before the peacebuilders and long- 
term humanitarian development projects reach the area. Given the fact that political 
change and some aspects of economic or social life need to be undertaken constantly, 
the xvithdrawal of peacekeepers and the humanitarian assistance provided by both UN 
specialised agencies and NGOs -vvithout the prompt replacement of peacebuilding 
operations and humanitarian development programmes would obstruct the recovery 
378 Richmond (2001: 40) 
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process following such conflicts. Human security is therefore an appropriate approach 
to fill the existing operational void. 
6.3.3 On Japan-US Relations: 
'US Partner' 
As shown in Table 6.1, the US policy towards the UN in the latter half of the 
1990s can be divided into three main areas - political affairs, economic and social 
affairs and international law. As a permanent member of the UNSC, it is not surprising 
that the US government focuses more on the political dimension of its UN policy than 
on any other area. In terms of official statements released by the US Missions in the UN, 
there have been approximately 440 official statements and remarks accounting for such 
issues as UNPKOs and terrorism, while there are approximately 450 statements 
regarding disarmament. Nevertheless, the US government has not neglected its 
obligations to promote the UN policy in economic, social and development areas. The 
relative emphasis on humanitarian affairs and sustainable development is considerable, 
as seen in the 366 statements and 339 speeches on these issues during 1998-2006, 
respectively. 379 it could be argued that the numbers of speeches and statements made 
during these past years highlights the US interest in both security and humanitarian 
issues. It is especially cited by the Department of State that humanitarian programmes 
have also gained a prominent place and occupied US overall foreign policy and that the 
humanitarian factor has become central to senior policy makers' deliberation over US 
foreign policy priorities. 
380 
379 Speeches and Statements counted from the US States Mission to the UN website, 
littp: '/\v\v \\. us unnewyork. usmi ssi on. gov/pol sec. htm and 
littp:! NNN\, \\. tisLiiiiieNvyoi-k. Lisniission. Rov/hunianit. htm, accessed 04/07/2006. 
1 380 LIS Department of State (2000: 3) 
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Regarding the policy towards human security, although the US had somewhat 
limited influence comparing to other major countries, even Japan, the relationship 
between the two countries in implementing UN policies in the latter half of the 1990s 
were more or less in line. As suggested earlier, although the US has never adopted 
'human security' in any of its official policy rhetoric, it has not undermined Japan's 
attempt to promote human security through the Commission on Human Security via the 
UN and also has consented to the principles behind the concept itself, though with some 
reservation regarding the predominance of state-to-state relationships rather than a 
people-centred approach to security. 381 Besides, the US government's emphasis on 
promoting 'fundamental freedoms' and the so-called 'non-negotiable demands of 
human dignity', which are regularly repeated, also include almost all aspects mentioned 
under the human security concept generally advocated by Japan and the international 
community. 
382 
In a way, Japan's promotion of the human security concept could be considered 
as a 4policy compatibility' that helps substantiate the US's assertiveness about 
4sustainable development. ' Accordingly, the two policy concepts, pursued differently by 
both partners, naturally complement each other. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note 
that the concept of human security, especially in the aspect of 'freedom from want' or 
the 'empowerment' element, embraced and consistently developed by the international 
community, is broadly similar to the US promotion of sustainable development. To put 
-181 Interv I exv with a high-ranking MOFA official and the former Japanese Mission to the UN, 21,02/2006 
382 The issues include the problems of refugees, human rights, food crisis, governance, education, health 
care and so on. Source: US Department of State (2004a), Statement by Mark P. Lagon, Deputy Assistant 
Secretarv for International Organisation Affairs, Remarks at the Hudson Institute, 13 September 2004. 
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it more clearly, equality of opportunity and a life of dignity can only be achieved 
through development, which, in the US view, must be 'sustainable. ' 383 
In the other aspect of freedom from fear or the protecting function of human 
security, although the US has been renowned for its unilateral effort to secure peace and 
security by means of political and military interventions, it also shares the same ideas 
adopted by the international community that a 'comprehensive' approach to security 
and UN peace operations must be thoroughly assessed and put into action. It is therefore 
typical for the US to accept with open arms the shifting position of the international 
community in favour of humanitarian intervention, which has always been in line with 
the US policy in utilising the UN and its peace operations. As precisely put by 
Madeleine Albright in her appraisal of NATO's embarking on building a new post-Cold 
War order by using force in Europe: 
,[] while weakness invites aggression, strength is a parent to peace. ' 384 
This clearly shows how the US believes in the power of force to establish long- 
term peace and therefore it has become natural for the US to expect not only on Japan, 
but also the international community, to assume the 'international -role' identity as US 
partners, especially during the time when such transnational threats as terrorism are 
overwhelming. In the area of UN peace operations, for example, the US has made it 
clear that there must be a focus on following aspects in managing UN peace operations. 
Firstly, in principle, it is widely understood among US officials that UN operations are 
nowadays a multifaceted task, which requires multilateral efforts based on human rights 
and democracy to achieve lasting peace and security. To a large extent, the US has 
383 US Department of State (2002) Vision Statement for the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 
21 May 2002) 
384 
. 4sahi 
Shinibun, January 2000 
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never deviated from its founding principles and framework of peace based on a 
democratic system and the rule of law. Secondly, the US government agrees that 'multi- 
dimensional peacekeeping' such as disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and 
rehabilitation of former combatants (DDRR) are now believed to be substitutes for the 
traditional peacekeeping function of only ceasefire monitoring. 385 
Furthermore, the US strongly emphasises civilian and military policing and the 
significance of institutional ising these functions to facilitate the increasing demands of 
complex peacekeeping operations. 386 The emphasis is clearly an attempt by US and the 
international community to fill the gap between peacekeeping and peacebuilding as well 
as between short-term peacekeeping assistance and long-term institution development. 
In this sense, the US also shares the ideas of the international community that focusing 
on grass-roots complications offers a head start to maintain the overall structure of 
lasting peace and security and that the lack of a continuous presence of peacekeeping 
institutions or short-term humanitarian assistance would simply invite unrest in the 
immediate post-conflict period. 
6.4 Domestic-Type Identity Formation: Japan's Political Identity during 
the Promotion of Human Security Policy 
As shown in previous sections, Japan's own understanding about its political- 
security identity has undergone tremendous change and transformation throughout the 
past decade, from a mere reluctant Player to an active peace promoter. To a large extent, 
Japan's ideas surrounding peace and security and its 'peace diplomacy' 
387 during the 
38S US Department of State (2004b), Statement by Ambassador Stuart Holliday on UNPKO in the UNSC, 
17 Nlav 2004 
386 US Department of States (2001 a), Statement by Ambassador Patrick Kennedy in the 46' Committee of 
the General Assembly on the Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of PKO, 21 November 2001. 
387 Yasushi Akashi's terminoloý, -v. 
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latter half of the 1990s have been influenced by its failure in the Gulf Crisis and its 
unexpected success in the Cambodian peace process. The most significant change of 
ideas seems to be the country's realisation that 'peace is no longer free' and that to get 
the most of the secured international security environment, Japan has to contribute. The 
following section will discuss the system of ideas and beliefs embedded within Japan 
and how far these ideas have informed Japan's 'domestic-type' identities during the 
promotion of human security. 
6.4.1 Ideas Surrounding International Peace and Security: 
'Comprehensive Security Promoter' 
Since the end of the WWII, Japan's national security has been placed in a unique 
arrangement with the US, which allows it to refrain from full-scale military exercises 
outside Japan and from participating in collective defence. On the contrary, the 
maintenance of international peace and security has been placed upon the parameter of 
Japan's UN-Centrism without any substantial link to Japan's national security. Not only 
has the security discourse in Japan been sharply dichotornised; the policy priority has 
been clearly placed on national security and the close alliance with the US over the 
concern about international security and UN-Centrism. From 1976 until the emergence 
of human security, Japan started to release, through the MOD, the National Defence 
Programme Outline (NDPO), which clearly states that: 
,[] the international political structure of the surrounding regions and 
Japan's own domestic situation would not undergo any major changes for some 
tirne and judging that the existence of the Japan-US Security Arrangements 
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could continue to play a major role in maintaining the stability of international 
relations [ ... ], 
388 
The statement confirmed that Japan's primary concern regarding its national 
defence and the scope of the SDF's function could not extend beyond the parameters of 
the existing Japan-US security arrangements nor the area surrounding Japan. However, 
the same Outline revised in 1996 states differently, specifically regarding the role of the 
SDF and the ideas behind Japan's security understanding. It is rather obvious that in the 
latter half of the 1990s, in addition to the principal concern over its own national 
defence and the minimum necessity of the SDF exercise to ensure national safety, both 
ideational concern and the actual SDF functions have been extended to provide a more 
stable security environment through international peace activities. As stipulated in the 
1996 Outline: 
,[] the expectations for the role of the SDF have been increased in such 
functions as providing aid in cases of large-scale disasters and contributing to building a 
more stable security environment through participation in international peace 
cooperation activities, in addition to their principal mission of defending Japan. ' 389 
By adopting the 'domestic-type' identity of 'comprehensive security promoter, ' 
Japan's new understanding about peace and security could be witnessed in the 2005 
NDPO, which acknowledges that 'new threats and other various situations that affect 
peace and security, including proliferation of weapons' do in fact 'pose an imminent 
challenge to today's international community. ' 3 90 Apart from the fact that Japan started 
to recognise the new threats and changing environment, the country was also capable of 
388 J DA (1976), National Defence Programme Outline 1976 
-1 ,,, ) 
ZI) 
390 
JDA (1996), National Defence Programme Outline 1996 
JDA (2005), National Defence Programme Outline 2005 
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visualising how to ensure its national security beyond the area surrounding Japan. The 
recent security understanding also implicates both Japan's defence and foreign policy to 
rely not only on the existing Japan-US security arrangements to prevent physical attacks 
on Japan but also on collective efforts via the framework of the UN to prevent 
international threats from arising in the first place. This so-called two-pronged 
'Integrated Security Strategy' is also coupled with another layer of development in 
Japan's understanding about national and international security, specifically through the 
permission of the SDF to assume its primary mission in UN peace operations. 39 1 The 
corresponding policy implementation is essentially the result of the acceptance of the 
necessity of the use of force in the process of both conflict prevention and other UN 
peace operations. It could be argued that Japan's present security concerns have entered 
an unprecedented phase: a balanced framework between Japan-US security 
arrangements and the UN mechanism. As stipulated in the current 2005 Outline, 
'[] Under these circumstances, the international coordination and cooperation 
on security issues have taken root in the international community as the stable 
international environment serves the interests of all nations, and nations of the world are 
making wide range of efforts including those under the framework of international 
organisations such as the UN 
Besides, military force has begun to play broader roles and is actively used 
for various purposes, such as preventing conflict and reconstructing failed states in 
addition to deterring and/or responding to armed conflict 
[ 
... 
iý 392 
Hughes (2004: 70-71) 
-192 NIOD, NDPO (2005: 2). 
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Despite its unique view on traditional security, further development of its human 
security policy emerged on the Japanese political stage as an alternative security course. 
In fact, human security has taken its roots from the concept of 'freedom from fear and 
from want' advocated in the Constitution Preamble. 393 However, it was not until the 
promotion of human security that Japan could incorporate the idea of promoting 
international peace and security into its UN-Centrism and make it more concrete. 
Japan's human security has been integrated into the bigger framework of both Japan Is 
UN and foreign policy via its generous contributions to the Commission on Human 
Security and its Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects in early 2000 and through the 
incorporation of human security as one of the three basic principles of the ODA in 2005. 
394 At face value, Japan's move to focus on human security activity is often understood 
as merely a response to 'global trends' or 'international pressures' or even to the logic of 
'burden-sharing' between Japan and the US. It is also often understood that human 
security, in fact, is within close proximity to the humanitarian missions to which Japan 
has long adhered. 
However, Japan's insights into interconnected threats and the country's 
experiences in UN peace operations have led to considerable convergence of the 
ideational differences regarding national and international security held by the JDA and 
the MOFA. The key basis from which the concept has materialised is that national 
security cannot be achieved unilaterally or through a narrow-minded 'type-identity' as 
393 As quoted in section 3.1, p. 94 of this dissertation. 
394 The concept materialised during Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi's administration, when he expressed his 
\ le\N, s on human security and announced Japan's support for establishing the Trust Fund on Human 
Security in the United Nations in December 1998. From then on, succeeding Japanese administrations 
have contributed financially to the Trust Fund on a regular basis and the concept itself has been gradually 
reviewed and developed to suit Japan's original peace philosophy. In addition, in 2001, the Commission of 
Human Security was also established under the full sponsorship of the Japanese government and co- 
chaired bv Ogata Sadako, the former High Commissioner of the UNHCR and the Cambridge professor, 
Aniartya Sen. See further details on activities related to the Trust Fund on Human Security in MOFA, 
Japan (2004b: 7). 
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the 'one-country pacifist. ' Having acknowledged security in this new light via the 
decade-long interactions with the international community within the UN, Japan has 
gradually integrated the idea that the concept of national security should go beyond the 
traditional assurance of Japanese and regional integrity to equal assurance of 
international security. The perpetual transformation of political identity to that of so- 
called 'comprehensive security promoter' is, therefore, the result of the transformation 
of Japan's security insights. As seen in the 2005 NDPO, one of the three bases of 
Japan's defence policy is to 'improve the international security environment so as to 
reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place. ' The obvious link 
between Japan's national security and international security has become systematically 
rationalised and institutional ised, partly because the earnest promotion of human 
security policy, via active participation in the UN and other activities undertaken to 
enhance the international security environment as well as via the ODA and extensive 
diplomatic efforts, which are of the greatest advantage to Japan. 395 
6.4.2 Ideas Surrounding UN Peace Operations: 
'Development Peace Promoter' 
Since the end of WWII, Japan's idea about the maintenance of international 
peace and security was simply to put its faith in the UN and to place its strong 
dependence on bilateral relations with the US. Although Japan was more successful in 
utilising its new UN-Centrism as a platform to promote international peace and security 
in the post-Cold War period, as evident in Japan's contribution to more than 20 
UNPKOs and related UN peace operations throughout the past decade, the central policy 
395 NIOD, NDPO (2005: 7) 
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framework on which these contributions were based was nowhere to be found. 396 The 
human security concept emerging during the Asian Financial Crisis -a concept directed 
to help solve the social and economic problems in Asia - happened to be the platform 
from which Japanese policy makers could link the new-UN Centrism to actual policy 
implementation to promote international peace and security. 397 As mentioned earlier in 
Chapter 3 and as shown in Figure 3.3, human security is perhaps the policy 
manifestation of the new UN-Centrism. 
In essence, since 1998, when the Obuchi administration started to introduce 
human security as Japan's concrete policy agenda, the working definition of the concept 
itself had been developed without much direction until it was officially conceptualised 
by the Commission on Human Security in 2001.398 The key elements of Japan's human 
security concept proposed by the Commission on Human Security, as described in 
Figure 6.1, consist of the strategies adopted to reach the goals of 'protecting and 
empowering' people, which can also be implemented into two different but intertwined 
levels - short-term and long-term. The two concepts of 'protecting and empowering' 
people are different to the extent that the former will be adopted to address both 
immediate effects and short-term conflict-related problems, while the latter will be 
implemented to emphasise long-term development assistance through aid, good 
governance and the promotion of democracy to 'prevent conflict' from taking place. The 
'protecting function' is specifically concerned with how to help maintain human rights 
396 MOFA (2001: 14-15), Nihon to Kokuren (Japan and United Nations). 
397 Interview with a high ranking MOFA official responsible for human security policy, interviewed on 
21/02/2006 
_'98 The concept and its connection to UN peace operations itself was unknowingly pronounced by the late 
Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro in 1996, although he did not intend for the concept to be labelled 
'human security'. He clearly announced Japan's intention to create a 'better world for future generations' 
through which the prevention and resolution of conflicts, PKO or other UN operations that are 
complementary to the collective security function, and the long-term development programmes which 
Guarantee the well being of every human being, would all be simultaneously promoted by the Japanese 
government. N10FA (I 996a), Statement by Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro at the 5 Ist Session of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, 24 September 1996. 
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and ensure the safety of people trapped in ongoing violence and conflicts. This would 
basically include preparation for the pretext of military intervention, humanitarian 
actions and technical assistance to disarm, protect casualties' rights and well being. and 
so on. It might well be stretched so far as to establish more legitimate and stabilised 
political and economic regimes, which would finally ensure sustainable peace for those 
people. All of these functions are believed to be fulfilled through UN peacekeepers and 
partly through UN peacebuilders in order to facilitate 'seamless assistance for peace 
consolidation. ' 399 On Japan's part, it has directed its efforts into undertaking UN peace 
operations involving disarmament, clemobilisation and reintegration (DDR) in Sierra 
Leone and Afghanistan, for example. 
The 'empowering function' involves both short- and long-term supportive 
measures aiming at eradicating the root causes that account for the eruption of political 
and economic unrest as well as the rise of transnational organised crime and terrorism. 
The latter is specifically a new threat that can be countered only through the strength of 
people and communities rather than the traditional approach of military exercise through 
collective security. 400 Apart from the significance of ensuring good health and better 
education through several development assistance programmes, the concept of 
empowering people is also founded on the belief that people and their communities 
should be reinforced with freedom of faith, dignity and fulfilment in order to make better 
choices for themselves and stay clear from violence. Accordingly, the concept of human 
security itself is broadly different from humanitarian actions. The latter simply addresses 
the narrow but positive side of development assistance, which Japan has undertaken for 
quite some time. either through its ODA or through UN organs such as the UNDP or the 
399 See for ftirther details in MCIFA (2004c) on The UN in the 21 st Century: Time to Address New 
Challenges. 
400 Commission on Human Security (2003: 213-24) 
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UNHCR. The human security approach, on the contrary, is aimed at integrating the 
whole procedure of short-term difficulty alleviation and long-term maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
Figure 6.1: Japan's Human Security Approach 
'Protecting 'Empowering 
Functions' Functions' 
Short-term 
Long-term 
Health care 
Human rights 
Violence and conflict Skills/knowledge/ 
education 
Arms reduction, Migration, Dignity 
Institutional isation Education, Health 
of protecting organs Economic security 
e. g. civilian police etc. 
Source: Author's Figure 
It is obvious that Japan is not inclined to support endeavours to promote the 
'protection function' under the new label of the Canadian's government's 'responsibility 
to protect' due to its ingrained philosophy of not using force to enforce peace. The 
emphasis on the connection between 'peace operations and development, ' which 
broadens the focus of 'preventing violent conflict (in order to establish peace) and 
eradicating deprivation such as impoverishment, ill health, illiteracy or maladies (in 
order to maintain balance and constitute long-term development, ' has been on actions 
that a development peace promoter like Japan is rather keen on. The ideas and beliefs of 
this slightly different shade of the human security concept inevitably result in the 
formation of the identity of 'development peace promoter, ' whose focus is on 
development or the preventive approach, rather than on the protection approach as a 
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starting point to international peace. As suggested by one renowned Japanese 
international figure: 
]'humanitarian intervention' is not what Japan pushed. On the 
contrary, the emphasis is on 'protection from the top', which deals with people 
when they are not being protected by their own government through UN 
peacekeepers, and 'empowerment from the bottom' which involves several 
combinations of short-term humanitarian assistance and long-term humanitarian 
development via the UN peacebuilding operations and other separate donor 
governments. These two main elements are something Japan and the 
Commission have seriously developed [ ... i1 
401 
Furthermore, by embracing such ideas and assuming the 'domestic-type' identity 
as the 'development peace promoter, ' the major concern collectively shared by the 
Japanese government and the international community regarding the past 
implementation of the UN peace operations is the gap between each individual stage of 
the operations, especially between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The absence of an 
integrated approach to link short-term humanitarian assistance and long-term 
humanitarian development has become the main focus of the Japanese government and 
leading Japanese development agencies. Obviously, the difference between Japan's 
previous development ideas and the current development implementation under the 
human security approach is that Japan's development policy is now integrated into UN 
peace operations and is no longer a separate policy. One concrete example, as mentioned 
several times before, is the review of ODA Charter in 2003. with other key development 
401 Interview with a former head of the UN speciallsed agency who is currently the president of Japan's 
leading development institution, 22`021-2006 
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agencies, such as the JICA, all placing human security as one of their leading criteria for 
Japan's ODA policy and development assistance. 
6.4.3 Ideas Surrounding Japan-US Relations: 
'US Partner' 
Some raise questions as to whether the human security policy is an alternative to 
traditional policies for national security and whether Japan's future security orientation 
will part way with the US. It has been argued that Japan's action to promote human 
security does not approximate traditional security policy and merely centres on 
humanitarian issues. 402 One objection to this assertion might be that the development of 
Japan's human security concept and the ideas behind it is partly a product of ideational 
interactions with the international community on contemporary threats and security and 
partly a result of Japan's decade-long internal transformation of ideational 
understanding towards how to achieve peace and security. Peace and security for Japan, 
in Yukio Satoh's words, 'is not like water anymore because it's no longer free' 403 and 
the increasing interlinking of Japan's national and international security have inevitably 
resulted in a shift in the idea that Japan's UN policy is best implemented in parallel with 
a Japan-US alliance, and vice versa, to ensure overall peace and stability for Japan. 
Former Prime Minister Koizumi also repeatedly emphasised the importance of making 
the Japan-US alliance compatible with Japan's cooperation in the international 
community. 404 Further questions have been raised by a Japanese academic about the 
increasing importance of Japan's UN policy and the settlement of peace and security. 
402 -': 2 0) Edstrom (200 1 
403 Interview with a former high-ranking MOFA official and a president of a Japanese research insti It) 
I itute, 
21 "02'2006 
404 Daili, Yondw-l', "4'0-"-'004 
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The Japan-US alliance is no longer the only viable option that wfll help ensure the path 
towards the maintenance of peace and security. In Fujiwara Kiichi's words: 
,[] if Japan and the United States give priority to their bilateral security 
relationship -a by-product of the Cold War era - over their relationship with the 
United Nations, and keep on updating it, will that ensure the maintenance of 
peace in Asia and the world? No. I think it would be even more difficult to 
maintain international peace and security [ ... ], 
405 
On the one hand, the human security concept has not even been an issue that has 
had a direct impact on the relationship between the two countries. A Japanese high- 
ranking official even points out that Japan's promotion of human security policy does 
not obstruct any of the US interests in the UN and that the US still has no interest 
whatsoever in the concept of human security, compared to the Canadian or other 
European governments. 406 This statement is at least partly correct. As mentioned earlier, 
the US has never actually registered the term 'human security' in any of its official 
statements and remarks in the UN. However, as the essence of the human security 
concept, including the protection and empowerment functions proposed by the Japanese 
government and the Commission on Human Security, are similar to the US promotion 
of comprehensive peace operations and sustainable development, the US interest in 
endorsing what it perceives, perhaps, as redundant to the existing concepts, is 
rhetorically far from active. 
Notwithstanding the US ambivalence to the human security concept within the 
UN, the collective ideas regarding the increasingly complex security environment and 
405 Asahi Shimbun, February 2000 
4oo Interview xvith a high-ranking NIOFA official and a former Japanese Mission in the UN, 21 '02'2006 11 
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how the UN peace operations should be handled between Japan and the US are fairly 
well synchronised. Occasionally, the US also pushes forward concrete policy 
implementations that complement definitions under the scope of human security. For 
example, the US government also argues for 'fundamental freedom', which emphasises 
the safety and well-being of people, especially from violation and punishment by their 
own governments. 407 From the perspective of human security's 'protection elernenC the 
US policy to dispose of oppressive regimes and to enhance the free will and liberty of 
spirit inherent in all human beings is also considered to fall within the scope of Japan's 
human security concept. Moreover, Japan has always recognised the importance of 
connecting preventive measures to post-conflict peacebuilding and national 
rehabilitation. The US generally agrees that 'support for the efforts of the UN and the 
efforts of all states to engage in preventive measures - measures that identify causes of 
conflict and address them before they evolve into violence - are necessary. ' 
408 
In the area of peace operations, both countries also agree about the 
comprehensive approach in UN peace operations that address the missing link or the 
void between the transitional periods of each individual peace operation. The 
cooperation and synchronised ideas between the two countries are particularly evident 
through concern about the void between peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. 
For example, the US suggestion of the institutional isation of the civilian police was 
earnestly reciprocated by the Japanese government and was also advocated as an 
important measure during the transition period from the peacekeeping to the 
peacebuilding process, because people's safety and security is also in question when 
military peacekeepers have completed their mandates. Peacebuilders, on the contrary, 
407 US Department of State (2004a), Statement by 'Mark P. Lagon at the Hudson Institute, 13 September 
2004 
408 US Department of State (100 1 b), Statement by Ambassador James B. Cunningham on Peacebuilding: 
ToNN ards a Comprehensive Approach, 5 February '200 1. 
283 
are mandated with missions that focus only on reconstruction and development. Apart 
from providing public security and criminal justice, the institutional i sation of laý\- 
enforcing missions or the civilian police for the purpose of preventing the re-emergence 
of social and political unrest during the post-conflict state also produce an integrated 
approach for integrated UN peace operations, which are considered by both countries to 
be an important agenda. 
Besides, while Japan's 'seamless peace consolidation' addresses the problem of 
short- and long-term humanitarian assistance (during the peacekeeping stage) and 
humanitarian development (during the peacebuilding stage), the US's additional 
argument is that post-conflict activities are not in 'linear' progression. Therefore, 
peacebuilding measures must sometimes be organised even while peacekeeping 
operations are present. 409 This line of argument, raised by both governments, was also 
emphasised by Ambassador James Cunningham, who argued that the real protection is 
to create a 'culture of protection' based on the rule of law. In this sense, he means that 
peacekeeping measures alone cannot substitute for the rule of law or the restoration of 
legitimate national authority and effective national rehabilitation, which must be 
constructed via international efforts during the peacebuilding stage. In the following 
section, the ideational positions of the Japanese key actors and the exchanges of ideas 
and beliefs among them, which are believed to have an impact on the transformation of 
Japan's 'domestic-type' identities, will be explored. 
409 US Department of State (2004c), Statement by Ambassador Anne Patterson on Civilian Aspects of 
Conflict Management and Peacebuilding, in the UNSC, 22 September 2004. 
284 
6.5 Ideas and Beliefs that have informed Domestic-Type Identities 
6.5.1 Bureaucratic Worldviews 
Throughout the past decade, there has been a gradual change in Japan's ideas 
towards stabilising international peace and security, which have resulted in the identity 
transformation from the 'unilateral pacifist' during the Gulf Crisis and 'peace supporter' 
during the Cambodian peace process to 'comprehensive security promoter' in the late 
1990s. The most vital change is the key idea or concept of 'peace' within Japanese 
society and the exchange of that ideational understanding about peace with others in the 
international arena. This transformation of ideas regarding peace and security is 
considered as one of the main influences on the transformation of Japan's political 
identities, which directly resulted in Japan's more active UN policy preference within 
the past 15 years. Aside from the changing ideas that 'peace is not free anymore, ' there 
is also an obvious change in the Japanese understanding, as suggested by MOFA 
officials: 
'In the past, the peace of our own country was peace from the direct 
threats through the direct wars that Japan was fighting against. But nowadays, 
peace has broadened into a complex of situations that have been taken place in 
different areas or different countries. We have more people and youngsters who 
are willing to work in more ... difficult places ... and 
in international organisations. 
I think the meaning of peace in my generation would have a more international 
meaning compared to the past generation [ ... ]. ' 
410 
Within the MOFA, there have also been changes in ideas and beliefs regarding 
international peace and security, how Japan could contribute to UN peace operations 
410 Inter\ lew with NIOFA officials, 06,022/2006 
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and the impacts towards Japan-US relations. Firstly, with regard to international peace 
and security, the most notable change of ideas is that Japan's national security cannot 
rely solely on the Japan-US alliance. This is not to say that the unique and special 
bilateral relationship based on the Japan-US security treaty has become less relevant in 
Japan's security course. Assessing the situation from the viewpoint of the decision- 
making structure, the major portion of Japan's security policy had traditionally been 
handled by the North American Bureau in the MOFA and its implementation shared by 
the JDA, with the former being in the dominant position. Japan's international security, 
however, was attached to another pillar of the UN, and had been principally handled by 
the UN Policy Division of the MOFA. Before the tenure of Hisashi Owada as Vice- 
Minister for Foreign Affairs in the early 1990s, it was agreed among MOFA officials 
that the power leverage of the North American Bureau was fairly overwhelming. 
However, this scenario of clear dichotomy between national and international 
security, with the former taking priority over the latter, has been somewhat transformed 
since Japan's participation in the Cambodian peace process in 1993. Owada's initiative 
to create a central policy coordinating organ - the Foreign Policy Bureau - in which the 
UN Policy Division and the National Security Policy Division were relocated, so that 
both issues could be dealt with in parallel within the same bureau, was a fine example of 
ideational transformation regarding the interconnectedness of national and international 
security, the changing priority of Japan's security policy and its unprecedented linkage 
Nvith the UN policy. The reduced dichotomy between national and international security 
is clearIN, significant. 
411 
411 Interview with a UNDP Senior Advisor and a former MOFA official, 07/03 2006. and interviews with 
an MOFA and a JDA official, 30/01,2006 and 01/02/2003, respectively. 
286 
Secondly, although Japan's human security policy was originally initiated with 
an aim to address the immediate problems of the 1997 Asian economic crisis, which had 
a substantial impact on the socially and economically vulnerable segments of the 
population, the approach itself has gradually been developed to cover several related 
aspects of Japan's international contributions, especially through the UN peace 
operations. The essence of Japan's human security, which originated within the MOFA 
under the supervision of the late Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo, initially consisted of 
only the so-called 5Cs for overcoming Asia's economic difficulties - courage, 
compassion, creativity, cooperation and confidence. These simple and intangible 
elements, which attached great importance to a 'human centred' approach to the crisis, 
were based on the MOFA and Prime Minister Obuchi's understanding about the 
interconnectedness of various kinds of international threat, such as environmental 
danger, transnational crimes, displaced persons, violation of human rights, infectious 
diseases and terrorism. 412 From then on, the MOFA and the Japanese government have 
developed the concept of human security to accommodate its UN policy, which 
emphasises both sides of UN peace operations, that is, 'security and development. 413 
Japan's emphasis on human security, unlike the Canadian version of human 
security, which focuses on the responsibility to react to threats and the responsibility to 
protect people through humanitarian intervention by force, stresses the combined 
elements of effective 'conflict prevention' and the 'seamless operations of peacekeeping 
and post-conflict peacebuilding. ' Although Japan has long been the main advocate for 
'conflict prevention, ' the related measures in 21" century conflict prevention not only 
focus on preventing inter-state threats such as arms reduction, arms trafficking or 
412 NIOF-k (1998b), Opening Remarks by Prime Minister Obuchi at an Intellectual Dialogue on Building 
. Asia's Tomorrow, 2 December 
1998. 
413 N 1OFA (I 998c), Statement by H. E. Mr. Keizo Obuchi at the 53 rd Session of the General Assembly, 
September 1998. 
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confidence-bui I ding measures, but also on positive contributions that address the root 
causes of social problems, especially inequalities of education, health care. basic human 
rights and poverty. 414 It is clearly emphasised by the Japanese government and the 
MOFA that the key to pursuing effective 'conflict prevention' is to enhance human 
freedom, potential and dignity or the 'empowerment function' of the human security 
approach. To a certain extent, the MOFA and the Japanese government have shown 
their appreciation of the notion of 'responsibility to protect, ' especially when it was 
categorically defined in the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and 
the Report by the Secretary-General entitled 'In Larger Freedom', and have 
acknowledged the fact that the protection of people is firstly entrusted to each state. In 
the event when national authorities fail or are unwilling to ensure such protection, Japan 
believes that the responsibility simply falls to the international community to use 
diplomatic and humanitarian means or, as a last resort, the use of force to help protect 
those people. However, as stated by a high ranking MOFA official: 
'Japan gives priority to preventing the aggravation of the situations 
created by conflicts or crises. We believe that we should employ all kinds of 
measures to prevent such aggravation. In this context, the international 
community has a lot of things to do, such as development assistance, 
humanitarian assistance, human rights protection or police and PKO activities. 
We constantly attach great importance to protecting and empowering individuals 
and local communities in continuous phases from pre-conflict and post-conflict 
humanitarian relief to development. ' 
415 
414 N1OFA (1999), Address by State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Keizo Takemi on 'Capacity Building for 
Human Dignity: The Essence of the International Order in the 21" century, ' I September 1999 
415 NlOFA (2003b), Statement by H. E. Kinichi Komano on the occasion of the 7th Ministerial Meeting of 
Human Security Network. held in Ottawa, 18-20 May 2005. 
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Despite the above favourable reception for the necessity of humanitarian 
intervention, the MOFA's primary focus is still on cementing the tie between peace 
operations and development activities. The 'seamless operations of peace keeping and 
peacebuilding' addresses the weakness of the previous generations of UN peace 
operations, who clearly defined the mandates of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in 
linear progression - the withdrawal of the peacekeepers followed by peacebuilding and 
post-conflict nation reconstruction, including the initiation of long-term development 
assistance. According to MOFA officials, the major hindrance to effective peace 
operations in the past was the so-called 'institutional gap' between the withdrawal of the 
peacekeepers or other short-term humanitarian assistance and the entrance of long-term 
human development agencies or other development assistance. Under the concept of the 
human security approach, the way in which the UN peace operation will be 
implemented is undoubtedly affected, especially the need for an integrated and 
comprehensive approach in the area of refugees, returnees, internally displaced persons 
or demobilised combatants. 
416 
In the context of Japan-US bilateral relations and human security policy, the 
linkage between the two has never been officially pronounced by either government. 
However, it has been made clear in Japan's Diplomatic Blue Book on developing and 
extending cooperation between the two countries in areas relating to people-centred 
security. For example, the cooperation between Japan and the US based on the so-called 
'Japan-US Common Agenda for Cooperation in Global Perspective', launched in 1993, 
long before the announcement of the Japanese government about adopting human 
security as one of the main foreign policy agendas, has covered problems that today 
416 NIOFA (2003c), Statement by H. E. Ambassador Haraguchi Koichi on the strengthening of the 
coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the LT; nited Nations, including special 
economic assistance, Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, 21 October 2003 and interviews with 
high-ranking NIOFA officials, 21,021-'006 and 30/01/2006. 
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would be called 'human security related problems, ' including the promotion of health 
and human resources; the response to challenges to global stability; the protection of the 
global environment; the advancement of science and technology and the fostering of 
exchanges for mutual understanding. 417 Furthermore, in the area of human security 
conditions, both countries have been very active throughout the past decade in 
addressing major issues facing the international community. Another development is the 
agreement by both countries to strengthen the competency of UN peace operations, 
especially in the area of civilian policing. 
6.5.2 Party Politics 
In the latter half of the 1990s and after Japan's direct experiences in UN peace 
operations, the change of ideas and beliefs regarding international peace and security as 
well as the nation's identity transformation into an assertive 'comprehensive security 
promoter, ' 'development peace promoter' and a genuine 'US-partner' have been visibly 
conceived among politicians. As well as the inspiration to create a world 'free of fear 
and want', as mentioned in the Constitution Preamble, such ideas as 'the creation of a 
better world for future generation' were advocated during the Hashimoto administration 
from 1996. The human security concept, pioneered by two prominent LDP politicians - 
Keizo Obuchi, while assuming his position as the Foreign Minister and Keizo Takemi, 
the then State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, through the pronouncement of the creation 
of 'a century of peace and prosperity built on human dignity, ' has also been embraced 
by politicians. 
Basically, the early human security concept understood by the LDP politicians 
signifies a comprehensive view of all threats to human survival, life and dignity and 
, zo. 
ip/[)olic,,, other/bluebook/ 19961- 417 NIOFA (1996b), Diplomatic Bluebook 1996, http:,,, 'Nv\NNv. 1i10faj 
d. htnil', '4, accessed 26/033/2004. 
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stresses the need to respond to such threats via the simultaneous promotion of peace, 
418 development and the reform of the UN . Based on Japan's political expertise in the 
development field, its increasing assertiveness to secure peace through UN peace 
operations without having to involve itself directly in military operations is more than a 
marriage of convenience. Earlier versions of Japan's human security developed within 
the LDP shared the very basic values of those humanitarian ways of thinking and human 
dignity, survival and life itself. However, Japan very carefully developed a concept of 
human security which does not totally deny the need for humanitarian intervention but 
places more emphasis on the aspect of 'protection' through systematic bilateral and 
multilateral humanitarian projects that address the fundamental problems of protracted 
conflicts and the continuous links between peace operations and development. 419 
Compared to the old 'hard-liners' like Ichiro Ozawa, who was once, in the early 
1990s, the main advocate for Japan's normalcy in embracing the ideas of shouldering 
full international responsibility, including the exercise of military operations, the LDP 
politicians and those in the Koizumi cabinet embraced the idea that Japan should be 
more responsible and base the country's foreign policy on a more comprehensive and 
I well-rounded' approach to secure peace and security without stepping over the essence 
of peace philosophy stipulated in the Constitution. An LDP member of parliament 
observed that the younger generation of LDP politicians are striving for key words such 
as 'peace' and also see themselves and Japan as a promoter of peace rather than a 
passive beneficiary, as was the case in the old days. For example, in the areas of UN 
peace operations, there has been extensive discussion about the increasing responsibility 
of the SDF in peacekeeping missions and it is most likely that the expanded missions 
418 NIOFA (1998c), Statement by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi at the 53 rd Sess I on of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations 1998, September 1998. 
419 Interview with a senior LDP member and a current member of the House of Councillors, 20/02, '2006 
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will include unarmed guard duties as well as the despatch of the SDF to participate in 
multinational forces. It is commonly agreed among the younger LDP members that in 
order to maintain a respectable place in the international area, it is important that the 
idea that 'Japan cannot survive alone' is fully embraced, and steps that must be taken to 
promote international peace and security must be further emphasised. 420 This is agreed 
by a cabinet minister, who comments on this point as follows: 
Japan is now a big player. And if you're a big player, you have to 
be a more all-round player. I think Japan should make its contribution - 
necessary contributions - in most areas, unless Japan finds itself extremely 
unprepared to do so. And in real life, so many of the functional areas are 
interrelated. For example, if you wish to solve conventional weapon problems, 
such as landmines or small arms and light weapons, you might have to look into 
development issues or gender issues because most of the victims are women and 
children, in fact. Or you might have to look into community development issues 
or capacity building issues such as law enforcement officers 
Human security is a rather broad concept and it's the key concept. You 
can discuss development issues on the basis of poverty and deprivation. Then 
you can discuss human security from the aspect of freedom from fear. And then 
that relates to weapons and peace operation issues. So, indeed, human security is 
one of the areas that Japan can flag in [ ... I. 
1421 
Since the end of 1955 political system and the start of the Murayama 
Administration the discussion between the ruling government and the opposition 
420 InterN le\\, with an LDP member of parliament, 10'02,2006 
421 Inter\ le\\ with a Cabinet Minister, 14'02/2006 
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parties regarding security issues has become more engaging and constructive, as evident 
during the Cambodian peace process and the despatch of the SDF to subsequent 
UNPKOs. Although the prominent role of the SDPJ has faded, the newly emerged 
opposition party, the DPJ, has become a constructive force in Japanese politics in terms 
of the discussion of Japan's foreign policy. As shown in Figure 6.2, the DPJ has made it 
clear that the Japan-US Alliance, close collaboration with the UN and close 
relationships with other Asian nations will be the three main pillars of the party's 
foreign policy. Although it seems that there is no obvious difference between the DPJ's 
and the LDP's stance on foreign policy, the nuances of emphasis on those three pillars 
between the LDP and the DPJ are clearly identifiable. 
On the one hand, it might be correct that the LDP's transformation of ideas 
regarding security priorities is less dichotomised, with more parallels between national 
and international security. The idea that the UN mechanism is to be utilised to promote 
international peace and security, which will simultaneously ensure Japan's national 
security, is increasingly embraced by LDP members. At the same time, Japan-US 
security arrangements do not only serve the interest of national security, but could also 
used to support the stability of international security, in addition to regional security. 
This parallel type of foreign policy orientation has come to replace the formulation that 
previously prioritised Japan-US bilateral relations at the top, as previously shown in 
Chapter 3 and in Figure 3.1. On the other hand, the DPJ does not have priorities in 
pursuing foreign policy but rather portrays an overlapping comprehensive policy 
framework that addresses both national and international security simultaneous I Y. 422 
Although foreign policy orientations between the two parties seem to be different in 
422 Interviews with DPJ's research team for the former President Katsuya Okada, 18/02/2006 and 
10 0-1 2006 
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structure, the notion that the inseparable spheres of national and international security 
and the way in which the UN mechanism has become a prerequisite to secure both 
Japan's national security and international peace are embraced by both parties. 
Figure 6.2: Comparison of LDP's and DPJ's Foreign Policy Nuances 
LDP DPJ 
Japan - Japan's 
US UN 
Alliance, A4, Policy 
Regional 
Policy 
Source: Author's Figure 
Furthermore, the largest opposition party, the DPJ, under the leadership of both 
Okada Katsuya and Maehara Seiji, is also very positive in embracing the ideas of 
Japan's assuming leadership in international peace and security promotion. Since its 
equal merger with Minseito in 1998, the DPJ has embedded relatively more constructive 
ideas than the previous largest opposition party, the SDPJ, in discussing Japan's 
international postures with the LDP government. Several issues relating to international 
security have been discussed between the ruling and opposition parties and have helped 
to lay, out a common background and understanding on Japan's international posture. 
For example, regarding opinions on the Constitutional revision and Article 9, Prime 
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Minister Koizumi once stated that 'complicated questions can arise if we continue to 
proceed on the assumption that the SDF do not constitute a military. It is disrespectful to 
the SDF that we have been unable to end the controversy over whether the SDF is 
unconstitutional or not. ' This could be interpreted to mean that the SDF should be 
defined as a military under the Constitution or that Article 9 should be abandoned 
altogether. Yukio Hatoyama, one of the DPJ key leaders, has also voiced a similar view 
regarding this matter. 
423 
Furthermore, the basic policy of the DPJ, which materialised during the 
presidency of Okada Katsuya, took a serious stance on assertive diplomacy through UN 
activities. The basic policy also stresses the importance of Japan's active pursuit of 
preventive diplomacy, increasing participation in the LJNPKO and Japan's gaining of 
membership of the UNSC in order to effectively promote international peace and 
security on its own terms. Apart from this basic stance on foreign policy, which is to be 
continued during Maehara's presidency, the DPJ also makes an advanced 
pronouncement by suggesting that the government should consider supporting the UN, 
within the limits of its Peace Constitution, in case the UN military force based on 
Articles 42 and 43 should materialise. 424 The party also agrees with the LDP regarding 
the promotion of human security. The DPJ believes that 'enhancing human security and 
the like' would enlighten the national interest to achieve peace and security in the 
international community as a whole. Furthermore, the LDP has made it clear that moves 
towards the integration of ODA policy to facilitate sustainable development and the 
revision of the current five principles of PKO participation to be aligned with other 
423 Yoniiiii-i Shinibun, 0_3 10-5/200 1 
424 DPJ (1999), 'The Democratic Party of Japan's Basic Policies on Security, ' 
littp: /, \\, \\ \\. dpj. or. jp'cn,,., lish poi. icv! security. htniI, accessed 10/02 2006 
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shared ideas of the international community through the mobilisation of the SDF and 
the civilian police force will be fully supported. 425 
6.5.3 Public and Editorial Opinions 
National Newspapers 
In the latter half of the 1990s, it could be pointed out that the ideational positions 
of Japanese leading newspapers regarding Japan's assertiveness in promoting 
international peace and security no longer represented a controversial issue, as was the 
case during the early 1990s. As for the ideas regarding international peace and security, 
it is quite clear that, among national newspapers, the main advocate for Japan's 
assuming the identity of 'comprehensive security promoter' is no other than the Yomiuri 
Shimbun. It is perhaps the only national newspaper that regularly raises concerns about 
Japan's identity or the lack thereof in the world arena. From its series of editorials, the 
frustration and worry that the international community tended to view Japan as a 'nation 
without a face' has led the newspaper to constantly nudge Japan's decision makers and 
the public to contemplate Japan's international standpoint and its belief in a national 
I peace philosophy. ' From the Gulf Crisis onwards, the newspaper has always urged 
politicians and the public 'not to pray for peace' but to promote debates about what 
Japan must do as a nation that plays active roles in building a peaceful and stable 
426 1 world . The newspaper s stance 
has remained consistent throughout the past decade in 
campaigning for the country to take on a 'well-rounded, comprehensive and assertive' 
approach to the maintenance of international peace and security. 
425 See further in Okada (2005) on DPJ basic foreign policy. 
42t, Doiýy Yonihn-i. 16/08/1995 
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With respect to human security policy, the Yomiuri Shimbun has consistently put 
pressure on the government since the early 1990s to consider the questions of security in 
'the wider sense of the term, ' such as how to cope with issues regarding grass-root 
problems of the conflict. 427 Furthermore, the Yomiuri Shimbun also tagged along with 
the international community and the majority of the Japanese people on the 
transformation of ideas regarding the clear dichotomy of national and international 
security. During the Cold War period, as commonly argued by scholars and 
practitioners, the term 'security' often meant national and state-centred rather than 
international and people-centred security. Given the present post-Cold War era, the 
changing situations of intertwined threats and free flows of transnational problems and 
conflicts also call for the reorientation of the focus of the term 'security', from state- 
centred to human-centred security. The Yomiuri Shimbun clearly states that: 
'[ ] such problems are spreading beyond their borders and creating a 
'cold peace. ' This is far from the affluent and peaceful world that people had 
expected with the end of the Cold War. If this situation continues, personal 
security cannot be guaranteed, no matter how much a nation strengthens its 
military power and enhances its national security. This is the reason why 
emphasis should be shifted from national security to 'human security. ' 428 
On the issues of UN peace operations, Japan's identity as 'development peace 
promoter', which emphasises the empowerment functions of human security and 
addresses the problem of the missing link between short-term humanitarian assistance 
and long-term development programmes, was endorsed by the Yomiuri Shimbun. Since 
427 Editorial, Daiýv Yomiw-i, 03'05 119933 and Daily Yomiuri, 2T041999 
428 Dailv Yonjilli-i, 05'04/1995 
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1993, the newspaper has also called for a comprehensive approach in placing the 
ODA's priority on the basic ideal of 'holistic humanitarian considerations, ' including 
not only short-term humanitarian relief but also the growing need for sustainable 
ýstructural' and 'self-help' support . 
429 However, with its consistent advocacy for Japan 
to assume the full-fledged identity of a peace promoter, the newspapers is still of the 
opinion that the SDF should be able to participate in the major tasks of UN peace 
operations, including 'guard duty', which is believed to be an added virtue to the 
responsibilities of the SDF peacekeepers. 
Although the government has deliberately excluded guard duty from the list of 
the SDF's responsibilities, due to the country's limitation on the use of force, the 
Yomiuri Shimbun believes that there should be no distinction between the SDF and 
other countries' peacekeepers in fulfilling UNPKO obligations. 430 Japan's earnest 
contributions to UN peace operations and its assuming of the identity of 'comprehensive 
security promoter' and 'development peace promoter', especially in the latter half of the 
1990s, also coincided with its identity as the 'US partner' in the area of maintaining 
international peace and security. The Yomiuri Shimbun's editorials clearly reflect its 
hope that 'Japan will grow into a wholesome and dynamic society ready to meet the 
various challenges presented by the new age' and that 'Japan, as a close ally of the US 
and a full-fledged member of the international community, will demonstrate its 
determination to think about other nations from a bilateral and a global point of view 
and act accordingly' and will ultimately 'end the nation's tendency to be solely 
preoccupied with its own national peace and security. 431 
429 Dai4v Yoniiiii-i, 0'1'0ý1993 
430 Daiýv Yondut-i, 03 051995 
431 Editorial, Dai1v Yonihn-i. 01,012000 
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As for the Asahi Shimbun, it has clearly voiced its opinion regarding Japan's 
national and international security as well as the assertive position on UN peace 
operations on two scores. Unlike the Yomiuri Shimbun, the Asahi Shimbun has remained 
doubtful about the use of force to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, 
even in the name of 'human security'. The obvious concern of the Asahi is the extent to 
which the use of force under UN parameters, supported by the international community 
and especially the US, will inevitably be integrated into the US grand strategy of the 
existing Japan-US security alliance. On the one hand, the Asahi Shimbun advocates a 
more balanced UN-Centrism and reliance on the Japan-US security arrangement. That is 
to say, to the Asahi, Japan's progress towards the maintenance of peace and security 
should be conducted under the UN as much as retaining the close collaboration with the 
US, specifically in regional security matters. However, the collective ideas adopted by 
the international community regarding the use of legitimate military manoeuvres to 
enforce peace, even under the UN and in close cooperation with the US, raise concern 
among the newspaper's subscribers as to whether such 'military interventions out of the 
area' enunciated in the NATO strategy will finally be extended to 'situations in areas 
surrounding Japan' under the guidelines on Japan-US defence operations. 432 
With respect to UN peace operations, the concerns are often linked with the 
above-mentioned ideas on 'humanitarian intervention'. Although the Asahi Shimbun 
always advocates keen contribution to the UN operations, the notion of 'human 
concerns' of the international community that are sometimes forced upon other 
sovereign countries is the main reason xvhy the Asahi Shimbun still takes a cautious 
stance in fully supporting Japan's participation in UN peace operations and the 
prornotion of hurnan security. However. the Asahi Shimbun clearly supports the ideas 
Asahi Shinibun, Annual Reports: Report -1000 
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that the human security approach truly addresses post-Cold War threats to people, 
which affect the long-term establishment of peace and security. It is not only that human 
rights or any humanitarian concerns should be selectively emphasised on a case-by-case 
basis. The Asahi Shimbun has often expressed the opinion that all humanitarian 
concerns should be addressed more systematically and universally and that Japan should 
be the pivotal country promoting such concerns. As mentioned in its publication: 
,[] massacre of innocent civilians is a crime in any culture ... the creation of an 
'intercivilisational' concept of human right and human concerns based on the common, 
universal values underlying the many different cultures ... Japan should become the 
leader in such innovative endeavours [ ... ], 
433 
The Mainichi Shimbun, the proponent of the former opposition party, the SDPJ, 
has shifted its ideational position since Japan's successful contribution to the 
Cambodian peace process. In the latter half of the 1990s, the Mainichi Shimbun has 
acknowledged the ideological U-turn of the SDPJ, especially on the ideas regarding 
SDF participation in UN peace operations. Despite the overall change, it remains 
evident that the fundamental nature of the Mainichi Shimbun's request for the political 
development or enactment of a basic law relating to Japan's policy towards the 
maintenance of international peace and security merely focused on the traditional 
understanding of state-to-state security, which emphasised only such issues as nuclear 
434 
weapons and arms reduction . The 
SDPJ and the Mainichi Shimbun, in its editorials, 
advocated that it was time for Japan to assume the identity of a 'humanitarian nationý. 
which should take on non-military responsibilities among the members of the 
43, ', 
, 4sahi Shimbun, 27/08,, 2000 4 14 
. 
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international community. Although the identities of 'comprehensive security promoter' 
and the 'development peace promoter' and the essence that these identities entail are not 
fully embraced by the former opposition party or the Mainichi Shimbun, a slight change 
in ideas regarding their preference to see Japan focus more on 'human-centred security 
arrangements' is more than evident in issues such as environmental problems and 
human rights. 
Regarding peacebuilding operations, the newspaper has always advocated 
Japan's promotion of peacebuilding development measures, though this scenario was 
dated and addressed only a fraction of the whole international security problems. In 
essence, the newspaper particularly suggested that 'a grand design for making non- 
military contributions through peacebuilding operations' should be encouraged. In the 
newspaper's view, although Japan's contributions towards the UNPKO have been 
successful, the government's efforts in other areas of UN peace operations have been 
somewhat inadequate. The Mainichi Shimbun further stressed that Japan should still 
focus its efforts on peacebuilding measures that involves no military components but the 
skills of diplomats, soldiers and humanitarian workers from NGOs. 435 By assuming the 
'domestic-type' identity as 'the comprehensive security promoter', the newspapers 
agrees that it is vital for the country to keep the SDF from becoming involved in full- 
scale military activities, but not to prevent the SDF from making meaningful 
contributions such as the need to discharge weapons in self defence, to protect refugees, 
medical staff, patients and civilians works and so forth. 
However, the Mainichi Shimbun has made it clear that in light of the 
increasingly multifaceted threats and the complex international situation, 'Japan needs 
to formulate a pacifism that Nvill be suited to the 21" century. If Japan takes the narrow 
4 ', 5 1 lainichi Shimbun, 20/01/1999 
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view that its pacifism allows it to go alone, it will lose touch with the realities of the 
world and become self-righteous. It is important that pacifism be paired with 
international cooperation. ' 436 As for Japan-US relations, while the Yomiuri Shimbun 
clearly supports the government's fundamental balance and linkage between its existing 
Japan-US bilateral security pact and the maintenance of peace and security, as seen in 
the 2 nd Iraq crisis, the Mainichi Shimbun openly argues that the government's enactment 
of the bill to allow Japan to despatch the SDF to provide logistical and other support to 
the US-led international coalition against terrorism or the anti-terrorist law signified 'a 
radical departure' of Japan's security policy, which centred on the alliance with the 
us. 437 With its cautious stance on Japan's assuming the identity as the 'US-partner, ' it 
gives the impression that the newspaper's idea of how Japan should continue to promote 
international peace is to put the emphasis only on humanitarian assistance and 
development. 
As for the Nikkei Shimbun, its liberal stance in pushing Japan to bear more 
responsibilities through a redefinition of Japan's domestic and international identity has 
never changed even the slightest bit. In the area of securing international peace and 
security and ideas regarding UN peace operations, even though the human security 
concept is not a topic usually discussed in the Nikkei Shimbun, the newspaper still urges 
each of the LDP administrations to seriously clear the 'hurdles' that impede Japan from 
engaging in several active international political functions, especially via the UN, such 
as making an effective bid for a UNSC seat, increasing its effort in humanitarian 
contributions, clearly explaining to the Japanese about the importance of 'collective 
self-defence' or even participating in full-fledged peacekeeping operations. 
'-"", Ilainichi Shimblin 01/05/2002 
417 
,I fainichi Shimblin, 07/10 '00 1 
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Along with the Yomiuri Shimbun, whose sentiment is in favour of Japan's re- 
interpretation of the right to collective self-defence in order to participate in other UN 
missions beyond the 'surrounding areas' of Japan, the Nikkei Shimbun also shares the 
same position, although less fervently, suggesting firstly that the government discuss the 
438 issues 'from several angles' and courageously explain it to the Japanese . Secondly, in 
early 2000, in order for Japan to effectively fulfil its obligations on UN peace operations, 
the newspapers also openly stated that Japan 'must allow itself to participate in UN 
peacekeeping by ending the freeze on the SDF. ' Most importantly, the newspaper is of 
the opinion that because Japan is in the most advantageous position to further strengthen 
civilian activities in the UN peace operations, as it has long been the main advocate for 
non-military contribution, it should establish a legal infrastructure that enables the 
country to make such contributions more systematic. 439 
Public Opinion 
Human security policy emerged during the period when the mindset and 
ideational position of the Japanese public regarding international peace and security was 
at its greatest maturity. In the Gulf Crisis, the ideational understanding of the Japanese 
public regarding international peace never looked far beyond the area surrounding Japan 
and the focus on the term 'security' rarely meant anything except the traditional concept 
of the country's survival based on the Japan-US alliance. One of the Yomiuri Shimbun's 
editorials rightly portrayed Japan's strategic security understanding after the end of 
WWII and during the Gulf Crisis as 'an immature teenager struggling for full 
independence and adjusting to new responsibilities. Like young adults living with their 
parents, definitely, a comfortable situation of 'having it both ways' had existed for a 
418 
Nikkei Shimbim 12/02/2001 
4 339 A, ikkei Shinibun, 09/09`2000 
long time. ' 440 In the latter half of the 1990s, it was clearly understood by the Japanese 
public that 'to merely appreciate peace' and 'to actively promote peaceý were 
significantly different. Although peace had for a long time been perceived by the 
Japanese as 'free', the concept was also currently appreciated by the majority of the 
public in a real sense, in a very idealistic way, in which actively rejecting the military 
meant that they were actively promoting peace. 441 
Furthermore, nowadays, it is rather a consensus among the Japanese that Japan's 
own national security is simply indivisible from peaceful international security. The 
Japanese people are better aware of the cost of multifaceted conflicts and the 
significance of Japan's participation in the process of maintaining peace and security via 
the UN and have started to embrace the idea that 'international peace' is significant and 
442 
essential to Japan's national survival . Although it is clear that Japan also shares ideas 
with the international community about the 'people-centred' approach to peace and 
security, Japan's human security approach also reflects its own preference for its 'peace 
diplomacy'. In the narrowest sense of term, Yasushi Akashi suggests that it means 'the 
efforts to assist disarmament and defuse tensions worldwide and the extending 
assistance to developing countries both in terms of financial and personnel contribution 
to UN peace operations. ' 443 On the other hand, the urge to transmit its own national 
ideas and beliefs on 'active pacifism' with sufficient and concrete tangible contributions 
to international peace and security has been evident since the mid-I 990S. 
444 However, 
it was not until the latter part of the 1990s, after the process of transforming its identity 
based on its ideational maturity in dealing with the issues of the maintenance of peace 
440 Editorial, Yonfiuh'Shimbun, 25/03/2000 
441 Interview with a former high-ranking MOFA official, 07/02/2006 and an interview with officials in the 
MORA, 06/02/2006 
442 2/2006 Interview with DPJ staff, 10/0. - 44 3, 
Daiýy Yonihn-i, '31/07/2000 
444 
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and security, as seen in the human security policy, that Japan was able to concretely 
contribute to international peace in the form of 'national philosophy' under the 
transformed framework of its pacifism. 
Public opinion, assessed from a series of polls throughout the past decade, also 
significantly demonstrates the changing trends of ideational position among the 
Japanese people regarding the maintenance of peace and security. Although polls 
regarding human security policy are nowhere to be found, related polls raising issues 
under the scope of human security policy can be used to suggest such changing 
inclination among the public. For example, the polls conducted by the Prime Minister's 
Office throughout the past decade from 1991-2001 on samples of between 1,400 and 
2,200 Japanese adults on the question of which foreign policy Japan should pursue 
through the UN demonstrate that the Japanese public has put the highest priority on the 
policy to promote humanitarian assistance, mediate regional conflict and secure 
international peace and security via the UN. 445 From 1991 onwards, the policy that 
focuses on the maintenance of peace and security has been ranked on top, with an 
average of 34 percent of respondents preferring this policy in the first half of the 1990s. 
Public support for view that the Japanese government should pour further resources into 
the policy related to the promotion of humanitarian assistance and international Peace 
and security also skyrocketed in the latter half of the 1990s, from 37.5 percent in 1996 
to 40 percent in 1998 and to 50.3 percent in 2001. 
This clearly suggests that in the latter half of the 1990s, the sentiment of the 
Japanese public has been inclined to utilise the UN as the core mechanism to resolve 
protracted regional and international conflicts and stabilise sustainable peace and 
seCUrity. The second-highest issue that the Japanese public believes Japan should pursue 
44i Prime Minister's Office, ýýZ, ý! Mt6t-NAUM VE (Polls about Japan's Diplomacy), 1991 -2003 
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through the UN is in the area of the protection of human freedom, democracy and 
human rights. Developing the world economy and assisting developing countries follow 
in the 3 rd and the 4 th place respectively. The least relevant issue area that the Japanese 
public think should be pursued via the UN is the policy that focuses on other global 
cultural and cooperation issues. 
From Chart 6.1, another important policy within the UN that should be 
scrutinised is the decreasing tendency to associate the UN with the development of the 
world economy and assistance to developing countries. As mentioned in Chapter 4, 
during the Cold War period and in the early 1990s, Japan portrayed itself as the 
'traditional peacebuilder/developer' and based the idea of the maintenance of peace and 
security on a stabilised world economy and prosperity. However, in the latter half of the 
1990s, it became obvious that while the ideational position of the Japanese public is in 
favour of the promotion of humanitarian assistance, the mediation of regional and 
international conflicts, the securing of international peace and security through the UN 
and the use of the UN to develop the world economy or to assist developing countries to 
boost their prosperity are no longer the main priorities. From the polls, during the early 
1990s, the focus on the political front on promoting humanitarian assistance and 
mediating in both regional and international conflicts and economic attempts to develop 
the world economy and to assist Third World countries were only 3.1 percent and 8.3 
percent different. This shows that Japan weighted both issues at almost approximately 
the same level. In 1993, the difference between such political attempts and the 
promotion of economic development and assisting Third World countries w-as virtually 
none. The differences between the two policy fronts were only 2.7 percent and 0.1 
percent, which literally demonstrated that the sentiment of the Japanese public was 
inclined towards the belief that both political and economic manoeuvres \\ere efficient 
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ways to help alleviate protracted conflict, which happened to be the period when Japan 
was the main political facilitator and the peace supporter during the Cambodian peace 
process. 
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However, in the latter part of the 1990s, it became evident that economic factors 
had become less significant in the policy relating to the UN. In 2001, the gap between 
Japan's emphasis on the use of the UN to promote international peace and security via 
hUrnanitarian assistance and the mediation of regional and international conflict and the 
use of the UN to develop the world economy and to assist developing countries was 
over 30 percent. This explicitly shows that Japan's UN policy focus has inclined 
towards non-econornic efforts, which perhaps implied more assertive political and other 
concrete contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security. 
The poll summarised above might not be able to clearly demonstrate what the 
Japanese public have had in mind regarding concrete measures to fulfil Japan's 
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obligation to promote humanitarian assistance, to mediate regional or international 
conflicts and to secure international peace and security. The following summarv of the 
same polls, shown in Chart 6.2 446 , ask 1,400-2,200 Japanese people throughout 1991- 
2003 for details regarding the areas that the interviewees regard as essential for Japan to 
promote international peace and security through the UN. The polls show the complete 
details of the policies for which the Japanese public would prefer the government to 
cooperate with the UN both in economic and political areas. The polls give the idea that 
the maintenance of international peace and security via UN peace operations has ranked 
the highest, at around 68 percent, throughout the past 13 years. The second highest issue 
area in which the public would prefer Japan to cooperate with the UN is Third World 
development and assistance, at approximately 35 percent. 
However, these polls show the same tendency as those mentioned previously: 
among the Japanese public, the preference for Japan to pursue UN policy in the areas of 
economics and Third World development is somewhat in decline. According to these 
polls, 43.8 percent of the Japanese public voted in favour of these policies in 1991, 
whereas the corresponding figure in 2003 was only 34.2 percent. Other issues areas in 
which the Japanese public perceive cooperation with the UN to be highly significant for 
Japan are those of refugee assistance, disarmament, environmental and drugs problems, 
all of which see the support of about 20-40 percent of those polled. The interesting point 
derived from these polls is that in the latter half of the 1990s, literally around the period 
when the human security policy was introduced, issues under the scope of hUman 
security, such as those of population protection, gender equality for women or crime 
prevention, were also seen by the Japanese public as issues that should be included in 
cooperation with the UN. 
44o 
Prime Minister's Office, Jý 1991 -2003 
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Chart 6.2: Which areas are important for Japan 
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6.6 Conclusions: The Conformity of the Domestic-Type and 
International-Role Identities 
It is fairly clear in this chapter that the clash between the 'domestic-type' 
identities and Japan's 'international-role' identities during the promotion of human 
security policy has significantly diminished. The transformation of 'domestic-type' 
identities from the 'unilateral pacifist, ' 'traditional peace builder and banker' and 'US 
follower' during the Gulf Crisis to the current 'comprehensive security promoter, ' 
'development peace intervener' and 'US partner' was the result of decade-long 
ideational interactions with other members of the international community and the 
gradual transformation of ideational positions within the key actors and among the I 
public thernselves. It is quite clear that in the area of international peace and security and 
the Japan-US alliance, Japan's adopted 'domestic-type' identities and its pro ected 
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'international -role' identities were in tune with each other. Although there is a slight 
difference in the areas of the UN peace operations between Japan's 'domestic-type* 
identity as the 'development peace promoter' and the 'international-role' identity 
collectively shared by the international community as 'humanitarian peace intervener, ' 
the two identities are considered complementary to each other within the framework of 
human security. 
In the area surrounding international peace and security, the collectively shared 
ideas and beliefs among the international community regarding the current international 
threats confirm the established fact that the present threats are increasingly 'internal, ' 
4vertical, ' and 'horizontal' with multifaceted and intertwined causes and solutions. 
Furthermore, the international community also agrees that the greatest transformation of 
ideas regarding international peace and security is perhaps the shift in the security 
approach from 'state-centred' to 'people-centred' security. This transformation of ideas 
regarding the way in which international peace and security should be approached 
affects the extent of 'people protection measures, ' with which national governments and 
the UN will be directly involved. Two major strands of the human security approach 
were systematically introduced by the Japanese and the Canadian governments. 
Although both countries share central ideas about the new focus on 'people* rather than 
I states' in contemporary security debates, the Canadian human security approach places 
more emphasis on the protection element, stressing the importance of humanitarian 
intervention, including military manoeuvres to ensure that people benefit from full 
protection measures. The Japanese version, on the contrary, focuses more on the 
empowerment function of human security by way of creating a seamless or a structurally 
secured mechanism between short-term humanitarian assistance and long-term I 
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humanitarian development as well as addressing the root causes of conflict, especially 
social and economic facets. 
The international community has perpetually transformed itself step by step from 
the 'peace enforcer' during the Gulf Crisis to the 'peace promoter' dealing specifically 
with various angles of conflicts, from political and arbitrary to social and development 
functions during the Cambodian peace process. In the latter half of the 1990s, the 
transformed identity into 'comprehensive peace promoter' is the result of an embracing 
of the ideational significance of the so-called 'responsibility to protect. ' Such 
transformed identity has been based on a particular kind of interpretation of human 
security: the protection function, which addresses the problems of basic human needs, 
all of which require a minimum guarantee of safety, survival, livelihood and dignity. 
Another important function of the human security approach is the empowerment 
function, focusing on long-term human development in such basic areas as economic, 
health, personal, environmental, community, cultural and political security. Although 
this basic human welfare is nothing new to the concept of development, under the 
human security approach, it is treated as an integral and interrelated set of developments. 
This is believed to have contributed not only to post-conflict reconstruction but also to 
the preventive measures of peace operations. It is apparent among the inter-national 
community that empowerment through development measures under the human security 
concept is not treated as an end itself, but rather as a means to an end to achieve the 
purpose of the protection function and to provide people with the guarantee of safety, 
survival, livelihood and dignity. 
As for Japan, Japanese policy makers and the Japanese public had always placed 
ideas regarding international peace and security in the remotest corners of political t: ) 
concern. Japan was a country where the clear dichotomy between national and 
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international security were fairly marked, with the former being attached to the Japan- 
US Security alliance while the latter was officially or rhetorically placed in the hands of 
the UN. In a way, the traditional fashion of assessing security issues among the Japanese 
revolved only around the concern over the survival of Japan rather than seeing the 
interrelatedness of Japan's survival through the upholding of international security. 
Despite its unique view on traditional security, human security emerged on the Japanese 
political stage in the latter half of the 1990s after the nation had made several successful 
contributions to UNPKOs. The concept of human security has been developed and 
successfully utilised as an overall international security policy 'label. ' The key basic 
contribution of the concept of human security is based on Japan's newfound ideational 
position that a certain country's national security cannot be achieved unilaterally or 
through the previous adoption of the narrow-minded 'one-country pacifist' identity. 
Such transformed understanding and ideas inherently resulted in the adoption of the 
'domestic-type' identity as the 'comprehensive security promoter', which focuses on the 
idea of preventing violent conflict (in order to establish peace) and eradicating 
deprivation such as impoverishment, ill health, illiteracy or maladies (in order to 
maintain balance and constitute long-term development), and which is very well in tune 
with the expected role identity being shared by the international community. 
In the areas surrounding UN peace operations, the Gulf Crisis, the Cambodian 
peace process and other subsequent missions have all pointed to the importance of 
countering multifaceted threats and of promoting peace with an effective multilateral 
system via the UN. Such understanding has also led the international community to 
assume the 'international-role' identities of 'multilateral pacificist' and *peace promoter', 
\\-hose major function was to partly respond to inter-state conflicts through collective 
security and partly to handle the complex issues of internal threats to humanity via 
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myriads of peace operations to restore peace and restructure war-torn countries. Based 
on the previous identity transformations, in the latter half of the 1990s, the newly 
transformed 'international -role' identity as the 'humanitarian peace intervener' was 
literally a result of the understanding that nowadays the threats confronting the 
international community are primary internal and that internal collapses and violence 
also have a direct impact on people rather than on states: hence the need for 
humanitarian protection and intervention. 
The collective idea regarding humanitarian intervention, especially in intra-state 
conflicts, also has significant implications for UN peace operations in several ways. In 
the area of conflict prevention, the areas of focus are no longer preventive diplomacy or 
confidence building, as had been the case during the Cold War period. Instead, the 
preventive measures focus on structural prevention, which covers both immediate 
actions such as consultations, good offices, military and political deployment and 
humanitarian relief, and the long-term support of the establishment of human security 
systems. Furthermore, the line between peacemaking via the pretext of military 
measures and the quasi-enforcement measures of the peacekeeping state has also 
become conspicuously intertwined. This is also the case with the increasing 
interrelatedness of the peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, in which the 
mandates of the peacekeepers and peacebuilders have overlapped to include the tasks 
summarised as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). 
Japan also shares the ideas collectively embraced by the international 
community regarding UN peace operations. Notwithstanding Japan's substantial 
international contributions, the lack of an integral and national approach, coupled with 
its unusual military restrictions, made the attempts appear inconsequential throughout 
the earl), post-Cold War period. After the emergence of the human security concept, 
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which has been further developed through the course of international and domestic 
ideational interactions, Japan has clearly developed its own version of human security, 
which substantiates its contributions to the UN peace efforts. The key elements of 
Japan's human security concept proposed by the Commission on Human Security 
consist of the strategies adopted to reach the goals of protecting and empowering people, 
as emphasised by the international community. 
Moreover, the transformation of Japan's 'domestic-type' identity from that of 
4peace supporter' in the Cambodian peace process, during which enormous resources, 
ranging from personnel, money and ideas, were poured into the UN peace operation, to 
the so-called 'development peace promoter' has signified Japan's maturity in pursuing 
its UN policy. Japan's focus on the protective function has relied more on its aspiration 
to maintain human rights and ensure people's safety through the pretext of military 
intervention, humanitarian actions, technical assistance and so on. However, Japan has 
placed a relatively higher emphasis on the empowerment function, which involves both 
short-term humanitarian assistance during the peacekeeping stage and long-term 
development programmes in the period of peacebuilding. The ideas behind Japan's 
adopted identity as the 'development peace promoter' was the emphasis on the 
preventive approach rather than on protection as a starting point for international peace. 
As regards Japan-US relations and their implications for the human security 
policy, although the US has never adopted human security in its official policy 
framework, nor has it undermined the Japanese effort to promote human security 
through the UN. This is partly because the US's existing emphasis on promoting 
'fundamental freedom' and the so-called 'non-negotiable demands of human dignity' 
falls within the same categorisation of 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from wanti, 
hence representing a complementary line of approach that tackles similar international 
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threats to international peace and security. It is, therefore, not surprising that the US 
government welcomes more 'partners' in the main scheme of the maintenance of peace 
and development through other complementary approaches from other countries, 
including Japan. In the areas of peace operations, the US is still the main advocate for 
multilateral efforts to maintain international peace and security and to reconstruct aný, 
failed nations based on democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Another important 
emphasis of the US government on the UN peace operations is the importance of the 
institutional isation of civilian and military policing to facilitate the demands of complex 
peace operations. This emphasis is clearly one of the attempts by the US and the 
international community to fill the gap between peacekeeping and peacebuilding -a 
point that is also a concern of the international community. 
For Japan, the human security concept does not have a negative impact on the 
relationship between the two countries. Despite the US's inactive response to the human 
security concept within the UN, the collective ideas regarding the increasingly complex 
security environment and the way in which the UN peace operations should be handled 
to ensure sustainable peace and security between Japan and the US are relatively mutual. 
Under the human security approach, Japan found itself more comfortable adopting the 
'domestic-type' identity of 'US partner' to assist the US in disposing of oppressive 
regimes, to protect people from violations of their basic rights and to enhance free will 
and greater dignity. This was the case precisely because the US's argument for 
'fundamental freedom' and Japan's perspective on human security's protection element 
are aligned and complementary. In the area of the UN peace operations, both countries 
also shared the same collective view on the void between the transitional period of 
peacekeeping and the peacebuilding stage. Furthermore, Japan also emphasises the 
importance of filling the gap during the same transition period between the humanitarian 
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assistance undertaken during the peacekeeping stage and humanitarian development 
during the peacebuilding period. 
Among the key domestic actors themselves, the MOFA is still the core actor in 
the area of international peace and security. The most notable change of ideas within the 
MOFA is that Japan's national security cannot rely solely on the Japan-US alliance. In 
the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, this dichotomy was fairly clear, as the 
MOFA often linked Japan's national security with the security pact with the US, while 
leaving concerns about international peace and security with the UN. This dichotomy 
about national and international peace and security has become less acute and MOFA 
officials and the public have increasingly acknowledged the fact that the two spheres of 
security concerns have become more intertwined. 
Another aspect of ideational change within the MOFA is the way in which 
Japan's international contributions have become directly linked with UN peace 
operations. The human security approach provides the opportunity for MOFA officials 
to effectively link the generous ODA to the establishment of peace and maintain long- 
term security. Instead of relying on forceful intervention or 'the responsibility to protect', 
the MOFA has been very keen on promoting Japan's version of human security, which 
emphasises the 'responsibility to develop' and 'seamless international contributions' that 
address the importance of the synchronisation of all three stages of peace operations: 
conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding. Through effective 
humanitarian support and long-term development assistance, the MOFA is convinced 
that such measures could effectively address the grass-root problem of conflicts. 
Among the LDP politicians, the promotion of hurnan security policy reflected 
their ideational position to integrate its peaceful inspiration with effective international 
contributions via the UN peace operations. Similar to the MOFA, the key ideational 
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transformation among the LDP politicians is the acknowledgement of the 
interconnectedness of national survival through stabilised international security, not only 
through the sole reliance on the Japan-US security pact but also through the UN 
mechanism. Precisely put, national security and international security are not mutually 
exclusive, but rather increasingly intertwined. Compared to the 'hard-liners' during the 
Gulf Crisis who advocated Japan's normalcy in shouldering full international 
responsibility through military operations, the new UN policy of activism through the 
human security policy emphasises a well-rounded approach to the maintenance of peace 
and security and a seamless humanitarian assistance and humanitarian development 
programme at every stage of UN peace operations. 
The leading opposition party, the DPJ, has also become a constructive force in 
Japanese politics and has expressed a relatively constructive idea in the discussion of 
security by stressing the interconnectedness of national and international security. The 
DPJ also took a serious stance on assertive diplomacy through LN activities. Apart from 
the party's concern over such issues as the environment, population, human rights and 
poverty, the basic policy also stresses the importance of Japan's active pursuit of 
preventive diplomacy, increasing participation in the UNPKOs and gaining membership 
of the UNSC in order to effectively promote international peace and security on its own 
terms. 
In the latter half of the 1990s, the most obvious transformation among the 
Japanese public was related to pacifist-based national security and the linkage between 
national and international security. Japan's increasing acceptance and enthusiasm 
towards contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security in the first 
half of the 1990s may largely have derived from the traumatic experience from the Gulf 
Crisis and the marked success in the Cambodian peace process and subsequent PKOs. 
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Via the process of interactions with others at the international level, the mindset of the 
Japanese public also began to absorb the ideas and beliefs collectively shared by the 
international community regarding international peace and security. Generally speaking, 
Japan's national newspapers, the Yomiuri, the Asahi, the Mainichi and the Nikkei 
Shimbun, all agreed on the importance of Japan's taking on a 'well-rounded, 
comprehensive and more assertive' approach in maintaining international peace and 
security. 
In the areas of UN peace operations, the call for 'holistic humanitarian 
considerations', which include not only short-term humanitarian relief but also the 
growing need for sustainable growth and the effective eradication of grass-root threats 
to people, is emphasised. These leading newspapers' support for Japan's contribution to 
international peace and security also coincided with their understanding about the 
existing Japan-US alliance in some ways. Although Japan-US relations had been 
perceived by the Japanese public as the main cornerstone of Japan's national security 
and had little to do with international security, such ideas have significantly shifted in a 
way that enabled the alliance to be pursued in light of the maintenance of peace and 
security. 
Furthermore, human security policy also emerged during the period when the 
mindset and ideational position of the Japanese public regarding international peace and 
securitY had reached its zenith. One of the examples is the shift of ideas regarding peace, 
which is no longer perceived by the public as 'free' or contemplated in an idealistic way. 
Nowadays, it is a consensus among the Japanese that Japan's own national security is 
simply indivisible from international peace and security. Although both politicians and 
MOFA officials have confirmed that the Japanese public has acquired a better 
understanding of the government's promotion of human security, polls representing 
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public opinion on the issue are nowhere to be found. However, other issues under the 
scope of human security, which can be used to indicate the changing inclination of the 
public regarding the approach to peace and security, can be seen in a series of polls 
conducted by the Prime Minister's Office. Through the examination of both 
'international-role' and 'domestic-type' identities and the level of conformity between 
them, this chapter has confirmed that active promotion of the human security policy has 
resulted from the transformation of Japan's political identities in the area of 
international peace and security. To emphasise the decade-long process of identity 
transformation, the overall process will be summarised in the final chapter, in section 
7.3 and Table 7.1. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
Following the empirical analyses of the three cases in Chapters 4-6, the final part 
of this research includes the theoretical summary of the ýrecursive version' of Wendt's 
Constructivism and the application of 'identity transformation' on the analysis of 
Japan's UN security policy. The new interpretation on Japan's UN security direction and 
the essence of Japan's decision-making process is also wrapped up in this section. Also 
surnmarised below in section 7.3 is the detailed analysis of the case studies on the Gulf 
Crisis, the Cambodian peace process, and the human security policy. The final section is 
the concluding theoretical and substantive contributions made in this research. 
7.1 Theoretical Wrap-up: Recursive Wendt's Constructivism 
Although Wendt's Constructivism has been criticised by other post-modern 
constructivists that its epistemological essence is still very much positivist-based, it is 
clear among Wendt's Constructivists that the approach does serve the purpose of 
building up a middle ground theory that bridges the gap between positivism and post- 
positivism. In fact, the core objective of Wendt's Constructivism is to draw the attention 
of the mainstream positivist IR theorists to the importance of such 'non-material' factors 
as norms, identity or culture, which designate the course of foreign policy directions. In 
essence, Wendt's Constructivism emphasises ideas and discourse through the 
observation of either norms, cultures or identities and how these ideas and discourse, 
exchanged among states during system interactions, have shaped the structure of the 
international system. In other words, Wendt's Constructivism challenges the traditional 
mainstream IR theories in two related respects. 
On the one hand, it questions the fundamental accounts of both Realism and 
Liberalism, specifically their neo-versions, which underscore *structure' as the principal 
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factor generating international outcomes and social phenomena. Contrary to the 
rationalist theories, which stress the importance of 'system structure' in determining 
states' behaviours, Wendt's Constructivism underlines the 'structural idealism' which 
mainly suggests that non-material factors can be constructed, reconstructed and 
internalised by intersubjective or social aspects of the system structure - by the 
distribution of ideas and knowledge at the system level. Also relating to the fundamental 
accounts of the rationalist school, Wendt's Constructivism questions the validity of the 
material factors and the distribution of material capabilities emphasised by both Realism 
and Liberalism. The notion that structure alone and such material factors as military or 
economic capabilities affect states' behaviours constitutes a different set of ontological 
positions among Wendt's constructivists. Rather, Wendt's constructivists focus on the 
importance of non-material factors, the process of transformation of these factors and 
their impacts on the restructuring of the system. 
The theoretical ground aside, it remains to consider the extent to which Wendt's 
Constructivism can be effectively applied to empirical cases. Several scholars have 
attempted to incorporate Wendt's theoretical construction of social theory into their 
analyses through the adoption of norms, culture and identity itself as the key analytical 
tools. However, it is strongly argued in this research that each of the analytical tools 
serves different research purposes. The majority of Wendt's constructivists choose to 
use 'norms' to represent the whole system of knowledge and shared ideas and beliefs. 
The examination of the constituent parts of identity. or even culture, through norms is 
agreed to be more practical, as the former are admittedly very vague concepts and 
difficult to grasp. Moreover, in the literature using Wendt's constructivism, norms and 
identities are sometimes mentioned interchangeably, signifying the same things. 
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However, this research argues that norms and identities are merely opposite sides 
of the same spectrum, serving different theoretical functions and operational purposes. 
Figure 2.2 and Table 2.2 clearly suggest that norm-led research observes how, norms 
generate actions and behaviours in international politics or how such behaviours affect 
the changing structure at the system level. On the contrary, identity-led research 
basically deals with the system of knowledge, ideas and beliefs of system agents. The 
extent to which the transformation of ideas, beliefs, experiences and so on impinges on 
the preference of the state to adopt a particular 'domestic-type' identity, to project its 
'international-role' identity and to reach a final 'collective' identity is the primary 
concern in identity-led research. This kind of research also takes the end-point of the 
newly emerging form of the shared conception of identity as a reflection of the state's 
policy preference. Unlike norm-led research, the primary objective of identity-led 
research is to explore the source of policy choices and preferences of system agents 
rather than to explain the transition of the normative system structure. Also, as opposed 
to the original version of Wendt's Constructivism, which focuses more on 'role' and 
4collective' identity and the 'linear' process of social system interaction, this research 
takes the following route: 
Firstly, this research focuses on observing the transformation of the system of 
ideas and beliefs at both the domestic and the international level. While Wendt's 
constructivists often treat the 'domestic-type' identity as constant and exogenous to 
system interactions, this research observes how 'domestic-type' identities have been 
transformed and in what capacity the identities affect the direction of the state's policy 
pro. jection. It is true to some extent that 'identity, ' by most constructivists' definitions, is 
a label for the construction of statehood enacted domestically and projected 
internationally. Therefore, it could be assumed that domestic and international identity 
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should be one and the same. Under normal circumstances, the conformity between the 
'domestic-type' and the 'international -role' identity is likely to be on a higher level, to 
the point where only the observation of the role-identity projected at the international 
level alone is academically justified. In some situations, Japan being a case in point, the 
foreign policy and decision-making process is so unique and complex that the projection 
of the 'international -role' identities does not always conform to the 'domestic-type' 
identity. The key assumption for a country like this is that unless the 'domestic-type' 
identity is in tune with the 'international -role' identity projected out of expectations 
from others at the system level, an active approach or a high level of policy activity 
cannot be expected. The clash between the two identities over Japan's policy towards 
the Gulf Crisis is a fine example of this, confirming the importance of the dual 
observation of the transformation of the system of ideas and beliefs at both the 
international and the domestic level. 
Secondly, in cases employing Wendt's Constructivism, the observation of the 
process of identity or norm transformation is often applied to, for example, the process 
by which norms shape identity or the process by which norms and identity 
transformation shape the normative structure of the inter-state system. All of this 
basically proceeds in a linear fashion: the observation of the transformation of norms or 
identities is derived from social interactions only at the system level and from the way in 
which this transformation affects the changing structure of the normative system. The 
end product of this process of social interactions and transformation is the 'collective' 
identity or a new set of norms, which will transcend into a new system structure. This 
Study slightly modifies the existing formulation of Wendt's Constructivism to suit the 
research's objective, which aims to observe the process by which 'identity II 
trail sformat i on' shapes national interests and state policies. This research examines not 
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only the process by which social interactions at the system level affect the 
transformation of the 'domestic-type' at the domestic level, but also the process by 
which social interactions at the domestic level affect the projection of the 'international- 
role' identity at the system level. 
As shown in Diagram 2.2, this research will not treat the 'domestic-type' identity 
as pre-given or as exogenous to the research observation, but will treat the overall 
process in a recursive fashion, based on the assumption that social interactions between 
or among states do not necessarily result in a collective identity at the system level. 
Rather, in some difficult cases, the result of social interactions at the system level is that 
a ma . or signal is sent back to states as to what kind of condition or 'international-role' i 
identity is expected. This is not to say that states will always transform their 'domestic- 
type' identities in accordance with the conditions set by the international community. 
The process of redefinition and transformation of the system of ideas and beliefs, or the 
transformation of the 'domestic-type' identity, will eventually be circumscribed by self- 
reflection and will in turn be communicated back to the system level. Therefore, whether 
the new 'domestic-type' identity at the domestic level will be transformed to correspond 
to the 'international-role' identity shared among the international community at the 
international level depends on the issue. In section 7.3, the projected 'international-role' 
and the adopted 'domestic-type' identity will be compared to examine the degree of 
conformity during the Gulf Crisis, the Cambodian Peace Process and the promotion of 
human security policy. The following section will summarise the substantive issue 
surrounding Japan's UN security policy and its development within the context of the 
UN. 
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7.2 Japan's UN Security Policy: A Balanced Security 
At the substantive level, it is admittedly uncommon to put the words 'UN' and 
4security' in the same policy rhetorical spectrum. Until recently, Japan's UN policy itself 
had always been pronounced as one of the top foreign policy agendas, despite its limited 
functionality. Since the end of WWII, Japan's UN policy focus had revolved only 
around non-military or non-security issues, especially those in the development, social 
and economic areas. The incorporation of the security layer into Japan's UN policy had 
never been a serious issue until its first involvement in the Gulf Crisis in early 1990s. 
Although the attention to Japan's possible military participation in the UNPKOs had 
taken centre stage within its UN policy agenda, along with its bid for permanent 
membership of the UNSC, there had been no extensive discussion of the overall 
development of the UN policy and the extent of its security element. This research, 
therefore, undertakes the primary task of assessing another possible aspect of the 
security function within the framework of the UN policy. 
This research argues that Japan's security structure had been dichotomised since 
the end of WWII, with the country's ideal determination to establish not only a peace- 
loving nation but also to achieve the realisation of world peace through the UN 
mechanism. This clearly suggests that the layer of international security placed under the 
UN framework was separated from the issue of protecting national security and the areas 
surrounding Japan, which have always been placed in the hands of the Japan-US 
security arrangements. This dichotomy of national and international security, in effect, 
signifies an imbalance betNveen the emphasis on the Japan-US alliance and Japan's UN- 
Centrism. This security scenario set the scene for most of the Cold War period. The shift 
towards the increasing concern for international security and the incorporation of both 
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national and international security dimensions was not complete until the late 1990s, as 
evident in the human security policy. 
As evident, Japan's post-Cold War security concern has become more balanced 
and less dichotomised, with a more integrated security policy that extended beyond the 
area surrounding Japan. The term 'peace and security' is also re-defined to extend 
beyond Japan's national integrity to the promotion of international peace and security. In 
light of the increase in international instability, the UN has become the primary conduit 
for Japan to act upon its international security concern: hence the new or revived 
aspiration of UN-Centrism originally outlined by the post-WWII political founders. 
Furthermore, in terms of policy implications, human security has emerged as a product 
of the ideational interactions at both international and domestic levels. The essence of 
the human security policy did not emerge out of a vacuum, but is literally the product of 
such ideational and identity transformation of Japan's peace and security function to the 
world: that is, to promote peace is to work on it through communicating a substantial 
policy approach via the UN. 
In short, Japan's post-Cold War security understanding is two-fold. On the one 
hand, the notion of Japan's 'security' has been extended beyond the concern for national 
survival under the framework of the Japan-US security arrangement to the concern for 
overall international peace under the parallel framework of the UN. On the other hand, 
via the human security policy, the post-Cold War UN-Centrism has also incorporated the 
'security' layer into Japan's usual economic and social development tracks. To 
understand the post-Cold War Japan's security orientation, the three case studies are 
chosen to capture the process of the identity transformation throughout the past decade, 
NNhich is believed to be responsible for such security policy transformation. In the 
follo\\ ing section, the transformation of both the 'international -role' identities I 
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collectively adopted by the international community and projected by Japan in light of 
the expectations of others and the 'domestic-type' identities collectively adopted during 
the Gulf Crisis, the Cambodian Peace Process and the promotion of human security 
policy will be surnmarised and discussed. 
7.3 From the Gulf Crisis to Human Security: From Clashes to Conformity 
One of the primary objectives of this research is to reveal the process of Japan's 
ideational and identity transformation, which has taken more than a decade to complete, 
from the Gulf Crisis in the early 1990s to the promotion of human security policy in the 
I late 1990s. As shown in Table 7.1, the three cases represent the whole process of Japan, s 
ideational and identity transformation in the past decade. The recursive process of 
identity transformation, believed to have a direct influence on foreign policy preference, 
started to reveal itself during the Gulf Crisis when Japan engaged itself in the process of 
social interactions with others and was exposed to the ideas being shared by the 
international community. 
Theoretically speaking, with such extensive interactions at the international level, 
Japan would inevitably have to project its international -role identity in accordance with 
others as a 'multilateral pacificist', 'peace enforcer' and 'US-partner' in dealing with the 
critical military operations during the crisis. Although Japan recognised the collective 
ideas embedded among the international community at the time and attempted to project 
its 'international -role' identity accordingly, the key problem that resulted in the 
passiveness and the failure of Japan's foreign policy in the Gulf Crisis lay in the 
incompatibility between the 'international-role' identities and the 'domestic-type' 
identitv embraced xvithin Japan itself During the Gulf Crisis, Japan's 'domestic-type I 
identities xvcrc the products of the process of identity formation during the post-\\ar 
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period. It is a known fact that Japan strictly adhered to the so-called 'unilateral pacifist' 
identity, the 'traditional peacebuilder/developer' and the faithful 'US follower. ' The 
clash between the two sets of identities or the low degree of conformity between the two 
was an alternative explanation for why Japan was uncharacteristically reluctant to 
actively contribute to the Gulf Crisis. 
The Cambodian peace process reveals the stage at which the process of 
transformation gradually took place. The low degree of conformity between the 
'international-role' identity and the 'domestic-type' identity during the Gulf Crisis 
shows that social interactions at the system level do not necessarily result in a collective 
identity, as normally predicted by Wendt's original Constructivism. On the contrary, 
such discrepancy between two sets of identities often brings about a process in which 
signals from interactions at the international level are sent back to the domestic level. 
Within the domestic arena, the reorientation of the system of ideas, beliefs, knowledge 
and experiences, partly collected from interactions at the international level and partly 
embedded within the society, will take place and usually result in a new or transformed 
identity. This transformed identity will then be signalled to the international community 
through social interactions. This recursive process of identity transformation will usually 
involve a process of signals being sent back and forth within the domestic level and to 
the international level. 
The Cambodian peace process was therefore the period when Japan started to 
reorient its system of ideas and beliefs on how international peace and security should be 
pursued through the tangible promotion and contribution towards peace and security, 
and not only, through limiting itself to a self-military constraint version of one-sided 
peace promotion. During the Cambodian peace process, the international community 
collectively embraced the 'international-role' identities of 'political arbitrator' and full- 
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scale 'peace promoter' and Japan was also expected by the US to be a 'US suPporter. ' 
Japan's 'domestic-type' identities during the peace process had also undergone a process 
of reorientation into a higher degree of conformity with the international community as a 
'political facilitator', 'peace supporter' and 'US supporter'. Although the degree of 
conformity between the two sets of identities was relative higher than that during the 
Gulf Crisis, this does not suggest that the process of identity transformation had been 
completed. Instead, the signals sent by Japan about its preferred 'international-role' 
identity during the Cambodian peace process were to inform the international 
community of Japan's ideational position and its policy preferences to facilitate and 
support the peace process and not to plunge itself into full-scale political involvement or 
full-fledged peace operations. The feedback gathered from social interactions at the 
system level was simultaneously signalled back to the domestic level for further possible 
ideational adjustments and identity transformation. 
Following the Cambodian peace process, the promotion of human security policy 
is examined in this research to demonstrate the completion of the recursive identity 
transformation process. The positive response from the international community to 
Japan's policy endeavours to help facilitate the peace process through the adoption of 
the identities of 'political facilitator', 'peace supporter' and 'US supporter' also helped 
to confirm the direction of the identity transformation and the policy execution in the 
area of peace and security during the post-Cold War period. The promotion of human 
security is considered the most assertive policy initiation in the area of international 
peace and security. It is, in a way, the result of a decade of ideational reorientation and 
identity transformation through the exchange of ideational interactions at the system 
w 
level and the reorientation of the system of ideas and beliefs v\ ithin the society. The 
philosophical approach and system of ideas and beliefs behind the human security policy 
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are certainly less at odds with the rest of the international community, while at the same 
time, still holding the fundamental ground of Japan's pacifist approach to peace and 
security. 
The human security policy could also be considered as a policy example 
resulting from the development of genuine ideational transformation in the area of peace 
and security from the 'narrowly-defined' approach to a 'well-rounded' international 
security approach that addresses both immediate aspects of in-crisis humanitarian 
assistance and long-term humanitarian development. As a result of the transformation of 
the system of ideas and beliefs, the transformed identity is the end product, demonstrated 
through the continuous and recursive process of social interactions at both the 
international and the domestic level. Compared to the previous two cases, the promotion 
of human security policy also demonstrates a higher degree of conformity between the 
'international role' identities projected internationally and the 'domestic-type' identities 
adopted internally. While the international community also transformed its own ideas, 
beliefs and identity into that of so-called comprehensive security promoter and 
humanitarian peace intervener, and the US also expected Japan to be its US security 
partner, Japan was also more comfortable following the international community by 
adopting the similar identities of comprehensive security promoter, development peace 
promoter and 'US partner'. Although the degree of conformity was not a hundred 
percent exact, it was relatively higher than it had been during the Gulf Crisis and 
therefore resulted in a very active and successful policy implementation. In the 
folloNving three sub-sections, the case studies will be discussed in more detail. 
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7.3.1 The Gulf Crisis: A Complete Clash of Identities 
Japan's reluctance to contribute to the Gulf Crisis and its failure to implement a 
successful and assertive policy during the Gulf War was due largely to the complete 
clash between the collective ideas and beliefs embraced by the international community 
and those embedded within Japan. Throughout the Gulf War, the shared ideas and 
beliefs among the international community in the area of international peace and 
security were fundamentally transformed and eventually contributed to the formation of 
the new identity as the 'multilateral pacificist. ' This collective identity was based on the 
shared ideas and understanding that the post-Cold War threat was largely characterised 
by new threats, which became more 'vertical', 'intra' and 'caused from above. ' The 
impacts of such threats were also not confined only to limited geographical areas, as 
they had been during the Cold War, but created 'horizontal' impacts across borders. To 
maintain international peace and security in an era when such disorder was not limited 
only to a few states but affected the whole international community, the collective 
identity emerging from such shared knowledge and ideas was, therefore, transformed 
into the so-called 'multilateral pacificist' identity. 
The collective identity or the 'international-role identity' as the 'multilateral 
pacificist' assumed by the members of the international community suggested firstly a 
renewed understanding that the main task to restore and maintain international peace and 
security was through 'multilateral' effort, especially through the UN mechanism, rather 
than 'unilateral' military manoeuvres by any single country. The assumption behind the 
formation of the 'multilateral pacificist' identity urged the international community to 
recognise the importance of strengthening the efficiency of the UN through the 
involvernent of both tangible inputs and ideational contributions from the international 
cornmunitv. In addition. another important development of the ideational position of the 
ýmultilateral pacificist' embraced by the international community was the systematic 
layout of how to achieve peace through both short- and long-term programmes. 
The clear intention of the international community in collectively fulfilling the 
identity of the 'multilateral pacificist' was evident in both the quantitative and the 
qualitative volume of activities. In terms of tangible contributions, the UNSC resolutions 
trebled in the early 1990s compared to the Cold War period. The numbers of countries 
contributing to the UN military and police forces also doubled. Among others, the 
annual budget on PKOs was 6 times higher in 1992 compared to donations by member 
countries in 1988. In terms of ideational input, while 'An Agenda for Peace' 
fundamentally dealt with the problems encountered by the UNSC because of the Cold- 
War security remnants, such as the problems regarding the effectiveness of preventive 
diplomacy, peacemaking or peacekeeping, the elaboration of 'An Agenda for 
Development' in 1994, for example, suggested the start of a dual approach to the 
maintenance of peace and security, which involved multilateral efforts from the whole 
community. 
On the contrary, Japan's attempt to share the ideas embraced by the international 
community and to project its 'international-role' identity as the 'multilateral pacificist5 
was far more reluctant, to the point of failure. Japan's response to the Gulf Crisis was 
widely known among the international community as untimely and inadequate, and was 
commonly criticised as 'too little, too late, ' despite its generous financial contribution of 
more than $13 billion. It is argued in this research that Japan's reluctance was partly 
because its ideational position towards international peace and security was still fixated 
on the post-x\ýar belief that overall international peace could be simply maintained if 
Japan renounced Nvar and restrained itself from any military activities. Japan's post-\%ar 
adoption of the 'domestic-type' identity as the 'unilateral pacifist' was based on the 
fundamental beliefs and ideas rooted in its historical experience of war calamity and 
losses during WWII. From then on, Japan's post-war state had developed its own unique 
political identity: a domestic-type identity that placed all security concerns on the Japan- 
US alliance and all faith in the international community's love for freedom and devotion 
to peace. The core idea behind Japan's adoption of the 'unilateral pacifist' identity was 
that Japan's survival and sustainable international peace could be attained only if it 
strictly adhered to the 'no-war' clause in the Peace Constitution. In other words, it ývas 
the conviction that Japan could contribute to the maintenance of international peace and 
security by means of not becoming a military power, limiting its potential to invade 
others and pursuing a policy that hoped to discourage military build-ups in other 
countries. The clash between the 'international-role' identity as the 'multilateral 
pacificist' collectively adopted by the international community and Japan's 'type- 
identity' as the 'unilateral pacifist' was certainly one of the factors that contributed to 
the passive and reluctant response of the Japanese government. 
Another set of identity clashes between the international community and Japan 
during the Gulf Crisis was in the area of peace operations. During the Gulf Crisis, the 
ideational position of the international community in dealing with international security 
was firmly placed upon the UN mechanism and belief in the effectiveness of the UN as a 
messenger for peace. Accordingly, the international community's ideas and beliefs on 
the way in which the UN peace operations should function to ensure international peace 
and security were largely transformed after the success of the multinational force in the 
Gulf Crisis. After the Gulf Crisis, with the overwhelming success of the multilateral 
forces in the Gulf and the subsequent peacekeeping operations, the international 
commUnity started to recognise the effectiveness of the UN mechanism and embrace the 
identity of 'peace enforcer' instead of only stressing the area of preventive diplomacý. 
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This assumption of the identity of 'peace enforcer' implies the changing emphasis of the 
UN peace operations towards legitimising the use of force to respond to both imminent 
and actual aggression as well as to force conflicting parties to comply with cease-fire 
agreements and so on. The international community's adoption of the identity of peace 
enforcer also reflected its shared ideas and beliefs that peace enforcement is an integral 
part of any peacekeeping operations and the combination of the two activities must be 
seamless and coherent in order to respond to the flexibility of security demands, 
specifically in activities involving the military, the police and civilian personnel. 
During the Gulf Crisis, although Japan was well aware of the increasing 
importance and success of strengthening the UN via an effective response to security 
matters by the use of force, it was still very hesitant to Part ways with its long- 
established identity as a 'traditional peacebuilder/developer' that would involve itself in 
the UN operations only in the later stages of development and nation-bu iI ding. 
Alongside the adoption of the 'unilateral pacifist' identity, the adoption of the 
'traditional peacebuilder/developer' identity was based on the idea that international 
security went hand-in-hand with prosperity. Accordingly, Japan's general foreign policy 
during this period, and the UN policy in particular, was led towards closer cooperation 
with democratic countries to promote joint prosperity around the world. In other words, 
when it comes to Japan's post-war insight into the maintenance of international peace 
and security, the fundamental element underlying sustainable peace was believed to be 
prosperity, possibly through development rather than any other means, such as military 
manoeuvres or other UN enforcement measures. It was therefore clearer to Japan that 
international Peace and security could be achieved through the promotion of 
development and the strengthening of peacebuilding processes through financial I 
contributions, which would facilitate the level of economic development in war-torn 
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countries. The clash between the international community's ideational emphasis on the 
use of force and the strengthening of the UN mechanism in the area of peacemakiiig and 
peace enforcing was thus apparent when Japan's domestic-type identity was still based 
on the ideas of prosperity or economic-based security rather than the use of force. 
The final set of identity clashes during the Gulf Crisis involved the expected 
'international-role' identity posed within the framework of Japan-US bilateral relations. 
In the Cold War period, wars against communism, waged mostly unilaterally by the US 
government, were numerous throughout several parts of the world, from Southeast Asia 
to Latin America, not to mention 'proxy wars' supported behind the scenes by both the 
US and the former Soviet Union's government. These ideological differences and 
military conflicts were the main political events characterising international politics 
during the Cold War period. The US's ideas on the rationale of unilateral attempts in 
military operations during the Cold War period were also somewhat transformed during 
the Gulf Crisis. 
Apart from the nature of the Gulf War itself, which was in essence interest-based 
and not ideological and was the first time in 40 years, since the end of WWII, when 
international conflict had arisen in the form of a territorial merger, the US also shared 
similar ideas with the international community on collaborative efforts to restore peace 
and to maintain international security. This sentiment was seen through the US's attempt 
to pursue military actions through the UN mechanism, which had standardised the 
maintenance of peace and security processes in the Cold War period. Furthermore, the 
most vital ideational transformation was not only that the US placed formal emphasis on 
the UN mechanism; it also expressed its belief that the international community, 
including Japan, was an indispensable 'US partner' in the N\ars against rogue states. 
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As for Japan, the Japan-US bilateral alliance had contributed to the formation of 
the Japanese post-war political identity in a crucial way. As the post-war aim of both 
allies was to establish a peace-loving nation that placed its security concern on the 
Japan-US security arrangements, Japan thus had developed its unique identity as a 
4unilateral pacifist' and a 'US-follower' that basically conducted its foreign policy under 
this 'leader-fo I lower' pattern. During the Gulf Crisis, having fixed its own identity as a 
loyal US follower and ally, Japan behaved accordingly against domestic opposition by 
contributing a huge amount of financial support to the multinational force and by 
despatching minesweeping troops overseas as part of the alliance obligations. 
These gestures were acted out according to the expectation of the US that Japan 
should behave as a 'US partner' to help the US in its attempt to establish a 'New World 
Order. ' Despite the above tangible financial and personnel contributions, what was 
lacking in these attempts was that Japan did not embrace the collective ideas regarding 
the extent to which international peace and security should be pursued via multilateral 
efforts and that peace operations sometimes included the possibility of being enforced 
by military means. Among others, Japan was still apparently reluctant to transform itself 
into a true US partner and was still satisfied with its function as a secondary power. This 
simply signified that Japan's ideational position regarding international peace and 
security during the Gulf Crisis was still out of touch with the rest of the international 
community and was somewhat underdeveloped and narrowly defined. The process of 
ideational and identity transformation was not present until the start of the Cambodian 
peace process. 
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7.3.2 The Cambodian Peace Process: The On-going Transformation 
The Cambodian peace process could be considered as the first of a new kind of 
conflict resolution undertaken by the UN and the international community, which 
addressed a whole new set of intractable intra-state political dissentions and grass-roots 
social and economic problems. Compared to the Gulf Crisis, when the idea dominating 
the international community was that threats to international peace and security 
sometimes originated from traditional aggressors who aimed at shaking the well- 
established international order, the Cambodian conflict was an intractable intra-state 
conflict that also disturbed the balance of regional and international peace and security. 
In a way, the Cambodian conflict was one of many post-Cold War threats that were 
more vertical, in that the population was socially and economically threatened by its 
own government. 
Both the Gulf Crisis and the Cambodian conflict, however, shared the same 
magnitude of impact, which was immensely horizontal, including a flood of war 
casualties to neighbouring countries and the collapse of the whole social system. 
Nevertheless, the Cambodian peace process was significant not only because it was 
perhaps the last war in which the root cause involved the remnants of the ideological 
divergence of the Cold War, but also because it required involvement on an 
unprecedented scale to sort out the multi-dimensional problems and tasks that were 
necessary to restore peace and maintain international security. This understanding of the 
conflict situation and the ideas and beliefs being transformed since the Gulf Crisis thus 
led the international community to assume the identity of 'political arbitrator. ' This 
transformed identity was literally based on the understanding that such a complex and 
w'ide-scale political scenario, deriving from the aftermath of long-standing internal 
struL, gles, cannot be unravelled by itself, and on the idea that the enhancement of 
338 
international mechanisms to help disentangle intra-state conflicts and help provide more 
systematic national rehabilitation schemes was indispensable. 
Japan's idea surrounding international peace and security during the Cambodian 
peace process was basically a product of its social encounters and the exchange of ideas 
and experiences with the international community during the Gulf Crisis. Although 
Japan's ideas and beliefs regarding international peace and security did not take a sharp 
U-turn to conform to the views of others, the nation began to adjust its 'domestic-type' 
identity to a more acceptable and assertive style as a 'political facilitator' during the 
Cambodian Peace Process. Japan might not have portrayed itself as a political arbitrator 
like the other major powers, due to its political immaturity and late-coming status in 
international security affairs, but it nonetheless outran other countries in projecting itself 
as a political facilitator and undertook several political functions to assist the smooth 
political manoeuvres of other major powers. During the peace process, Japan positioned 
itself as a facilitator that helped to cultivate special relationships between all factions 
through both formal and informal talks and negotiations. Japan's political efforts also 
included attempts to smooth out the difference of interests between key factions through 
both informal talks and official proposals, which could not be effectively pursued by the 
major powers themselves. 
The ideas and beliefs regarding the UN peace operations among the international 
community during the Cambodian peace process also transformed into another forward 
step. Unlike the Gulf Crisis, which could be categorised as an inter-state conflict and 
required the international community to emphasise the enforcement function of peace 
operations, the Cambodian case was literally a civil war or an intra-state conflict, like 
tile maýjority of the post-Cold War conflicts, and reqUired different sorts of peace 
operations. Such international conflicts compelled the UN and the international 
139 
community to cope with wider aspects of peace transition and restoration, including 
post-conflict political, social and economic rehabilitation. While the UN and the 
international community were expected to fulfil the identity of peace enforcer during the 
Gulf Crisis, the portrayal of the international community as a promoter of peace or the 
UN as an agent of democratic transition, which undertook more complex and multi- 
dimensional UN peace operations, was further developed during the Cambodian peace 
process. 
As the international community adopted the identity of peace promoter, the first 
element of peace operations, or the peacemaking effort, was closely and efficiently 
pursued by several parties as part of the adoption of the 'political arbitrator' identity. 
During the Cambodian peace process, good offices and diplomatic activities were 
conducted in dual tracks, both at formal and informal levels, and especially through late 
diplomatic prevention by means of intense diplomatic and negotiating activities. 
Peacekeeping operations also addressed the multi -d imens ional aspects, which included 
such functions as confidence-building measures, power-sharing agreements, electoral 
support, strengthening the rule of law and so on. Peacebuilding operations also became 
relatively more complex, requiring external efforts and integrated action in many facets 
to assist countries in transition, ranging from military to diplomatic, political, economic, 
social and humanitarian efforts. The identity of 'peace promoter' thus signified the idea 
adopted among the international community, which emphasised more coherent peace 
operations with systematic and overlapping stages of peacemaking, peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding. 
While the international community had launched a full-scale peace operation 
cornmensurate to its collectively adopted identity as the 'peace promoter', Japan was 
rather cautious in pursuing full-fledged UN peace operations due to its restricted 
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domestic political conditions. Compared to Japan's ideational position regarding UN 
peace operations during the Cambodian peace process, its understanding of effective UN 
operations during the Gulf Crisis was relatively one-dimensional and focused only on 
the impact of financial intakes in sustaining international peace and security. 
The Cambodian peace process, however, clearly demonstrated Japan's shift of 
understanding, ideas and attitudes regarding the way in which UN peace operations 
should be handled and directed. Japan's transformed 'domestic-type' identity as the 
4peace supporter' was reflected through its undertaking of several core functions at 
almost every step of the peace operations, from peacemaking to peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding. It also supported multiple contributions, ranging from personnel to 
financial and ideational inputs, via various channels, ranging from Japanese diplomats 
involved in late-preventive diplomacy and peacemaking operations to SDF personnel 
who took charge of various stages of peacekeeping operations. In addition, the most 
significant aspect of Japan's contribution to the Cambodian peace process was still the 
peacebuilding stage of UN peace operations. Japan's 'domestic-type' identity as the 
4peace supporter', although it reflected the nation's preference for contributing in all 
aspects of peace operations, still emphasised post-conflict peacebuilding operations. In 
contrast to Japan's reluctance in the Gulf Crisis, its dedication to the peacebuilding 
process in Cambodia did not furnish the international community with the image of a 
cash dispenser. Rather, it was evident to the international community that Japan would 
w, ant to portray itself as a prime mover in helping Cambodia to restore peace and 
reconstruct its country. 
Regarding the Japan-US bilateral relationship during the Cambodian peace 
process, the US was rather a latecomer in the process of arbitrating the conflicts among 
the four factions compared to other major countries. How-ever, through the venue of the 
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UNSC, the US had played a major role, alongside other major powers, in outlining the 
contents of the political settlements of the Paris Agreements. Regarding the ideational 
position of the US and its expectation of Japan's projection of its 'international -role' 
identity during the Cambodian peace process, the US was very keen to ensure the basic 
rights of self-determination among the Cambodian people and the enhancement of the 
UN mechanism in conflict resolution. The ideas and beliefs embedded by the US were 
literally in tune with the international community, especially on the collective stance 
taken regarding the guidelines for political settlement via the UNSC and other P-5 
members. It was natural, as a close ally, that the US would expect Japan to share the 
same sets of ideas and beliefs regarding the way in which the political settlement and 
UN operations should be conducted. Japan's projected 'international-role' identity as the 
'US supporter' was certainly expected. Japan made several diplomatic efforts to smooth 
out the differences in how to handle the conditions set by the guidelines of the political 
settlements, such as the issue of arms reduction or the UNTAC's control of all factions, 
demonstrating that Japan had embraced the ideas shared by the US and the international 
community. 
During the Cambodian peace process, it was easy to observe Japan's success in 
transforming its 'domestic-type' identity from that of 'US-follower' to 'US-supporter'. 
The significant element that could differentiate Japan's status from 'follower' to a 
decent 'supporter' was that the country did not have to be ordered to make political or 
ideational contributions, as had been the case during the Gulf Crisis. During the 
Cambodian peace process, Japan's adopted 'domestic-type' identity as 'US-supporter' 
conformed closely to the projected 'international -role' identity shared by others in the 
international community. The policy executed during the Cambodian peace process, 
which w-as the result of the identity transformation to active 'US-supporter'. could be 
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seen through several diplomatic attempts and full-scale personnel and financial 
contributions to substantiate the collective ideas mentioned in the guidelines of the Paris 
Peace Agreements, such as the right to national self-determination, the enhancement of 
the UN mechanism via the administration of UNTAC and the strengthening of peace 
based on western democracy. The above general ideational guidelines aside, Japan also 
contributed tremendously as a 'US-supporter', especially in filling the void at the 
negotiating table between the US and some of the other factions. The harmony between 
Japan's projected 'international-role' identity and its 'domestic-type' identity during the 
Cambodian peace process gradually resurrected Japan from its policy failure in the Gulf 
Crisis and could be considered as an ongoing process of ideational and identity 
transformation in Japan's security within the framework of the UN. 
7.3.3 The Human Security Policy: The Conformity of Identities 
Although Japan's assertive promotion of human security policy in the UN could 
well be observed on its own, it is treated in this research as the culmination of a decade- 
long process of identity transformation. While the clash between the identities 
collectively developed and embraced by the international community and Japan's 
attempt to cling to its post-war identities was one of the significant factors explaining its 
reluctance and passive policy endeavours during the Gulf Crisis, the conformity between 
Japan's 'international -ro I e' and 'domestic-type' identities is relatively higher and 
has led 
towards its assertive promotion of the new approach to the maintenance of peace and 
securitv via human security policy. 
In the latter half of the 1990s and after the successful experience of the 
international community in the Cambodian peace process and some painful experiences 
in the Balkans and in African countries, a shift of ideas among the international Zý I 
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community towards a new 'people-centred' security system became the keenest 
ideational position on the maintenance of peace and security. For one thing, the 
international community was in accord on the notion that although the threat of inter- 
state war has not completely vanished, the most acute and prevalent threats nowadays 
lies in internal political eruptions and structural or grass-roots social and economic 
vulnerability within countries. In other words, the transformation of post-Cold War ideas 
regarding international peace and security is a result of the increasingly complicated 
threats and shifting focus from 'state security' to 'people's security. ' 
This transformation has surely impinged on the ways in which the international 
community - especially the UN, as the main player - would choose to deal with these 
interwoven threats and to enhance people's well-being, dignity and creativity. The 
shifting ideas surrounding international peace and security in the latter half of the 1990s 
have led the international community to collectively develop and transform its identity 
from that of 'multilateral pacificist' and 'political arbitrator' into a so-called 
6comprehensive security promoter' who addresses the importance of an all-round 
approach that provides both protective and empowering functions for countries in 
conflict. Precisely speaking, the protective function offers a way to handle problems 
regarding casualties of war, the victimisation of citizens or displaced persons from both 
inter- and intra-state conflicts. On the other hand, the empowering function of human 
security introduces a long-term focus on development and addresses the importance of 
the optimistic qualities of human development, especially the expansion of people's 
choices and equal access to public goods and to a secure and stabilised community. 
Japan in the latter half of the 1990s has also developed its fundamental ideas on 
peace and security in relative harmony \\,, ith the international community. Since the end 
of WW11, Japan's national and international security concern had long been 
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dichotomised, with the former being placed on Japan-US security arrangements while 
the latter was rhetorically and principally placed on the UN. With the inefficiency of the 
UN during the Cold War period and Japan's idealist position on how international peace 
could be achieved through mere good faith and the one-country pacifist belief, the 
nation's post-war security concern was therefore weighted more towards national 
security and the areas surrounding Japan, rather than towards attempts to pour its 
physical and ideational resources into securing international peace. This set of ideas has 
been transformed throughout the past decade, as a result of Japan's interactions with the 
international community during the Gulf Crisis and its direct experiences in the 
Cambodian peace process as well as in subseqUent UN peace operations. 
In the latter half of the 1990s, Japan also internally embraced the shared ideas 
among the international community regarding the 'people-centred' security system and 
the increasing understanding of the interconnectedness of national and international 
security. This reduced dichotomy between national and international security is 
significant, as it clearly shows the changing priority within Japan's security policy and a 
more coherent link between Japan's security and the UN policy in maintaining 
international Peace and security. Japan's identity transformation into the role of 
'comprehensive security promoter' is clearly reflected through its assertive promotion of 
the human security policy, with its aim to improve the international security 
environment and also to limit the possibility of any threats reaching Japan from areas 
beyond the region. Via the integration of human security into the core criteria of ODA 
and other development aid. these attempts clearly suggests that the link between Japan's 
national and international security has become institutional ised and systematically 
rationalised via the earnest promotion of human security and Japan's increasing 
involvernent with the UN's security activities. 
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As a result of the transformation of ideas on international peace and security 
among the international community and its experiences in the UN peace operations 
during the Cambodian peace process, UN peace operations have entered a phase of 
multi-layered missions, which require an overlapping combination from the complete set 
of late-preventive diplomacy, a new prototype of peacekeeping operations and post- 
conflict national reconstruction. In the latter half of the 1990s, the increasing numbers of 
internal conflicts and the support for ideas regarding 'people-centred' security among 
the international community paved the way towards another transformed idea regarding 
UN peace operations. As the threats confronting the international community nowadays 
tend to be internal and rarely involve self-defence, the focus of UN peace operations 
thus has to be adapted to address the problem of internal structural collapses and human 
victimisation. 
The idea has led the international community to largely agree to assume the 
identity of 'humanitarian peace intervener', which is based on the idea that in the event 
of high-volume genocide and major victimisation due to a state's structural failures, the 
principle of non-intervention must yield to the international responsibility to protect, 
even via military means. By assuming the identity of humanitarian peace intervener, the 
UN's peace operations have become integral in balancing and maintaining the traditional 
rights of the international community to protect people from victimisation within those 
states. The collective ideas and the 'international-role' identity embraced among the 
international community thus help to advance the systematic combination of conflict 
prevention and the pretext of military intervention (peacemaking), peace settlements, 
including quasi-enforcement measures and humanitarian actions (peacekeeping and 
peace enforcing) and development assistance (post-conflict peacebuilding) into the same 
integrated process. I- 
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Although Japan shares relatively similar accounts on the current approach to 
international peace and security and the way in which it should effectively be maintained, 
it has a slightly different view on the principles underlying the right of the international 
community to intervene or the responsibility to protect. Although it simultaneously 
addresses how to increase human freedom and fulfilment by way of protecting people 
from severe and widespread calamities, Japan's human security approach, which has 
been proposed alongside the Canadian version, highlights the empowering function of 
human security. Japan's adoption of the 'domestic-type' identity of the 'development 
peace promoter' is founded on the belief that people and their communities should be 
reinforced with the freedom of faith, dignity and fulfilment in order to make better 
choices for themselves and stay clear from violence. When these ideas and beliefs are 
translated into actual UN peace operations, Japan's human security promotion therefore 
very much emphasises the creation of a seamless link between short-term humanitarian 
assistance and long-term humanitarian development. 
In a way, Japan's human security signifies a more coherent security and 
development policy in relation to its international security concern via the integration of 
security aspects into the new UN-Centrism. Therefore, its new UN-Centrism, centred 
around the emphasis on the empowering function and on bridging the gap between 
humanitarian assistance and long-term development, is literally an attempt to create a 
well-rounded approach that connects security functions to development programmes and 
vice versa. This includes the broadening of the focus on preventing violent conflict (in 
order to establish peace) and eradicating deprivation (in order to maintain balance and 
constitute long-term development) simultaneously. This could be considered a crucial 
motive in translating the idealist perspective of how international peace and security 
should be pursued by the international community. 
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On Japan-US bilateral relations during the promotion of human security, the US 
ideational position towards the common security concern in the post-Cold War period 
has been relatively in tune with the rest of the international community, specifically in 
terms of the format of threats, which are primary internal. However, the newly emerging 
human security approach has somewhat limited influence on the US policy agenda 
compared to other major countries, especially Japan. Despite the US's lack of official 
policy rhetoric supporting the promotion of the human security approach, it has not 
undermined Japan's attempt to promote human security through the Commission on 
human security via the UN. Furthermore, the US is also convinced of the principles 
behind the concept of human security itself, as evident in its emphasis on the promotion 
of fundamental freedom and the so-called demands of human dignity, and the assurance 
of other aspects of security being shared by the international community. 
In fact, the US's expectation on Japan and the rest of the international 
community has been relatively consistent, as in other areas of maintaining international 
peace and security since the end of the Cold War: that is, to be US Partners. The human 
security approach has been considered as ideational and policy compatible, helping to 
substantiate the US's assertiveness on sustainable development, as it is fairly clear that 
the aspects of freedom from fear and the responsibility to protect are consistent with the 
US's eagerness to apply the right to intervene in areas where it is considered 
strategically at risk. The aspect of freedom from want or the empowerment function, 
embraced and consistently developed by the international community, is also fairly 
similar to the US's promotion of sustainable development. In other words, equality of 
opportunity and a life of dignity can only be achieved through development, ývhich, in 
the US's view', must be sustainable. 
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Japan's transformation of the 'domestic-type' identity regarding Japan-US 
relations in the area of the maintenance of international peace and security from one of 
'US-follower' to 'US-partner' has happened since the Cambodian peace process. 
Irrespective of the US's imprecise response to the human security approach within the 
UN, the collective ideas regarding the increasingly complex security environment and 
the way in which UN peace operations should be handled to ensure sustainable peace 
and security between Japan and the US are practically mutual. Unlike the Cambodian 
peace process, where assuming the identity of 'US partner' meant sharing ideas and 
projecting its policy to accommodate the political guidelines set by the US and other P-5 
members and to fill the political void at the negotiating table between the major powers 
and the Khmer factions, Japan's adoption of the identity of 'US partner' in the latter half 
of the 1990s in the promotion of human security suggests its tangible contributions in 
terms of both ideational and physical inputs in security matters. Japan's commitment to 
fight against the domineering governments alongside the US has been rather extensive, 
as evident in Japan's participation in the Afghanistan conflict and the second Iraq War. 
In the area of UN peace operations, apart from trivial configurations of UN 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, such as the institutional isation of civilian 
policy or the focus on structural reconstruction in the post-conflict peacebuilding process, 
both countries also share the same conviction about the need for a seamless approach to 
UN peace operations that addresses the missing link between short-term humanitarian 
intervention/assi stance and long-term humanitarian development. The most significant 
shared idea between the two allies regarding UN peace operations perhaps relates to the 
vie\\,, that the linear progression from one stage of peace activities to another should be 
eradicated, N\, -ith the creation of more organised and overlapping peace operations. from 
the early stage of peacemaking to post-conflict peacebuilding. In short, these sets of I Z: ) 
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identity transformation happening throughout the past decade clearly demonstrate the 
different levels of conformity between the 'international-role' identity shared by the 
international community and the 'domestic-type' identity adopted by Japan. It is evident 
that during the promotion of human security policy, the higher degree of conformity led 
to a more active policy projection, compared to the lesser degree of conformity during 
the Gulf Crisis. 
7.4 Final Conclusion 
This research's original contribution is the attempt to establish an analytical tool 
that captures the understanding of how security policy choices are determined by such 
cultural factors as 'identity', by addressing both theoretical and substantive questions 
about the security dimension of Japan's UN policy and how it could be approached 
through an alternative form of Wendt's Constructivism and the process of identity 
transformation. As a means of analysing foreign and security policy preferences, 
'identity transformation' as the key analytical too] suggests, in contrast to the existing 
traditional mainstream IR theories, that non-material or social factors are also 
appropriate tools with which to examine the issues of 'high politics, ' such as security 
policy. Traditionally, the preference of security policy is argued to be largely determined 
by material factors such as power relations among states, while the process by which 
non-material factors such as identity affect the outcome of security policy choices is 
often taken for granted. This research demonstrates that identity transformation or the 
process of changing sets of ideas and beliefs with which states' political identities are 
identified at a particular time contributes much to the preference and direction of states' 
security orientation. 
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Taking identity as the central analytical tool, this research strongly argues that 
'political identity' is neither static nor pre-given, but constructed. The process of its 
transformation, resulting from series of social interactions and the exchange of ideas and 
beliefs among key actors within states, reflects the change of self-understanding about 
who they are, which will define what they do and will finally bring about changes in 
security policy preferences. Unlike other cultural factors such as norms or culture, which 
are usually adopted as means of analysing foreign and security policy in the 
Constructivist literature, this research is convinced that norms and identities should not 
be coined interchangeably or treated as identical in signifying the same analytical goals 
or processes. It is suggested in this research that the two analytical tools differ 
significantly in their sets of research objectives, analytical questions, explanatory 
focuses and expected results. 
The studies of norms may contribute to the understanding about how behaviours 
and practices are institutional ised into collective forms and offer clues about the impact 
of norms on the continuity and change of inter-state normative structures. However, it is 
still questionable whether the reverse process of studying institutional ised norms (what 
we repeatedly do) could explain the reasons behind the sets of ideas and beliefs 
constituting 'the self or identity' of actors or agents (who we really are). In contrast, the 
examination of the sets of ideas and beliefs that inform the dominant political identities 
(who we really are) and the observation on the transformation of these sets of political 
identities provides a clearer explanation of how and why certain sets of actions and 
social practices (what we repeatedly do) are formed and translated into foreign and 
security policy patterns and preferences. In SUM, to Understand the underlying causes 
and processes that determine foreign or security policy choices, 'identitv' is perhaps 
more suitable as the key examining tool. 
351 
Adopting identity as the analytical tool to examine foreign and security policy 
preferences is not the only important contribution of this research. Unlike other Wendt's 
Constructivists, who often examine the process by which states' security choices are 
determined by series of interactions among states at the system level, this research 
emphasises the process by which the dual track of identity transformation at both the 
domestic and the international level is fashioned recursively and determines security 
policy preferences. This also leads to another point, strongly argued in this research, that 
the incorporation of a state's 'domestic-type identity' into the analytical process along 
with the examination of its international-role identity is indispensable. As captured in 
Diagram 2.2, the 'recursive' model of identity transformation developed in this research 
shows not only that the process of the transformation is lengthy, but also that it is 
complex. It is the process that allows certain sets of ideas and beliefs with which a 
dominant political identity is identified, to be constantly exchanged and constructed as 
much at the domestic level as at the international level. 
The findings show that there are times when states do not project their 
'international-role' identities in accordance with the 'domestic-type' identities 
embedded within the domestic level. There are also times when these two sets of 
identities clash, resulting in reluctant or passive security policy pursuits, as was the case 
with Japan during the Gulf Crisis. Thus, concerns about the pitfalls of pursuing Wendt's 
Constructivism, with its treatment of the domestic-type identity as static and 
exogenously given and the process of the interactions at the system level being treated as 
linear by most constructivists, are underscored in this research. It must be acknowledged 
that the sarne processes happen at the domestic level, with links between the recursive 
interacting patterns, and the sending back and forth of signals between the domestic and 
the international level should be equally emphasised. In other words. to better assess the 
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foreign or security policy decision-making process, it is important to take into account 
that security policy choices are often determined by the degree of conformity between 
the 'domestic-type' and the 'international-role' identities, as repeatedly mentioned in the 
preceding chapters. That is to say, an assertive security policy preference is essentially 
the result of a high degree of conformity between the 'domestic-type' and 'international- 
role' identities, whereas a lower degree of conformity between the two identities would 
inevitably bring about reluctant and passive security policy pursuits. 
In connection with the above two arguments, this research not only highlights the 
use of identity transformation as a means of analysing security policy preference and 
demonstrates the validity of applying cultural factors to the issue of high politics, which 
had previously been poles apart. It also attempts to bridge the gap between the levels of 
analysis in the study of foreign policy and security issues. In the absence of an approach 
that considers factors and processes that could be traced and assessed simultaneously at 
the system and domestic level, a distinct separation of foreign and security policy 
analysis, focusing on structural determinants and domestic politics, has characterised 
and separated most studies of foreign and security policy issues. 
To overcome such overly clear-cut theoretical classification, it is suggested in 
this research that a middle-ground approach should be introduced. Unlike previous 
applications of the Constructivist approach to Japan's foreign policy, which employ 
Wendt's model without any modification, this research significantly shows that the 
adaptation of Wendt's constructivism into a 'recursive' model improves the 
understanding of the foreign and security policy decision-making process. This is 
because the adapted 'recursive' model offers explanations about the origin of security 
preferences (the 'why' question), which are largely derived from repeated social 
interactions among key actors at the domestic level. The revised model also t- 
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demonstrates how such security choices are projected, communicated to, and transcend 
into collective choices of foreign and security posture through social interactions within 
the system environment (the 'how' question). Besides, the dual process of identity 
transformation essentially reveals how the separate levels of analysis could be linked 
through observation of recursive social interactions exchanged back and forth between 
the two levels, which also characterise the overall process of identity transformation. 
Aside from the theoretical contributions stated above, the application of 
Constructivism and identity transformation as the central approach in this research also 
makes a significant contribution to the changing standard interpretations of Japan's 
security and UN policy in several ways. By using the identity transformation approach 
to examine Japan's security policy orientation in the UN, this research offers unique 
arguments about the source of Japan's passiveness or activeness in international security 
policy pursuits. On the one hand, traditional interpretations usually point out that Japan's 
reactiveness or lack of enthusiasm in pursuing assertive foreign and security policy is 
due to its domestic and institutional constraints, such as constitutional restrictions or 
faction politics within key decision-making groups. On the other hand, Japan's 
occasional active political and security policy choices are typically tied with external 
pressure. 
This research, however, attempts to offer an alternative model, which 
systematically assesses Japan's decision-making process regarding security and the UN 
and also suggests different sets of explanations. It argues that the key to Japan's 
activeness or passiveness in pursuing a certain foreign or security policy is the level of 
conformity between the two sets of political identities. embraced domestically on the 
one hand and projected international ly on the other. Similar to the core theoretical 
assumptions about the identit,,,, transformation stated above, the political identities 
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transformed and embraced within the domestic level or 'domestic-type' identities are not 
necessarily always in tune with the 'international-role' identity projected at the 
international level. This seems to be the case with Japan, especially when key actors' 
understandings about certain sets of ideas and beliefs are poorly developed during social 
interactions with others at the system level. However, such interactions and exchanges 
of ideas and beliefs between Japan and the international community are two-way 
communications, whereby the transformation of ideas and beliefs that inform political 
identity takes place respectively at both the international and the domestic level. Hence, 
the dual observation on the identity transformation at both levels is an integral part in 
this research and in understanding the process of Japan's foreign and security policy 
decision-making. 
Empirically speaking, the process of social interaction between Japan and the 
international community at the system level throughout these past years, during such 
crucial events as the Gulf Crisis, the Cambodian peace process and its earnest promotion 
of human security, has occurred in tandem with social interactions and ideational 
exchanges within Japanese society itself These recursive processes of ideational 
transformation, passing back and forth, led Japan to pursue a more proactive and 
sustainable projection of UN security policy in the latter half of the 1990s. This research 
confirms that the preference for projecting a passive or an active foreign policy is not 
merely due to international pressures, the changing international structure or short-term 
domestic political negotiations and constraints. Rather, the key determinants are the 
long-term adjustment of political identities, both 'international-role' and 'domestic- 
type, ' via repeated exchanges of ideas and information at both levels. The level of 
conformity between the tx\,, o sets of ideational systems or the two different sets of 
identities is thus the crucial factor that shapes Japan's choice of active or passive foreign 
policy projection, from the Gulf Crisis to the promotion of human security policy. as 
pointed out several times in this research. 
In addition, this research also argues against the existing tradition, which often 
examines Japan's security from the perspective of Japan-US bilateral relations or 
security arrangements. This research demonstrates that the development of Japan's 
security policy could also be investigated under the framework of the UN. Over the past 
fifteen years, following the Gulf Crisis, Japan has developed its new security 
understanding under the framework of the UN along with a new revival of UN-Centrism. 
This research simultaneously examines the development of security understanding in the 
context of this new UN-Centrism, which was previously focused only on the areas of 
economic and social development. It is clearly suggested here that as a result of the 
continuous social and ideational interactions with the international community and the 
continuous adaptation of its system of ideas and beliefs domestically, Japan's 
understanding of national and international security has become less dichotomised. The 
dichotomy between national and international security and Japan's concern over its 
survival during the Cold War period contributed to the imbalance between Japan's 
policy towards Japan-US bilateral relations and the promotion of international security 
via the UN. This scenario has been transformed throughout the past decade due to the 
changing sets of ideas and beliefs of both the international community and the Japanese 
domestic actors towards a more integrated approach to security projection within the UN 
framework, as evident in the active promotion of human security. 
The examination of human security policy, in addition to the popular cases of the 
Gulf Crisis and the Cambodian peace process, provides further significant understandino Zý 
of the ftiture direction of both Japan's security policy and the riew UN-Centrism. This 
research is strongly convinced that human security is the policy manifestation of Japan's 
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new UN-Centrism, with a strong element of the security dimension. This particular 
dimension of Japan's security policy pursuit, which is different from the existing 
security arrangements with the US, will be developed towards an equal emphasis on 
physical security contributions via UNPKOs and Japan's existing humanitarian 
assistance and development to establish international peace and security. This 
transformation from an imbalance between physical security contributions and 
humanitarian development projects has materialised through changing sets of ideas and 
beliefs about people-centred security as the core mechanism to maintain international 
peace and security, which will simultaneously ensure Japan's national security. 
Furthermore, Japan's assertiveness in promoting human security via the UN 
framework is not the result of a simple process of securing consensus among domestic 
interest groups; nor is it merely because of pressure from external forces. Rather, it is 
clearly the outcome of a lengthy process of transforming sets of ideas and beliefs 
through repeated social interactions and exchanges at both the international and the 
domestic level, and is therefore treated in this research as the concluding result of a 
decade-long process of identity transformation. Also, as a policy which has not been 
systematically assessed before by other scholars, the examination on human security 
promotion under the context of Japan's UN security policy in this research is believed to 
have set out a preliminary work for further study. 
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